[en] In Bangladesh, the application of radioactive material began in sixties of the nineteenth century in the field of medicine. After becoming the member of IAEA in 1973, the application of radioactive materials augmented in the country and at present appreciably expanded in the field of research & education, industry, food and agriculture. Utilization of different categories of radioactive materials/sources such as Co-60, Cs-137, Sr-90, Am-241, Ir-192, Am/Be-241 and so on are in place. The country is paying profound attention in ensuring their security during use, transport and storage. Bangladesh is fully aware of global threat of radiological terrorism and thereby always aspiring in fulfilling the indispensable and obligatory needs by formulating and revising the responsibilities of competent authorities to achieve better radioactive security sustainability. In 1993, Bangladesh enacted its first regulatory instrument named Nuclear Safety and Radiation Control (NSRC) Act. From then licensing system of radioactive materials was started through the Bangladesh Atomic Energy Commission (BAEC) which was founded in 1973. In 1997, Bangladesh enacted Nuclear Safety and Radiation Control (NSRC) Rules in view to regulate all the nuclear and radiological activities and facilities of the country. The NSRC Rules included the implementation of security system as the mandatory requirement for the issuance of license. In 2012, the country enacted Bangladesh Atomic Energy Regulatory (BAER) Act and accordingly in 2013 Bangladesh Atomic Energy Regulatory Authority (BAERA) was founded. Now, it is overseeing the safe and peaceful use of atomic energy in the country. The country is committed to protect radioactive materials in use, storage and transport and facilities; and to establish and enforce necessary standards, codes and manuals. The licensee is liable to radiation safety, radiation protection, physical protection (PP), emergency preparedness including verification thereof during all the phases of radiation facility from siting to decommissioning. Licensee is also liable to maintain the PP of radioactive materials during import, export, transport and storage. The BAER Act empowers to develop regulations consistent with above subjects, although no regulations are published yet. The NSRC Rules are still in force to meet such vital regulatory needs. It is essential to incorporate the recommendations accessible in the relevant IAEA publications and Code of Conduct on the Safety and Security of Radioactive Sources. At present, BAERA, operators, national stakeholders and international communities are jointly driving in strengthening the security regime of the country by emphasizing the safe storage of the unused radioactive materials and so on. BAERA is strictly maintaining the inventory of the radioactive materials and imposing licensees to manage their unused radioactive materials. Disused radioactive materials are storing in the Central Radioactive Waste Processing and Storage Facility (CWPSF) of BAEC which was built through the cooperation of IAEA. It is the only authorized national facility for transportation and management of radioactive wastes. Starting from 2004 to today, 59 category 1-5 sources and 90 category 3-5 sources recovered from different devices were stored in the CWPSF. At least 203 disused Ra-226 sources collected from different medical, industry and research institutes were also stored in it. The national policy for radioactive waste management is waiting for the Governmental approval. With the help of US- DOE, Bangladesh has been developing the PP system of the radioactive materials facilities since 2006. Moreover, USDOE is offering trainings covering radiological security awareness, PP system and management, search-secure and recovery of orphan radioactive sources. Bangladesh has an approved IAEA Integrated Nuclear Security Support Plan (INSSP). Through this Bangladesh is strengthening its nuclear security regime primarily emphasizing the development of national detection strategy. US Megaports is helping in controlling illicit trafficking of radioactive materials. Through cooperation with Japan and the Forum for Nuclear Cooperation in Asia (FNCA), the country is enhancing its expertise on strengthening the security of radioactive materials. For successful Human Resource Development (HRD), young scientists are sending to India and Russian Federation for subjective training and higher studies. However, challenges such as development of qualified and competent HR for processing, conditioning and management of disused radioactive sources (DRSs), development of capabilities to establish long-term storage/disposal facility for Category-1 and 2 DRSs, built confidence in moving to non-isotopic alternatives, interim storage under proper regulatory requirements and with adequate infrastructure, conduct hands on training exercises on the search and securing of orphan sources are duly needed. Threat on radioactive materials and their facilities is increasing worldwide day by day, but Bangladesh is committed to ensure the security of radioactive materials till achieving a better sustainability. (author)

