



# Overview of (DevSecOps) OWASP Projects

OWASP Stammtisch Frankfurt

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- Open Source / Open Knowledge Enthusiast



# Simplified view on ISO 27001 | OWASP SAMM | OWASP DSOMM




High Level

ISMS


Doing

# Simplified view on ISO 27001 | OWASP SAMM | OWASP DSOMM




Doing

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Doing

# Simplified view on ISO 27001 | OWASP SAMM | OWASP DSOMM




# SAMM and DSOMM



- **SAMM** ● “Standard”
  - > High level overview
  - Management topics like compliance and governance
  - Planning of high level targets
  - Mapping to ISO in the future

- ⚙ **DSOMM** ● Emerging
  - > Low level overview
  - Only DevSecOps topics
  - Planning of concrete targets
  - Mapping to ISO/SAMM
  - ISMS: documentation in DSOMM

# DevSecOps Dimensions



Build and Deployment



Culture and Organisation



Information Gathering



Hardening




Test and Verification



**DSOMM**



# DevSecOps Dimensions



Build and Deployment



# DSOMM



Culture and Organisation



Information Gathering



Hardening



Test and Verification

# Security Champions playbook



Identify  
teams

Define  
the role


Nominate  
champions

Comm  
channels

Knowledge  
base

Maintain  
interest

*OWASP Juice Shop is probably the most modern and sophisticated insecure web application!*



# “OWASP Top 10 2017 German”

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German OWASP Top Ten 2017  
Great for an initial training plan





# Possible Rewards / Motivations

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- High-Fives 



# Possible Rewards / Motivations



- High-Fives 
- Pins



# Pro/Con Pins



- Reminder
- Fast achievements
- Gamification: “We want to collect all pins”
- Transforms non touchable security into touchable security



# Pro/Con Pins



- Reminder
- Fast achievements
- Gamification: “We want to collect all pins”
- Transforms non touchable security into touchable security
- Needs to be designed and produced





# Implementation



# Implementation



# Virtual COVID-19 way: Backstage at SDA SE



The screenshot shows the Backstage.io interface for the 'team-dock-marshals' team. The browser address bar shows 'backstage.sda-se.io'. The team name 'team-dock-marshals' is displayed with a star icon. The 'Owner' and 'Lifecycle' are both listed as 'unknown'. The 'OVERVIEW' section is active, showing three main panels: 'Team Dock Marshals', 'Security Champions', and 'Ownership'. The 'Team Dock Marshals' panel includes a profile card for 'TD' with a link to '[sda\_se\_open\_industry\_solutions]'. The 'Security Champions' panel features a 'SECURITY CHAMPION' badge for 'Dominik Henneke (Oliver Sand)' and a grid of 38 'SECURITY PINS' with various icons and numbers. The 'Ownership' panel displays six colored boxes with counts: Services (2), Documentation (0), APIs (0), Libraries (0), Websites (2), and Tools (0). The 'Members (3)' section at the bottom shows three team members: Dominik Henneke, Oliver Sand, and Phillip Fuxer.

GROUP — TEAM

## team-dock-marshals ☆

Owner unknown Lifecycle unknown

OVERVIEW

### Team Dock Marshals

Team Dock Marshals

TD [sda\_se\_open\_industry\_solutions]

### Security Champions

SECURITY CHAMPION  
Dominik Henneke (Oliver Sand)

SECURITY PINS (38)

Learn more →

### Ownership

2 Services	0 Documentation	0 APIs
0 Libraries	2 Websites	0 Tools

### Members (3)

of Team Dock Marshals

Dominik Henneke Oliver Sand Phillip Fuxer

# Training Rewards



# Nudging (Reminder)

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- “Steer people in particular directions”
  - E.g. road signs
- > Security pins on a hat
- Reminder of topics

# Nudging Advanced



# Threat Modeling

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- What are we building?
- What can go wrong?
- What are we going to do about that?
- Did we do a good enough job?



