[en] Full text: Standards and regulations have no intrinsic practical effect without taking into account those who are the object of such standards and regulations. Standards and regulations do not become operationally effective until they are implemented by the entities which are subject to them. Accordingly, there is a necessary synergy between the regulator and the regulated - the regulators whose task it is to make and enforce the rules for safe, efficient and reliable transport, and those whose job it is to transport within the rules. No sector of transport is regulated more stringently than the nuclear transport industry. The nuclear transport industry is subject to a comprehensive, inter-connected regime of international, modal and national regulations and standards. The IAEA transport safety regulations, the so-called TS-R-1, are at the heart of that international regulatory regime. Appropriate provisions of TS-R-1 are incorporated in the regulations and standards of the International Maritime Organization (IMO) for marine transport, the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) for air transport, the ADR, RID and ADN for road, rail and inland waterways in Europe, and the regulatory regimes of the IAEA Member States themselves. The IAEA transport safety regulations are reviewed every two years and amended or revised as appropriate to ensure they are up-to-date. There is a widespread recognition today that maintaining transport options in the interest of bringing the benefits of nuclear energy where they are wanted the world over requires open and sustained dialogue between regulator and the regulated. There is a clear determination on the part of the nuclear transport industry and the key international organisations to dialogue, and the World Nuclear Transport Institute provides a vehicle for taking part in this dialogue. Equally, industry must take the opportunities afforded it to inform the regulators, the IAEA and others of the context in which industry performs its essential services, and to be engaged in the regulation review and implementation processes. Under WNTI auspices, companies integrally involved with effecting shipments of radioactive materials meet regularly to analyse changes and proposed revisions to applicable regulations, to discuss relevant research activities and practical experiences and to develop approaches for ensuring the continued safe movement of radioactive materials. Active working groups are focusing on issues such as interpretations of, and proposed revisions to, TS-R-1, packaging requirements for the transport of uranium hexafluoride, and issues related to marine transport of Class 7 cargoes. The nuclear transport industry takes its responsibilities seriously. The industry has come together, through the World Nuclear Transport Institute, to collaborate in ensuring that it continues to meet its commitments to safety. A fuller sharing among major stakeholders of experiences in reviewing and operating within the international transport safety regime can only increase understanding, and potentially contribute to greater efficiencies to all concerned. (author)

[en] Full text: The harmonisation of safety standards at an EU level is not a new idea. Work has gone on since 1975. Much of this work has been inseparable from the work on standards done at the IAEA. A set of basic safety principles were published by the Commission in 1981 that tied safety to the legally binding 'basic safety standards' for radiation protection adopted under Chapter III of the Euratom Treaty. Parallel and similar work was being carried out at the IAEA. Starting from a very similar base, the two activities have more recently developed differently, the IAEA worked on the further development and revision of nuclear safety standards while the European Commission activities tended more towards the practical harmonisation of general safety requirements for design and operation. The EU has basic safety standards for radiation protection. These are nearly identical to those developed by the ICRP and used by the IAEA, but are binding within the EU territory. Why a push for common standards now? The Nuclear Safety Convention highlighted the benefits of an international nuclear safety regime. The EU Member States realised that the task of assessing nuclear safety in the countries candidate for accession was hampered by lack of common standards or practices. The European Parliament called on the EU to adopt common safety standards (in July 2002). The Member States themselves agreed that a high level of nuclear safety is needed throughout the EU (Laeken Summit). The European Court of Justice ruling of December 2002 clearly stated that EU could not artificially separate radiation protection from nuclear safety. The IAEA is currently clarifying and ordering its numerous safety requirements and guidelines. The European Commission and many Member States are involved in the work. Once the IAEA has completed this process we will implement the results in the EU, but in a binding way. (author)

