[en] The nuclear material control and accounting system at Exxon Nuclear will be described in detail. Subjects discussed will include: the basis of the MC and A system, the nuclear materials accounting systems (NMRS and NICS), physical inventory taking, IAEA inspection experience, safeguards organization, measurements and measurement control, MUF evaluation, accounting forms and reports and use of tamper-indicating seals. The general requirements for material accounting and control in this type of a bulk-handling facility are described. The way those requirements are met for the subject areas shown above is illustrated using a reference (Model Plant) version of the Exxon Nuclear plant The difference between the item-accounting procedures used at reactor facilities and the bulk-accounting procedures used at fuel fabrication facilities is discussed in detail

[en] This paper describes the contents of a tour of a materials testing reactor with emphasis on nondestructive assay techniques. Following a brief description of the Omega West Reactor separate sections discuss a Cherenkov viewing device, a high-resolution gamma spectoscopic method of burnup determination and the measurement of the gross gamma activity profile of an MTR spent fuel element

[en] The Hungarian system for nuclear materials control and accounting is briefly described. Sections include a historical overview, a description of nuclear activities and an outline of the organizational structure of the materials management system. Subsequent sections discuss accounting, verification and international relations

[en] The history, uses, strengths and limitations of non-destructive analysis (NDA) are briefly described. NDA methods are then classified according to their active or passive nature and according to the kind of radiation involved. Each method is then described in more detail in a separate section. Examples of methods discussed are scintillation spectroscopy and neutron absorptiometry

[en] In this session, physical protection, nuclear material accounting and control, and containment and surveillance have been discussed, with emphasis on the interactions of these measures within the context of IAEA safeguards. In addition, the current physical protection equipment and techniques have been reviewed. The interactions can be summarized as follows. Although physical protection is a fundamental element of IAEA safeguards, it is solely a state/facility operator responsibility. While the IAEA has an interest in promoting the implementation of effective physical protection systems, it serves only in an advisory capacity. Nuclear material accounting directly involves the state, facility operator, and the IAEA. Facility records and reports provided by the state are independently verified by the IAEA. The SSAC is of fundamental importance in this process. Containment and surveillance measures are used by the UAEA. Installation and routine use of C/S equipment must be approved by the state and facility operator, and must not affect facility operations or safety

[en] Research and zero power reactors are divided into three groups according to power output and core size for the sake of the discussion in this paper. The safeguards relevant features of each group are then outlined. IAEA safeguards requirements such as inspection goals facility attachment provisions and facility specific safeguards approaches are then considered. Finally IAEA inspection procedures and measurement techniques are described

[en] The legal basis and regulatory guidelines for Southern California Edison's accountability of special nuclear materials are outlined and the organizational and procedural steps taken to comply with requirements are described. Separate sections discuss the organizational structure of the company, the nuclear materials accounting system and the accounting process, including assignment of responsibility to various departments

[en] Destructive analysis techniques to measure unirradiated fuel materials are discussed in detail. The discussion is organized around the key measurement points in low-enriched uranium fuel fabrication facilities. Major emphasis is placed on methods for the elemental and isotopic analysis of uranium but plutonium assay methods are described briefly. The precision and accuracy of the techniques is considered. Methods discussed include mass spectroscopy, x-ray fluorescence and absorption spectroscopy

[en] The NRC's safeguards inspection program is a dynamic program - changing as necessary to best insure that the inspection objectives and goals are accomplished. This evolving program may be influenced in many ways: regulation changes, better equipment, more efficient accounting practices, and so on. The program includes periodic training and retraining to assure that the NRC safeguards inspectors are equipped with the latest in inspection equipment and techniques

[en] Neutron-based measurement techniques have found wide application in the control and safeguarding of nuclear fuel. Both uranium and plutonium in the form of pellets, rods, plates, and subassemblies can be measured with accuracies in the range of 0.2 to 1.0%. The accuracies are better than for most NDA applications because the product material is well defined in composition and geometry. Applications to fuel pins and pellets have been under way for roughly a decade and the measurement equipment and procedures are now an integral part of the plant operation. Nondestructive measurements for fully assembled LWR and FBR fuel subassemblies is rather new and just coming into use. International inspection of fuel materials at both the fabrication and reactor facilities gives added emphasis to the assay of the complete fuel assemblies