# Threat Modeling Playbook

Get TM  
stakeholders  
buy-in

Embed TM  
in your  
organization


Train your  
people to  
TM

Strengthen  
your TM  
processes

Innovate  
with TM  
technology




# Threat Modeling: What can go wrong?



- Card Games (e.g. OWASP Cornucopia)
- Remote:
  - Online Cue Cards
  - Hybrid
- > Send out card games before
- > Send out hand before
- > Participants might look at it beforehand

Free Cards for German OWASP Members:  
Request [robert.seedorff@iteratec.com](mailto:robert.seedorff@iteratec.com)

# DevSecOps Dimensions



Build and Deployment



Culture and Organisation



Information Gathering



Hardening



Test and Verification



**DSOMM**

# Dynamic depth for applications


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


**DSOMM**





DSOMM







Simple Scan

















# Web Security Testing of (an unknown) Enterprise World





## Target Cluster (DEV)



# Vulnerability Management System: Deduplication



## ● Handle Findings




### Decision\*

- Accept (The risk is acknowledged, yet remains)
- Avoid (Do not engage with whatever creates the risk)
- Mitigate (The risk still exists, yet compensating controls make it less of a threat)
- Fix (The risk is eradicated)
- Transfer (The risk is transferred to a 3rd party)

## ● Deduplicate Findings to detect handled findings



# SDA SE ClusterScanner in DSOMM



# SDA SE ClusterScanner Overview



CLUSTER SCANNER






# SDA SE ClusterScanner Overview




CLUSTER SCANNER



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
# Cluster Scanner + DefectDojo




# SDA SE ClusterScanner Overview



CLUSTER SCANNER



# DevSecOps Dimensions



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# DSOMM

# OWASP AppSensor: What/When




Logged information	Property
When	Event date/time
	Log date/time
Security event	Type
	Severity
	Confidence
	Custom classification(s)
	Owner
Location	Host
	Service/application name
	Port
	Protocol
	HTTP method
	Entry point
	Request number
Request	Purpose
	Target
User	Source
	Identity
	HTTP user agent
	Client fingerprint

Logged information	Property
AppSensor detection	Sensor ID
	Sensor location
	AppSensor Detection Point ID(s)
	Description
Optional supporting details	Message
	Request headers
	Request body
	Response headers
	Response body
	Error stack trace
	Error message
Result (including AppSensor response)	Other system response
	Status
	Reason for status
	HTTP status code
	AppSensor Result Response ID(s)
Record integrity	Description
	Message
	Identity
	Hash

# OWASP AppSensor: Detection Points



Category	Detection Point		
	Detection Point Category	ID	Title
Access Control Exception	ACE1	ACE1	Modifying URL Argument Within a GET for Direct Object Access Attempt
	ACE2	ACE2	Modifying Parameter Within A POST for Direct Object Access Attempt
	ACE3	ACE3	Force Browsing Attempt
	ACE4	ACE4	Evading Presentation Access Control Through Custom POST
Input Exception	IE1	IE1	Cross Site Scripting Attempt
	IE2	IE2	Violation Of Implemented White Lists
	IE3	IE3	Violation Of Implemented Black Lists
	IE4	IE4	Violation of Input Data Integrity
	IE5	IE5	Violation of Stored Business Data Integrity
	IE6	IE6	Violation of Security Log Integrity
	IE7	IE7	Detect Abnormal Content Output Structure
Encoding Exception	EE1	EE1	Double Encoded Character
	EE2	EE2	Unexpected Encoding Used
Command Injection Exception	CIE1	CIE1	Blacklist Inspection for Common SQL Injection Values
	CIE2	CIE2	Detect Abnormal Quantity of Returned Records
	CIE3	CIE3	Null Byte Character in File Request
	CIE4	CIE4	Carriage Return or Line Feed Character in File Request
File IO Exception	FIO1	FIO1	Detect Large Individual File
	FIO2	FIO2	Detect Large Number of File Uploads

- Open Source/Knowledge is startup and enterprise ready
- > Even for security
-  OWASP<sup>®</sup> provides a lot of useful projects

# Questions?



OWASP Amaas

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