[en] Before open access, long-term contracts between gas producers, pipelines, and local distribution companies (LDCs) were the rule. Since then, spot trading has dominated the gas market. Spot prices govern short-term transactions and often determine adjustments in longer-term contracts. Experts have repeatedly predicted a return to long-term fixed-price (LTFP) contracts. (open-quotes Fixedclose quotes means unrelated to spot prices, but not necessarily frozen.) They have perceived spot dealing as a response to temporary chaos, or as the consequence of a open-quotes bubbleclose quotes of deliverable gas that would soon vanish. The Federal Energy Regulatory Commission staff's analysis of Order 636 anticipates that the order will foster long-term contracts. But as the dust settles, the reign of spot gas continues. LTFP gas contracts certainly appear superior to spot trades. In readily, LTFP contracts are inferior at almost every turn. Paradoxically, they are riskier than spot transactions. If LTFP contracts were worthwhile, most large gas buyers would use them. Instead, those buyers purchase spot gas and hedge it with futures and options. Electric utilities, nonutility generators, and LDCs are virtually the only users of LTFP contracts. Unlike other gas buyers, utilities can shift risk onto their customers through automatic adjustments in their regulated rates. If ratepayers were not captives, they would not bear the added risk of LTFP contracts without compensation. LTFP contracts are a thing of the past, a security blanket for utilities that is paid for by their customers. If regulators do not put an end to LTFP contracts, competition will. Customers with choices will not hold still for LTFP pass-throughs, as has become evident in LDC gas bypass

[en] A great deal of attention is currently being directed to issues surrounding the decommissioning of nuclear generation plants. Chief among these is determining the best way to recover the associated costs. The cost-recovery procedure should be tied to three things: (1) the nature of the business risks created by nuclear power, (2) who bears those risks now, and (3) who has historically been compensated for bearing those risks in the past. Further, and important analogy can be made to past experience with utilities' diversification into other areas of business. It is important for regulators to balance the costs to the customer against the compensation that investors have already received for bearing the risk of nuclear power. Each case will be different, but it is neither fair nor wise to force all costs on customers

[en] In a unanimous vote, the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) has approved a final rule on nuclear power plant license renewal. The rule outlines the procedure by which plant operators will show that they have addressed age-related stresses on certain systems, structures, and components. Right now, 112 nuclear units - supplying 20 percent of the nation's electricity - have been licensed to operate. The original 40-year operating licenses for almost half (41) of those will expire between the years 2000 and 2014

[en] Observers of the emission allowance market, noting the relatively few trades to date, fear that utilities have been deterred by the tax consequences. Their thinking runs like this: Because allocated allowances carry a zero-cost tax basis, the proceeds from sale are fully taxable and the utility receives only the after-tax value. On the other hand, if the utility banks allowances and uses them for compliance on its own plant, it realizes its entire investment. Thus, market price comparisons for emissions allowances should be adjusted to reflect this tax penalty. This argument may sounds plausible, but as a general rule it's not true

[en] This article describes the programs that Jacksonville Energy Authority undertook to improve performance in the face of continuing deregulation of electric utilities. Special emphasis is placed on JEA's Mission and Goals Action Plan (MAP). JEA's mission statement contains five separate elements, each of which has five performance goals that define success. This results in 25 MAP goals against which performance is measured. Under this plan customer satisfaction and service has increased, pollution has been reduced while increasing sales, the safety record has improved, number of employees has remained constant while adding 80,000 customers, and net book value has more than doubled over ten years

[en] The Financial Standards and Accounting Board has issued for comment a draft of proposed financial accounting standards pertaining to nuclear plant decommissioning. This article examines the proposed rules and discusses alternate approaches in those areas in which the author takes issue with the FASB draft

[en] A new study shows that cost differences among U.S. nuclear plants can be explained by six key variables. Dwindling economic competitiveness has plagued the nuclear power industry for some years. In the industry's early years, some reactors were completed for less than $100 million. Experience gained overseas (often in projects with American partners) provides sobering evidence that nuclear reactors can still be built at low cost in short periods of time. But now here in the United STates, where rising construction and O ampersand M costs have become industry bywords

[en] The governments of most Latin American countries have yet to establish clear policies about the future ownership of existing generation assets, but they do expect future capacity to be largely developed by the private sector. There were at one time plans for many government-financed hydro projects in the area, but these projects produced much paper and little electricity. Present trends will take the area toward independent power projects, both hydro projects and thermal power projects. This article is a review of those present trends

[en] Unless Congress takes some action, utilities will be forced to provide onsite storage of spent fuel from civilian nuclera reactors much longer than they ever imagined. Congress's failure to authorize the Department of Energy (DOE) to begin planning a centralized, interim storage facility and, equally important, to accelerate development of a permanent repository, means that spent nuclear fuel will remain in limbo at 73 reactor sites in 34 states. Today's 30,000 metric tons of spent fuel from civilian nuclear plants will grow to 85,000 metric tons by 2033, according to DOE. The agency also must find a home for a future 70,000 tons of defense waste. There is a growing sense of urgency in Congress this year that something must be done about the nation's nuclear waste problem. By 1998, 26 civilian nuclear units will have exhausted their storage capacity. By 2010 - the earliest DOE says it could open a permanent repository at Yucca Mountain in Nevada, provided the site proves feasible - 80 nuclear units will be out of storage space. At least half a dozen bills have been introduced so far in the 104th Congress, by both propoents and opponents of nuclear power. Recent events in Washington suggest this will be a hard-fought battle

[en] This article describes TVA's nuclear program, the costs that are not yet in the rate base, and the cost to complete projects already partially completed. TVA cannot simply raise rates to capture the costs, as customers would go elsewhere for power. The TVA case raises questions of whether expensive nuclear programs can be justified in the present competitive utility environment