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The European security and defence discourse and the role of arms companies

A Critical Discourse Analysis on European security policies post-2016

Abstract

This study concerns the security and defence policies of the European Union starting from 2016. This thesis aims to investigate how these European policies reflect a more general discourse on security and defence and how this discourse includes and influences the role of arms companies at the European level by creating new dynamics between private and public actors. The core of this study is the concept of *security and defence discourse*, understood as the representation of the security issue through ideas, principles, behaviours and structures. This thesis is based on three theoretical frameworks to fulfil the study's aim. The first frame of reference concerns the concept of security as a policy, the second outlines the terms of security and militarism, and the last examines the notions of elite and the Military-Industrial Complex. It is concluded that the European Union has embarked on a security and defence discourse that encapsulates for the first time the concept of militarism. In the recent European policies, militarism is not only understood as the predisposition to the use of armed force to resolve conflict and the importance of military spending and arms production, but also as a process of expansion of a particular sector – specifically the Military-Industrial Complex – with the creation of new relational networks that go beyond the private-public division.

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List of Abbreviation

AEA: Airborne Electronic Attack
AFET: Foreign Affairs Committee
ASD: Aerospace and Defence Industries Association of Europe
CARD: Coordinated Annual Review on Defence
CDP: Capability Development Plan
CGEA: Community General Export Authorization
CSDP: Common Security and Defence Policy
EDA: European Defence Agency
EDAP: European Defence Action Plan
EDIDP: European Defence Industrial Development Programme
EDF: European Defence Fund
EEAS: European External Action Service
ENAAT: European Network against arms trade
EOS: Organization for Security
EP: European Parliament
ESRIF: European Security Research & Innovation Forum
ESRP: EU Security Research Program
ESRB: European Security Research Advisory Board
ESS: European Security Strategy
EUGS: European Union Global Strategy
FP7: Multiannual Framework Program 7
FYROM: Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia
GoP: Group of Personalities
HR/VP: High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy / Vice President of the European Commission
IEPG: Independent European Program Group
ISIS: Islamic State of Syria and Iran
MIC Military Industrial Complex
NATO: North Atlantic Treaty Organization
PADR: Preparatory Action on Defence Research

R&D: Research and Development
PESCO: Permanent Structured Cooperation
SEDE: Subcommittee on Security and Defence
SIS: Schengen Information System
SMEs: Small and Mid-size Enterprises
TFEU: Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union
TUE: Treaty on European
UK: United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland
US: United States of America
USSR: Union of Soviet Socialist Republics
VIS: Visa Information System
WPR: What is the Problem Represented to be
WWII: World War II

1. Chapter I: Research design

Security is an elusive term. Because of its ever-changing and multidimensional form that adapts to specific situations and structures, it is very challenging to find a precise definition of the concept of security. Each individual or group defines security differently depending on the time and space context (McSweeney, 1999. Neal, 2019).

Security can mean the absence of threats and the creation of a stable and safe environment in which an individual or group can pursue their goals (Fischer, et al., 2004). Security and securitisation are vital concepts that allow the existence and the evolution of individuals or groups. The stability of a society is given by the level of security of the same. Indeed, trying to achieve security is one of the primary goals for a state.

The security issue touches many areas such as sociology, geopolitics and IR, and economics. Over time, mainly due to the post-World War II events, the concept of security has taken an increasingly broader dimension, falling inside new issues such as energy, finance, health, environment, and many others. Along with this new expansion, new actors, specifically professionals, agencies, private companies, groups, and movements, have participated in the definition and the implementation of the concept of security (M. E. Smith, 2010. Neal, 2019).

The core of this thesis is the term *security and defence discourse*. Here, the study of the discourse is not a mere linguistic analysis, it also considers semantics as the action of giving meaning to a phenomenon through words. Discourse is understood in a post-structuralist way as a tool to create knowledges (Bacchi and Goodwin, 2016: 21). In studying the concept of security and defence discourse, I want to consider how a particular actor represents the problem of security and defence, how this problem translates into behaviours and actions, what are the implementation processes, what are the structures that are created, what are the principles and ideas behind the problem representations.

There is a close link between the specific creation of knowledge through discourse, the related culture, and politics. Indeed, Shore and Wright have argued that every policy is the product of a specific culture (Shore and Wright, 1997). In politics, security and defence discourse translates pragmatically through laws, funds, programs, practices, dynamics between actors, and structures of organisation.

After the crucial changes triggered by the end of the Cold War, the European Union (EU) has increasingly presented itself as a new actor in the field of security. The EU, one of the largest economic powers in the world, is taking on more and more power, from its Member States, in the sphere of security (Karampekios, et al., 2018. Tocci, 2017). This new constant expansion and redefinition of the political and economic decision-making competences of the European Union has created relentless transformations in the sphere of security and defence. The recent European policies have signified a watershed. Since the issue of the European Union Global Strategy (EUGS) in 2016, the EU has begun to represent the problem of security in an increasingly comprehensive and multidimensional way through a new security and defence discourse.

In studying how Europe represents the security problem in a new way, it is crucial to consider how particular policies within the security and defence discourse of the EU have an impact on private arms company. As a matter of fact, security and the process of securitisation and militarisation have led to a reshaping of the relationships between certain social actors (Bigo, 2002. Neal, 2019). Defence companies have been particularly affected by new dynamics, given their indispensable role in building an effective security strategy (Guay, 1998). Starting from 2016, the European Union has implemented a new security and defence discourse also through a specific system of connections with the private arms industries. Some mechanisms created by the recent European security policies, first of all the Permanent Structured Cooperation (PESCO) and the European Defence Fund (EDF), have laid the bases for creating stable and permanent networks that cross the public-private divide. In this situation, I will employ the terms Military Industrial Complex and elites to delineate the system of relations that links the public decision-making actors and the market-dominant armaments companies. Indeed, it is crucial to consider not only how the European security and defence discourse has impacted arms firms but also how these companies are able to be part, promote and change the same discourse. The security configuration outlined by these policies has created structures that gave power to arms firms, and arms firms have adapted in order to continue and to increase this power gaining.

This study finds that the security and defence discourse in Europe is moving towards a new representation linked to the concept of militarism. In fact, I will emphasize that the European Union is generating a new military effort through the recent security and defence policies. The concept of military security and hard power are increasingly entering into the European security and defence discourse. Moreover, the EU is trying to replicate the decision-making structures

and the power relationship of the Military-Industrial Complexes previously organized mainly on the Member States level. The ultimate aspiration of this emulating process is to militarily compete with other external powers such as the United States, China and Russia.

This thesis starts from the consideration that the world is becoming more and more complex. The events of the last few years, such as globalization and technological progression, have radically changed societies. The European continent has not been left out by these transformations. To face the new challenges the European Union is expanding its political and economic powers, playing an increasingly important role in its citizens' lives and in the global order. In this thesis, the study of the transformations taking place in the sphere of security and defence at a European level allows to reflect and create awareness of the numerous social changes of the present and the future in the real world.

This work is not the only research that studies the concept of security at the European level. In fact, in this domain, there are many academic documents and books that proceed in parallel with the new expansion and redefinition of the competences of the European Union in the field of security and defence. However, the continual evolution of the European security structure means that each new step taken by the EU requires further study and research. In this case, the post-2016 European policies have paved the way for a new comprehensive and multidimensional discourse on security and defence that integrates what was previously the untouched militarism concept.

I reckon that so far, the academic studies on the concept of security at the European level have failed to define the new security and defence discourse. For this reason, this thesis seeks to fill this void by bringing new results within academic study in the fields of European Studies, Security Studies, Economic History and International Relations.

