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Emergence and Evolution of Meaning

José M. Díaz Nafría* and Rainer E. Zimmermann**

*Universidad de León, Spain; Hochschule München, Munich, Germany, diaz-naf@hm.edu

**Fakultät 13, Hochschule München, Munich, Germany, rainer.zimmermann@hm.edu

Abstract: The category of meaning is first traced forwards starting from the origin of the Universe itself and its grounding in

pre-geometry; then it is traced backwards from the sense-interactions within the world to the interpretation of the corre-

sponding reality. Different from many former approaches in the theories of information and also in biosemiotics in our pro-

gressive perspective, we show: on the one hand, that the forms of meaning emerge alongside with information and energy;

on the other, that information can be visualised as being always meaningful – in a sense to be clarified, which extends

Floridi’s General Definition of Information – rather than meaning showing up as a later specification of information within

social systems only. In the regressive perspective the category of meaning is explored starting from the manifestation of

reality in its own level of interaction. Based upon the physical constraints of the manifestation through electromagnetic

waves generated by an object of observation, which constitutes the basis of animal vision, we analyse the limits of the

meaning-offer of such manifestation. This allows us: (1) to compare the efficiency of natural evolution in the reception of

such meaning-offer; (2) to analyse the conditions for developing a hermeneutical agency able to acknowledge the reality

underlying its manifestation. Hence, what we actually do – through this dual perspective – is to follow the strict line of the

Unified Theory of Information in the sense of Hofkirchner, visualising information and energy as two different categorical

aspects of one and the same underlying primordial structure.

Keywords: Philosophy of Information, Unified Theory of Information, Meaning, Quantum Gravity, Electromagnetic Theory,

Perception, Biosemiotics

1. Introduction

“ὁδὸς ἄνω κάτω µία καὶ ὡυτή”

[The way up and the way down are one and the same]

(Heraclitus of Ephesus, DK 60)

From a dualist perspective, one could be the way down, in which reality is ordered, and other

the way up, in which it is interpreted, i.e. in which it acquires meaning (for a subject). The classical

problem attached to this view concerns the communication of substances, which can be rephrased

as: if both ways are independent from each other, how could the starting point be reached? How

can reality be properly referred to by the meanings possessed by a subject?

When speaking of information as something necessary meaningful – as it is for instance con-

ceived by Floridi’s General Definition of Information (GDI) – and disseminated all over the world –

as considered by the sciences, well beyond human contexts – the problem can be stated as: How

Information acquires meaning in the first place and for the different contexts. Floridi addresses this

issue in terms of the Symbol Grounding Problem in a way we have criticized elsewhere (Zimmer-

mann and Díaz Nafría 2012), basically because by tackling the problem in its epistemic aspects, he

is dragging-in the aforementioned hindrances of the dualist perspective. Instead, we prefer to hold

with Heraclitus an intrinsic continuity between the way up and the way down, adopting instead an

onto-epistemic stance, therefore rather monist, which can be very well represented by the Spinozist

proposition “the order and the connection of ideas is the same as the order and the connection of

things” (Spinoza 1677, II prop.7). Nevertheless, it is important to notice that our position neither

implies the reversibility of the interpretation cycle, nor that the world is as we represent it. On the

contrary, the interpretation cycle is in strict sense irreversible, similar to thermodynamic cycles. And

such irreversibility is indeed essential to the evolution of complexity in the universe from the most

elementary interaction of matter – as represented by spin networks – to the creation of molecules,

biological structures, cognition and social systems.

This progressive perspective, aimed at understanding the emergence of meaning from pre-

geometry to reflexive meaning, is developed in section 2, based upon a common “skeleton-of-the-

universe”. While arguing the grounds of this vision in §2.1, we intend to draw attention to the fact

that – as happened with the conceptualization within 19th century physics, which forged the

grounds for a scientific understanding of information, chiefly manifested from the 1940s (Segal

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2003) – remarkable developments in fundamental physics for the last decades are currently foster-

ing new insights into the understanding of information. As we will show, such insights are addition-

ally connected to the endeavour of solving one of the most challenging problems for the unification

of the sciences (namely the reconciliation of the theories of relativity and quanta), though such

insights concerning information have not properly been acknowledged within the field of information

studies. Thus its integration within the framework of developing a common understanding of infor-

mation might provide robust roots for the formulation of a Unified Theory of Information (UTI) as

proposed by Hofkirchner and others (Hofkirchner 1999; 2010). As discussed in §2.2, a generalized

concept of autonomous agency underpins the proper development of the GDI throughout nature,

as something which is always meaningful. To this end, meaning is related to an effective course of

action, so, instead of being regarded as an epistemological category – like in Floridi – it is con-

ceived onto-epistemologically. This general understanding of information and meaning enables the

visualisation – as argued in §2.3 – of information alongside energy, referring to the potentiality of

selecting or producing changes respectively; and, correspondingly, structure alongside matter, as

the actualization of the selected or realised changes respectively. Moreover this broad understand-

ing provides a way for overcoming Capurro’s trilema (Capurro et al. 1999, 9 sq.), which states the

necessity of choosing among univocity, analogy or equivocity when speaking of information

throughout different contexts – something that was indeed overcome in the nineteenth century with

respect to energy.

In section 3, the “skeleton-of-the-universe” (previously suggested as the basis for the down-

wards path corresponding to the hierarchical evolution of complexity) serves as a foothold for an

upwards pathway corresponding to the interpretation of reality. As analysed in this section, the

fundamentality of the emergence of regularities and meaning, argued in the previous section, im-

poses essential constraints to the interaction within the world when we aim at interpreting it. One of

these emergences – relevant to our means of awareness – is represented by electromagnetic

fields, which correspond to the regularity arising from the interaction of a more elementary level of

matter (§3.1.1). Our vision (even if assisted by microscopic techniques) is strictly constrained to the

structural regularities of the electromagnetic fields (§3.1.2). We will show from the corresponding

structural constraints that the world is not as we observe it (§3.2). Instead, the manifestation of

reality itself – no matter what sensing ability the autonomous agents possesses – contains a fun-

damental ambiguity that has to be somehow solved by the agent in order to enable a proper re-

sponse according to the corresponding level of interaction. To this end, since hermeneutical agents

are also products of the world (i.e., they are attached to the, so to speak, same rules of the game

which chiefly concerns the effectiveness of the interaction), the very complexity of the mechanism

of awareness at a high level of complexity (evolving from an objective to a reflexive response as

analysed in §3.3) has the possibility of creatively imagining reality, similarly as the world creates it.

Information – in a cognitive sense, which can be derived from a wider perspective of information in

other natural processes – corresponds to the actualization of this creative imagination while inter-

acting with the world. This interaction imposes a non-reversible path in the round trip of constituting

reality (within which the reflexive observer has come into existence) and interpreting it (by the ob-

server herself).

In the conclusive remark (§4) we compare our approach with other frameworks advanced in the

converging fields of information, computation, cognition and communication, showing that our scaf-

folding provides new grounds for the development of the Unified Theory of Information Programme,

as well as the possibility for bringing among different endeavours to solve common challenges.

2. The Progressive Perspective: Top-Down

2.1. Information in Fundamental Physics

After roughly 35 years of development in the theories of self-organization and related variants

(chaos, self-organized criticality and so forth), it is somewhat of a surprise that the insights from

physics proper have not yet sufficiently been heard in the ongoing quest for a precise concept of

information (Hofkirchner 1999; 2012; Floridi 2011; Díaz Nafría and Salto 2009). As Seth Lloyd

points out in his book from 2006 (Lloyd 2006, 52), already as early as in the sixties of the last cen-

tury Fredkin and Zuse visualized the universe as a digital computer. This is a line of argument that

Wolfram has followed more recently in his work on cellular automata published in 2002, not to

speak of the more recent theories on quantum information (Benenti et al. 2007, Berman et al.

1998) which generically couple to theories of quantum gravity. For these physical theories, infor-

mation plays a key role in a sense clearly transcending its classical understanding, as patently

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expressed by David Deutsch (one of the leading protagonists in these fields): “… [b]its, Boolean

variables, and classical computation are all emergent or approximate properties of qubits, mani-

fested mainly when they undergo decoherence” (Deutsch 2004, 93). In other words: “The world is

made of qubits … What we perceive to some degree of approximation as a world of single-valued

variables is actually part of a larger reality in which the full answer to a yes-no question is not just

yes or no, nor even both yes and no in parallel, but a quantum-observable – something that can be

represented as a large Hermitian matrix” (Ibid., 100).

This line of argument actually goes back as far as to John Wheeler in 1977 for whom “… [a] true

observation of the physical world … must not only produce an indelible record, [but] somehow in

part meaningful information” (Davies 2004, 8 – our emphasis). For him, “… [m]easurement implies

a transition from the realm of mindless material stuff to the realm of knowledge. So it [is] not

enough … that a measurement should record a bit of information, that lowly bit had to mean some-

thing” (Ibid. – our emphasis). This perspective led at the time to the famous “it-from-bit” thesis pro-

posing that “the universe [is] fundamentally an information processing system from which the ap-

pearance of matter emerges at a higher level of reality” (Ibid., 10). In fact, it is Seth Lloyd himself

who after all has developed the cosmological implications in most detail when presenting his work

on the computational universe (Lloyd 2006; 2010). For him, the big bang was also a bit bang (Pen-

rose 1994, 96).

