Champions League Tactical Analysis 2024/25: Best Formations & Plays From Matchday 4
Matchday four of the 2024/25 UEFA Champions League is complete.
Our tactical analysis shares the best formations, plays and tactics from Champions League week four.
We will analyze Barcelona’s attacking tactics, the characteristics of the half-spaces, and the benefits of overloads in these areas.
Additionally, we will examine Bayer Leverkusen’s central overload in the build-up play and Liverpool’s solutions.
Red Star Belgrade Vs Barcelona Tactical Analysis
Hansi Flick Barcelona’s tactics overpowered Vladan Milojević‘s Red Star Belgrade 5-2.
In the 76th minute, FC Barcelona scored through Fermín López to make it 5-1.
The entire analysed sequence starts at 75:00 and ends with the goal at 75:50.
Several interesting tactical principles can be observed here, demonstrating how to dominate and break down a deep-lying opponent.
Barcelona’s positioning with the ball is highly flexible and adapts to the zones that need to be occupied.
The full-backs, Jules Koundé and Gerard Martín, are solely responsible for providing width.
The wingers (at the time of the goal, Lamine Yamal and Fermín) drop into the half-spaces on the ball-near side.
Notably, the left winger, Fermín, operates as a “free player” in Barcelona’s play with the ball, similar to Raphinha, whom he replaced.
This allows him to act primarily as an overload player on his nominally far-side right, regularly filling specific spaces to create numerical superiority.
Barcelona initiates a possession phase against Belgrade’s deep-lying opposition, who are set up in a 4-5-1.
Yamal, Dani Olmo, Fermín, and Robert Lewandowski overload the space between the lines, forcing Belgrade’s defensive line to push up repeatedly, creating issues in their coverage.
At the same time, the opposition’s midfield line is forced to reorient to constantly maintain their cover shadows.
To create marking problems, Barcelona frequently uses opposing movements, both in-depth and coming back from it.
Following the play further, we can see how Barcelona overload the half-space.
With Marc Casadó on the ball and the winger Yamal and the attacking midfielder Olmo shifting into the half-space, the centre is pulled open, which Yamal subsequently attacks.
This setup also gives Barcelona greater flexibility, as they can attack both the flank and the centre from the half-space.
Additionally, Barcelona has more passing options from the half-space.
The full-back Koundé, who provides width, becomes an additional passing option, along with players in the centre and the opposite half-space.
Following the play further, another advantage of the ball-near overload, especially in the half-space, becomes evident.
Olmo loses the ball between the lines in the half-space, but Barcelona immediately has numerical superiority close to the ball due to the overload.
The number of players and Barcelona’s players’ positioning in the surrounding space are crucial for successful counter-pressing here.
This enables Barcelona to immediately counter-press aggressively, as their numerical superiority in the half-space blocks the path to the centre.
The opponent is forced into a dead zone on the flank with a closed body position facing the sideline, and the ball is regained.
This aggressive counter-pressing allows Barcelona to maintain pressure on the opponent over an extended period without sacrificing necessary risk in their possession play.
Barcelona then builds up play again, following the same pattern as at the start of the sequence.
Casado, on the ball, dribbles forward in the half-space.
This time, the left winger Fermín, acting as a “free player,” joins the right half-space as an overload player alongside the shifting Yamal.
Passing options are again created in the space between the lines.
With these positions, Belgrade’s centre-backs face a dilemma between pushing up and covering, while their winger is caught between shifting centrally and closing off the flank.
In addition to the vertical alignment, the three players in the half-space use slight diagonal staggering.
Casadó, Pedri, Olmo, and Lewandowski also form a series of diagonal passing options toward the goal.
This arrangement is well-known and favoured in “Relationism.”
Such a setup makes it more challenging for the defence to cover, as they must shift both horizontally and vertically.
Moreover, the diagonal pattern makes it easier for the attacking team to advance toward the goal, as each pass immediately opens up multiple further diagonal passing options.
A diagonal pass follows through the newly opened gap to Koundé, bypassing a total of 9 players.
Koundé then lays it off to Fermín, who makes a run into the space behind and scores.
Liverpool Vs Bayer Leverkusen Tactical Analysis
Arne Slot‘s Liverpool won 4-0 against Xavi Alonso‘s Bayer Leverkusen.
However, the first half was largely balanced, with the score at 0-0 at half-time.
Partly due to a tactically adjusted build-up play, Leverkusen generated possession phases in the opponent’s third.
In the seventh minute, Leverkusen broke free from Liverpool’s high pressing.
Leverkusen build-up play in a flexible 3-2-3-2 or 3-2-2-3 formation.
The quick Jeremie Frimpong and Victor Boniface occupy the wide areas, maximizing both width and depth.
In the centre, Granit Xhaka and Aleix García typically operate.
At the same time, Florian Wirtz plays centrally in the three-player line ahead of them, with Alejandro Grimaldo shifting in from the left and Exequiel Palacios on the right.