[en] Blood irradiation is known as the best method to prevent the risk of transfusion-associated graft- versus-host disease (TA-GvHD). Gamma-irradiation was commonly used for blood product irradiation where Caesium-137 (Cs-137) is utilised as a main radioactive source with activity ranging 40 - 120 TBq. Cs-137 is assigned to Category 1, corresponding to security Level A based on the IAEA Code of Conduct on the Safety and Security of Radioactive Sources and IAEA Nuclear Security Series. The purpose of this study is to evaluate the nuclear security culture in organization and to determine how extensive nuclear security as part of the organisation’s culture. Two locations were chosen as a research location which is National Blood Centre and Ampang Hospital. The system was assessed through surveys and interviews where questionnaires was distributed to all respondent that inclusive medical officers, science officers, medical laboratory technicians and hospital attendants. The interviews session was conducted by one interviewer and few observers for verbal and non-verbal data collection. The study found that security system and policy are already in place but the security culture is not fully practiced by all staff. Management foresees the need of structured training programme to improve staff understanding on security culture. Even though majority of the staff are aware of security culture, they still didn’t embraced the security culture due to lack of awareness on the potential threat. Improvements can be made by developing a comprehensive nuclear security training programme, encouraging effective communication between top management and staff members and ensure staff members adhere to procedures in order to support and enhance nuclear security. Apart of conducting another round of self-assessment on nuclear security culture for government, private and university hospital, there also will be initiative to develop a close cooperation with IAEA and to be listed in Integrated Nuclear Security Support Plan (INSSP) 2018-2021 as part of the future plan. (author)

[en] In the year 2000, an unsecured radioactive waste had caused serious injuries and three deaths in Thailand. Thailand Institute of Nuclear Technology (TINT) owns the category I of radioactive sources in the waste storage facility and agriculture product irradiation facility. The Physical Protection System (PPS) recommended by IAEA guide for security of radioactive sources was introduced by the physical protection advisories to TINT for upgrading are strengthen the PPS of a category I radioactive sources. The Pacific Northwest National Laboratory (PNNL), operated by Battelle Memorial Institute, is the advisory and implementing agent on behalf of the United States Department of Energy (DOE). The advisory mission’s objectives of the upgrading are strengthen on the performance of the PPS to oppose and limit the adversary toward radioactive sources and are based on the IAEA Nuclear Security Series No. 11 Security of Radioactive Sources. The enhanced security systems were incorporated into existing site access control, intrusion detection, and applicable CCTV system(s) for the high and low activity storage rooms, shipping and receiving areas and alarm monitoring station. Next steps, a security upgrading is to establish the contingency plan and evaluate the performance of the PPS. (author)

[en] CEA is an important player in the global security domain and developed its experience through different European, national or internal research projects. The paper presents recent concept and technological solutions related to the Radiation Portal Monitor (RPM) domain. RPM is a key solution in the frame of Homeland Security applications in order to prevent a terrorist attack including nuclear or radiological threats and MORC (Material Out of Regulatory Control). In the frame of the Horizon 2020 C-BORD project (duration of 42 months, started in 2014, led by CEA LIST), CEA LIST carried out an important work for developing advanced RPMs and tested them in real measurement environment. This paper makes a focus on these specific developments of the C-BORD project. First of all, we present new RPMs designed and developed in the frame of C-BORD. A specific focus will be made on the algorithmic aspect implemented in these systems, for optimizing the identification step of radionuclides and minimizing the rate of non detection and false alarms. Then, we will expose experimental results obtained using our RPM in three real environments located in three different countries. The first configuration corresponds to big port environment (Rotterdam – Netherlands), the second configuration is focused on container terminals (Gdansk–Poland) and the last one is dedicated to road checks (Rözske –Hungary). We will present the feedback resulting from these trials and the potential ways of improvement. Finally, we will present our future developments, including Artificial Intelligence (AI) approaches which seems to be a promising way to address the false alarm detection problem. (author)