Within the theories of quantum gravity, these aspects have gained even more pertinence. This

is because the quantum viewpoint itself typically tends to conceptualize information (contrary to

Haefner’s assertion (1999, xv): “at the physical level, we encounter a set of physics theories that

have never considered information as an appropriate term to understand physical phenomena”). As

Carlo Rovelli has concluded: “… what precisely quantum mechanics is about is the information that

physical systems have about one another” (Rovelli 2004, 19). The quantum aspect itself however,

turns out to be somewhat more involved than expected, as Roger Penrose has pointed out in his

more recent works when he talks, for example, of what he calls quanglement in demonstrating his

reluctance to utilize the concept of quantum information. As he says: “Quantum is not information,

but [it] can be used in conjunction with ordinary information channels, to enable these to achieve

things that ordinary signaling alone cannot achieve” (Penrose 1994, 603, 607).

It is especially in loop quantum gravity that these features are most prominent. The idea is that

“[j]ust as a polymer, although intrinsically 1-dimensional, exhibits 3-dimensional properties in suffi-

ciently complex and densely packed configurations, the fundamental 1-dimensional excitation of

geometry can be packed appropriately to provide a geometry which, when coarse-grained on

scales much larger than the Planck length, resembles continuous geometries” (Ashtekar 1998,

181). The theory is named after the Wilson-type loops which are essentially closed curves carrying

quantized electric flux and being organized into hexagonal networks called spin networks (Smolin

2000, 135; Smolin 2004, 504). To be more precise, the significant objects are not just the loops, but

their holonomies: they represent a generalized kind of parallel transport that can be described in

terms of a Lie group element in the fibre bundle attached to the chosen base manifold. Hence,

holonomies can be visualized as homomorphisms from some group structure defined in terms of

equivalence classes of closed curves onto a Lie group. We can see then that essentially, “the result

of evaluating a Wilson loop about a very small planar circle around a point x is proportional to the

area enclosed by this circle times the corresponding value of the curvature tensor of the gauge field

evaluated at x” (L.Kauffman 1998, 79; cf. Baez 1994). Hence, the holonomy has the same infor-

mation as the curvature at this point (cf. Gambini 1996, 1 sq.). A spin network then, is a linear

combination of products of holonomies of closed curves that wrap along the graph (Rovelli 2004,

237). Louis Kauffman who dealt with a representation of loops and knots in terms of (mathematical)

category theory, has shown that in principle, the binor identity characterizing spin networks, the

skein identity of the bracket polynomial in knot theory, and the trace identity are really all the same.

Hence, space altogether shows up then as one of the possible targets of the many functors that

extract information from the network (L.Kauffman 1998, 277 sq.) (For general networks see e.g.

Barabási (2002), for categories see in particular Lawvere and Rosebrugh (2003), for an alternative

approach in terms of strings see Susskind and Lindesay (2005). As to the relationship between

functors and knots see also Yetter (2001), and Zimmermann (2000; 2002))

As a preliminary conclusions of all of this we can note the following.

First, the physicist’s quest for a unified theory from the outset (an enterprise in fact that already

starts at the end of the 19th century) justifies that the concept of information is always present in the

sense that comparatively early it became necessary to map the physical processes involved by

means of thermodynamical (and statistical) techniques. From the beginning therefore, for Penrose,

the entropy of a state is described as a measure of the volume of that compartment which contains

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the phase-space point which actually represents this state (Penrose 1989, 313). Hence, if a theory

of cosmology must, as Smolin puts forward (Smolin 1997, 291), in order to be self-consistent, be a

theory of the self-organization of the universe, the very aspect of organization entails a concept of

information on an equal footing with the concept of energy. (A point, in fact, Floridi would agree

with (2011, 135). See also Jantsch (1982)). This idea became popular back in the late seventies of

the last century following the international reception of the theories of René Thom and Ilya Prigo-

gine (Thom 1973; 1975; 1983; Prigogine 1979; 1996; cf. Zimmermann 1974-1990). As one can

clearly recognize from this development, the problem of organization is closely related to the prob-

lem of a unified theory of physical interactions. Although significant progress has been achieved

here, starting with Maxwell’s theory of electromagnetism and with Einstein’s theories of relativity,

leading forward to a further unification including weak interactions (Salam-Weinberg-Glashow) and

even to a GUT (Grand Unified Theory), gravitation (completing a true TOE, Theory of Everything)

has not yet been successfully integrated into this enterprise. And the reason for this may be a defi-

ciency in the proper co-ordination of energy and information within the theories of the cosmological

beginnings. Looking particularly for characteristic differences in the entropy of the universe, in

1979, Roger Penrose has claimed a principle of time-asymmetry which shows up as a direct con-

sequence of this evolution of entropy and can be formulated as an explicit energy condition (called

the Weyl curvature hypothesis) (cf. Halliwell et al. 1994; Hawking and Penrose 1996). In fact, this is

why recent approaches to quantum gravity try to explicitly reconcile energy and information. This is

particularly apparent when dealing with black holes. But there is still another point to this, constitut-

ing our next conclusive remark.

Second, as is obvious from the underlying intention of unified theories, they also refer to a kind

of secularized grounding problem which in metaphysical philosophy is traditionally dealt with when

talking about the concept of substance and its attributes (Zimmermann 1991; 1998a; 2005a; 2010;

2011). From time to time this perspective is mentioned more or less at random, but altogether, the

philosophical perspectives taken by physicists are very often far from being relevant and precise.

This is mainly due to the terminology utilized according to somewhat arbitrary criteria and to the

mixing up of ontological and epistemological problems. First of all, there are serious attempts to

conceptualize the underlying physics with a view to basic principles which give a kind of philosoph-

ical grounding to physics normally absent when discussing physical details. Roger Penrose, for

example, in his 1995 Tanner Lectures, is comparatively prudent in his formulations when stating

that “[w]hat we need is a criterion to enable us to estimate when two space-times differ significantly

and this will lead to a time-scale for Nature’s choice between them. Thus, the viewpoint is that Na-

ture chooses one or the other according to some rule we do not understand yet” (Penrose 1997,

86). In that case he points to the theory of consciousness which he has developed himself together

with Stuart Hameroff. Therefore, for him the solution must be somewhere in the quantum domain:

“It seems to me that consciousness is something global. Therefore, any physical process responsi-

ble for consciousness would have to be something with an essentially global character. Quantum

coherence certainly fits the bill in this respect.” (Ibid., 133) He thus concludes that “[m]entality …

[is] ontologically fundamental in the Universe” and mentions some kind of “proto-mentality” (Ibid.,

176). This is something we can subscribe to: If there is a choice for Nature, then Nature is acting in

a sense, it is subjective rather than objective. This is indeed an idea that is present in philosophical

theories from Schelling to Bloch. And in particular it is the idea of characteristic time-scales that fits

nicely to Schelling’s worldly epochs (Zimmermann 1998a; 2004b; 2010; 2011). Pitifully other physi-

cists do not share Penrose’s modesty; for instance, Lee Smolin claims that “[p]hysics should be

more than a set of formulae that predict what we will observe in an experiment; it should give a

picture of what reality is …. It cannot be that reality depends on our experience” (Smolin 2006, 7).

As to the first statement we notice that the vagueness in formulation actually destroys the strong

argument provided by Penrose, because automatically, we envision a world which is some sort of

living creature and loose the aspect of “proto-entities”

On the other hand, the vagueness in Smolin’s statement renders the whole approach to end up

with a false idea. This is mainly so because it is not quite the task of physics to say what there ac-

tually is. And it is a mere claim that reality cannot depend on our existence (because it is this very

reality that produced us in the first place). But the main point is here that the concept of reality is far

from clear: because traditionally, reality refers to what the world is like in absolute truth but that we

cannot actually perceive at all, because the cognitive capacity of human beings is limited. Hence,

the world as we see it is its modality, the world as it really is we call reality. Obviously, the former

can only be an approximation to the latter. And this is what in the physics of quantum gravity we

would also like to call approximation or emergence (Ashtekar 1998, 181; Johnson 2002; Davies

2004, 10; Deutsch 2004b, 93, 100; see also: Deutsch 2004a; Penrose 2005, 603). Hence, in the

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strict sense of the concept, Smolin would be right (but then, physics could not help). Or, if he has

mistaken the concept and refers to modality instead, he is simply wrong, because the latter does

indeed depend on our existence. A similar critique is adequate when referring to the recent book of

Vedral’s (2010) when the author struggles with the concepts of nothingness and creatio ex nihilo

(Ibid., 2, 5). In fact, he does not actually answer the questions he starts with (“… why is there a

reality at all and where does it come from?”), because on the one hand, he shares with Smolin the

same difficulty referring to the correct meaning of “reality”, and because on the other hand, he for-

gets that information (as well as energy) is a worldly concept which is utilized for human modelling,

but not part of reality proper.

Now, in order to summarize, we can say the following. Similar to the concept of energy, infor-

mation is already always present in fundamental physics. Both energy (and the matter which it is

manifesting) and information are two different aspects of the same underlying primordial structure

of the world we will know not before there is a consistent TOE. Within this theory, both concepts

have to be unified, and by doing so, there will also enter the aspect of some cognitive meta-theory

which tells us how human modelling is coming about as part of a process actually performed by

nature. Such an approach will also establish an innovative relationship between philosophy and the

sciences, because epistemologically, all of them have to rely on each other. Hence, the appropriate

TOE cannot be found, if a philosophical framework for the grounding of the world is not also devel-

oped, which in turn is only possible if philosophical research gets interdisciplinarily entangled with

the other fields of the sciences. What this attitude is actually up to shall be discussed in this present

paper.