1.1 Aim & Research Question

The European Union is constantly expanding its political capabilities in the area of defence and security. The recent European security policies issued starting from 2016 aimed to endow Europe with new tools necessary to conduct an effective foreign (and internal) security policy. Many of the recent European security policies represented a first-of-its-kind action in the field of military capabilities cooperation (K. E. Smith, 2017. Tocci, 2017) Europe, through initiatives such as the 2016 EU Global Strategy (EUGS) and the so-called Winter Package, has undertaken new policies regarding, for instance, the definition of a coherent foreign security

policy, the financing of military industries through co-research and co-development on military technologies, analysis on national and European military capabilities, purchase of armaments, etc. (Blockman, 2016).

The fast expansion of the political and economic decision-making capabilities of the EU in the sphere of security and defence has also led to redefining the relations at the European level between private and public actors. In particular, some players such as defence companies have been considered central by European policymakers in a new representation of a security and defence discourse that also includes a new militarist facet (Blockman, 2016).

Although relations between the public and private sectors are not recent, the expansion of European security and defence decision-making competence has had a new impact on the position of private actors. Following the Europeanisation of the security and defence discourse, European arms companies have grown their market dominance and consequently their influence in the political sector (Jones, 2017. Slijper, 2005). After 2016, together with the new European security policies, new mechanisms and new relationship structures were created that brought arms companies to have even closer, more profound and stable relations with public decision-makers.

In this thesis project, I want to investigate in which way the recent European security policies reflect a more general security and defence discourse, understood as structures, relations, ideas, principles at the core of the concept of security, and how this discourse includes and impacts the role of the defence companies at a European level creating new dynamics between private and public actors.

In consideration of the foregoing, my research question is

How has the security and defence discourse been represented in Europe since the promulgation of the 2016 EU Global Strategy? What are the main implications of this specific security and defence discourse, particularly for European arms companies?

In this analysis, I will primarily take into consideration the action of the European Commission intended as the first promoter of European defence policies and consequently the main proponent of the security and defence discourse. As mentioned above, I will also consider

private actors, specifically private defence companies, but always in the European context. Clearly, this study's space will be Europe, and the frame of reference will be the European Union. Singular EU Member States, other EU institutions and agencies, and the NATO alliance will be considered, but only insofar as necessary to clarify the action framework.

The research questions take into account the time period from the promulgation of the EU Global Strategy of the High Representative Federica Mogherini in 2016 to early 2021. Many authors have highlighted the important changing role of this document. The EUGS has paved the way for a new comprehensive and multidimensional discourse on security and defence at the European level, which also includes a new militarist aspect. I want to restrict my analysis to this particular time period to focus on the new trends and changes that the post-2016 security and defence policies have triggered at the European level.

1.2 Previous research on power relations in the EU

Many scholars have ventured into the study of the security field in the European context (Bertz, 2010. Biscop, 2020. Dardes, 2017. K. E. Smith, 2017. Tocci, 2017). As the EU expanded its political and economic decision-making capabilities, academic research has increased. This section will briefly summarise some studies that I consider very important for my subsequent analysis.

The focus of these researches is the private-public relations in the European Union defence and security structure from the early 2000s until about 2016. The documents reported here try to study the dynamics between public and private actors without analytically defining the related European discourse to the concept of security and defence. In fact, it is challenging to clarify the security and defence discourse of the European Union before 2016, given the lack of a unified and coherent strategy (K. E. Smith, 2017. Tocci, 2017). For this reason, in this section, I will not use the term security and defence discourse in regards to policies, strategies and programme operated within the Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) by the EU before the 2016 Global Strategy.

The following studies intend to demonstrate how the relations between European institutions and defence companies were formed in parallel with the development of a more mature and coherent security agenda in the Union. Moreover, these researches show through which

channels and structures the private sector has managed to get in touch with the public institutions. The result demonstrates why it is imperative to study defence companies for seriously understanding the actual Union's security and defence discourse.

Authors such as Jones, Vranken and Rufanges have highlighted through studies how some practices in the field of defence and security in the European context have led to the growth of influential power of some private actors (Jones, 2017. Rufanges, 2016. Vranken, 2017). The policies of a state (or a political system, in the case of the EU) represent the tangible translation of a theoretical political plan. These studies focus on implemented policies such as funds, programs, and initiatives to understand how the problem of security started to be represented in Europe before 2016.

Scholars studying the European security and defence structure often use the term EU Military Industrial Complex, recalling the Military-Industrial Complex model of the US. This term, which I will address in more detail in the theory section, tries to underline how the private sector has been changed (and has changed in turn) by a new attitude towards defence and security carried out by the EU starting in the early 2000s (Jones, 2017. Rufanges, 2016. Slijper, 2005).

In fact, since 2001, with the creation of the Group of Personalities (GoP), a new decisive chapter of public-private relations between institutions and defence companies in Europe has begun (Jones, 2017. Slijper, 2005). This first GoP, which first met in 2003, was in fact created within the EU framework and was composed by security experts (including CEOs of arms companies) with the aim of advising the European commissioners in drafting future security policies. The 2003 GoP was not an isolated initiative. Indeed, since the early 2000s the interconnections between public and private actors in the EU arena were plenty and clear. As Jones pointed out, the European Union has very often developed its defence agenda through these connections with private actors. The development of DNA databases and data exchange, surveillance and identification systems, European police networks, and the militarisation of EU borders to address issues such as terrorism, organised crime, migration, and illegal trade are some clear examples in where European institutions not only requested the help of private defence companies but worked closely with them to define purposes and methods to face issues (Jones, 2017). The most dominant arms companies that have a leading role in the European defence system, notably BAE Systems, Airbus, Leonardo, and Thales, can be considered economic giants with the ability to both manufacture arms and influence the decision-makers (Jones, 2017. Rufanges, 2016).

The European defence agenda has led to the creation of an increasingly powerful security sector. In order to continue to obtain and increase a dominant market position, defence companies have adapted over time to enter into an ever-closer connection with the European institutions, especially with the Commission. The arms industry set up the Organization for Security (EOS) and the Aerospace and Defence Industries Association of Europe (ASD) to represent the interests of arms companies (ASD, 2020. EOS, 2021. Rufanges, 2016).

Notwithstanding the Transparency Register of the EU in lobbying activities, the opacity of the private-public dynamics is still unsettled (Rufanges, 2016). Very often, the defence companies use non-institutional tools to influence the decision-making process of a policy, going so far as to change (and sometimes to define) the policy itself. In fact, many of these researches have highlighted the lack of clarity concerning how the public sector works together with the private one to promote a specific type of defence policies.

These previous researches showed that before 2016 the representation of the security problem in the European Union only touched the sphere of civil security, excluding the concept of militarism. It is also pointed out that since the early years of the new millennium, there has been a close link between the private and public sectors in the sphere of civil security. However, these researches failed to analytically define the European discourse on security and defence for two reasons: the lack of a comprehensive and multidimensional representation of the security problem in European policies before 2016, and too much focused and limiting attention to the study of relations between the public and private sectors without reflecting on the concept of security as politics.

My analysis will help to overcome these limitations by studying European security and defence policies more comprehensively and considering public-private relations in order to define the European discourse on security and defence.

1.3 Theoretical Framework

This thesis aims to understand the European security and defence discourse, its pragmatic implications, and what are the main effects for arms companies at the European level. To do so, it is essential to consider theories and concepts necessary to build an analysis of the European security dynamics in place since 2016.

Firstly, I will try to create a framework for addressing the understanding of security as politics. I will draw on Andrew Neal's work to study a new kind of security political attitude of states. This idea defined as 'security as normal politics' will be used in this thesis to understand how the concept of security can be conceived in the political arena (or professional politics). Using Andrew Neal, I will also tackle the issue of policies normalisation (Neal, 2019).

