Introduction to Side-Channel Analysis



François-Xavier Standaert

UCL Crypto Group, Belgium

Summer school on real-world crypto, 2016

Outline

- Link with linear cryptanalysis
- Standard Differential Power Analysis
- Noise-based security (is not enough)
- *CPA vs Gaussian templates*
- Post-processing the traces
- Noise amplification (aka masking)
- Conclusions & advanced topics

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

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

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

Linear cryptanalysis (II)

- Main characteristics
  - Divide-and-conquer attack
  - Data complexity $\propto \frac{1}{\varepsilon^2}$
    - $\varepsilon = 2^{n-1} \cdot \prod_{s=1}^{n} \varepsilon_s$ (n S-boxes in A, bias ε_s)
  - Time complexity $\approx$ # of active S-boxes in R1

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  - Data: good (non-linear) S-boxes ✓
  - Data & time: Many active S-boxes ✓
  - Data: Larger number of rounds ✓

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$\Rightarrow$ AES: $\varepsilon < 2^{-64}$ after a few of rounds

Side-channel cryptanalysis



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$\Rightarrow$ Unprotected implem: $\mathrm{MI}(K; L, X) > 0.01$

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Standard DPA



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

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

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

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

Measurement & pre-processing

- Noise reduction via good setups (!)
- Filtering, averaging (FFT, SSA, …)
- Detection of Points-Of-Interest (POI)
- Dimensionality reduction (PCA, LDA,…)
- …

Prediction and modeling

- General case: profiled DPA
  - Build "*templates*", i.e. $\hat{f}(l_i|k, x_i)$
    - e.g. Gaussian, regression-based
  - Which directly leads to $\widehat{\Pr}[k|l_i, x_i]$

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  - e.g. $m_i^{k^*} = \mathrm{HW}(z_i)$

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- Separation: only profiled DPA is guaranteed to succeed against any leaking device (!)

Exploitation

- Profiled case: maximum likelihood

Exploitation

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- Unprofiled case:
  - Difference-of-Means
  - Correlation (CPA)
  - « On-the-fly » regression
  - Mutual Information Analysis (MIA)
  - […]

Illustration

Gaussian templates



$$\tilde{k} = \underset{k^*}{\operatorname{argmax}} \prod_{i=1}^{q} \frac{1}{\sqrt{2 \cdot \pi} \cdot \sigma(L)} \cdot \exp\left(-\frac{1}{2} \cdot \left(\frac{l_i - m_i^{k^*}}{\sigma(L)}\right)^2\right)$$

- More efficient (why?)
- Outputs probabilities

CPA



$$\tilde{k} = \underset{k^*}{\operatorname{argmax}} \frac{\mathrm{E}\left(L \cdot M^{k^*}\right) - \mathrm{E}(L) \cdot \mathrm{E}(M^{k^*})}{\sigma(L) \cdot \sigma(M^{k^*})}$$

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First-order CPA (I)

- **Lemma 1.** The mutual information between two normally distributed random variables X, Y with means μ_X, μ_Y and variances σ_X^2, σ_Y^2 equals:

$$\mathrm{MI}(X;Y) = -\frac{1}{2}\log_2(1-\rho(X,Y)^2)$$

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- **Lemma 2.** In a CPA, the number of samples required to distinguish the corrrect key with model M_k from the other key candidates with models M_{k*} is $\propto \frac{c}{\rho(M_k,L)^2}$ (*with c a small constant depending on the SR & # of key candidates*)

- **Lemma 3.** Let X, Y and L be three random variables s.t. $Y = X + N_1$ and $L = Y + N_2$ with N_1 and N_2 two additive noise variables. Then:

$$\rho(X, L) = \rho(X, Y) \cdot \rho(Y, L)$$

First-order CPA (II)

- **Lemma 3.** Let X, Y and L be three random variables s.t. $Y = X + N_1$ and $L = Y + N_2$ with N_1 and N_2 two additive noise variables. Then:

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- **Lemma 4.** The correlation coefficient between the sum of n independent and identically distributed random variables and the sum of the first $m < n$ of these equals $\sqrt{m/n}$