2.2. The General Definition of Information Revisited

Much of what we have said so far is the foundation for the results announced earlier, which

generally point to the role already attributed to the concept of information when applied within the

framework of fundamental physics. So, Floridi is certainly right when mentioning that “information

can be said in many ways just as being can” and that “th[is] correlation is probably not accidental”

(Floridi 2004, 40). But it is not clear why a UTI project should be necessarily reductionistic, because

– different from the unified projects in physics – it deals with a conceptual rather than physical uni-

fication; primarily it aims at a conceptualization which is for information what it was before for ener-

gy and mass. In other words: Unification means here unifying energy and information rather than

unifying different types of information. Hence, it is also a project of unifying a catalogue of terminol-

ogies, but at the same time one of unifying two irreducible phenomena. Similar to quantum physics

where the difficulty is to distinguish between what is axiomatic and what is empirical, modern in-

formation theories have to distinguish between what is substantial and what is accidental. (This is

summarized somewhat in Capurro’s Trilemma, §1). In the case of quantum physics, the result is a

bundle of interpretations, and it is hoped that eventually it will be possible to settle on a master

interpretation. In the case of information, the task is practically the same. The crucial difference

may be the fact that certainly, an adequate UTI will not be grounded on the mathematical theory of

communication in the sense of Shannon, but will instead turn out to be part of a physical TOE. It is,

however, all the more necessary to determine what meaning is all about, a notion which according

to common terminology surpasses the concept of mere information, which is linked to Floridi’s re-

mark on the advent of hermeneutic theories (Floridi 2004, 41). Nevertheless, it is insufficient to let

things be as they are without going into further detail as to a possible definition of the underlying

basis of meaning. (See also Floridi 2010; 2010b; 2011a-b).

This is mainly so because the concept of meaning enters the discussion very early. Starting with

a proper definition, it is immediately part of what Floridi calls the General Definition of Information

(GDI). This definition states that an instance of information visualized as objective semantic content

is given, if and only if (iff) it consists of n data (n ≥ 1) which are well-formed and meaningful. (Floridi

2004, 42 – our emphasis) There we are: from the beginning on we have to deal with meaning. And

having a look at the list of possible data within the definition’s range (Ibid., 42 sq.), we notice that

primary data, metadata, as well as operational data can be found throughout nature: they are not

restricted to social systems. Only derivative data extracted from the first three types are possibly

reserved for social systems. The question is whether this is also true for meaning. If there is no

information without data representation, and if a datum is a relational entity (Ibid., 43), then obvi-

ously, throughout nature, there is information which by its very relational quality always entails

meaning in the first place. This does, however, imply a significant difference between what Floridi

means by meaningful data and what we mean by stating the intrinsic meaningful value of data it-

self, as we have argued in detail elsewhere (Zimmermann & Díaz Nafría 2012).

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If Bateson is right, and information is the difference which makes a difference (Floridi 2004, 44),

then it is quite straightforward to notice that the existence of a difference immediately implies the

means of recognizing a difference as difference, in other words of interpreting differences (Zim-

mermann 2007a; Zimmermann & Soci 2004). This is so because the mere existence of such rela-

tional difference in reality implies that the informee – as a part of reality too – can likewise reflect a

similar or corresponding relational difference so as to detect it whenever it gets in touch with the

former difference. We can also say, there is a minimal nucleus of proto-type forms of cognition and

communication essentially comprised of a detection device which is able to distinguish between

what a signal actually shows and what this actually means (Díaz Nafría 2011) – independent of

whether the physical structure (be it a living structure or not) is able also to reflect about the fact

that presently, it possesses knowledge of this process.

As to the concept of meaning we find this line of argument confirmed from time to time, if often

only as a side-remark. Seth Lloyd, for example, is quite clear about meaning: “If you adopt Witt-

genstein’s perspective that the meaning of a piece of information is to be found in the action this

information provokes, the meaning of a computer program written in a particular computer lan-

guage is to be found in the actions the computer performs as it interprets that program” (Lloyd

2006, 26). And we remember that action – according to quantum gravity theory – is already there

from the very beginning. A spin network, the fundamental fabric of space, processes the infor-

mation which is produced by means of the organizing action of the loops co-operating in order to

constitute the network in the first place. This has an interesting consequence: a loop in the above

sense fulfils what Stuart Kauffman calls the criteria for autonomous agents, namely, the ability to

perform full thermodynamic work cycles for the provision of its own needs and the participation in

natural games according to the constraints of its environment (Kauffman 2000-2006). This aspect

has already been mentioned in the recently emerged field of biosemiotics (Taborski 1999; Zim-

mermann 2007a; Hoffmeyer 2010, 192).

Hence, although we can live with Floridi’s formulations of Ontological Neutrality: ON 1 through 4

with respect to adequate data representations (Floridi 2004, 44 sq.), we dispute formulation GeN –

Genetic Neutrality, i.e. data can have a semantics independently of any informee – and also the

viewpoint that false information is no information. In other words: we would like to stay with the

GDI, but would prefer to choose another interpretation of some of its consequences.

In fact, what we would aim for can be illustrated in more detail when looking at the catalogue of

main concepts assembled in the handbook edited by Floridi: beside information, there is computa-

tion, complexity, and system. From elaborating on the first (Copeland 2004) we obtain the im-

portance of Goedel’s theorem which restricts the power of computability from the beginning on.

Complexity however, is visualized exclusively as computational complexity which is probably a little

too narrow (Urquhart 2004). Finally, Mainzer (2004) is quite correct in stressing the origin of sys-

tems which is in dynamical systems (in the mathematical sense). The importance of this insight lies

in the idea that one cannot describe any dynamical system without describing its state space at the

same time. And as we know from more recent developments, the KAM (Kolmogorov-Arnold-Moser)

theorem points to the ubiquity of mixed systems such that dynamical forms of deterministic chaos

dominate the processes throughout nature (cf. ibid., 31). Now, if structures in nature and society

can be explained by the dynamics of complex systems and their attractors (Ibid., 33), then indeed,

the existence of observable structures is essentially grounded in their underlying information:

Hence, “[a] dynamical system can be considered as an information processing machine, computing

a present state as output from an initial state of input. Thus, the computational efforts to determine

the states of a system characterize the complexity of a dynamical system.” (Ibid., 36) The point is

here that as far as computation goes, this formulation is certainly correct. But in view of the Goedel

theorem, computational complexity is not quite satisfactory after all. The solution may be found in

what Mainzer calls “computational ecologies”: possibly, it is self-organizing agents as they are al-

ready available in computer networks which open a new perspective here. (See also what we said

above on S. Kauffman’s autonomous agents.) But then, game theory becomes relevant again

(Jantsch 1982; Zimmermann 2004a; 2005; 2006).

Hence, we can state that the GDI is confirmed with respect to the emergence of meaning which

is visualized as a concept to be handled parallel when dealing with information: Information is al-

ways meaningful, and it is the emergence of an autonomous agency within a particular context that

comprises at the same time: meanings (as the courses of efficient and functional actions with re-

spect to eventual interactions within its context, embodied in constraints that enable the driving of

work) and information (as what enables the selection of courses of action for both the fulfillment of

agent’s needs and the participation in natural games within its context). On the other hand, the GDI

has to be modified with respect to false information and meaning, as we have discussed in detail

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elsewhere (Zimmermann and Díaz Nafría 2012). The idea is that also false information can be

utilized for a productive purpose, not only in the case of biological systems (when a copying error of

the DNA produces a mutation which may be able to survive and even grow), but also for the case

of fundamental physical systems (the difference being that copying errors in spin foams have not

yet been studied sufficiently so as to determine what a surviving mutation would be in practice).

2.3. Emergence of Meaning

Hence, the Universe is meaningful from the beginning. Meaning emerges alongside with infor-

mation, together with energy, at the Big Bang. Subsequently, the evolution of meaning is character-

ized then by emergent steps in the development of complexity. The preliminarily crucial step is

being initiated by the emergence of reflexive (or: self-reflexive) meaning as exhibited by human

beings (cf. Crutchfield 1994). But, how does emergence actually work? Emergence can be best

visualized as emergence of averages, very much in the classical, statistical sense. For a given

system, macroscopic phenomena are then nothing but approximations of processes taking place

on the microlevel of state space. The former are essentially observable, the latter are essentially

non-observable. Hence, in contrast to Floridi’s observables, we consider these not as pure episte-

mological category, rather as something ontological in the first place, namely an ontological emer-

gence determined by the interactions at its lower level of complexity; thus, in clear opposition to

Floridi’s explicit rejection of ontological levelism (Floridi 2011b, 47). However since observation

happens at a given level of interaction, observables are also epistemic. Therefore to this respect,

our stance is onto-epistemic, as stated above.