Afterwards, I will face the concepts of security and militarism. I consider militarism as the most evident and most connected phenomenon of a national state's security agenda. Even the EU, a rather particular actor in the field of defence, and with very stringent limits of action in the military arena compared to its Member States, is trying as much as possible since 2016 to conduct a security strategy that includes a militarism facet (Koutrakos, 2012. Tocci, 2017).

Finally, I will move my theory analysis to the study of private actors and their ability to impact politics. Several authors argue that particular dominant players have a strong ability to influence political and economic decision-making centres (Mills, 1956. Rufanges, 2016). Furthermore, I will use the concept of elite to delve into the so-called Military Industrial Complex. This set of theories revolving around the concept of elite will help me in the following sections to understand the role of the armaments industries and their ability to move in public-private relations.

1.3.1 Security as politics

The first fundamental theoretical framework for this thesis is addressed by the study of the security concept in politics. With an historical analysis, Andrew W. Neal highlights how the concept of security was approached since Hobbes as a negative issue that affects and limit freedoms. For a long time, the security problem, mainly understood as intelligence and military defence, has been represented as something separate from the normal political democratic process. For instance, during the Cold War, security was managed in a secret and opaque manner for democratic institutions, such as parliaments. Even the government often did not have control of some decisions made in the security field. Andrew Neal argues that this type of approach led into the Hobbesian trap that approaches security as opposite to politics. A vision strongly carried forward over the years by many academic circles (Neal, 2019).

Neal offers another type of approach that does not seek to replace the concept of security as anti-politics but simply wants to date it to a specific historical period. The transformations in the 90s, particularly the end of the Cold War, marked the rise of a new approach to the concept

of security as politics. The security problem has increasingly begun to permeate into the democratic political game. Politicians, government, and parliaments have, in fact, progressively improved their ability to define what security is and what strategy needs to be followed to solve the problem of insecurity. The concept of security understood as negative to politics has begun to be inadequate to comprehend the new political dynamics of the new millennium (Neal, 2019).

Through this analysis, Neal not only defines two different approaches to the concept of security within the political sphere, but he also studies the process of normalization of security as politics. The normalization process, which was triggered by the end of the Cold War's changes, is highlighted within the political sphere through the growing active role of governments and political democratic institutions in representing the security issue. The emergence of public discussions within the democratic institutions is the clear result of the process of normalization of security and defence discourses in recent decades. Neal focuses explicitly on the role of democratically elected parliaments. The growing capacity of these institutions, and in particular of internal subcommittees, to define securities policies is the main sign of the normalization process that leads to the definition of security as a normal politics (Neal, 2019).

To summarize Neal's analysis of the study of security as politics, it is possible to identify two types of approaches or views. The first can be dated to the pre-Cold War period where security policies represented a threat to democracy, and a second that characterizes our time where security is defined as a normal policy. The role of democratic institutions in defining security policies represents the turning point for defining security as anti-politics or normal politics (Neal, 2019).

1.3.2 Security and Militarism

What is security today? Nowadays, everything can be part of the security concept. Environment, cyber, finance, and health are some of the clearest and most current examples of areas where the concept of security has expanded. More and more public and private actors interact in this field (M. E. Smith, 2010. Neal, 2019). But if the action's limits of the concept of security are broken down, and everything is security, the concept empties itself of its uniqueness and vanishes. This thesis considers the new openings of the concept of security in contemporary society but tries not to fall into the 'all become security trap' (Neal, 2019. Stavrianakis and Stern, 2018). For this reason, I must narrow what security is. Johan Eriksson

wrote that every scholar who defines security must take responsibility for limiting the term (Eriksson, 1999). I believe that this warning makes clear that the researcher must be careful in determining what security is.

The German philosopher Max Weber wrote that a state “is a human community that (successfully) claims the monopoly of legitimate physical violence within a given territory” (Weber, 1918 p. 136). By defining a territory and an instrument (the legitimate physical violence), the state proposes itself as the dominant actor to create a stable environment for the prosperity of an individual or a group. According to the Weberian view, the state implements security through the monopoly of legitimate physical violence.

This idea of legitimate physical violence leads the concept of security to be strictly related to the notion of militarism. In this thesis, the concept of security is mainly studied through the narrower term of militarism, that is, when it comes to legitimate physical violence/military power.

Stavrianakis and Selby define militarism as “social and international relations of the preparation for and conduct of organized violence” (Stavrianakis and Selby, 2014 p. 3). According to the authors, militarism represents a distinctive feature of almost all the states. Although its nature remains throughout history, the concept of militarism has profoundly changed mainly due to three factors: the hegemony of liberalism, the growth of ‘failed states’ and new types of wars, and the dominance of a discourse over the concept of civil and human security. The changes triggered by these factors, however, should not be confused with a decline of militarism.

There are five different facets and aspects of militarism. The first common understanding is militarism as *ideology*. This conception translates into a social glorification of war, armies and military institutions. It also means transporting the military mentality into society by copying into the civil sphere models of action and decision structures typical of a military organization. The second conception of militarism is *behaviour* that can be understood as the inclination to use force to resolve conflict. This tendency involves a preference for resolving conflicts through the use of armed force. In this case, militarism is identified in actual policy outcome. Unlike the ideological conception, there is no value or principle rooted in the society that glorifies military force, but this behavioural tendency is based on different and moveable justifications (rather than values). Militarism can also be understood as *military build-ups*. This means the importance of military spending and arms production. It can be easily analysed

through six factors: military spending, arms imports and arms production, army size, number of wars and number of military regimes. Another category of militarism is the *institutional* one. Usually, this translates to solid connections among political and military institutions, with the latter holding power. This aspect is particularly typical in those social structures that limit the discussion on the role of military power. Finally, militarism as *sociological* conception where militarism is rooted in society. Unlike the concept of institutional militarism, in this case, the whole society is linked to military institutions and their value (but without an ideology). (Stavrianakis and Selby, 2014 pp 12,14). Each dimension represents a different side of the same coin to understand security and militarism.

Militarism can also be addressed using another term. Stephanie Anderson, for example, focuses on the concepts of soft and hard powers. In studying the recent militarisation process of the European Union, she argues that soft power represents the civil power of the culture and economy of a society. Differently, hard power can be understood according to the different conceptions of militarism. Primarily this means the ability to conduct a state foreign action through the level of military capabilities, especially to persuade and exercise control on external actors (Anderson, 2010).

1.3.3 Elites and the Military-Industrial Complex

It is impossible to address the complex security political issue without considering how certain actors influence the governmental decision-making process. It is common sense to believe that there are opaque power structures in sectors where the market tends to be an oligopoly controlled by large international companies. The defence sector can be considered for its construction a domain in which private actors influence policy-making institutions (Adams and Adams, 1972. Hartley, 2020). As a matter of fact, several authors illustrate the strict correlation between public and private sector in the security and defence domain, where the latter tries to influence the first (Hartung, 2011. Mills, 1956. Rufanges, 2016).

My discussion about elites begins with Charles Wright Mills as perhaps the most distinguished exponent investigating the relationships between economic, political, and military power. ‘The Power Elite’ is *de rigueur* the starting literature to face the issues of power relations and actors’ ability to influence the decision-making process externally. In this book, Mills presents a critique of the American social power system in post-World War II. The transformations of WWII in the US have led to permanent modifications of the American institutions’ system.

Mills writes: “Such changes in the institutions reach of the means of violence could not but make equally significant changes in the men of violence: The United States warlords”. Further, “As the United States has become a great world power, the military establishment has expanded” (Mills, 1956 p 186-202). World War II represents the beginning of a process in which military leaders received considerable autonomy and power.