[en] Radioactive sources—materials produced because they emit radiation useful in agriculture, industry, construction, medicine, mining, research, and transportation—are quite dangerous in their own right. Globally, they number in the millions. Tens of thousands of these sealed radioactive sources—small capsules of highly concentrated radioactive material in solid form—merit real concern. They can be vulnerable to theft and to black-market sale. Worse, they could be used by jihadists to make a radioactive dispersal device, otherwise known as a dirty bomb. Complacency towards the threats of radiological terrorism has huge consequences to the environment, hospitals and government. If a security event were to occur in a hospital–regardless of its health effects– it could potentially damage the organization’s reputation and leave it vulnerable to a range of further liabilities. On a practical level, such an event could disrupt the hospital’s regular operations for days, months, or even permanently should contaminated areas fail to be restored to an acceptable level. The associated costs for clean-up and the relocation of individuals and businesses could be enormous. Furthermore, depending on the situation, an RDD explosion could create fear and panic among citizens—terrorists’ desired outcome precisely. Although global radiological security is linked to terrorism risk, little is known about the significance of increased access to cancer care and improved cancer treatment using non-radioactive external beam radiation therapy systems. The significance arises from the phasing out of high risk radiotherapy treatment technologies including Cobalt-60 and Caesium-137 machines in favor of security worry-free linear accelerator machines. Using survey data from a professional-based sample of linac operators working in radiotherapy centers across Africa, (n = 50), this study investigates priority actions for radiological security implementation in radiation therapy field. Cross-sectional and longitudinal analyses reveal those priority actions that potentially facilitate the adoption and sustainable use of linac in Africa where terrorism risk is a reality and cancer is an epidemic.

[en] The interior layer is a vital component of a State’s nuclear security detection architecture. Essential Element 10 in International Atomic Energy Agency’s (IAEA) Nuclear Security Fundamentals: Objective and Essential Elements of a State’s Nuclear Security Regime describes the locations where detection and assessment capabilities should be established, including “within a State’s territory.” The United Nations Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 1540 further supports the establishment of appropriate “law enforcement efforts to detect, deter, prevent, and combat…illicit trafficking.” Since 2010, the majority of reported incidents of detection of nuclear and other radioactive material out of regulatory control have occurred in the interior as indicated by the IAEA’s Incident and Trafficking Database. The multi-layered, defense-in-depth approach to detection of nuclear and other radioactive material out of regulatory control is supported by a robust interior detection capability. Detection in the interior is complementary to security at facilities and along borders. It also presents unique challenges. Common interior detection scenarios include searching for lost or stolen nuclear or other radioactive material, law enforcement operations based on information, protection of strategic locations and major public events, and interior area surveillance and monitoring. Detection approaches in the interior share many commonalities with detection at borders; however, interior detection involves a different set of stakeholders and presents some additional challenges which require tailored solutions. Significant challenges for a robust interior detection layer which are generally distinct from border point of entry/exit detection include (A) wide open areas lacking well defined or controlled boundaries; (B) the presence of regulated nuclear and other radioactive materials at distributed locations within the interior; (C) potential targets of a nuclear security event; (D) multiple competent authorities with diverse and competing responsibilities and priorities, which make coordination and maintaining awareness of and focus on the nuclear and radioactive material threat difficult; (E) higher diversity of criminal or intentional unauthorized acts to be detected; compressed timelines between detection and response when detection occurs near potential target locations; and (G) lack of supporting communication systems, secondary inspection, and temporary storage infrastructure. This paper presents a discussion of how lessons learned and good practices for detection within a State’s interior can be applied to address these interior detection challenges. This paper builds on discussions from the IAEA Technical Meeting on the Detection of Criminal or Intentional Unauthorized Acts Involving Nuclear and Other Radioactive Material out of Regulatory Control within a State’s Interior conducted at IAEA headquarters in Vienna, Austria, from 29 January to 2 February 2018. This paper will address good practices including (A) the need to have a method to assess information in order to strategically position assets; (B) use of a diverse set of detection approaches for resources prioritization, monitoring or surveillance, information alert-based action, and information sharing; (C) leverage of existing capabilities such as law enforcement investigative techniques and specialized teams; (D) maintaining operational flexibility to address evolving threats or imprecise threat information; and (E) managing technical information flow to facilitate expeditious alarm adjudication as appropriate and decision-making by on scene operators. (author)