And why do we think to conceptually solve Capurro’s trilemma (§1) then? Because it is the evo-

lution of complexity (as related to Stuart Kauffman’s 4th law of thermodynamics) that demonstrates

that the multiperspectivity of univocity, analogy, and equivocity, respectively, does not actually pre-

sent a trilemma. Instead, it unfolds the local perspective of conceptualization with respect to that

level of complexity which is topical for a given discussion. E.g., if asking what the difference of self-

organized non-living and living matter can mean (as Wolfgang Hofkirchner asks in Ibid., 24), the

answer is simply that it is the level of complexity which gives a ranking to structures (indicating a

lower or higher rank in the state of organization, in fact). Hence, as we deal in physics with one

definition of energy plus a conservation theorem (overall balance), but with various forms of energy

which are permanently transformed into each other (defining various balance equations such as

that which describe the fine structure of the mentioned conservation theorem), we equally deal in

the theory of information with one definition of information plus a set of evolution theorems (the four

laws of thermodynamics), but with various forms of information which are also permanently trans-

formed into each other: The essential idea (capable of achieving a broad consensus) is that in

physics, energy is in some sense the prime expression for the potentiality of a system. As McMullin

says: “It almost seems that it is to the potential, rather than to the actual, that reality should be at-

tributed at the most fundamental level” (McMullin 2010, 33). This is in fact compatible with quantum

theory. As Jeffrey Bub (1997) has shown, the Schroedinger time-dependent equation characterizes

the temporal evolution of what is possible, not what is actual at time t:

“[I]n a classical world, change is described by the equation over time of what is actual, where

what is actually the case … is selected by … the classical state – as a temporally evolving

substructure against the background of a fixed Boolean lattice of possibilities. In a quantum

world, what is actually the case at time t is selected … on a changing background of possibili-

ties. So in a quantum world there is a dual dynamics: the Schroedinger dynamics for the evo-

lution of possibility, and a dynamics for how what is actually the case changes with time …

From this perspective, we can understand the phenomena of interference and entanglement

… as arising from the way in which what is actually the case at t changes from t to t’ in such a

way as to mesh with the change in possibility structure from t to t’. … I still think the essential

difference between classical and quantum mechanics is captured by the insight that going

from classical to quantum mechanics involves the transition from a Boolean to a non-Boolean

possibility structure for the properties of a physical system.” (Bub 1997, xii, xv; cf. Magnon

1997).

We would like to claim a similar differentiation for the concept of information because it is well-

known that there is a generic difference between information about what is actually the case, and

information about the possibility for something to become the case eventually. In fact, comparative-

ly early, von Weizsaecker (1971) has mentioned a similar aspect when defining energy as the po-

tential to move matter and differentiating information from both matter and energy (ibid., 344 sqq.).

For him, information shows up as a measure for the quantity of form (complexity?) and can be de-

20

José M. Díaz Nafría and Rainer E. Zimmermann

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termined by the number of single alternatives which have to be decided in order to describe the

form (Ibid., 347). This opens interesting points for discussion, although we would not really ascribe

to his equations matter, motion = form, mass = information = energy, in the end (Ibid., 361). But we

can clearly recognize that the relevant discussion has been begun much earlier than usually no-

ticed. Jantsch refers to von Weizsaecker in his work from 1982 (Jantsch 1982, 88 sqq., also 202).

In Jantsch, contrary to von Weizsaecker, information is made somewhat more precise when dis-

cussing the co-evolution of macro- and microlevels as origin of complexity. Information then (in-

formation) refers to a special dynamical regime of a self-organizing structure. (Ibid., 300) Further-

more, by using the aforementioned Weizsäcker’s distinction between potentiality and actuality of

information (Weizsaecker 1971, 28), we would like to generalize this distinction, ascribing, on the

one hand, potentiality to energy and information, with respect to the realization of changes or the

selection of changes respectively; on the other hand, actuality to matter and structure with respect

to the actualized changes and the selected changes respectively.

3. The Regressive Perspective: Bottom-Up

3.1. Manifestation of Reality as Emergence

As we have seen in previous sections, at each level of the hierarchy of complexity the co-

operating parties produce an action whose course constitutes the meaning of the corresponding

agency. This meaning produces in nature new regularities, new classicities in the upper levels,

which are emergent in both ontological and epistemological senses; ontologically emergent, be-

cause they represent properties which are not reducible to the mere superposition of the properties

of the involved parties, but essentially dependent on the rules of interaction; epistemologically,

because these regularities constitute the environmental uniformities that agents – at the macrolevel

– can sense.

Although we might consider different kinds of sensing, vision constitutes a paradigmatic and

highly developed way of sensing the environment, quite widespread throughout animal species. It

entails the reception of the electromagnetic radiation coming from objects which generally scatters

an illuminating homogeneous radiation (at least homogeneous in comparison to the heterogeneity

of the scattered radiation). Abstracting the means of sensing this radiation, we can regard this scat-

tered field surrounding the object as the manifestation of the object itself or as potential observa-

tion, which is indeed emergent to the underlying reality – as we will see by analyzing the nature of

such radiation. This emergence, in which the reality causing the actual manifestation is contingent

to the manifestation itself (i.e., it can be produced by an open set of equivalent objects) imposes on

the subject of observation an ontological boundary with obvious epistemological consequences.

Further epistemological boundaries are given by limitations of the electromagnetic sensing appa-

ratus of animal vision.

3.1.1. Physical Limitations of the Manifestation of Reality

Although the normal case of observation is constituted by the scattering of an illuminating radia-

tion, the problem of perception is actually related to the attention on the heterogeneities due to the

scattering field, therefore it is reasonable to focus on the equivalent problem of observing a set of

electromagnetic radiating sources – avoiding the need to consider illumination. If we hypothetically

knew the set of radiating sources, the question of how they manifest over a domain of potential

observation D, as illustrated in figure 1a, can be directly handled by using the Maxwell equations.

The linearity of these equations straightforwardly allows us to apply superposition in order to find

out the field distribution over the domain of interest. This problem is commonly called the “forward

problem”. However, the problem of perception is opposite: the field distribution over an observation

domain – the retina – is to some extent given, while the related source distribution is intended. This

is usually referred to as the “inverse problem”. According to the electromagnetic uniqueness theo-

rem, there is a unique solution for the field distribution surrounding the sources whenever either the

electric or the magnetic field is given at any surface enclosing the sources, for instance at surface S

in figure 1 (cf. Balanis 1989). Hence, there is a degree of freedom corresponding to which surface

is selected; in other words – as could also be argued using Schelkunoff’s equivalent theorem

(1936) – a volumetric distribution is undetermined by a surface distribution. The contingency of the

actual source distribution with respect to its manifestation constitutes a basis for speaking of mani-

festation as emergence: it is the co-operation of the parts related to the organization of the field

produced by each part which manifests as a whole. This represents an ontological limit directly

related to the epistemological boundary of delving into the object enclosed by S.

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Figure 1: a) In the forward problem, the linearity of the Maxwell equations provides a straightfor-

ward solution; b) In the inverse problem, the uniqueness and equivalent theorems limits

the problem to the determination of a superficial distribution.

The feasibility of solving the inverse problem can be handled in terms of the complexity of the

information provided by the electromagnetic fields generated by the object. In fact, the complexity

of an electromagnetic field of wavelength λ is strictly limited – as one of us has proven elsewhere

(Díaz Nafría and Pérez-Montoro 2011b; Díaz Nafría 2003, 2011):

(i) There is a minimum distance between independent intensity values, which is λ/2 for an arbitrary

observation (sampling theorem for arbitrary observation) and λd/2a for observation at a distance

d from an object within a ball of radius a (sampling theorem for distant observation). This mini-

mum distance can also be regarded as the size of the smallest perceivable details (or hetero-

geneities).

(ii) The maximum Kolmogorov complexity of the field produced by a source within a ball or radius a

is limited to N = 32π(τa/λ)2 (complexity theorem for radiation field), where τ ≥ 1 stands for an ex-

cess of the maximum spatial frequencies with respect to 2π/λ at S, related to the relative pres-

ence of evanescent modes at the vicinity of the object.

Concerning this maximum complexity, it is interesting to point out, on the one hand, that no mat-

ter how big the complexity of the object is, the complexity of the field distribution surrounding the

object cannot be bigger than N; on the other hand, that such complexity depends on a2, thus on the

area of the surrounding boundary, not on its volume. Consequently, the ambiguity provided by the

radiation of the object with respect to its volumetric structure corresponds to one dimension.1 Nev-

ertheless, though N constitutes a natural limit to what can be given by the field, generated by an

observed object, this is just a maximum rarely reached by such field, and – what is more important

to the problem of figuring the object from its manifestation – by the complexity of the object itself,

say, NO. It is clear that if NO >N, finding out the structure of the object from its field is out of reach,

the question is then whether the observation is enough for finding out the structure of the object in

case of NO < N.

This consideration of the manifestation of an object in isolation, independent of the observer,

should not be interpreted as a pure realist or objectivist stance. It is indeed the interaction with the

environment that is here considered since the space where the electromagnetic field takes place is

much more than nothing (in the sense of ontological emptiness), it has a structure which can be

expressed in terms of electric permittivity and magnetic permeability. With respect to the observer,

the validity of our classical electromagnetic analysis requires that the observer has little effect on

the whole field distribution. Therefore, the field distribution around an isolated object can be re-

garded – under this assumption – as potential observation.

3.1.2. Limitations of the Sensing Apparatus

Whilst the aforementioned limitations are independent of any sensing ability, it is also worth

considering how the sensing structure of animal vision is adapted: on one side, to the physical limi-

tations of the electromagnetic radiation; on the other, to the leeway and constraints offered by the

evolutionary path, as can be – for instance – observed through comparison between vertebrate and

cephalopod vision. This viewpoint represents a significant difference to Floridi’s account of data

and the Levels of Abstraction (which are in turn constituted by observables): whereas in Floridi

1 Though for the scattering problem – i.e. the usual case of observation –, this might be considered trivial, the problem,

as stated, comprises a volumetric distribution of electromagnetic currents.

S

ε2,µ2

qe,qm

J

M

D

ε1, µ1

x

y

z

?

a) Forward Problem

x

S

D

y

z

?

ET

ε1, µ1

b) Inverse Problem

JT

MT

22

José M. Díaz Nafría and Rainer E. Zimmermann

CC: Creative Commons License, 2013.

these are given, we try to explore what can be regarded as its emergence – as we have discussed

in detail in (Zimmermann & Díaz Nafría 2012).