Similar to what Mills wrote, William D. Hartung analyses the solid and opaque relationships between the economic, political, and military centres of power in a more pragmatic way. At the core of the attention of Hartung’s study is the connection between the world’s largest arms manufacturer, the American firm Lockheed Martin, and the economic-political decision-making centres of the United States. Following his analysis, the American company, born mainly as a civilian manufacturer of aircraft, begun over the years to operate in unusual military security arenas. Indeed, Lockheed Martin has started to provide policing, training, and surveillance solutions for the United States. Moreover, the firms have provided experts to government facilities, especially in complicated situations such as war scenarios and high-risk prisons (Hartung, 2011). Hartung show dynamics closely connected to Mills’ words when he writes that the influence of the so-called group of ‘warlords’ is increasingly changing the lives of Americans, touching areas usually under civilian control (Mills, 1956).

Many authors have described the general dynamics of power relations, particularly in the defence system, with similarities and differences. The issues of military power elites can be better understood using a common term of the field. In his farewell address to the nation of January 17, 1961, the President of the United States, Dwight Eisenhower, used the concept of Military-Industrial Complex (MIC) for what appears to be the first time. Concerned by the same society and by the same power relations that Charles Wright Mills was writing about in the same years, Eisenhower warned American citizens of the inherent danger of secret agreements between the political leaders, the military apparatus, and the war industry (Dunne, Sköns, 2009).

Jordi Calvo Rufanges tried in his studies to better define the concept of the Military-Industrial Complex. The author explains that it as a group that includes several actors with common interests in the sphere of defence economy and with the willingness to collaborate to pursue them. These actors who benefit from the defence economy, mainly through spending on armaments and military operations, are proportionate to the state’s industrialisation level. Arms and defence companies play an essential role in the Military-Industrial Complex, as do trade

unions, politicians and high members of armed forces, and government departments for defence, domestic, and foreign policies (Rufanges, 2016).

Furthermore, Rufanges links the MIC concept with two terms. The first notion is Defence Economics, a science that considers International Relations in the allocation of “scarce resources to different destinations and purposes” to address security and defence scopes (Rufanges, 2016 p. 306). The second term is the Military-Economic Cycle, in which the author tries to explain how the defence economy works and which actors take part. In this cycle, we can see the requirement of a system that legitimises military force, the presence of a network of actors (such as think tanks, foundations, social movements, industrial companies, states, and agencies), the different ways of assign recourses, and the role of the state as a consumer. The author argues that the Military-Economic Cycle constantly grows in volume and impact (Rufanges, 2016).

1.4 Method

In this section, I will explain which method I have chosen to highlight how some European policies have defined a particular discourse on security and defence.

The method that I have chosen is based on the concept of problematization, or rather when people think and question objects of thought and practice, highlighting difficulties and problems (Webb, 2014). Paulo Freire wrote that problematization is a “strategy for developing a critical consciousness” (Bacchi, 2011 p. 1). Objects of knowledge influences, directly and indirectly, our social and political life. Through problematisation, men and women try to dismantle the founding precepts given as fixed essences taken for granted (Bacchi, 2009). The action of dismantling means self-asking about the foundation of human knowledge in order to clarify its possibilities, validity and limits (Bacchi and Goodwin, 2016. Simons, 1995). In the problematization practice, the actor in conducting a critique on the object is therefore led to scrutinize and rethink the social structures of connection and knowledge in a new way (Neal, 2019).

The post-structuralist and interpretivist problematization analysis is based on the fact that objects of knowledge (such as the concept of security) do not exist a priori outside human relations. An object has no meaning in itself but takes on meaning from individuals. Therefore, objects can take different connotations. Relationships between human beings have forged

through language these objects of knowledge and regulation. Since objects are constructed by language, it is important to analyse the world (and objects) through analysis on discourse. Discourse is understood in a post-structural way that refers to knowledges rather than to merely language (Bacchi and Goodwin, 2016: 21)

For this thesis, I chose the Critical Discourse Analysis because it implies in itself a deeply rooted critical position that turns into a conscious attempt to use the analytical tools of discourse to study social issues. In fact, this type of analysis examines the function of discourse in society as a device for building social power relations (Vaara and Tieneri, 2008).

Many authors have developed within the Critical Discourse Analysis different tool and tactics to study the political sphere analytically. Carol Bacchi, in particular, is instrumental in developing a method of analysis appropriate for the purposes of the problematization of governmental policies.

Carol Bacchi presents the ‘What is the Problem Represented to be?’ method of analysis, a tool that aims to help critically study public policies. The purpose of this post-structural tactic is to understand the deeper meaning of the production of a given policy.

In a post-structuralist view, politics and government are considered cultural objects forged in a particular place and time, characterised by specific historical-cultural values. Policies are the result of a specific culture. Nothing is taken for granted, even the idea of politics passes under the lens of questioning (Bacchi 2009). In the ‘What is the Problem Represented to be?’ (WPR), politics is seen as part of a larger government project or program that seeks to correct/fix something. It is argued that politics means problematizing activity. Bacchi wrote: “It makes the case that policies do not address problems that exist; rather, they produce ‘problems’ as particular sorts of problems” (Bacchi and Goodwin, 2016: 16). Every time there is a political proposal to change something, it means that there is a problem (or rather that a problem is created) that must be corrected. The WPR method aims to reach the implicit starting point/problem to scrutinise it critically.

I have chosen the WPR analytic strategy because it matches the aim of my thesis, which is to consider politics in a broadly way to understand what kind of knowledge is intrinsic within policies, how it was produced and what are the effects of it. Moreover, Ashley has argued that at the transnational/international level, there is a stronger and deeper link between governance and problematizing (Ashley 1989). Also, for this reason, I have chosen problematization and

specifically the WPR method to highlight the intrinsic problems of European policies and to critically study the role of these policies in defining a specific security and defence discourse.

The ‘What is the Problem Represented to be?’ method is composed of six questions to be considered to analyse a specific policy:

Question 1: What’s the ‘problem’ represented to be in a specific policy or policy proposal?

Aim: assists in clarifying the implicit problem representation within a specific policy or policy proposal.

Question 2: What presuppositions or assumptions underpin this representation of the ‘problem’?

Aim: reflection on the underlying premises in this representation of the ‘problem’

Question 3: How has this representation of the ‘problem’ come about?

Aim: consideration of the contingent practices and processes through which this understanding of the ‘problem’ has emerged

Question 4: What is left unproblematic in this problem representation? Where are the silences? Can the ‘problem’ be thought about differently?

Aim: careful scrutiny of possible gaps or limitations in this representation of the ‘problem’, accompanied by inventive imagining of potential alternatives

Question 5: What effects are produced by this representation of the ‘problem’?

Aim: considered assessment of how identified problem representations limit what can be talked about as relevant, shape people’s understandings of themselves and the issues, and impact materially on people’s lives

Question 6: How/where has this representation of the 'problem' been produced, disseminated and defended? How could it be questioned, disrupted and replaced?

Aim: a sharpened awareness of the contestation surrounding representation of the 'problem'

(Bacchi, 2012: 21-22).

1.5 Material

This section presents and discusses the material on which I based my thesis. This thesis studies the recent European defence and security policies issued starting from 2016. The primary sources for carrying out this analysis are mainly the same policies and initiatives available from the websites of the European institutions. In this thesis, I will analyse the policies that can be applied to the theoretical concept of security and militarism defined in the previous sections. The policies that I have selected are mainly the 2016 Global Strategy (EUGS) and the subsequent Winter Package (especially PESCO, CARD and the EDF). These policies are the product of a political system in which many actors (public and private) interact.