[en] The most recent IAEA General Conference resolution on nuclear security (GC[61]/RES/9) calls upon all Member States, within their responsibility, “to achieve and maintain highly effective nuclear security, including physical protection, of nuclear and other radioactive material during use, storage and transport and of the associated facilities at all stages in their life cycle.” Resolution GC(61)/RES/9 also calls upon all States “to improve and sustain, based on national security threat assessments, their national capabilities to prevent, detect, deter and respond to illicit trafficking and other unauthorized activities and events involving nuclear and other radioactive material.” The resolution further calls upon States “to enhance international partnerships and capacity building in this regard” and encourages States to continue efforts “to recover and secure nuclear and other radioactive material that has fallen out of regulatory control.”

[en] During 11 years of its activity, the National Agency for Regulation of Nuclear and Radiological Activities (NARNRA) supported by the Government of the Republic of Moldova, IAEA, other international organisations, US NRC, US DoE, Swedish Radiation Safety Authority and other partners has made all possible efforts for establishing an adequate infrastructure for security of radioactive material. Established infrastructure consisting of human capacities, legal framework, radioactive sources national register, authorisation, inspection, law enforcement and other elements. In context of uncontrolled by official governmental entities of “Transnistrian region” and the fact of instable situation in the region, strengthening sustainability and effectiveness for security of radioactive material and nuclear security became more actual and needs more efforts to be made by many stakeholders. With the assistance of US DoE, border crossing points in the Eastern part of Moldova, as well as Chisinau International Airport and first response agencies were equipped with performant detection equipment and personnel are trained accordingly. Conducted in the last three years common exercises involving different national agencies at the level of first responders, mobile expert teams and nuclear forensics lab were highly appreciated by participants, Government and external observers. In 2007 NARNRA began its activity with inventorization of all radioactive sources throughout the country, which in the end leaded to creation of the National Register of Radioactive Sources. This could be implemented with the assistance of US NRC, using experience of other countries in the region.

[en] There has been an increase in the use of radioactive materials in the industry and government establishments in Nigeria over the years. This has been sustained due to the national legislative frame work established for the use, control and monitoring of establishments, using radioactive materials in the country. The security and safety of these materials used at the Centre for Energy Research and Training (CERT) are properly guaranteed as outlined in the mandate and Statutes establishing the Centre. Safeguard issues on radiation emitting substances are also included in the National Nuclear and Radiological Emergency Plan (NNREP) which is the bed-rock of the National Policy on the security of radioactive materials in the event of any nuclear or radiological emergency. Nuclear material audit, accounting and licensing of users of radioactive materials is a legislative function of the Nigerian Nuclear Regulatory Authority (NNRA) while the Nigeria Atomic Energy Commission plays a dominant supervisory role on the facilities and establishments using these materials. A temporary ‘repository’ of spent radioactive materials as well as orphaned sources used all over the country in the form of a radioactive waste facility; with an operational oversight by CERT, gives assurances of the security of these materials from undue public interferences.

[en] France has a long experience and a mature regulatory control system over radioactive sources regarding radiation protection. Even if provisions regarding safety may benefit the security of the sources, the protection of the French high-activity radioactive sources (HASS) against malicious acts has to be strengthened. Those HASS are held by many kinds of users, either small-size business or larger companies, public or private, for varied uses, either medical or industrial, fixed or mobile, etc.. After having assessed the present security level of those sources, the French authorities and experts joined in a national working group to draft regulations to improve the security of HASS. This draft is based on a national threat assessment and an international benchmark focused on sources security regulations developed by our counterparts and on international guidelines, in particular AIEA documents. The process involved the participation of all stake holders (other French authorities, operators, carriers…) and lead to extensive debates and modifications of the draft. The regulations are now almost finished and should enter into force during 2018. This presentation aims to give some insight on the way France has designed its regulations, the main issues that were discussed and the solutions that were found. (author)