[en] Full text: Under the terms of Article III of its statute IAEA has established standards for protection against ionizing radiation and safety of radiation sources and provide for the application of these standards to peaceful nuclear activities. The IAEA SAFETY STANDARDS SERIES (SSS) cover nuclear safety, radiation safety, transport safety and waste safety and general safety. The hierarchy of the standards comprise; Safety Fundamentals; Safety Requirements; Safety Guides and other safety related documents. Advisory committees oversee the development of the safety standards. The IAEA SAFETY STANDARDS are not legally binding on Member States. They may be adopted at the discretion of Member States for use in national legislation and regulations in respect of development and application of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes. The Standards are binding on IAEA as far its operations and on Member states who receive assistance from the Agency in the development and application on nuclear and nuclear-related activities. The challenges posed by the adoption and application of the safety standards series include: the development of a structure that is compatible with that of SSS; management and leadership; government commitment; availability of qualified experts and consultants to oversee the drafting and review of documents for approval by the National Competent Authorities; the long bureaucratic process of enactment of legislation and regulations; political and institutional instability; availability of adequate numbers of well trained and qualified and committed persons to regulate the application and implementation of the provisions of the adopted safety standards. The Ghanaian approach to the adoption and application of the safety standards is highlighted in this address. (author)

[en] Full text: World demand for energy is growing at a rate of 2.3% per year and will increase by 43% by 2025. Nuclear energy can address this demand if it is deployed in the near-term. Currently, the United States is the world's largest supplier of commercial nuclear power with 103 commercial nuclear plants producing electricity in the United States. The U.S. National Energy Policy (NEP) released in May 2001 supports further development of nuclear energy by developing advanced nuclear fuel cycles and next generation technologies and advanced reprocessing and fuel treatment technologies. At the U.S. Department of Energy, Office of Nuclear Energy, several programs have been initiated to implement the recommendations of the NEP. The U.S. led Generation IV International Forum (GIF) is an eleven-member group interested in jointly defining the future of nuclear energy research and development. A Generation IV Technology Roadmap was prepared by the GIF member countries that identified the six most promising reactor system and fuel cycle concepts and the R and D necessary to advance these concepts for potential commercialization by 2030. These concepts included a gas-cooled fast reactor, lead alloy liquid metal-cooled reactor, molten salt reactor, sodium liquid metal-cooled reactor, supercritical water-cooled reactor and very high temperature gas reactor. The concepts offer advantages in the areas of economics, safety and reliability, sustainability, and nuclear nonproliferation. Furthermore, the Advanced Fuel Cycle Initiative was initiated to reduce the volume of spent nuclear fuel and thereby reduce the cost of geologic disposal, reclaim spent fuel's valuable energy and reduce inventories of civilian U.S. plutonium, and reduce radiotoxicity of spent fuel. By initiating these programs, the U.S. hopes to further nuclear energy as a viable energy source today and in the future. (author)

