[en] Since the last IAEA symposium on this subject, held eight years ego in 1986, the world of safeguards has experienced a number of momentous changes which have opened a new period of intensive development in safeguards. The important events were: The discoveries in Iraq during activities under United Nations Security Council resolutions, South Africa's decision to become a party to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), the IAEA-Argentina-Brazil-ABACC Quadripartite Safeguards Agreement, the break-up of the former USSR into newly independent States, and the problems encountered in the implementation of NPT safeguards in the Democratic People's Republic of Korea. The consequences for international safeguards of these events were presented in papers at this symposium, with special emphasis on verification of a State's declaration as well as on detection of undeclared activities. Other fundamental changes stem from converging relationships between nuclear arms reductions and the civil use of plutonium, and the international debate on the associated issues. Furthermore, the review and extension of the NPT is due in 1995. Events have opened the possibility for ambitious new concepts for verification regimes. These matters were addressed at the symposium in the opening session and in the closing panel discussion. Refs, figs and tabs

[en] The paper presents an overview of inspection work performed by the IAEA Divisions of Operations in the Department of Safeguards. The general increase in the workload from 1986 to 1992 in terms of countries, facilities and nuclear material is shown in a general 'zero growth' budget situation. Staffing levels have remained stable over these years, and certain problems are beginning to show. Changes redefining the role of IAEA safeguards are being discussed, some of which may provide a potential to reallocate some resources, but many others will create new demands on safeguards operations with regard to capacity, new skills and training, reflecting adaptation to new requirements from a re-interpretation of international safeguards. With the investigation of new requirements it will inevitable also to re-examine the resources necessary to enable IAEA safeguards to fulfill the changing or rather increasing expectations. (author). 15 refs, 8 figs

[en] A class of inspection resource allocation problems is examined in which it is supposed that only a subjective ranking of violation risks is feasible and in which only an equally subjective yes/no answer can be given to the likelihood of detection in any given instance. Inspection is had in mind in which the objective to verify the absence of undeclared activity, rather than confirmation of declarations. 2 refs, 1 fig., 1 tab

[en] An approach of short notice random inspections (SNRIs) for inventory change verification can enhance the effectiveness and efficiency of international safeguards at natural or low enriched uranium (LEU) fuel fabrication plants. According to this approach, the plant operator declares the contents of nuclear material items before knowing if an inspection will occur to verify them. Additionally, items about which declarations are newly made should remain available for verification for an agreed time. A six month field test of the feasibility of such SNRIs took place at the Westinghouse Electric Corporation Commercial Nuclear Fuel Division. Westinghouse personnel made daily declarations about both feed and product items, uranium hexafluoride cylinders and finished fuel assemblies, using a custom designed computer 'mailbox'. Safeguards inspectors from the IAEA conducted eight SNRIs to verify these declarations. Items from both strata were verified during the SNRIs by means of non-destructive assay equipment. The field test demonstrated the feasibility and practicality of key elements of the SNRI approach for a large LEU fuel fabrication plant. (author). 14 refs, 2 figs

[en] As a continuation of the measurements with uranium bulk samples that led to the development of the non-destructive assay method for uranium concentration measurements, new measurements were made with the same uranium samples plus an additional Cobalt 57 excitation source. The results are described. 2 refs, 1 fig., 2 tabs

[en] United National Security Council Resolution 687 (1991) mandated, inter alia, the destruction of all weapons of mass destruction - chemical, biological, ballistic and nuclear - existing in Iraq, including equipment, facilities and materials used for their production. Resolution 715 (1991) adopted an open-ended plan for ongoing monitoring and verification aimed at preventing a reconstruction of Iraq's capabilities in the production of weapons of mass destruction. Under these resolutions the IAEA was given responsibility to implement the Security Council mandate in the nuclear area, with the assistance and co-operation of the United Nations Special Commission. The paper provides an overview of the IAEA's activities in Iraq under United Nations Security Council resolutions and offers some comments on the lessons to be learned. (author)

[en] The quality assurance system of the IAEA Safeguards Analytical Laboratory was last presented and reviewed at the 1987 Advisory Group Meeting for Destructive Analysis. Since then the system has been further developed, documented and implemented, what is described in the presentation. 9 refs, 2 figs, 1 tab

[en] The feasibility study on near real time materials accountancy (NRTMA) at Tokai Reprocessing Plant (TRP) was carried out from 1978 to 1981 as one of the tasks of the Tokai Advanced Safeguards Technology Exercise (TASTEX). In 1985, a co-operative field test with the IAEA was performed as one of the task of the Japan Support Programme for Agency Safeguards (JASPAS). One of the importance results was the NRTMA would be effective in detecting possible abrupt loss. However, another result was that the greater cumulative material unaccounted for (CUMUF) tendency reduced the ability of NRTA to detect protracted loss. Therefore, an improvement of the pump operation and output accountancy procedure has been made in order to reduce this tendency. Consequently, it became fairly flat and slightly downward. The equation to estimate unmeasured inventory in solvent extraction contactors was improved; it had formerly shown a lower inventory than was actually correct. (author). 2 refs, 8 figs

[en] Capability of trace analysis to detect fissile material and/or fission products in environmental samples for revealing clandestine nuclear activities is discussed. 12 refs

[en] The requirements for the management of information at the IAEA and its Department of Safeguards are rapidly changing. Historically, the Department of Safeguards has had the requirement to process large volumes of conventional safeguards information. An information management system is currently in place that adequately handles the IAEA's conventional safeguards data needs. In the post-Iraq environment, however, there is a growing need to expand the IAEA information management capability to include unconventional forms of information. These data include environmental sampling results, photographs, video film, lists of machine tools, and open-source materials such as unclassified publications. The United States Department of Energy (DOE) has responded to this information management need by implementing the safeguards information management system (SIMS) initiative. SIMS was created by the DOE to anticipate and respond to IAEA information management needs through a multilaboratory initiative that will utilize an integrated approach to develop and deploy technology in a timely and cost effective manner. The DOE will use the SIMS initiative to co-ordinate US information management activities that support the IAEA Department of Safeguards. (author). 1 ref., 2 figs