Given the intergovernmentalism of the European security decision-making process, two main public actors define these policies more strongly than others: the European Council formed by the leaders of the Member States and the European Commission (Howorth, 2012). Specifically, the Commission, given the role of government and political guide in the EU, is the principal architect of these policies. The 2014-2020 Juncker Commission is, in fact, the main promoter of the 2016 security policies. As I will study, the EUGS and the Winter Package differ in contents. The first is a political document of intent that concerns the definition of a foreign policy strategy, for this reason, the main author is the High Representative and Vice President of the Commission Federica Mogherini (K. E. Smith, 2017). The Winter Package differently regards the organizational structure of the European security system and defence market, and it involved many Commissioners. For example, some authors cite Commissioners Elżbieta Bieńkowska (Internal Market), Dimitris Avramopoulos (Migration, Home Affairs and Citizenship) and Cecilia Malmström (Trade) (Blockman, 2016. Jones, 2017. Tocci, 2018). I decided to consider these specific European policies as many authors have highlighted how they represent a watershed in the process of integrating the concept of security. In particular, Tocci and Smith highlighted how European security policies subsequent to 2016 represent the fundamental step to provide the EU with a comprehensive and effective security strategy with

related goals, plans, and resources (Ianakiev, 2019. K. E. Smith. 2017. Tocci, 2018). For this reason, I will try to investigate, using the WPR method, which particular security and defence discourse is intrinsic in these post-2016 policies and what are the implications of it.

1.6 Disposition

In this section, I will explain my strategies to develop my analysis of the security political discourse in Europe. The next chapter (number II) will serve as a historical frame to analyse the process of Europeanization of security from post-World War II to 2016.

Chapter III represents the centre of my analysis where I will use and merge the questions of Carol Bacchi's method 'What is the Problem Represented to be' with my framework theories and the empirical material. In the first two sections of Chapter III, I will explain the skeleton of the EUGS and the Winter Package analytically, briefly describing the contents of these two documents. In doing this, I will just report data and events without using any theory or any method. I will begin my analysis in the next section by systematically answering the different questions of the WPR method. I will gradually move from question number one to question number five. I have decided to not address question number six ('How/where has this representation of the 'problem' been produced, disseminated and defended? How has it been (or could it be) questioned, disrupted and replaced?'). This question that aims to contextualize the representation of the security problem will be sufficiently addressed in the historical background in Chapter II and in the first part of Chapter III.

2. Chapter II: Historical Background

The Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) is the policy section that defines the arena of action of the European Union in the field of security and defence. Through the CSDP, the Member States has used the EU to preserve European and global peace and security, promote human rights, democracy and good governance, encourage cooperation, and prevent conflicts and crisis (EEAS, 2018).

In this chapter, I will historically frame the process of Europeanization of security and defence. European defence cooperation has never been a steady process. During the integration process, the collaboration between the different Member States has experienced ups and downs. Zielonka uses the notion of ‘euro-paralyses’ to identify the divergence of interest and intent of EU Member States as the main obstacle in the European cooperation defence process (Zielonka, 1998). As many authors argue, defence is ‘high-level’ politics that touches vital strategic areas for a state. Therefore, cooperation in this field is complex and can face many more obstacles than other ‘low-level’ subjects (Guay, 1998. Tocci, 2017. M. E. Smith, 2010)

Many scholars have highlighted how, in the course of history, various exogenous and endogenous events have severely affected and changed the Europeanization of the concept of security. Particularly phenomena such as marketisation (Bertz, 2010), globalisation (Hayward 2000. Mabee, 2009), and technological improvements (Guay and Callum 2002) have had a significant impact. Despite these causes, what was clear to states from the beginning of this Europeanization was that the traditional approach to security based on national power was no longer bearable. States increasingly need to seek allies to forge diplomatic and industrial relations in order to survive (Guay, 1998. Taylor 1990)

2.1 From the post-WWII to the Treaty of Maastricht

The post-World War II period is characterized by the aspiration to create ambitious European cooperation projects with the intention of developing interconnections between European states and consequently limiting the growth of possible future military threats in the continent. Together with the formation of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), the first important step for Europeans took place with the signing in 1947 of the Alliance and Mutual

Assistance Treaty that established the mutual assistance between France and the United Kingdom, subsequently extended to BENELUX with the Brussels Treaty. Successive attempts to advance European integration, such as the never born European Defence Community or the weak Western European Union, however, fail to trigger a change of perspective in defence, leaving the logic of security to national states (EDA, n.d)

In the 1960s and 1970s, cooperation in the field of military capabilities, particularly as regards equipment and weapons, moved bilaterally and nationally oriented. Examples are the cases of the agreements between France and West Germany to co-develop and co-produce a new type of missile, the similar France-UK aircraft manufacturing agreement and the Tornado consortium between the UK's West Germany and Italy (EDA, n.d.. Heinrich, 2015). To better organise these bilateral agreements in 1976, NATO's European states established the Independent European Program Group (IEPG), an annual forum to discuss arms manufacturing among allies. Furthermore, with the intention of improving competitiveness through the removal and standardisation of tariffs, the Single European Act was passed in 1985 (EDA, n.d.). This act, in particular, marked a first clear sign of the marketisation of the security sector. Guay pointed out that consequently, the defence companies have started to face more and more market competitiveness problems. Moreover, from this point begins the merge of the civil security and military defence sectors. Indeed, arms firms started to develop more and more dual-use products (for both civil and military use) (Guay, 1998).

As has been said, the defence and security system of cooperation in Europe was state-nationally oriented. Consequently, each European state did consider its own interests and did not develop a broader and more far-reaching strategic perspective. This led to a lack of an adequate capacity and power in the military action of European countries that arose clearly between the 1980s and 1990s, especially with events such as the collapse of the Soviet Union and the Balkan crises. Only NATO and particularly the role of the United States, could effectively act on European soil to counter the former Soviet Union and to contain the Yugoslav disintegration. European countries were clearly unprepared (EDA, n.d.). These events were not just crucial for political reasons. As expected, these changes also affected industries and markets. Europe's armaments industry was undergoing a transition.

The end of the Cold War marked an abrupt reconfiguration of the security framework for all states. In the first place, there was a sudden drop in spending on national defence. In the eyes of the European states, the end of the conflict between the USSR and the US, in fact, allowed

a reduction of tensions and perceptions of military threat. Furthermore, again in the 90s, with the globalisation process, there was a significant push towards marketisation, leading to an increase in competitiveness in the arms market (Mabee, 2009). Besides, technology innovation led to the development of more expensive and complicated products. As a result, in most European states, large defence industrial groups began to emerge and become quasi-monopoly leaders at the national level. The increasingly influential and strategic role of these private industries has led to an intensification of the interdependence between the private and public national sectors (Guay, 1998).

The post-Cold War period was an eye-opener that marked a significant turning point for Europe. European leaders decided that it was time to resolve military powerlessness and arms market inefficiencies. To do so, in 1993, the Treaty of Maastricht came into force to formally create the current European Union's structure (EDA, n.d.).

2.2 The post-Maastricht period

The post-Maastricht period represented an expansion of the action's arena for the EU in many fields, including security. In fact, the late 90s marked the beginning of the European Union's aspiration to establish itself as an international player. To do so, European leaders promoted the Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) in 1999. The central underlying idea was to endow the EU with the capabilities to manage civilian crises (Faleg, 2017). As early as 2003, the EU achieved success with its first autonomous operation in the Democratic Republic of Congo and the control of the NATO operation in the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (FYROM) (EDA, n.d.). Beyond the military sphere, in the same years, the Union experienced significant developments in the integration process. The Euro was launched, the European economy was growing, and the EU was considering its eastern enlargement. But as Tocci and Smith argue, not only positive forces pushed for this optimistic European spirit. Subsequent to the terroristic attacks, especially 9/11, the NATO alliance began to suffer setbacks (Tocci, 2017). Under the Bush administration, the American allies set up an aggressive foreign policy that left the European countries divided and unable to act conjointly. Italy, UK, Spain sided with the US, while France and Germany criticised the aggressive military interventions (K. E. Smith, 2017).