This structure strongly resembles Guardiola’s 3-2-2-3 build-up, which is based on Cruyff’s 3-diamond-3 system.
By arranging a three-player build-up line and positioning Frimpong and Boniface as wide as possible, Liverpool were forced to close a very large width in their pressing.
This significantly complicated defending Leverkusen’s central numerical superiority.
With five players in the centre, Leverkusen always had an overload in the strategically important middle of the field.
With the participating Hradecky, a four-player chain could be formed from the three-player build-up line, allowing for an even wider positioning.
At times, as seen in this play, Leverkusen also pushes the central centre-back one level higher to create even more numerical superiority in the centre.
The numerical superiority in the centre, created by the drifting Grimaldo, Wirtz, Palacios, and the two holding midfielders, provided great flexibility in Leverkusen’s build-up play.
This flexibility is particularly evident through the attacking midfielders, who regularly find space in the gaps between the lines.
Wirtz, acting as the “free player” in Leverkusen’s possession, enjoys significant positional freedom and can thus consistently create overloads on the ball-near side.
In addition to the build-up variations through the centre, as seen in the seventh minute, Grimaldo on the left and Palacios on the right frequently dropped into half space to bypass Liverpool’s first pressing line.
Thanks to its numerical superiority in the middle of the field, Leverkusen was able to create overloads in ball-near areas as needed.
This further demonstrates how strategically valuable control over the centre of the field is.
The wide positioning of Boniface and Frimpong ensured that depth was created behind the opponent’s defence, either binding the last defensive line or provoking 1v1 situations on the final line.
This was especially the case when a Liverpool centre-back stepped out of the back line to balance the overload in the centre but had to sacrifice defensive coverage, leading to 1v1 situations on the flanks.
This is how Frimpong scored in the 43rd minute to make it 1-0 for Leverkusen, although the goal was disallowed for handball.
These tactical conditions would initially suggest a clear dominance for Leverkusen.
However, Liverpool’s style of play, especially in the second half, ensured that Leverkusen, despite their tactically superior build-up play, could not generate a real period of pressure.
The behaviour of Liverpool’s back four helped reduce the numerical disadvantage in the centre.
Regularly, centre-back Van Dijk would step out to cover Palacios, who was dropping into the half-space.
However, Van Dijk did not always fully step out to Palacios; instead, he stayed a few meters behind him, “on the move.”
This way, Van Dijk wasn’t completely dragged out of the back four and could drop back into position behind the defensive line if the ball was played to or beyond the last line.
Nonetheless, as previously described, Leverkusen managed to get behind the last line in the 43rd minute.
On the other side, full-back Trent Alexander-Arnold regularly stepped out to cover Grimaldo, who was dropping into the half-space.
To support this, Ibrahima Konaté, Virgil van Dijk, and Konstantinos Tsimikas shifted to the right side to provide cover, or when Leverkusen had central possession, Ryan Gravenberch would drop back into the backline.
From a 2-3 pressing structure with the advancing Alexis Mac Allister, Liverpool were able to put significant pressure on Leverkusen’s 3-2 build-up, disrupting the decision-making of Leverkusen’s build-up players.
Particularly in the second half, Liverpool repeatedly pressed Leverkusen’s goalkeeper Lukas Hradecky aggressively, forcing him into inaccurate long balls.
With the help of the covering shadows from the aggressively pressing forwards, Liverpool gave Leverkusen little time to play well-timed balls behind the last line; as a result, the back four could push up with less risk.
Additionally, Liverpool’s forwards would often drop deep when the first pressing line was bypassed to block the opponent’s holding midfielders and reduce the numerical superiority in the center.
Another key feature was that Gravenberch would mark Leverkusen’s “overload player” Wirtz man-to-man in such situations.
As a result, Wirtz, who plays such an essential role in Leverkusen’s build-up, was largely neutralised and struggled to make an impact.
Leverkusen’s build-up play had little impact on the game, which was also due to Liverpool’s very effective counter-pressing after losing possession.
This allowed Liverpool to frequently disrupt Leverkusen’s transition from winning the ball to setting up an organised build-up structure.
Additionally, Liverpool’s effective pressing during Leverkusen’s goal kicks forced Leverkusen to regularly play long balls, resulting in fewer build-up play situations.
Furthermore, Leverkusen struggled to create chances from their advantage, as they often got stuck against Liverpool’s outstanding four-man defence after bypassing the pressing in the transition play or when moving into the final third.
Both Van Dijk and Konaté were almost impossible to break down on the night.
For this reason, Leverkusen more frequently tried to exploit quick transitions after winning the ball to get behind the defence. As a result, there were fewer build-up play situations.
Conclusion
We’ve highlighted the most tactically interesting methods of this Champions League matchday.
This scout report shares insight for fans and coaches alike on what tactics have worked well so far in the 2024/25 UEFA Champions League, what to watch out for as the tournament progresses, and current tactical trends at the elite level.
We hope you enjoyed the continuation of the series with fewer game scenes but much more detailed analyses.