Comparing the physical limits of the electromagnetic fields stated above with the structure of the

retina, we observe that the distances between photoreceptors are within the boundaries stated by

the aforementioned limit (i): whereas the minimum expected distance between independent values

of the electromagnetic field is 0.2 – 0.4 µm for visible spectra (400 – 800 nm), the minimum dis-

tance between photoreceptors (corresponding to its maximal density at the fovea of human retina)

is 2.2 µm on average, and 1 µm for animals with maximal visual acuity (some birds), which clearly

does not surpass the physical limits (Curcio et al. 1987). Moreover we might ask why the vision

apparatus of some species does not appear to have evolved to reach the physical limit – particular-

ly since it could provide an adaptation advantage. To find an answer to this reasonable question,

we should consider at least two important constraints of vertebrate vision:

(1) Dispersion at the photoreceptors due to the nervous network located over the photoreceptors

layer as shown in figure 2.a (which is the most common case for camera-type eyes, though not

for cephalopods for instance, which vision – figure 2.b –, though functionally similar, followed a

different evolution path with respect to vertebrates since about 600 million years (Lamb 2011;

Ogura 2004));

(2) Spherical aberration, due to the roundness of the eyeball structures, which therefore decreases

if the eye size increases.

Besides fine disturbances due to the former, its weight clearly increases if the eye size also in-

creases (since dispersion happens through a longer distance); therefore both constraints impose

an antagonist pair which distances vision acuity from the possibility of perceiving the heterogenei-

ties actually present in the electromagnetic field. As argued in (Díaz Nafría 2008) , the peculiarities

of bird vision probably allows a best compromise in which the minimum distance between inde-

pendent values of the field at the photoreceptors layer is about 1 µm. But, beyond this relative op-

timal, the question is why vertebrate vision did not evolve as in the cephalopods, locating the pho-

toreceptors above the neuronal network. To this respect Lamb’s hypothesis (2011) offers a sugges-

tive explanation:

Animal photoreceptors are either of rhabdomeric- or ciliary-type. The former are common in in-

vertebrate, the latter in vertebrate vision. However, ciliary-type photoreceptors are also present in

most organisms for non-visual purposes (sensing light for regulating circadian and seasonal

rhythms), whilst rhabdomeric cells subsist in vertebrates, though transformed into projection neu-

rons. By means of primitive evolution of vertebrates, in abyssal dark environments, the photosensi-

tive rhodopsin of ciliary photoreceptors underwent a change conferring to these photoreceptors

higher sensitivity than is achieved by rhabdomeric ones. This advantage allowed the colonization of

dark ecological niches (probably just for circadian and seasonal regulation at the outset). In this

context rhabdomeric photoreceptors adopted a new role: transmitting and processing signals to the

brain. Since – in the former topology – these photoreceptors were directly located where the light

comes from, this topology imposed a constraint that could not be reverted causing that the neu-

ronal network was developed above the photoreceptors and therefore producing the aforemen-

tioned drawback (1). Nevertheless, the advantage provided by the evolution in sensitivity is clearly

expressed by the fact that vertebrate rods can detect single photons, therefore reaching the strict

physical limit to this respect.

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C

Figure 2: In vertebrates, the light must pass through the transparent neuronal network causing

dispersion before it reaches the photoreceptors (of ciliary-type), whilst in the retina of

the cephalopods the photoreceptors (of rhabdomeric-type) are immediately under the

membrane limiting with the vitreous body. [The illustration has been elaborated using: a)

fig. 881 of Gray’s Anatomy (1918); and b) own artwork based upon description of

cephalopod’s retina from Young (1962)].

But coming back to the fact that visual acuity – even in birds – is somehow distant from the po-

tential manifestation of reality, analyzed in the previous section, we can state that given the con-

straints of the evolving structure, the sensing apparatus agrees with the maximal heterogeneity that

such type of structure can get to detect.

Another major limitation of animal vision concerns:

(3) The lack of sensitivity to phase variations of the received field, which implies – as one of the

authors has shown (Díaz Nafría 2003) – the impossibility of determining a unique distribution

over a surface bounding the object from the observation at just one surface (e.g. the retina of

one eye).

To this respect, it is interesting to notice that natural evolution has solved this constraint through

combination of two eyes, even though camera-type eyes probably evolved from the pineal gland,

thus without bilateral symmetry at the outset. (This point has been discussed in more detail in Díaz

Nafría & Zimmermann 2012)

3.2. Emergence of Intention: Closing the Hermeneutical Cycle

Turning back to the analysis of the physical problem as stated in §3.1.1: in the case of NO < N,

the observation of the object could be enough – from the viewpoint of the amount of information

needed – for determining a proper idea of its volumetric distribution. However, since there is in

principle an unlimited number of inner structures whose projections over a bounding surface are

equivalent, as well as an undetermined number of projection surfaces, such an ‘idea’ (or model of

the observed reality) should be achieved based upon some guesses, assumptions or a priori

knowledge of the inner structure. These can be interpreted as the semantic or algorithmic ground

for reconstructing the object, in the sense of the algorithmic information theory (Burgin and Díaz

Nafría 2011), but considering the evolution of these semantic grounds, it can also be visualized in

terms of Thom’s logoi dynamics, as the authors have argued elsewhere (cf. Zimmermann and Díaz

Nafría 2012, §5.2; cf. also Zimmermann 2001).

However, disregarding this evolutionary perspective of interpretation, to which we will come

back later, the limits of interpretation can be better analysed by properly posing the problem of

observing an object within a bounded region, and assuming that the interaction level in which ob-

Light

Ph

o

to

re

c

e

p

to

rs

Ph

o

to

re

c

e

p

to

rs

Ne

u

ro

n

a

l n

e

two

rk

Light

Ne

u

ro

n

a

l

netw

ork

a) Retina structure of vertebrates

c) Retina structure of octopus

Limiting

membrane

Distal

segments

Basal

membrane

Supporting

cells

Proximal

segments

Epitelial cells

Efferent

fibre

Dendritic

collateral

Inner limiting membrane

Stratum opticum

Ganglionic layer

Fibers of

Müller

Inner plexiform layer

Inner nuclear layer

Outer plexiform layer

Outer nuclear layer

Outer limiting membrane

Rods and Cones

Pigmented layer

24

José M. Díaz Nafría and Rainer E. Zimmermann

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servation takes place can be well described by Maxwell’s relations, to which also the previous

physical analysis (§3.1.1) refers. This corresponds to an idealised situation, but, on the one hand,

natural observation tends to it (as we proved above); on the other, it serves to evaluate the limits of

what natural observation can achieve.

3.2.1. Physical Limits of the Meaning-Offer

According to theorems (i) and (ii) together with the aforementioned equivalent theorem

(Schelkunoff 1936), it can be shown that a useful way to make the inverse problem well-posed is

by locating N equivalent tangent point sources over S regularly spaced at a distance λ/2τ:

∑

=

−

=

N

i

i

i

1

)'ˆ(ˆ

)(ˆ

rrs

rs

δ

(1)

where ∧ is here used to indicate estimates for the equivalent variables corresponding to the model

of the object: { 'ˆir } is the set of locations of the equivalent point sources, and ŝi represents the in-

tensity of an equivalent point source situated at 'ˆir . The space of equivalent manifestations,

∑

=

−

=

∗

=

N

i

i

i

1

)'ˆ(ˆ

)(ˆ)(

)(ˆ

rrGs

rsrGr

Ψ

,

(2)

generated by the space of equivalent source distributions {ŝ(r)}, is equivalent to the set of eventual

manifestations of any arbitrary inner (discrete or continuous) volumetric distribution. (In the appen-

dix, some details are provided about how to interpret these mathematical entities physically, as well

as how to derive them from the Maxwell relations).

For the sake of simplicity we may suppose that the real source (i.e. the observed reality) is de-

scribed by a set of NO Dirac delta distributions of different amplitude and position within the volume

enclosed by S:

∑

=

−

=

O

N

i

i

i

1

)'

(

)(

rrs

rs

δ

,

(3)

whose corresponding manifestation is given by:

∑

=

−

=

∗

=

O

N

i

i

i

1

)'

(

)()(

)(

rrGs

rsrG

r

Ψ

(4)

Despite the formal similarity of (2) and (4), it is worth emphasizing the relevance of the differ-

ences N vs. NO, and 'ˆir vs. 'ir . Whereas the former makes (2) directly related to the maximal com-

plexity of the field distribution N; the proper selection of { 'ˆir } (regarding regular distancing and cov-

erage of S) warranties the independency of the fields generated by the equivalent sources. Thus,

(2) is invertible, but there is no guarantee about the invertibility of (4). Furthermore, since

}ˆ{

Ψ

Ψ∈

,

it is possible to determine a unique equivalent distribution belonging to {ŝ} and compatible with Ψ:

)(

)(

)ˆ(ˆ

1 r

Gr

Ψ

rs

−

∗

=

ʹ′

(5)

which – as illustrated in Figure 3 – can be conceived as the meaning-offer of Ψ upon the semantics

described by (1) and (2).

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Figure 3: On the left: spaces of (supposed) reality and manifestation of the object, when the com-

plexity is constrained to NO punctual heterogeneities; on the right: spaces of manifesta-

tion (or information) and meaning-offer on the observer (subject) side, whose complexity

is constrained to N punctual heterogeneities. The real structure of the object (here de-

termined by NO values and positions) remains veiled to the subject, whereas a projec-

tion in the space of N punctual heterogeneities can be achieved.

3.2.2. Unveiling Reality: Hermeneutical Agency

But returning to the case in which N≫NO – which is a rather typical case if we disregard small

scale heterogeneities, and consider the low entropic objects we usually deal with – the real com-

plexity of both the object and its manifestations is much smaller than the complexity corresponding

to equation (5), then some representation could be found in which the description becomes shorter.