In response to this crisis in 2003, the European Security Strategy (ESS) initiative was launched by the High Representative Javier Solana (Tocci, 2017). The ESS attempted to reconcile the

divergent views of European governments and restore the spirit of cooperation and integration. In fact, the intention was not to create a comprehensive strategy to the security problem in Europe but rather to reconcile the Member States' divergences. The main points listed in the ESS were based on three areas: i. addressing security threats such as terrorism, state crisis and organised crime ii. step-up cooperation for neighbourhood security iii. promote global defence cooperation. Despite the great significance of this document, the final result did not address security inefficiencies. It was clear that a serious strategy was still premature and that the EU was not ready to act as an international player (K. E. Smith, 2017. Tocci, 2017)

Still, Europe was trying, and Europeanization was moving fast. In 2004, the European Defence Agency (EDA) was finally launched. The new institution represented a big step for politics, but it was also a significant result of the new role of armaments companies at the European level. Since the early 00s, the three leading European defence company Airbus Group, BAE Systems and Thales, were heavily pushing to create an agency able to raise quality and quantity of spending in defence research, technology and acquisition in Europe. The entire European market was dealing since the 90s with the increasing competition of lower-cost producers, especially countries such as Russia, the US, China, Israel, Ukraine, and Brazil (EDA, n.d.. Guay, 1998. Slijper, 2005).

Since the Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) establishment, arms industries started to use think tanks, task forces, and closed-door lunch/dinner meeting to connect with European representatives. As early as the 2000s, the arms industries had official channels to get in touch with the public sector. Jones highlighted, in particular, the pioneering role of the 2003 GoP (Jones, 2017). At this first GoP participated eight exponents of the arms industries in collaboration with heads of research institutes and important politicians, including former ministers and prime ministers, aimed to advise the European Commission in civil security R&D programs as the European Security Research Program (ESRP) (Research for a Secure Europe, 2004). The 2003 GoP was followed by the larger 2005 European Security Research Advisory Board (ESRB), with fifty political, industrial and academic representatives, and in 2007, by the European Security Research & Innovation Forum (ESRIF) (Jones, 2017. Verheugen, 2005)

The results of these public-private partnerships showed up in the 2007-2013 Multiannual Framework Program 7 (FP7) and its actual civil security program, the EU Security Research Program (ESRP). Some objectives of the ESRP projects were: the development of European police networks, DNA databases and data exchange, surveillance and identification systems and the militarization of the EU borders to address and defeat issues such as terrorism,

organized crime, mass migration, and illegal trade (Jones, 2017). These projects, like all the ESRP, were expressly narrowed to the civilian level of security and defence, voluntarily omitting the untouchable sphere of military security still an absolute prerogative of the Member States.

Jones and Rufanges identify the most dominant arms companies that play a leading role in the European defence system, most notably BAE Systems, Airbus, Leonardo and Thales. These companies can be considered economic giants with the ability to produce weapons and influence decision-makers (Jones, 2017. Rufanges, 2016). Slijper wrote “With ambitious - sometimes even funny – names, LeaderSHIP 2015 (shipbuilding), the Group of Personalities (R&D) and Star 21 (Aerospace) seek to garner support in Brussels for their industry’s interests. Though they look like – and may in fact be – corporate-controlled initiatives, officially these task forces were set up by European Commissioners as policy advisory groups. By giving industry a leading position in these groups, they are the most open manifestations of corporate influence on European defence industrial policy developments” (Slijper, 2005: 12). There was an evident interdependence between public institutions and private firms. The foundation of the EDA and the 2007-2013 Multiannual Framework Program 7 (FP7) clearly reflected the private arms company’s interests (Jones, 2017. Rufanges, 2016).

To summarize this section, the post-Maastricht period marked the birth of a strong Europeanization of the representation of the security problem. This immediately translated into the creation of European public-private networks of actors within the sphere of security and defence. At the same time, these events highlighted the lack of a comprehensive and multidimensional discourse on security and defence in Europe. Indeed, the European security policies of the post-Maastricht period - such as R&D projects and programmes - clearly drew boundaries between military and civil security research.

2.3 The Lisbon Treaty

Since the early years of the new millennium, the European Union has embarked on a process of reorganisation necessary to be a decisive political and economic player on a global level. From 2001 to 2007, European leaders tried to take some initiatives to address the structural problems of the Union. There was indeed a strong will to reform the European structure. Yet, there were also many national differences over how the Union should have been reformed. Some national politicians, in fact, criticized the reform projects of the Union, arguing that give

new powers to the EU would have undermined the independence of the Member States. It took some time for European leaders to agree on comprehensively defining in which way the European Union should move (Koutrakos, 2012).

The new European structure entered into force in 2009 with the Lisbon Treaty. With this treaty, the CSDP underwent a complete change. The previous pillar system was abolished, and foreign policies moved to a unitary structure of principles. The role of the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy (HR/VP) was enhanced to ensure a more operative role as a figure able to represent the supranational (as Vice President of the Commission) and intergovernmental (as chief of the Foreign Affairs Council) sides of the EU. To strengthen its role as an international figure, the European External Action Service (EEAS) was set up to work in cooperation with the Member States' diplomatic services (Koutrakos, 2012. Wouters, et al., 2008).

Furthermore, the treaty not only aimed to improve the European system but also intended to progress with the Europeanisation of security and defence. A very central action of the treaty was the initiatives regarding military capabilities cooperation. Europe was still based on a national orientation logic which over time had shown multiple problems such as shortage/oversupply of equipment and underfunding. With the Lisbon Treaty, the Union seeks to endow itself with useful tools to solve these structural problems regarding military capabilities and, ultimately, shift its role from soft power to hard power. The treaty, in fact, requires Member States to make available the necessary sources to implement the CSDP and declares the European Defence Agency the reference for development, research and acquisition of equipment. As Koutrakos shows, however, these two actions are seen more as meaningful and symbolic than as implementations of specific mechanisms (Koutrakos, 2012).

The Lisbon Treaty marked a big step for the Union. For example, with Article 43 TEU, the CSDP missions were extended to new areas, and with Articles 42.7 TEU and 222 TFEU solidarity and mutual assistance clauses were introduced into the European Union structure. Moreover, through Articles 42.6 and 46 TEU and Protocol No 10, the Union set up a permanent structured cooperation in the military capabilities area between willing and capable states. (Koutrakos, 2012) (TEU, 2007)

Unfortunately, no sooner the Lisbon Treaty entered into force that profound crises began to spread all over Europe. It was no longer time to consider more cooperation. A series of exogenous and endogenous crises stopped the Lisbon transformation (Tocci, 2017).

2.4 The post-Lisbon period

The post-Lisbon period is characterized by great difficulties for Europe. A series of endogenous and exogenous factors were strongly influencing the continent, moving the attention of European leaders to more civil emergency problems.

Internally, the financial crisis and the resulting 2010 Eurozone crisis split Europe into two blocks. Countries had different views on how to solve and address the economic situation. Nordic governments, led mainly by Germany, called for cuts in public spending. Differently, Southern countries and Ireland demanded expansive economic policies to resolve the crisis (Tocci, 2017).

Externally, Europe's neighbourhood was pretty chaotic and unruly. Across the Mediterranean, the situation after the Arab Springs movements was tumultuous. In 2011, NATO decided to intervene militarily in Libya, and in the same year, the Syrian civil war broke out. These two events, in particular, opened in 2015 one of the biggest migratory crises in Europe, putting a strain on the Schengen system (Tocci, 2017).

