[en] As nuclear programmes have evolved, the quantities of nuclear material in use or storage, and the number of facilities operating or shut down has increased. In particular, the dismantling of nuclear weapons has resulted in greatly increased stockpiles of weapons usable plutonium and highly enriched uranium. Concern over the security of these and related materials has been further raised by the continued occurrence of cases of illicit trafficking. The risks are theft, leading to trafficking and possible illicit use, and sabotage which could lead to the creation of radiological hazards. The challenge is threefold: prevention, detection and interception, and response. Prevention starts with effective national systems for accountancy, control and protection. Detection and interception involves effective measures to combat illicit trafficking, and response requires planning for the consequences of theft and sabotage. Responsibilities in these fields are national, but nuclear security also has a powerful international dimension. The consequences of failures in national measures reach beyond national boundaries. The effectiveness of national nuclear security can be enhanced through international measures: through agreed international norms, standards and guides, through training and advice, through information exchange and the sharing of experience, and through developing common understandings and perceptions. The Stockholm Conference contributed by focusing on the threats, including terrorist, to nuclear and other radioactive materials; on how to assess them and on how to develop the appropriate security measures. National measures to protect nuclear material and facilities and the continuing development of international standards and obligations were described. The conference discussed the patterns and trends in the illicit trafficking of nuclear and other radioactive materials and national and international measures to combat such trafficking. Finally, it considered what lessons had been learned and appropriate steps for the future

[en] Human factors have a special role in creating a strong, effective system of physical protection directed against theft or unauthorized movement of nuclear and other radioactive materials and against sabotage of nuclear facilities. To bring the physical protection of existing nuclear facilities up to present-day requirements, procedural measures are needed such as access controls and background checks on personnel with access. The state of security of nuclear facilities is completely dependent upon human actions, both those with criminal intentions and those standing in their path. Political, socio-economic, spiritual and other factors are outside of the operator's control. Threat assessment must rely on postulated scenarios for terrorist actions. The difficulty of both forecasting and defending against all possible threats is reflected in the fact that different countries take different approaches in protection of nuclear reactors. There is a need to obtain objective information on terrorist intentions and on the reality of threats. (author)

[en] As a developing country, Jamaica does not have the capability or the resources to necessary to secure all its assets and must prioritize its allocation of resources. To date the incidents of terrorism and sabotage have been few to non-existent. Jamaica needs to set up units to focus on the potential threat to key facilities and to complement them with scientists who have expert knowledge. Such a group could examine issues such as reducing vulnerability, developing guidelines and rules for responses, and planning for the aftermath of terrorist attacks. (author)

[en] In Sweden a special transport system has been developed for transports of nuclear substances and nuclear waste. This system in itself includes a high security level. Extraordinary circumstances can give cause for protective police measures and intervention. In concerned provinces an incident and emergency response planning is carried out of the police actions that may be needed at the following types of events: (a) bomb threat; (b) attack or threat of attack on transport vehicle; (c) demonstrations. If a Swedish nuclear power plant is the subject of a bomb threat or other criminal assault, it is in Sweden, according to the Police Act, the task of the police to intervene, interrupt criminal acts and to restore order and security. The role of the Swedish police as regards the physical protection is, among other things, to carry out a certain control within protected area by specially trained police personnel before a reactor is put into operation or restarted after revision or repair. Police authorities that have a nuclear power station within its jurisdiction should establish a plan for police actions at the nuclear power station in consultation with legal owner or management of the plant, the Swedish Nuclear Power Inspectorate and the county administration. Special training and frequent practice of response personnel is crucial as well as co-training with key personnel at nuclear power stations. The National Criminal Investigation Department co-ordinates and commands police measures concerning different types of nuclear transports. Close co-operation with security and operational personnel at the nuclear power stations, operators of the transport system, the Swedish Nuclear Power Inspectorate and the Swedish Radiation Protection Institute is very important. (author)

[en] Full text: The goal of nuclear forensics is to develop a preferred approach to illicit trafficking investigations. This approach must be widely understood and acceptable as credible. The principle objectives of the Round Robin Test are to prioritize the forensic techniques and methods, evaluate attribution capabilities, and examine the utility of database. The Plutonium Round Robin has made a tremendous contribution to fulfilling these goals through a collaborative learning experience that resulted from the outstanding efforts of the six participating international laboratories. A prioritize list of techniques and methods has been developed based on this exercise. Future work will focus on a Highly Enriched Round Robin and extent to which the techniques and methods can be generalized. The Plutonium Round Robin demonstrated a rather high level of capability to determine the important characteristics of the materials and processes using analytical methods. When this capability to was combined with the appropriate knowledge and database, it resulted in a demonstrated capability to attribute the source of the materials to a specific nuclear fuel, reactor, and reprocessing facility. A number of shortfalls were also identified in our current capabilities. These included alternative dating techniques, Light Water Reactor discrimination techniques, and the lack of a comprehensive network of data/knowledge bases. The result of the Round Robin will be used to develop guidelines or a 'recommended protocol' to be made available to the interested authorities and countries to use in real cases. The poster will present a summary of the results of the Plutonium Round Robin and describe the plans the subsequent Highly Enriched Uranium Round Robin Test. (author)