[en] Full text: Many nuclear institutions in the world, especially the developing countries, are heavily dependent on the financing provided by the government for their activities. In August 2000, Malaysia in cooperation with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), organized a Regional Seminar on Strategies and Approaches towards Self-reliance and Sustainability of National Nuclear Institutions (NNIs). As a result of the forum and deliberation of the seminar, there is now a greater awareness among the member states that there should be a paradigm shift in the thinking of policy and decision makers. The main challenges and limitations faced by these policy and decision makers are firstly, in order that nuclear institutions to stay relevant in the context of mainstream socio-economic development, the NNIs must generate revenue to achieve self-reliance and sustainability. Secondly, the need for the NNIs to fulfil social obligations, i.e., provision of reasonably good and low cost technology to support food and agriculture production; health care system; safe industrial development and clean environment. Thirdly, to improve the image and acceptance of nuclear technology by the consumers and public in the face of proliferation of nuclear-arms race. Malaysia has been successful in addressing these conflicting requirements and challenges, i.e. generating revenue for sustainability and at the same time providing services and consultancy at a reasonable rate. The Malaysian Institute for Nuclear Technology Research (MINT) is now 30% sustainable in terms of operational costs via provision of services and consultancies to both private and government agencies. Technical services are provided in the areas of Industrial Technology (e.g. ND evaluation); Radiation Processing Services (e.g., medical product sterilization and food and herbal irradiation, and cross-linking of wire and cables); Dosimetry Services for personal and radiation equipment (e.g. personal dosimetry, calibration of survey meter); Provision of Training in safety and health, NDT, Medical X-ray, etc. The consultancy services focus on the area of Environmental Study and Evaluation; Technical and Engineering Services; Quality Assurance for Nuclear Instruments; Agro Technology, etc. The management of such services and consultancies, which includes marketing and costing, business negotiations and other related activities, is coordinated by a center called the Customer Service Unit. MINT also practices the concept of technology to market chain, which enhances transfer of technology from the laboratory to the end-users. It is also important to note that the expertise to supply services and consultancies to industries and public sector has been developed over the years with the cooperation of the IAEA since the inception of MINT in 1972. In Malaysia, perhaps unlike in some countries, nuclear technology has gained wide acceptance and encountered little resistance from the public and industries. Among the strategies to gain wider acceptance are the following: MINT placed a great importance on the relationship and rapport with existing and prospective customers and end-users, and the media (radio, TV and newspaper). MINT's personnel appear in such media regularly to explain to the public the importance and benefits of nuclear technology; MINT also accepts visitors at the premises, and conducts lectures at schools and institutions of higher learning as part of our outreach program; MINT regularly takes part in trade fairs and exhibitions to promote our products and services; MINT also buys advertising space in business directories and major newspapers to reach some selected and potential customers in a professional manner; service centers are certified with quality systems, e.g. ISO 9001:2000, ISO 17025, EN 46000, USFDA, etc; strategic alliances and smart partnerships with national and international agencies; and at the regional level, MINT also has been actively involved in the forum organized by IAEA, RCA and FNCA on technical matters as well as public acceptance programs for nuclear technology. In conclusion, well-designed and proper management of products and services which fulfil customer needs and statutory requirements, coupled with continuous quality improvement systems are key and important recipes to win customer trust, hence generate self-reliance and sustainability of NNIs. (author)

[en] Full text: The International Atomic Energy Agency, in co-operation with the World Nuclear Association, the World Energy Council, the International Science and Technology Center and the Electric Utilities Cost Group, organized the International Conference on Innovative Technologies for Nuclear Fuel Cycles and Nuclear Power, in Vienna from 23 to 26 June 2003. The main objectives of the Conference were to facilitate exchange of information between senior experts and policy makers from Member States and international organizations on important aspects of the development of innovative technologies for future generations of nuclear power reactors and fuel cycles; to create an understanding of the social, environmental and economic conditions that would facilitate innovative and sustainable nuclear technologies; and to identify opportunities for collaborative work between Member States and international organizations and programmes. There were seven sessions; four were devoted to talks on specific topics by 21 invited speakers drawn from 11 Member States and one full-day session to 21 oral presentations and 26 poster presentations of accepted papers. Part of the opening session and two half-day sessions were devoted to panel discussions in which 23 panellists from 9 Member States and 5 international organizations took part. The conference succeeded in bringing together top managers, policy makers and specialists from developed and developing countries as well as representatives of R and D activities in MS and international projects. All relevant aspects of innovative technologies for nuclear fuel cycles and nuclear power were discussed in an open, frank and objective manner with the following conclusions. No large increase in the use of nuclear energy is foreseen in the near and medium term, but is likely in the long term if developing country per-capita electricity consumption reaches that of the developed world. The nuclear sector including regulators view an increased use of nuclear energy as the solution for global sustainable energy needs considering that significant reductions in CO₂ emissions would be required. Although the current nuclear technology is considered to have matured as an industry, innovation is foreseen for further improvement of safety, economy, sustainability, non-proliferation, etc. On the other hand, the general public, politicians and environmental NGO's (Non Governmental Organizations) in many countries view nuclear specialists with distrust. In their view nuclear energy is not needed in the short and medium term and likely not also in the long term. Innovative fuel cycles and nuclear power technologies have to achieve inherent safety, proliferation resistance, foolproof measures against terrorist acts and sabotage, etc., even for being considered as an option. Thus there is a gap to be bridged if the potential benefits of nuclear energy are to be realized for peace and prosperity of humanity. Technical measures such as well defined user-requirements, improved design concepts and applications in addition to electricity generation, have to be developed. Communication has to be substantially improved both within the nuclear community and with the public and society at large. Apart from achieving acceptable economic targets in terms of cost per installed kilowatt and investment cost, it would be necessary to seek appropriate solutions for improving the investment attractiveness of nuclear plants in developing countries. There was a broad agreement amongst the participants that international collaboration in general and the collaboration especially between Gen IV and INPRO initiatives should be improved and substantially expanded. The IAEA is expected by all to play a key role in coordinating international efforts to develop innovative technologies. (author)