Due to these events, especially the refugee crisis, Europe's focus in the 2010s shifted from the original aspiration of military capabilities-security to a more needed civilian security attention. The EU had to suspend the high-level integration process established by the Lisbon Treaty to focus on issues such as migration, border control and anti-terrorism. Southern and Eastern Member States were increasingly clamouring for European border missions to control migratory flows (Tocci, 2017). In this situation, the EU publishes in 2015 the European Agenda on Migration aimed of prioritising the development of surveillance systems and the modernisation of crimes, visas and asylum applications databases such as the Schengen Information System (SIS) and the Visa Information System (VIS). Baird points out that the refugee crisis of 2015 pushed Europe to create an "extra-territorialised, militarised, increasingly transnational" and also "moveable, floating and harder" border policies (Baird, 2018 p. 118-119). As with previous projects, the European Union has made use of the role of the defence industries for the research, production and supply of civilian innovation to address migration management. With border securitisation, arms companies have not only responded to a call of interest from the Union but have framed and influenced European policies according to their preferences (Jones, 2017. Lemberg, 2013).

3. Chapter III: EU military security policies

2016 represents the real turning point in the process of Europeanisation of the security discourse (K. E. Smith, 2017. Tocci, 2018). In this chapter, using Carol Bacchi's WPR method, I will study this recent European security watershed through the theoretical framework discussed earlier. The aim here is to analyse what the European discourse on security and defence is, how it is represented by European decision-makers and what are the implications of it, particularly for defence companies.

Chapter III is divided into three parts. The first two sections will face respectively the European Union Global Strategy and the so-called Winter Package. Here I will report the data and contents of the policies without using any method and any theory. My analysis will start from the next third section where I will gradually answer the questions of Carol Bacchi's WPR method. As already mentioned in Chapter I, I will not answer question number six since it has already been addressed through Chapter II and in these two next sections on the post-2016 European security policies.

3.1 The 2016 Global Strategy

The 2010s of the new Millennium are characterised by profound complex changes for Europe and for the entire world. As mentioned above in the previous chapter, since early 2010s, some events severely affected European society. The multiple crises, especially the economic and migratory ones, led to strong cleavages between the Member States. The already fragile situation further worsened with the explosion of threats in the European neighbourhood. For instance, to the east, Russia's new realpolitik project re-emerges as a pressing security problem for Europe. Taking advantage of a political crisis in Ukraine, Moscow militarily intervened in Crimea, occupied the peninsula, causing one of the most severe violations of post-war international law (K. E. Smith, 2017. Tocci, 2017). Moreover, to the south, the Arab world was in turmoil. The instabilities in Gaza and the conflicts in Syria, Libya and Yemen seriously concerned the security and stability of the European Union. The self-proclamation of the Islamic State of Syria and Iran (ISIS) further aggravates the already precarious situation in the Middle East. The external instability of the European neighbourhood soon translated into a serious threat to the entire security of the continent. Indeed, the threats were not only external

and far from Europe. The relentless terrorist attacks in the heart of Europe, such as in Paris, Brussels and Berlin, have shown that peripheral conflicts directly affected all Member States. Additionally to these external crises from the south and east, the election of Donald Trump as President of the United States led to uncertainties about the stability of the NATO alliance. It was clear that for Europe, it was time to act autonomously (K. E. Smith, 2017. Tocci, 2017.)

The responses implemented in the 2010s addressing civil issues such as migrations and the Schengen system were not enough to face these severe crises. Europe was still feeling strongly threatened. For this reason, the original security cooperation project of the Lisbon Treaty had to be reopened (Tocci, 2017).

In late 2014, the establishment of the Juncker Commission and a new Franco-German partnership brought a new spirit of determination. The just elected 2014-2020 Commission and particularly the HR/VP, on the strength of a new and increasingly governmental political role in the European institutional system, intended to resolve the crises engulfing the continent planning to address the deep-rooted problems of the European security approach. The new European plan on the external action needed to be comprehensive and multidimensional to develop an effective long-term agenda on security. The time had come to bring back to life the Lisbon Treaty's spirit and translate it into a real action plan (European Union Global Strategy, 2016. K. E. Smith, 2017. Mauro and Thoma, 2016).

Shortly after the UK's decision to leave the Union, the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy Federica Mogherini decided to issue a document with the intention of uniting European countries in a common defence strategy. This is how the dissemination of the new security strategy for the Union took shape in June 2016 after a two years process of discussions between the EU institutions, its Member States, universities, think tanks and civil society (Dardes, 2017. European Union Global Strategy, 2016. Tocci, 2018)

Entitled 'Shared Vision, Common Action: A Stronger Europe', the EU Global Strategy (EUGS) document represents a new and real attempt to create coherence in the security agenda of the Union and its Member States. Mogherini wrote: "In challenging times, a strong Union is one that thinks strategically, shares a vision and acts together. [...] We know what our principles, our interests and our priorities are" (European Union Global Strategy, 2016: 3).

The EUGS defines four key principles of external action: unity of action, commitment in the global context, responsibility or sense of moral duty and partnership with states, regions and international organizations. The document also defines the main general interests of the

European Union are such as the pursuit of peace and security, prosperity and sustainable development, the safeguarding of democracies and a global rules-based system (European Union Global Strategy, 2016).

Karen E. Smith identifies three main characteristics to define a security strategy: goals, ways to achieve results, and resources necessary to succeed. Moreover, to be complete, a system requires considering external actors' role, in general state allies and the private sector. The overall EUGS plan includes almost all aspects to define a coherent strategy. However, Smith pointed out in 2017 that the plan still lacked in mobilising the necessary resources needed to achieve its goals (K. E. Smith, 2017). Indeed, shortly after the Global Strategy presentation, the European Union implemented other policies to make the EUGS not only a document of intent but a functioning aim of the European security system.

3.2 Winter Package

To fully understand the impact of the EUGS, it is necessary to consider the subsequent political projects. After the launch of this document, in fact, a policy package, so-called the Winter Package, followed up aimed to tangibly amplify the Europeanisation of the concept of defence and security. The Winter Package consists of three pillars.

The first pillar was the joint declaration of common proposals between the EU and NATO signed in December 2016 at the Warsaw Council. The document consisted of 42 initiative proposals on theme areas such as hybrid threats, Maritime military collaboration, cybersecurity, and defence capabilities (Blockman, 2016).

The second pillar was the European Defence Action Plan (EDAP) to address the issues of the inefficiency of the security and defence market and the need of Member States to invest conjointly in strategic capabilities. This particular plan seeks to strengthen the European defence market by reducing unnecessary duplication of R&D projects and improving the competitiveness of defence industries. The European Defence Action Plan ended in the European Defence Fund (EDF). The first EDF was made of two consecutive funding programs. The first EDF program from 2014 to 2020 consisted of two projects for a total of almost 600 million euros: the 2014-2019 Preparatory Action on Defence Research (PADR) with a budget of € 90 million and the 2019-2020 European Defence Industrial Development Programme (EDIDP) of € 500 million. The second program of the EDF for 2021-2027, after a long debate

(started with the Commission's proposal of € 13 billion), currently provides a budget of 8 billion within the 'Multiannual Financial Framework' (EDA b, n.d.).

The third and last pillar of the Winter Package was the Implementation Plan on Security and Defence that comprehend CARD, PESCO, EU battlegroups and the EU Military Staff. These initiatives bring a significant change in the security scheme in Europe because they allow the Union to enter directly into the dynamics of financing, development and purchase military equipment (Blockman, 2016. Legrand, 2020)

The Coordinated Annual Review on Defence (CARD) is an annual document, similar to the already implemented Capability Development Plan (CDP), written by the two European government agencies, the EDA and the EEAS. CARD collect the most up-to-date and detailed information possible to study the situation of the military and defence equipment of the various member states. The goal of this initiative is to adjust national defence spending plans. CARD represents a step towards greater efficiency and effectiveness of the European security scheme (EDA c, n.d.). Moreover, this third pillar of the Winter Package also includes the modernisation of the already existing EU Battlegroups and the EU General Staff, two not very useful tools but with a strong military hard power value of the Union (Blockman, 2016).