[en] In 1996, under the auspices of the IAEA, Japan, Sweden and the US agreed to provide technical assistance for the improvement of the nuclear material accountancy and control, and physical protection systems at the Kharkov Institute of Physics and Technology (KIPT). The biggest task was to upgrade the perimeter protection system including new fencing, intrusion detectors, providing an emergency power supply and building a central alarm station. This was completed at the end of 2000. Service and maintenance support will be provided by Japan to end 2002 after which maintenance expenses are to be provided by Ukraine. This will be difficult to achieve. (author)

[en] This paper describes the work done by Australia to update physical protection measures at the High Flux Research Reactor (HIFAR) at the Lucas Heights Science and Technology Centre research reactor in line with the recommendations of INFCIRC/225. Physical protection at the reactor now meets the minimum standards of the latest (Rev.4) (author)

[en] Improving physical protection (PP) of nuclear materials in existing facilities requires design and constructions to be fitted into structures which might have not been prepared for the purpose. Limited funds available for improvements are additional constraint. The IPPAS Mission arranged by the IAEA for Poland in 1997 assessed the situation and through assistance from two participating States considerable improvement in PP of nuclear materials was obtained in the Swierk Nuclear Center, mostly in 20 MW research reactor. The paper describes main features of the approach. (author)

[en] Full text: Over the last four years, the US Department of Defense has engaged 17 countries in the former Soviet Union, Eastern/Central Europe, and the Baltic states in two counter proliferation initiatives, i.e. the DOD/FBI and the DOD/US. Customs Service Counter proliferation Programs. These activities are designed to train and equip border security and law enforcement personnel to prevent, deter, and investigate incidents related to weapons of mass destruction, as well as the trafficking in chemical, nuclear, and biological weapons materials and technologies. Though these programs have begun to produce tangible successes, some recipient countries have failed to demonstrate an earnest commitment to program goals. The US DOD has fielded varied training courses in the region, together with associated WMD detection equipment. In spite of demands by the political leadership in many of the engaged countries, the most successful training has proven to be the more basic rather than the advanced training. Similarly, the real equipment needs prove to be for low rather than high technology. The presentation will explore the systemic, political/military, and geographic factors contributing to this result. The US Department of Defense will continue to engage participating nations in these international counter proliferation programs, and will continue to respond positively to assistance requests based on recipient country needs and honest commitment. Still there remain numerous opportunities for other donor states and international agencies to make positive contributions in the counter proliferation arena. Only with increased donor state commitment fiscal, programmatic, and personnel together with full donor state coordination, can international proliferation and trafficking problems be effectively deterred and resolved. (author)

[en] Creating a system that prevents the possibility of illicit use of radiation sources was a very important task to after Lithuania gets back the independence in 1991. Because of its geographic location Lithuania becomes a transit country of illicit transport of radioactive materials from Russia, Ukraine and other former Soviet states in to western countries. At the same time it was very important to ensure the safety of the sources since the former system disintegrated, and some companies became bankrupt. Under the requirements of the Law on Radiation Protection, Radiation Protection Center is the main institution in Lithuania responsible for solving the problems of Radiation Protection of population from the harmful effects of ionizing radiation. The responsibilities and obligations of the users of the sources were defined in legal acts: 1. The Law on Nuclear Energy; 2. The Law on Radiation Protection; 3. The Law on Radioactive Waste Management; 4. The Law on Changes and Appendices if the Code of the Administrative Law Violations; 5. On the Establishing the State Register of the Sources of Ionizing Radiation and Exposure of Workers, Governmental Resolution; and 6. On the Confirm an Regulation of Licensing the Practices with Ionizing Radiation Sources, Governmental Resolution. After approval of the State Register of the Sources of Ionizing Radiation and Exposure of Workers, all the users of sources of ionizing radiation have to present the necessary data to the Radiation Protection Center after annual inventory of the sources, after installation of new sources, after decommissioning and etc. The Customs Department every week presents the information about all the sources of ionizing radiation, that were imported to or exported from Lithuania and the information on the companies, that made these procedures. Under the requirements of the Law on Radiation Protection all activities with the sources of ionizing radiation is prohibited without license. 86 border checkpoints are supplied with control dosimeter equipment. There are plans to establish 103 ones, the same as 18 stationary check gates