[en] The questions of the radioactive monitoring and recovery of radioactive contaminated metallurgical scrap are very topical. The I.P. Bardin Research Centre, a State Research Centre, has developed a highly sensitive system for radiation monitoring of metallurgical scrap on delivery to a works and an efficient method for recovering contaminated metal which enables the return to economic use of substantial amounts of waste metal from the nuclear power and defence industries. The monitoring system automatically detects radioactivity in scrap-carrying vehicles entering a works. Its performance characteristics are as follows: detection threshold, 5 nSv/hr; sensitive surface of the detectors, 2500 cm²; lower energy threshold for the detection of gamma quanta, 50 keV. The detector signals are computer-processed. The system can operate in the temperature range ± 40 deg C and is adaptable to changes in monitoring conditions at steel works. Its features include: continuous monitoring of the radiation background; automatic adjustment of the operating threshold as a scrap-carrying vehicle passes by; variation with time of the averaging of information from the radiation detectors; suppression of vehicle-generated interference. It has been certificated by Gosstandart, the Russian Federation's State Standards Committee. It costs no more than $ 10 000, which is 3-4 times cheaper than foreign-made systems with similar characteristics. The method of recovering radioactive contaminated scrap relies on the use of special mixtures based on constituents that are either contained in some types of process byproduct (ashes and slurries) or are formed at certain stages in their processing. Application of the mixtures to the surface of the contaminated scrap is followed by low-temperature annealing of the metal and the evacuation of the radioactive reaction products. The resultant secondary radioactive waste is solid and requires no further processing; its volume is scores of times less than that of the recovered metal. The method is effective for depths of radioactive contamination up to several hundred microns. After being treated in this way, the metal can be used in normal steelmaking. (author)

[en] The Bureau of International Recycling (BIR) speaks as the unified voice of the international recycling industry on a world level, promoting free-trade in non-hazardous recyclables and the increased usage of recycled goods. In October 1998, BIR presented its 'Guide to Radioactivity' to its members in order to explain the basics of radioactivity, to help determine what actions material recyclers should take and to provide an initial contact guide for summoning expert help. The Guide was promulgated together with a survey questionnaire; initial results of this survey have been collated. BIR members do not trade in radioactive materials and do not wish to receive hazardous radioactive contaminated materials. Furthermore it is very uncommon to find this unwelcome and unwanted material. The burden of handling contaminated materials should not rest on the recycling industry alone, however, as the hazards associated with processing contaminated materials are potentially extreme, recyclers have a role to help safeguard both their workforce and subsequent customers. Some BIR members have invested in in-plant detection equipment of various types from a variety of suppliers to detect contamination from 'lost' sources or from naturally occurring radioactive materials (NORM). Strict State control on sources in use would be very welcome to limit these ' losses'. Not all BIR members are in a position to provide or operate detection equipment; therefore, BIR would welcome States providing detection and control at sea ports and at border checkpoints on railways and roads. Some states have proposed permitting requirements for the handling of radioactive contaminated materials and have tried, inappropriately, to impose on the mainstream recycling industry, permits designed for the specialist decontamination or decommissioning industry. Current discussions on applying the transport of dangerous goods regulations would lead to unnecessary and impracticable additional restraints to facilitating impracticable additional restraints to facilitating proper disposal. A more reasoned approach would be to draw up a binding code of practice to avoid disincentives to detection and subsequent appropriate action. Free of charge disposal routes would recognise that the recycling industry should not have to bear the costs resulting from lack of government/institutional controls. As the mainstream recycling industry never intends to purchase or sell radioactive contaminated metallurgical scrap, provisions to prohibit purchase and sales would not be constructive, and could lead to court actions, furthering disincentives to co-operation. International understanding of the basic scientific issues needs improvement. A clear distinction must be made between the very specialised decontamination industry and the normal recycling industry that does not want to process radioactive contaminated material There is a need to determine and harmonise the standards and measurement techniques of radiation. If a standard for 'below regulatory concern' could be internationally accepted, materials certified as such would be regarded as formal commercial materials. As detection systems become more effective and sensitive, this is the most important criteria to resolve. The misunderstanding and misuse of information related to radioactive contaminated metallurgical scrap is of great concern because the recycling industry could suffer from adverse and unfair publicity which would damage co-operation and damage markets for recyclables. BIR members' efforts are directed at environmentally sound materials recycling and the detection of this unwanted material is providing a service and safeguard to customers and to society as a whole. (author)

[en] It is increasingly frequent for States to have to deal with illicit movements of metallic substances contaminated by radioactivity. Steps taken in the areas of safety and health protection necessarily have financial implications . Except in cases of special urgency, a financial evaluation is vital before such decisions are taken. Specific actions must be initiated. Aside from action by the industries directly involved in self-regulation procedures, checks must be imposed in cases of fraudulent trafficking which has no connection with fair commercial activity. Customs administrations may take specific steps to restore order to legitimate markets. International organizations have a special role to play in disseminating information and promoting international cooperation. The paper outlines the financial impact of fraudulent trafficking, and methods of ensuring that those responsible for such activities bear the financial costs incurred. It underlines the roles that can be played by those involved in the traffic in contaminated products. (author)