The simpler the description, the better it can be extracted from noise and therefore it is received

cleaner. Nevertheless, it is well known that – according to Turing’s halting theorem – there is no

recursive method to decide if the minimum description has been achieved. It is thus a question of

proper guessing, of finding out a proper semantics which allows the interpreter to achieve a better

representation compatible with the observed manifestation. This action is carried out by an herme-

neutical agent who, similarly to how nature enabled the emergence of the manifestation through

the co-operation of the radiating parts, closes the cycle of interpretation by creatively constructing a

possible path for the emergence of the given manifestation, though in reality it always remains

open by virtue of the possibility of finding an even more efficient description. Since the hermeneuti-

cal agent is itself a part of nature, by this means, nature can recognize itself.

The fact that the real object is not merely given by its manifestation, makes the task of interpret-

ing or modelling the object transcendental. By considering the hermeneutical subject and its activity

on its material flesh as well as its hermeneutical activity we are moving within the frame of tran-

scendental materialism as thoroughly developed by one of the authors (Zimmermann 2004b).

Given our formulation of the hermeneutical agency, it is reasonable to consider that the herme-

neutical task consists of reducing as much as possible the complexity of the representation, which

always remains as an open task: on one hand, because one can always seek new data about the

object; on the other, because there is no sure means to know that the minimum description has

been achieved for the given data.

This evolution of hermeneutic agency can be nicely exemplified beyond the case of visual per-

ception by the historical development of the astronomical system: Tycho-Brahe’s model represents

an important advance with respect to Ptolemaic system by extending the observation; whereas

Kepler’s model represents a more efficient hermeneutic agent with respect to the former by simpli-

fying the descriptive means, as has been discussed by one of the authors (Díaz Nafría 2011). An-

other interesting example for the evolution of hermeneutical agency within scientific advance (also

therein discussed) is clearly illustrated by the superseding of the Aristotelian type of systems of

living species (as, for example, the Linnaean taxonomy) through the evolutionary type (as in Dar-

win’s evolutionary taxonomy).

3.3. The Levels of Interpreting Reality

Through evolution of complexity, the sensing apparatus increases its own complexity, which in

turn causes an increase in the complexity of the related responses and representation means. As

we have seen in §3.1.2, the improvement of the sensing apparatus drives the autonomous agent

towards the meaning-offer of the physical manifestation of objects, which in turn implies an in-

crease in the ambiguity concerning the relation of what is given by sensation and what can be

found out therefrom.

At a lower level of complexity the sensing apparatus offers little ambiguity with respect to what

is signed. In the extreme case, minimum sensing would only sign that something has changed in

the environment – which by the way constitutes the primordial datum of any sensing – though with-

out further precision. We can also speak of minimum sensing whenever what is signed is of the

kind: there is light; it is daytime; it is cold; there is too much acid, etc. In an evolutionary sense the

specific sensing of the agent enables an adaptive finding of a proper “objective response” that must

be stored in the organic codes – in the sense of Barbieri (2003), as clarified below. In higher com-

plexity levels, the ambiguity – provided by sensation with respect to what is signed – increases,

bringing about the need of improved means of representation and memorizing in order to solve

such ambiguity, which enables the emergence of reflexive response, and hermeneutical agency.

26

José M. Díaz Nafría and Rainer E. Zimmermann

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For the sake of clarity we can speak of four differentiated levels of response with regard to the

sort of sensing the manifested reality, which can be typified as: objective, cognitive, reflexive, and

socio-ethical.

3.3.1. Objective Response

The cell provides a paradigmatic case of objective response which is also present in systems of

higher complexity – as it constitutes its basis. A cell, in general, has several means of sensing the

environment and adapting to those variations which are relevant to its survival. Since we have

been dealing with visual sensing, it is here interesting to consider the minimum case of seeing as

represented, for instance, by the unicellular organisms of the genus Euglena, illustrated in figure 4.

These cells have an eyespot apparatus which filters sunlight into the photo-sensitive structures at

the base of its flagellum. This eyespot enables the cell to sense the strength and direction of light,

and to move accordingly towards a medium of moderate light (away from darkness and bright

light).2 The ambiguity of perception is here very low: the strength of light is high or low, and it

comes from this or that direction; and accordingly the accuracy in the determination of the envi-

ronmental state is low.

Figure 4: General anatomy of a Euglenoid cell [Illustration by C. Miklos available in Wiki-

media Commons].

Generally speaking, in the objective response, the meaning is embodied in the organic structure

(constituted in the Euglena by the photoreceptor, the eyespot, the flagellar swelling, the flagellum,

and a contractile vacuole, linked by topologic, mechanical and chemical relations), in which a set of

constraints enable an effective utilization of energy. However if – in an evolutionary sense – we

observe it diachronically, these constitutive relations are established with respect to its effective-

ness in offering an adaptive benefit. The dynamics of these relations (constraints for the proper

driving of work) are embodied in the corresponding evolution of genetic codes – in the sense of

Barbieri (2003). Genetic codes offer at the same time means of memorizing effective constraints –

viz. meanings – and change of these constraints for further adaptations.

From the viewpoint of our understanding of information: the light comprises in the first place –

besides energy – the meanings of the directivity in the driving of energy and its amount. Such

meaning-offer is in itself the result of an interaction with the real space. In this respect, we can

speak of first-order meaning and first-order interaction. However, this meaning-offer or first-order

meanings represent a potentiality with respect to the selection of change in the cell for a proper

driving of energy, which constitute second-order meanings. The action of the cell allows the actual-

ization of its structure, which in this example implies some tropism, based upon the received infor-

mation. The cell as an autonomous agent performs an effective driving of energy for the benefit of

the cell in its survival. We can thus speak of proto-hermeneutics since the preliminary meaning-

offer has to be actualised within the meanings of the cell, materialized in the organic structures

which produce fixed actions with respect to the given interaction. Therefore, the response and its

2 In the Euglena the afferent structures of the cell –sensing the environment- are directly connected to the efferent ones

–the flagellum which causes the necessary movement towards a more suitable environment (PEET 2010).

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related meanings are objective in the sense that they comprise a fixed reaction and an objectivised

mechanism of response.

3.3.2. Cognitive Response

In the cognitive response, the complexity grows alongside the formalisation means for the ap-

prehension of reality, which in turn requires the ability to guess within the ambiguity given by the

sensing and the manifestation of reality (as analysed in §2.1). Comparing the sensing of the cell,

mentioned above, with the animal vision: both the ambiguity and the information about the ob-

served reality increases significantly. Grasping more data about reality – particularly if they have

different modality, for instance, visual and tactile data as discussed in (Díaz Nafría and Pérez-

Montoro 2011a) – the ambiguity, left by some partial perceptions (e.g. a visual percept), can de-

crease although new kinds of ambiguity may appear. Probably, the completeness of percepts,

through adapting new ways of sensing for given environments and given agencies, as in the case

of the two eyes vision argued in §3.1.2 for solving the ambiguity of phase-less light reception at the

retina, is evidence of perceptual evolution.

This completion of sensing by different modalities can be represented by the algorithm depicted

in figure 5 (adapted from the generalized method of successive projections developed by one of

the authors (Díaz Nafría 2003) for the solution of different inverse problems). Since all percepts

must be consistent with the interpretation of the object, it can be shown that – in virtue of the con-

vexity of the linear relation Gi, which links between interpreted objects and what is observed as

described by equation (2) – the solution asymptotically converges towards a stable solution through

successive and recursive application of observation-data. A tolerance with respect to the achieved

stability of the solution, represented by the parameter ε, constitutes a pragmatic compromise which

can be easily mapped in human perception. Such tolerance represents the referred open character

of perception and implies a truthfulness criterion significantly different to the one proposed by Flo-

ridi in his Correctness Theory of Truth (2011, ch.8).

Figure 5. Algorithmic approximation to the completion of percepts by different sensing modalities

(based on the method of successive projections developed for the solution of inverse

problems (Díaz Nafría 2003)). Ob{ } represents the combination of the observation of

modality i with the non-observed manifestation, based on the previous interpretation of

the object through Gi (which in turn links the interpretation of the object s with the mani-

festation of modality i). Whereas K{ } represents the constructed model of the object (at

any iteration) through Gi

-1 and based upon such combination of observable and non-

observable manifestations.

Unlike the linearity of relations Gi – as referred to in §3.2.1 – in case of cognitive subjects, non-

linear relations – mediated by memory – are established between sources and phenomena,

s N

, Ψ

1

N

... Ψ

N

N

Initial hypothesis

G2

-1

G1

-1

G2

G1

Ob{ k

1

Ψ }

ε<

− }

,{

1

k

k

d ss

K{ k

s }

Ob{ k

2

Ψ }

Ob{ k

3

Ψ }

Ob{ k

N

Ψ }

G3

-1

G 3

GN

-1

G N

● ● ●

Application of

observations

(corresponding to

manifestation of

modality 1, 2,.. )

Gi : allows to derive the manifesta-

tion of modality i from an interpre-

tation of the object, s.

Gi -1: allows to make an interpreta-

tion of the object s consistent with

observation i

Truthfulness criterion

Iteration

Interpretation output

28

José M. Díaz Nafría and Rainer E. Zimmermann

CC: Creative Commons License, 2013.

achieving a much faster algorithmic convergence. Furthermore, since different neuronal subsys-

tems specialize in the response given to different sensing modes, instead of the successive appli-

cation of sensing data, the cognitive response simultaneously apply different sensing modalities,

which – though operative equivalent – offers an adaptive benefit regarding time-efficiency.