[en] Full text: Our topic is 'New Horizons', which implies looking beyond old horizons. We began INPRO by asking whether nuclear energy could be a key, substantial part of particularly developing countries meeting their energy needs for sustainable development for the long-term future. It is in the developing countries where population growth will be highest in the next 100 years. It is in the developing countries where development needs are the greatest. And it will be in meeting the concerns of the developing countries, that we are truly challenged to think beyond, and go beyond, old horizons. INPRO studied the new scenarios of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC), particularly their conclusions about nuclear power and nuclear generated hydrogen, and the answer is, 'yes', nuclear energy has a major role to play, and, 'yes', the scenarios anticipate a major long-term shift in the market for nuclear energy toward today's developing countries. The focus in Phase-IA has been on defining requirements that innovative nuclear concepts should meet to be part of successfully turning the potential for nuclear expansion into a reality. These requirements are different from requirements a supplier might formulate to help him win the next reactor order in the OECD. They reflect a global perspective, a long-term perspective, and an integrated perspective incorporating not just the reactor, but also the front- and back-ends of the fuel cycle, and even institutional and infrastructure factors. Formulating such new requirements is a challenge, and it would be over-confident to present our first draft, so to speak, as our final draft. Phase-IB of INPRO is indeed in the midst of several case studies to test the requirements as currently formulated and identify improvements to make them ever more useful. But even excellent requirements would have limited value without an understandable, transparent, but comprehensive mechanism for applying them to new candidate concepts, for comparing alternatives, and for drawing conclusions about future research and development directions. An essential part of this mechanism has to be nuclear system modelling, and we believe that extensive international co-operation is essential here. And we also believe the Agency can contribute an established, inclusive, productive forum with experience, expertise and networks in safeguards, safety, technology, planning, institutional mechanisms and all aspects and stages of the fuel cycle. We look forward to broad collaboration as we continue with INPRO. It is necessary if we are to move beyond old horizons, to explore the full potential of internationalisation options for fuel cycle components - as the Director General raised in his speech yesterday - and to respond to the new needs of the new century to integrate into the global nuclear system a new generation of nuclear users from interested developing country Member States. (author)

[en] Full text: Since 1996, the analysis and evaluation of open source information, including satellite imagery, has become key to safeguards implementation. The Department of Safeguards' dedicated, open source database now contains over 4 million records. The satellite imagery database has approximately 7000 images. An important strategy is to collect open source information from as many diverse sources as possible. Information is collected from many geographical regions and in different languages. The types of information collected range from general news reports to highly specialized technical articles. Source diversity contributes towards the important objective of assessing the credibility of information obtained. Open sources provide a solid basis for assessing whether a State has the economic and industrial capabilities to support the development of nuclear weapons. Scientific literature is also a valuable indicator of nuclear capabilities and of dual-use technologies used in non-nuclear applications that could also be applied to nuclear ones. Information relating to company and business activities is important for improving knowledge of imports and exports of safeguards relevance and for assessing technological capabilities in the States concerned. Commercial satellite imagery is a powerful tool used in conjunction with open sources and with State-declared information which gives details of specific geographical locations. Routinely, satellite imagery is used to assess the functions and capabilities of research and nuclear fuel cycle facilities. It can also be helpful in detecting any changes in the features and characteristics of locations of safeguards relevance and in the identification of nuclear-related activities. For the future, it will be important to utilize software applications of greater sophistication in order to extract the knowledge from the large and rapidly growing databases of open source and satellite imagery information. Keyword search and retrieval technologies will remain at the core, but will need to be augmented with more advanced, conceptual approaches in data-mining. (author)