Paper & pencil estimations (I)

- FPGA implementation of the AES
- Adversary targeting the 1st byte of key
- Hamming weight leakage function/model
- 8-bit loop architecture broken in 10 traces

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- How does the attack data complexity scale
  - For a 32-bit architecture?
    - i.e. with 24 bits of « algorithmic noise »
  - For a 128-bit architecture?
    - i.e. with 120 bits of « algorithmic noise »

Paper & pencil estimations (II)

- Hint: $L = \mathrm{M} + \mathrm{N} = (M_P + M_U) + N$

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  - For the 32-bit architecture:
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- Lemma 2: $\frac{c}{(\sqrt{8/8} \cdot \rho(M,L))^2} = 10$

Paper & pencil estimations (III)

- Data complexity for the 32-bit case:
- Data complexity for the 128-bit case:

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  - (10 < data complexity < 40 because of c)

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CPA vs. Gaussian templates

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  - i.e. unprotected implementations
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$\Rightarrow$ Gaussian templates outperforms CPA because it (usually) exploits a better (profiled) **model**

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Exploiting offline computing power

- Key enumeration



- & rank estimation if key is beyond enumeration

CPA vs. Gaussian templates

- Enumeration / rank estimation errors



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Masking & 2nd-order DPA



More generally (I)

- Let $z = S(x \oplus k) = S(y)$ be a leaking S-box
- Let $y = y_1 \oplus y_2 \oplus \cdots \oplus y_d$ be a sharing of y



- Perform computations on “shared” variables

More generally (II)

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- Multiplications: $\mathrm{c} = a \times b$ in three steps

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- Linear operations: $\mathrm{f(a)} = \mathrm{f}(a_1) \oplus \mathrm{f}(a_2) \oplus \cdots \oplus \mathrm{f}(a_d)$

- Multiplications: $\mathrm{c} = a \times b$ in three steps

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partial products

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partial products refreshing

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partial products refreshing compression

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partial products refreshing compression

$\Rightarrow$ Quadratic overheads & randomness

Main theorem (informal)

- Assume leakage variables $L_{Z_i} = \delta(Z_i) + N$ s.t.
  - $\mathrm{MI}(Z_i; L_{Z_i}) \leq \frac{c}{d^2}$ (why d^2?)
  - The leakages of the shares are independent
- For a masking scheme with *d* shares
- And an adversary using *m* measurements

- Then: $\mathrm{SR} \leq 1 - \left(1 - \mathrm{MI}(Z_i; L_{Z_i})^d\right)^m$

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- For $m = 1$, $\mathrm{SR} \leq \mathrm{MI}(Z_i; L_{Z_i})^d \propto (\sigma_N^2)^d$
- (Intuitively ≈ “noisy” piling up lemma)

Statistical intuition

- 1-bit, 2-shares example



(a) $Z = 0$, serial.



(b) $Z = 1$, serial.



(c) $Z = 0$, parallel.



(d) $Z = 1$, parallel.

Statistical intuition

- 1-bit, 2-shares example

key-independent means



(a) $Z = 0$, serial.



(b) $Z = 1$, serial.



(c) $Z = 0$, parallel.



(d) $Z = 1$, parallel.

Information theoretic intuition

- Slope of the IT curves = d (*if independent leaks*)



Wrapping up

- Is masking an efficient countermeasure?
  - Security (data) is exponential in d
  - Cost is […]

Wrapping up

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

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

- If the leakages are noisy and independent (!)

Wrapping up

- Is masking an efficient countermeasure?
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- If the leakages are noisy and independent (!)
- How does the time complexity scale in d?

