[en] Various aspects involved in the inspection of reactor and spent fuel storage facilities are discussed, including inventory verification, field measurements, sampling plans, verification of facility measurement systems, containment and surveillance, and iaea inspection and verification. Techniques, methods, and instrumentation presently employed in national systems and in IAEA inspection and verification are described. The type of information that these inspections provide and how this information is used to establish and verify facility inventory and to detect and deter diversion are considered

[en] In accordance with the United Nations Security Council Resolution 687 the IAEA carried out a number of nuclear inspections in Iraq. Planning procedures and the results of the inspections are described

[en] Early moves to restrict the proliferation of nuclear weapons are described together with the application of vigorous scientific techniques to the political framework of international treaties. Technical criteria for safeguards and verification methods are discussed. (U.K.)

[en] The article discusses the role and goals of non-proliferation regime and IAEA safeguards and reviews the IAEA activities in these fields

No abstract available

[en] IAEA safeguards are at the present under critical review with regard to their purpose and effectiveness. This paper describes the development of the IAEA Safeguards System from the early days, when procedures were developed on an ad hoc basis, to the present day. The development of State Systems of Accounting for and Control of Nuclear Material (SSAC), and of sophisticated instrumentation, has been necessary to deal with the rapid growth in the quantities of nuclear material and in the number of facilities under safeguards. The paper also discusses some of the managerial and organizational issues that are inherent in such a large international inspectorate. (author)

[en] A strong influence of the incoming α particle dose-rate in the time differential perturbed angular correlation (TDPAC) spectra of ¹¹¹Cd in silver, due to interactions between defect cascades, has been shown recently. A systematic annealing study is reported of the rate so that the ¹¹¹In impurity interacts only with its own radiation damage cascade. (Auth.)

[en] The present status of development in the Agency of the approach to safeguarding reprocessing facilities is briefly reviewed and some problems to be solved are indicated. In this approach the Agency should take into account the diversion hazards existing at such facilities, diversion assumptions, safeguards criteria to be satisfied and safeguards measures available, as well as the strategic value of material handled by facilities and its place in the nuclear fuel cycle. (author)

[en] In 1977, more than 700 times Agency inspectors visited nuclear installations in 45 States throughout the world to verify nuclear material through record audits and material characterization or measurements. The experience during the three years since the last symposium proved that there are only a few types of facilities at which the Agency can fully base its statements on quantitative verification of material, while there are many areas where the inspector must rely on semi-quantitative information like γ-spectroscopy, or qualitative information like containment and surveillance measures. Techniques have been improved, but a number of procedures to be further developed were identified by the inspectorate. (author)