[en] Full text: An interdisciplinary MIT faculty group studied the future of nuclear power because it is an important option for meeting electricity needs without emitting carbon dioxide. The economics, safety, waste management, and nonproliferation challenges of enabling a possible global mid-century deployment of about 1000 GWe were addressed through a set of findings and policy recommendations: Such a mid-century growth scenario will be based primarily on thermal reactors operated in a once-through mode; A merchant plant model of costs shows that, if nuclear power is to be competitive with coal and natural gas, industry must demonstrate its plausible but unproved claims of significant reactor capital cost reduction and the social costs of greenhouse gas emission need to be internalized. For the United States, we recommend electricity production tax credits for a set of 'first mover' plants; Long term storage of spent fuel prior to geological emplacement, specifically including international spent fuel storage, should be systematically incorporated into waste management strategies. The scope of waste management R and D should be expanded significantly; an extensive program on deep borehole disposal is an example; The current international safeguards regime should be strengthened to meet the nonproliferation challenges of globally expanded nuclear power. The Additional Protocol needs to be implemented; the accounting/inspection regime should be supplemented with strong surveillance and containment systems for new fuel cycle facilities; safeguards should be implemented in a risk-based framework keyed to fuel cycle activity; A major international effort should be launched to develop the analytical tools and to collect essential scientific and engineering data for integrated assessment of fuel cycles. Large demonstration projects are not justified in the absence of advanced analysis and simulation capability; Public acceptance is critical to expansion of nuclear power. In the United States, the public does not yet see nuclear power as a way to address global warming. The full report is available electronically at http://web.mit.edu/nuclearpower/. (author)

[en] Full text: As a result of more than 30 years of accumulated field experience, the IAEA has established a wide and sound range of equipment and techniques for use in safeguards implementation activities. As a consequence of a rapidly changing technology marketplace, and with the introduction of the strengthened safeguards system, the Agency must now adapt itself to new challenges so that it can continue to use appropriate and sustainable equipment in a cost effective and efficient manner. Four of the major challenges facing the Agency in the future are as follows: Having the capability to maintain a sound equipment management infrastructure in a fast developing technical environment (equipment sustainability); Having the capability to upgrade existing techniques and methods for strengthened and integrated safeguards; Ensuring the capability for implementing safeguards at new facilities; Improving the capability to detect undeclared nuclear material and nuclear facilities. All equipment authorized for inspection use undergoes extensive testing to ensure their suitability, usability and reliability. Taking into account the high cost of equipment development and implementation, and a substantial inventory of existing safeguards equipment, the Department of Safeguards needs the efficient adaptation of its equipment inventory in order to function effectively within budget constraints and to satisfy new requirements stemming from additional protocol activities. Achieving cost-effectiveness in an environment of rapidly evolving technology requires strong and technically competent in-house resources that take the Department's constraints and requirements as a first priority and are able to focus on equipment sustainability and adaptability. The advantage of such an approach is that it establishes greater independence of safeguards equipment development from national and corporate interests, and achieves greater effectiveness in the use of equipment funds. To ensure the availability of equipment meeting new inspection requirements, future equipment needs will focus on more sensitive devices that can detect undeclared nuclear material and on other devices that can continuously monitor environmental parameters. For example, laser technology can be used for the detection of undeclared enrichment facilities. Other techniques, such as airborne monitoring and wide area environmental monitoring, could be adapted for the detection of undeclared nuclear material and nuclear facilities. This presentation reviews the challenges facing the Agency in its bid to provide equipment for strengthened and integrated safeguards implementation approaches, discuss future equipment requirements, and suggest various options to meet those challenges. (author)