[en] The experience of British steel is that there is a serious and continuing threat of radioactive material being included in scrap delivered to steelworks. All scrap entering the steelworks is monitored for radioactivity. The scrap suppliers and the national authorities have recognized the difficulties caused by the presence of radioactivity in scrap, and are working to minimise the problem. Both domestic and imported scrap has been found to contain radioactivity, but the imported scrap is much more likely to contain radioactivity. If radioactivity is found the Environmental Agency is informed, and established procedures are used to minimise the hazard, and to isolate the radioactivity. Detecting, and isolating radioactive scrap, and preventing it being re-melted in the steelmaking process, is part of the overall commitment of British Steel to work safely, and to provide a safe, good quality, product (author)

[en] In recent years, the metal recycling industry has become aware of the presence of radioactive materials in scrap metal. While the problem has historical roots dating to the earliest days of the use of radium, the use of radioactive materials in industrial devices, coupled with incorrect disposal of those devices led to many cases where radioactive sources were unintentionally smelted in the course of recycling. A survey was made of the steel contamination produced during file years 1993 to 1996 in nine steel producing plants. Altogether 721 steel samples were measured by semiconductor gamma spectrometry. In 62% of the samples, no cobalt 60 activity was detected, i.e. the activity was below the minimum significant activity. In 95.5% of the samples, activity concentration of cobalt 60 was below 10 Bq/kg and in 3.4% of the samples, the activity concentration was between 100 and 1000 Bq/kg. The samples were collected according to a scheme which ensured a random choice. In addition, eight samples collected in plants where file investigation was performed were measured, following the melting of contaminated scrap. These samples had activity concentration of cobalt 60 greater than 1000 Bq/kg. (author)

[en] The International Atomic Energy Agency is specifically required by its Statute 'to establish or adopt ... standards of safety for protection of health and minimization of danger to life and property ... and to provide for the application of these standards ...'. Standards encompass three main elements: legally binding international undertakings among States; globally agreed international safety standards; and the provision for facilitating the application of those standards. Radiation safety standards are national responsibilities, but there is considerable value in formulating harmonized approaches throughout the world. The Agency has attempted to do this by establishing internationally agreed safety standards and by prompting their application. Of prime importance are the Basic Safety Standards for Protection against Ionizing Radiation and for the Safety of Radiation Sources. These deal with the basic requirements that must be met in order to ensure an adequate standard of safety. More detailed guidance on the application of these requirements is given in Safety Guides established under them. Fuller technical support is given in a series of Safety Reports. A number of Safety Guides are relevant to this meeting. An existing Safety Guide on exemption is being revised to cover related topics such as exclusion and clearance, and this is the subject of a separate presentation. As part of the programme to combat illicit trafficking in radioactive materials, a new Safety Guide on the topic is being developed. Both are near completion. Another Safety Guide is being produced to elaborate the requirements in the Basic Safety Standards on the safety of radioactive sources. The topics of illicit trafficking in radioactive materials and the safety of radioactive sources were given added impetus by resolutions of the last General Conference of the Agency. This paper provides an overview of these activities of the Agency. (author)

[en] It is shown that explosive cutting is often the only practicable way to disintegrate contaminated scrap. (P.A.)

[en] Before the war, the Bosnian foundry and steel industry were supplied with scrap partly from domestic sources but mainly from foreign market. The annual steel production before the war recorded 130,000 tonnes of casting and 2,000.000 tonnes of crude steel. Most of the scrap was imported to secure and stabilize the production. During and after the war, despite a significant loss of production, efforts have been made to return to the normal production level in many ways. In the wake of the war, there has been a growing concern over the import of radioactive contaminated metallurgical scrap or low quality raw materials which are uncontrolled or of unidentified sources. In this regard, it is urgently required to establish an effective system to prevent from, to detect and to control the flow of the radioactive contaminated metallurgical scrap. The system should be established in such a way that all sorts of radioactive metallurgical elements should be controlled and prevented from use in all the metallurgical manufacturing processes, ferrous and non-ferrous alike. The coverage of control should start from the border or (air) port checkpoint where the flow of the scrap begins to the final steel product. The control system should take a form of internationally common and acceptable standards and regulations. Equipments and measurement techniques should also be internationally common. (author)

[en] At Salzgitter AG, several monitoring systems have been installed to check the scrap transport by rail and by car. At the moment, the scrap transport by ship is reloaded onto wagons for monitoring afterwards. In the future, a detection system will be mounted onto a crane for a direct check on scrap upon the departure of ship. Furthermore, at Salzgitter AG Central Chemical Laboratory, a fully automated gamma spectrometry gauge is installed in order to observe a possible radioactive contamination of the products. The gamma spectrometer is integrated into the automated OE spectrometry line for testing melting shop samples after performing the OE spectrometry. With this technique the specific activity of selected nuclides and dose rate will be determined. The activity observation is part of the release procedure. The corresponding measurement data are stored in a database for quality management reasons. (author)

[en] Volume 1 of the Proceedings contains 28 full contributions, Volume contains 2 full contributions plus abstracts of all contributions. Eight abstracts have no full-text counterpart in the Proceedings. All 38 contributions (including those available in the abstract form only) were input to INIS. (P.A.)