If we understand the algorithm here depicted as the agent activity in which actualised infor-

mation (within the cognitive structure K{}) is computed upon the information provided through ob-

servation Ob{} (including previous computations), the model offers significant alignment with the

info-computationalism, as advanced by Dodig-Crnkovic (2010). However, we consider of funda-

mental relevance the distinction herewith established between information and energy, as well as

between potential and actual information (the latter represented by structure), which in Dodig-

Crnkovic’s approach seem to be blurred.

To the issue of the actualization of the cognitive structure, at this level of complexity (i.e. higher

than objective response but lower than reflexive one), neuronal-epigenesis, learning and memoriz-

ing play a significant role. Learning in the specific environments where animal life is going to be

developed (often through games of immature animals) probably enables the acknowledging of

relevant objects with which the animal will have to deal. By means of this acknowledgment, stored

in the animal memory, the ambiguity of sensing is solved and can be directly related to a behaviour

which is to a large extent determined by the genetic code (though its weight is lesser for higher

animals). Therefore the apprehension of reality can be directly linked to a particular response (or,

rather, to a complex set of responses), in which the efficiency of the animal agency is achieved

(related to the adequate driven of energy for the animal itself). As long as the response is fixed, we

cannot speak of reflexive response; to the extent that the ambiguity of the apprehension of reality is

solved in the cognitive system and its related memory, we cannot speak of objective response.

3.3.3. Reflexive Response

In the reflexive response, since the response to the apprehension of reality is not fixed once and

for all, offering through evolution a growing open character, the interpretation, though also mediat-

ed by learning (stored by memory), is left open to further revision, deepening, correction… as par-

ticularly observed in humans. It is however worth remarking that responses of objective and cogni-

tive type – referred to above – are to a large extent present in humans. For instance, the immediate

removing of the finger that is pricked by the rose spine is an example of an “objective response”.

But the repertoire of human responses of this kind is really extensive. Certainly, most of our somat-

ic and visceral activity is regulated by inner and outer sensing unconsciously imposed, and fre-

quently by means of a neuronal communication not passing through the cortex. Nevertheless, it is

also a remarkable feature of our nervous system, in which evolved connexions coexist with more

primitive ones, that the cortex holds the possibility of interfering with the “objective responses” –

though with some delay. This is because the spinal cord transmits the sense impulses simultane-

ously upwards and downwards (Raisbeck 1954; Sobrino and Simón 1986). We can observe this

feature as a consequence of the aforementioned “leeway and constraints of the evolutionary path”

(§3.1.2).

In any case, besides this coexistence of responses of lower complexity, it is characteristic of the

reflexive response that the apprehended reality can be directly sensed as reality itself and not only

as stimulation, i.e. as what produces a reaction for the adaptation to the sensed changes. Being

the manifestation of reality essentially ambiguous or incomplete (for physical manifestation – as

shown in §3.1.1 – there is a degree of ambiguity corresponding to one dimension with respect to

the space of representation, which can be, for instance, the four dimensional space-time) reality is

sensed by the reflexive agent as fundamentally open, in two senses: (i) with respect to the object

as something that has to be further fathomed, (ii) concerning its connection with the environment to

which it can be bounded by different functionalities. This is particularly the case of sensing objects

in cultural contexts (including its related technical means, social, as well as political and economic

relations). In agreement with “perceptual functionalism” – as developed by Brunner et al. (1947) –

or Foerster’s perceptual epistemology (Aguado 2009; Foerster 1981), we can state that perception,

driven by subjective dispositions, necessities and objectives, has a sort of hypothetical character

susceptible to modification, deepening and correction. But according to Gestaltpsychologie the

creative abductions that are needed in the hermeneutical process, requires a structured and holis-

tic apprehension of the interpretandum as a whole (including its connections with the environment).

The example given above (§3.2.2) of scientific discovery illustrates both the openness of her-

meneutics, linked to an evolutionary arrow, and the structuration of the wholeness (in which reduc-

tion of complexity of the interpretation is a sign of effectiveness of the related agency). By this

means, interpretation operates as nature: it searches for the simplest means (i.e. most effective

tripleC 11(1): 13-35, 2013

29

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with respect to used resources) for defining the agency in which the observed reality is involved.

Since the course of action of the autonomous agent constitute its own meaning, when the interpre-

tation is correct, the reflexive and the objective meanings (or their intensive and extensive aspects)

agree (cf. Zimmermann and Díaz Nafría 2012, §3.2).

3.3.4. Social and Ethical Response

In the social response, the autonomous agent is defined by the relations established among re-

flexive agents, embodied roles and moral behaviour. In the emergence of social agency, there is

often no reflexion on the involved benefit, though cultural semantics leave a degree of openness

concerning the involved relations which enables trial and error but also free interpretation by means

of which the imagination of new relations can offer shortcuts in the search of improved adapted

agency. Political agency can be conceived as aligned to the latter, while many situations reported

by anthropologists offer excellent examples of both. For instance, the family structure studied by

Claude Levi-Strauss (1969) – particularly the Australian systems, or the interesting case of change

in the ecological conditions mapped in the “Asdiwal story”, reported by the same author (1967). As

he analysed, a clear semantic openness was exhibited only at the time in which new relations were

sought until a new ecological equilibrium was achieved. Interestingly, the semantic openness is

closed through new bipolar distinctions adapted to the new relations. This points to a relevant fea-

ture of cultural symbolic universes whose meanings are adapted in normal conditions to effective

agencies: offering closure – often blocking intentional agencies at the lower level – when agency is

effective; exhibiting growing degrees of openness when the corresponding agency is not any more

effective. Whenever the agency is stable, the meanings of the related semantic universe constitute

the constraints which appropriately drive the energy to produce work in benefit of the social agency

itself. Moral values constitute an important means for building constraints at this level of complexity.

Particularly in the cases in which there is an intentional search of new social agencies, it is pos-

sible to speak of self-reflexion. The subject has to interpret herself in the social wholeness. Retro-

spectively she can fathom her biography immersed in social, cultural and historical worlds; pro-

spectively, she can imagine possible utopias (in the sense of Bloch) in a creative search of more

appropriate agencies. This self-reflexion of the appropriate relations to drive social action consti-

tutes the ethical reflection in itself. It aims at the objective of finding a more appropriate agency,

which can be very well symbolized by the Spinozist: “The more perfection a thing possesses, the

more it acts and the less it suffers, and conversely the more it acts the more perfect it is” (Spinoza

1677, V, prop.40).

4. Conclusive Remark: Towards a Unified Perspective of Information and

Meaning

As we have tried to show there are good grounds for adopting a unified vision of these funda-

mental aspects of reality in coherence with our scientific knowledge. This offers – as we advanced

in the introduction – a robust foothold for the development of a Unified Theory of Information (UTI)

as proposed by Hofkirchner (1999; 2010). We therein stated the dependence of this success on a

well-established foundation of physics, able to unify the theories of relativity and quanta. Though

this has not yet being achieved, we have adopted hereby a vision which – being consistent with

deep-rooted theoretical and experimental accounts – enables us to unfold an evolutionary under-

standing for the emergence of complexity and meaning in physical, biological, cognitive and social

systems; visualising emergence in a sense that is ontological and epistemological at the same time

(and can also be understood as emergence of classicities). Such insights enabled us to devise the

General Definition of Information (GDI) proposed by Floridi throughout nature properly; regarding

information alongside its related meaning as fundamental aspects of the structure of the world.

We estimate that the approach hereby advanced meets all the requirements of the UTI pro-

gramme as enunciated by Haefner (Hofkirchner 1999, xv-sq), offering further sound foundations for

its development. However, our viewpoint is not following the thought expressed by Fenzl and oth-

ers that “formalism [is] of merely secondary importance” (Fenzl and Hofkirchner 1997), not because

of the sheer purpose of attaining a nice formalised theory, neither for achieving quantitative scaf-

folds to assess how much is to gain or to lose, but because – as we have discussed through our

progressive and regressive perspectives – it is the “form” (either in potentiality or actuality) that is in

the core of the “new” in reality; of the emergence and dynamics of agency; of the emergence and

dynamics of meaning. Therefore, formalism is of major importance whenever it aims at a proper

mapping of the dynamics of form in reality, and particularly regarding qualitative features.

30

José M. Díaz Nafría and Rainer E. Zimmermann

CC: Creative Commons License, 2013.

With respect to the herein tackled levelism of interpretation (in which the regressive perspective

has been developed), our proposal and the one developed within the frame of UTI by Fenzl,

Hofkirchner and others (op. cit.; Hofkirchner 1999) are significantly aligned; but it is here worth

mentioning a relevant distinction. The latter consider three fundamental levels: (i) self-restructuring,

(ii) self-reproducing, (iii) self-re-creation. Whereas (i) comprises self-referential semiotics aligned to

objective responses, and (iii) comprises self-anticipation semiotics aligned to socio-ethical re-

sponses; we have split (ii) – originally comprising self-representational semiotics – into cognitive

and reflexive responses. This distinction is noteworthy concerning our review of GDI and the formal

aspects of UTI: a) at the level of cognitive response, representation is lesser flexible, being at-

tached to stabilized logoi – in the sense of Thom, as we have argued elsewhere (Zimmermann and

Díaz Nafría 2012); b) at the level of reflexive response, the representation means are more flexible

(say, {Gi} can be disputed, i.e. the relation between the alleged reality and its manifestation); thus

emergence of logoi dynamics – in the sense of Thom (op. cit.; Zimmermann 2001).

But in addition to these endeavours towards a general understanding of information and mean-

ing, there are others worth considering with a view to eventual synergies. We have previously re-

ferred to Dodig-Crnkovic’s Info-computationalism and its alignment – besides the mentioned differ-

ential nuances – with respect to modelling interpretation at the level of cognitive response (§ 3.3.2,

though info-computationalism is actually proposed as to model throughout all levels of complexity).