Wrapping up

- Is masking an efficient countermeasure?
  - Security (data) is exponential in d
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- If the leakages are noisy and independent (!)
- How does the time complexity scale in d?
  - Depends on the implem. (e.g. serial or //)

Outline

- Link with linear cryptanalysis
- Standard Differential Power Analysis
- Noise-based security (is not enough)
- *CPA vs Gaussian templates*
- Post-processing the traces
- Noise amplification (aka masking)
- **Conclusions & advanced topics**

Conclusions

- Unprotected implementations are easy targets
  - Physical biases are usually large
- Noise is an ingredient – not the solution
- Noise amplification is possible (via masking)
  - But is hard to implement securely

Conclusions

- Unprotected implementations are easy targets
  - Physical biases are usually large
- Noise is an ingredient – not the solution
- Noise amplification is possible (via masking)
  - But is hard to implement securely

- More generally, efficient countermeasures against side-channel attacks always combine two ingredients: sound (*falsifiable*) hardware assumptions & mathematical amplification

Advanced topics

- More elaborate/powerful attacks
  - Algebraic/analytical SCA
- Simpler/cheaper evaluations
  - Leakage detection
- Worst-case evaluations
  - Model certification
- Secure & efficient masking
  - Inner product masking
  - Threshold implementations (HW)
  - Formal verification (SW)
- Security by design (leakage-resilience)

THANKS

http://perso.uclouvain.be/fstandae/

Related publications & further readings. Standard DPA (slide 5). Stefan Mangard, Elisabeth Oswald, François-Xavier Standaert: *One for all - all for one: unifying standard differential power analysis attacks*. IET Information Security 5(2): 100-110 (2011). **Pre-processing (slide 6).** Victor Lomné, Emmanuel Prouff, Thomas Roche: *Behind the Scene of Side Channel Attacks.* ASIACRYPT (1) 2013: 506-525. ***Filtering*.** Santos Merino Del Pozo, François-Xavier Standaert: *Blind Source Separation from Single Measurements Using Singular Spectrum Analysis*. CHES 2015: 42-59. ***POI detection*.** Oscar Reparaz, Benedikt Gierlichs, Ingrid Verbauwhede: *Selecting Time Samples for Multivariate DPA Attacks*. CHES 2012: 155-174. 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François-Xavier Standaert, Eric Peeters, Gaël Rouvroy, Jean-Jacques Quisquater, *An Overview of Power Analysis Attacks Against Field Programmable Gate Arrays*, Proceedings of the IEEE, 94(2): 383-394 (2006). **Trading data for time (slide 14).** Luke Mather, Elisabeth Oswald, Carolyn Whitnall: *Multi-target DPA Attacks: Pushing DPA Beyond the Limits of a Desktop Computer.* ASIACRYPT (1) 2014: 243-261. **CPA vs. Gaussian templates (slide 15).** Stefan Mangard, Elisabeth Oswald, François-Xavier Standaert: *One for all - all for one: unifying standard differential power analysis attacks*. IET Information Security 5(2): 100-110 (2011). **Key enumeration/rank estimation (slide 16).** Nicolas Veyrat-Charvillon, Benoît Gérard, Mathieu Renauld, François-Xavier Standaert: *An Optimal Key Enumeration Algorithm and Its Application to Side-Channel Attacks*. Selected Areas in Cryptography 2012: 390-406. Nicolas Veyrat-Charvillon, Benoît Gérard, François-Xavier Standaert: *Security Evaluations Beyond Computing Power: How to Analyze Side-Channel Attacks you Cannot Mount?* EUROCRYPT 2013: 126-141. Cezary Glowacz, Vincent Grosso, Romain Poussier, Joachim Schüth, François-Xavier Standaert: *Simpler and More Efficient Rank Estimation for Side-Channel Security Assessment*. FSE 2015: 117-129. Daniel P. Martin, Jonathan F. O'Connell, Elisabeth Oswald, Martijn Stam: *Counting Keys in Parallel After a Side Channel Attack*. ASIACRYPT (2) 2015: 313-337.**Key enumeration/rank estimation errors (slide 17).** Romain Poussier, Vincent Grosso, François-Xavier Standaert: *Comparing Approaches to Rank Estimation for Side-Channel Security Evaluations*. CARDIS 2015: 125-142. **Masking (slides 19-20).** Yuval Ishai, Amit Sahai, David Wagner: *Private Circuits: Securing Hardware against Probing Attacks*. CRYPTO 2003: 463-481. Matthieu Rivain, Emmanuel Prouff: *Provably Secure Higher-Order Masking of AES*. 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