Not far from this approach, and covering what we have identified as reflexive and socio-ethical

responses (§ 3.3.3-4), one of the authors has advanced a computational approach to the modelling

of research processes in which not only deductive and inductive paths are focused, but particularly

the fundamental role of creative abductions (Zimmermann and Wiedemann 2012).

Staying at the formal aspects, the categorical approach provided by Burgin in his General Theo-

ry of Information (GTI) offers an interesting toehold (Burgin 2012). Indeed, as we have upheld in

the progressive perspective, the underlying structure of the world can well be modelled as to the

general aspects of emergence through category theory (cf. Zimmermann and Díaz Nafría 2012,

appendix 6). On the other hand, we have highlighted information as one fundamental ingredient for

general agent dynamics (namely as potentiality for the selection of proper changes). Hence, the

GTI seems to be valuable for the development of a UTI in both qualitative and quantitative senses,

particularly considering the proven consistency with well-established theories of information. Never-

theless, recalling the aforementioned shyness with respect to formalisation within the UTI project,

we also cherish the need to stress the modelling of information throughout nature in consistency

with its related scientific knowledge. We consider such development should rely on the sciences,

and requires proving with seemless consistency. Hence, a UTI should neither be a philosophia

prima as Floridi defends, nor a mere formalising toolkit; rather a suitable philosphia ultima – as one

of us has defended elsewhere (Zimmermann 2010), providing by those means an appropriate scaf-

fold for the understanding of information in relation to other fundamental aspects of the world

throughout the sciences – though neither reducing to them nor putting aside fundamental question-

ing.

Concerning the kernel question of the emergence of meaning, Brier’s Cybersemiotics (2008;

2010) shows also some parallelism with our approach, which similarly develops an understanding

of emergence in joint-venture with a general understanding of information. However, differently to

Brier, we give a step forward so as to consider the foundation of meaning not only upon the “sign

games” played by living beings, but also upon what might be named “spin games” played at the

very world foundation – at pre-geometrical levels, as argued in the first part. Moreover, unlike in the

cybersemiotic approach, we deem information to entail meaning in the first place – as we have

discussed extensively – though we agree on the necessity of elaborating meanings of higher order

through living, cognitive and social agency, as argued in the last section.

The terms of message and messenger as proposed by Capurro’s Angeletics (2010; 2011) can

be used to visualise the meaning-offer and the first-order interaction determined by a particular

agency, as referred to in §2 (for instance the interaction which enables the emergence of the elec-

tromagnetic field). As far as the existence of the messenger constitutes a necessary condition for

the message, in our scaffold, it is the first-order agency that is needed for the emergence of mean-

ing in the first place – even at the most fundamental level. But insofar as the existence of an ap-

propriate recipient enables the hermeneutical disclosing of meanings, it is the second-order agency

(rooted on the same possibility than the first-order one) that enables the emergence of second-

order meanings and even the unveiling of the first-order ones. In similar terms, one of the authors

has shown the complementarity of both programmes in a recent contribution (Díaz Nafría 2011).

Summarizing, our proposal contributes to the erection of a Unified Theory of Information accord-

ing to a reviewed GDI which allows visualising information in nature altogether, complying with the

tripleC 11(1): 13-35, 2013

31

CC: Creative Commons License, 2013.

scientific development and being able to collaborate with other approaches in order to achieve a

better understanding of information, computation, meaning, interpretation and evolution of com-

plexity.

As we argued at the beginning, it is the commonality of the way up and the way down what en-

ables us to overcome the hindrances of a dualistic position so as to properly tackle the problem of

understanding the emergence of meaning alongside the emergence of being throughout the hierar-

chy of complexity. The key-player in the advancement through the levels of complexity is the au-

tonomous agent, through which emergence occurs in both ontological and epistemological senses:

creating novelty in nature, and making that nature acknowledges itself. This onto-epistemic vision

can be nicely symbolized by Herbert’s verses concerning human’s worldliness:

“His eyes dismount the highest star;

He is in little all the sphere;

Herbs gladly cure our flesh, because that they

Find their acquaintance there.”

(George Herbert, 1633, Man, v.21-24)

Appendix

The problem of radiation, stated above, can easily be analysed by considering the Maxwell

equations for a given frequency ω=2πf:

m

e

q

q

i

i

=

⋅∇⋅

=

⋅∇⋅

+=

×∇

−−

=

×∇

H

E

E

J

H

H

M

E

µ

ε

ωε

ωµ

(A1)

where E and H stand for the intensity distributions of the electric and magnetic field, respectively; J

and M for electric and magnetic current densities; qe and qm for electric and magnetic charge distri-

butions; and ε and µ for the electric permittivity and magnetic permittivity of the medium.

The problem of relating the wave fields to the sources can be simplified through definition of the

well-known vector potentials A and F:

A

F

H

F

A

E

×∇

+

⎭

⎬

⎫

⎩

⎨

⎧

∇∇

+

−

=

×∇−

⎭

⎬

⎫

⎩

⎨

⎧

∇∇

+

−

=

µ

ω

ε

ω

1

1

1

1

2

2

k

i

k

i

(A2)

which verify the wave equations directly related to the current distributions J and M – being k the

wave number, k2 =ω2 εµ :

M

F

F

J

A

A

ε

µ

−

=

+

∇

−

=

+

∇

2

2

2

2

k

k

(A3)

Through (A3) the vector potentials can be described as linear superposition of Green distribu-

tions

'

4

),(

'

rr

rr

rr

−

=

ʹ′

−

−

π

ik

e

G

, where r’ represents the position of a punctual source, r the position in which

the field is evaluated:

)(

)(

)

()(

)(

)(

)(

)

()(

)(

r

rM

rr

rM

rF

r

rJ

rr

rJ

rA

G

vd

G

G

vd

G

V

V

∗

=

ʹ′

ʹ′−

⋅ʹ′

=

∗

=

ʹ′

ʹ′−

⋅ʹ′

=

∫∫∫

∫∫∫

ʹ′

ʹ′

ε

ε

µ

µ

(A4)

being V’ the volume of the source object, ∗ the tri-dimensional convolution. Using these vector po-

tential definitions, the electric and magnetic field intensity distributions can also be derived, which

can be described in terms of generalized Green tensors:

)()(

)(

)(

)(

)(

)(

)(

)(

)(

,

2

2

1

1

rsr

G

rM

rJ

rG

rG

rG

rG

rH

rE

∗

=

⎥

⎦

⎤

⎢

⎣

⎡

∗

⎥

⎥

⎦

⎤

⎢

⎢

⎣

⎡

−

=

⎥

⎦

⎤

⎢

⎣

⎡

HE

µ

ε

(A5)

where s(r) denotes generalized sources (electric and magnetic).

32

José M. Díaz Nafría and Rainer E. Zimmermann

CC: Creative Commons License, 2013.

Since according to the uniqueness theorem, the field E, H is unique when the superficial distri-

bution of the either the tangent electric E or the magnetic H is specified on S, it is enough to focus

on just one of the fields (or any combination of both), symbolized by Ψ(r) – as the phenomenon of

the source-object:

)()(

)(rsrGr

Ψ

∗

=

.

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About the Authors

Rainer E. Zimmerman

received his PhD in Mathematics in 1977 from FU Berlin) and spent the years between 1982-1988 in Studies in Philosophy,

History, and Literature at TU Berlin. He received a PhD in Philosophy in 1988 from TU Berlin. He has held the following

positions: since 1995 Professor of Philosophy at the Polytechnic University of Muenchen; In 1998, Habilitation in Natural

Philosophy (University of Kassel) – since then member (Privatdozent) of the department there; 1999/2000 Visiting Scholar

at the History and Philosophy of Science Department and Visiting Fellow of Clare Hall, both at Cambridge (UK) – since then

Life Member of Clare Hall; 2001 Research Visitor to the University of Bologna, Cooperative Research Project there under

the title “Reconstruction of the Historical City Centre”; 2003 Senior Visiting Fellow to the Institute of Advanced Studies, Villa

Gandolfi Pallavicini, University of Bologna; 2006 International Visiting Professor at the Information and Communication

Technologies and Society program, University of Salzburg; 2010/2011 Visiting Professor, Centre for Metropolitan Studies,

TU Berlin.

J.M. Díaz Nafría

obtained M.Sc. in telecommunication engineering from the Universidad del País Vasco, Bilbao, Spain, and received his PhD

in telecommunication engineering from the Universidad Politécnica de Madrid with a dissertation on "Contributions to the

electromagnetic inverse problem". He was also awarded with a M.Sc. in Philosophy by the Universidad Nacional de Edu-

cación a Distancia (UNED). He is currently researcher at the Universidad of León, visiting professor at the Munich University

of Applied Sciences, and belongs to the board of directors of the Science of Information Institute, the Institute für Design

Science, and the International Society of Information Studies. He is also member of several international scientific societies

in the field of information theories. He was research fellow at the Vienna University of Technology and at the Technical

University of Madrid. He also served as professor at the Universidad Alfonso X el Sabio in Madrid between 1997 and 2009

and has been visiting lecturer at the University of Furtwangen, Sankt Pölten University of Applied Sciences and University of

Salzburg. He co-directed the “First International Meeting of Experts in Information Theories” (León, Spain, 2008) and the

“Colloquium BITae” (León, Spain, 2009). He currently coordinates an interdisciplinary research group meted around the

BITrum project (Interdisciplinary approach to information, http://en.bitrum.unileon.es).