However, what represents the real turning point within the Implementation Plan on Security and Defence is the Permanent Structured Cooperation (PESCO). Many academics have focused on the value of this 'sleeping beauty' initiative that was legally founded on the Lisbon Treaty but was left dormant until then. PESCO is a structure that allows capable and willing Member States to cooperate on military R&D projects. PESCO born as the most important security initiative in the post-Global Strategy period to boost the Europeanization of the military capabilities. Despite the different views on inclusiveness or ambition that divide the Member States in the period prior to the implementation of PESCO, in December 2017, 25 EU Member States subscribed the binding commitments to invest, plan, develop and buy military innovations. Currently, PESCO consists of 47 projects (only one completed in February 2020) eligible for co-funding through the EDF. These projects touch areas as a troops training, drones, helicopters, surveillance system, semi-autonomous technologies for mine countermeasures, logistics hubs etc. (PESCO, n.d.).




Figure 1: A coherent approach from priorities to impact
 Source: European Defence Agency

<https://eda.europa.eu/docs/default-source/eda-factsheets/2019-10-25-factsheet-coherence246bb73fa4d264cfa776ff000087ef0f.pdf>

3.3 European Security Policies in analysis

In this section, I will apply the six questions of the WRP method to the European security policies previously mentioned in order to define the current European security and defence discourse. Without neglecting all the aforementioned policies, I will mainly focus on the EUGS and the subsequential policies EDF (and the two projects PADR and EDIDP), CARD and PESCO, as many scholars have highlighted the decisive role of these initiatives in shaping a European security agenda (Biscop, 2020. Ianakiev, 2019. K.E. Smith, 2017. Tocci, 2017)

Question 1: What's the 'problem' represented to be in a specific policy or policy proposal?

Aim: Assists in clarifying the implicit problem representation within a specific policy or policy proposal. Carol Bacchi argues that this first question must be answered directly to clearly understand the focal problem that the policymaker is creating (Bacchi, 2009).

Answer 1:

- **EUGS**: The problem that the Global Strategy seeks to address is contained in the title of the document itself. The lack of a ‘shared vision’ of a ‘common action’ of the Member States and consequently the absence of a ‘strong Europe’.
- **Winter Package**: The problem that the Winter Package tries to address is related to the European Defence Economy as scarcity of European funding in the defence sector (faced in the EDF), the overlap of national military projects and lack of homogeneity between the different national military systems (faced in CARD and PESCO).

In the EUGS, five problems are explicitly listed. First, the insecurity within the Union and the weakness of the defence system. Considering the concept of military security, the EUGS problematizes the lack of industrial technologies and capabilities to develop a European security strategy autonomously. Second, the external crises that turn into threats from the south and the east neighbourhood. Third, the absence of a single and coherent approach to conflicts and crises management. Fourth, the lack of cooperation with other continental regions of the world (as Africa, the Middle East, Asia). Fifth, the weakness of the International Financial Institutions and United Nations’ global governance (European Union Global Strategy, 2016).

Similarly, the Winter Package addresses EU security issues, particularly regarding the European Defence Economy and the European Military Economic Cycle. The problems occurred through the Security and Defence Implementation Plan. This initiative problematizes the defence industrial market, mainly focusing on useless inefficiencies (as shortage or overcapacity of military equipment) in the allocation of resources (European Commission, 2016. Blockman, 2016).

Tocci argues that a European Security and Defence Union means to think, to buy and to act together (Tocci, 2018). To sum up, through these policies, the European Union problematizes the not-thinking, not-buying and not-acting together of the Member States.

Question 2: What presuppositions or assumptions underpin this representation of the ‘problem’?

Aim: reflection on the underlying premises in this representation of the ‘problem’.

Answer 2: In the recent EU policies, the problems that plague the Union are understood as challenges to be overcome in the name of a securer and more prosperous society. To overcome

these obstacles, the solution is found in the Europeanisation of the security and defence discourse. The idea of these policies is that the Union should endow itself with the necessary tools to tackle these insecurity problems (Tocci, 2019). Former HR/VP Federica Mogherini, in the introduction of the EUGS, explicitly clarifies that the Union must expand and advance its foreign policy approach based on soft power, arming itself with hard power (European Union Global Strategy, 2016).

“The European Union has always prided itself on its soft power – and it will keep doing so, because we are the best in this field. However, the idea that Europe is an exclusively ‘civilian power’ does not do justice to an evolving reality. For instance, the European Union currently deploys seventeen military and civilian operations, with thousands of men and women serving under the European flag for peace and security – our own security, and our partners’. For Europe, soft and hard power go hand in hand” (European Union Global Strategy, 2016: 04).

Stephanie Anderson studies explicitly the shift in act in these policies from only civilian/soft power to both soft and hard power. According to the scholar, the European Union is a powerful player in the field of soft power. Indeed, the EU has for a long time based its foreign policy on building global economic and political connections that have allowed it to be a central player. However, the lack of military security (hard power) makes the Union a ‘passive foreign policy actor’ dependent on other actors (specifically the US) (Anderson, 2010).

Considering the five categories of militarism formed by Stavrianakis and Selby (*ideology, behaviour, military build-ups, institutionally, sociologically*), the willingness to endow the EU with hard power is, first of all, part of a *behaviour* or inclination to resolve conflicts with the use of armed force. Although the EU does not define in the EUGS an aggressive war-based foreign policy, it still sets the platform for future armed aggressive behaviours against possible threats. According to the document, along with peacebuilding and stabilization of fragile regions, the Union needs to be able to operate in other ways to put into effect its foreign policy. Notwithstanding the central role of civil and human security, this document expands the security discourse towards a military definition of the concept. In fact, for Europe, defence does not stop at the civilian level but also includes military security and military capabilities to solve possible future threats. The EUGS and the subsequent policies of the Winter Package strongly stress the need to broaden the discourse on security towards an assimilation and Europeanization of the concept of hard power (Blockman, 2016. European Union Global Strategy, 2016).

These post-2016 European policies focus in particular on the concept of autonomy, problematizing the lack of strategic autonomy in the external action of the Union. Nathalie Tocci unpacks this recurring term by arguing that autonomy does not mean unilateralism, sovereignty, and independence but rather the “ability of the self - autos - to live by its laws – nomos” (Tocci, 2021: 3). Following her analysis, to archive autonomy, three requisites are needed: unity as the ability to act as one, great common strategic investments in technology, and be an active international player.

The discourse on military *behaviour* and strategic autonomy in the EUGS and in the following European defence policies lead directly into another factor that is perceived to be at the centre of this analysis. Indeed, the conception of *military build-ups* understood as the importance of military spending and production of armaments and defence technologies can be strongly connected to the persecution of hard power (Stavrianakis and Selby, 2014). The 2016 European Defence Action Plan is the first concrete sign of the initial willingness of the European Commission to establish a common spending programme on defence and security (European Commission, 2016). The 2014-2020 European Commission and its President Jean Claude Juncker repeatedly stressed the need to endow Europe with the necessary equipment to adopt future hard power solutions when and if will be needed. The language used covers many economic terms and focuses on the idea of common investments in the European defence sector justified mainly by the creation of jobs and the increase of the strategic autonomy in foreign policy for all the Member States. Underlining how investments in defence have dropped dramatically in recent years in Europe and how countries such as China, the US and Russia have increased their defence budgets, the Commission pointed out that a common approach to spending on security could create an added value improving the competitiveness of the European market, stimulating cooperation and promoting a more efficient European Military Economic Cycle (European Commission, 2016: 5).

PESCO and EDF enter directly into this discussion of a new type of security discourse around *military build-ups*. EDF’s main goal is to fabricate the next generation of armament systems and combat capabilities also through the financialization of the PESCO projects.

The 2014-2019 PADR invested € 1,400,000 on the implementation of PILUM, a railgun system that uses the electromagnetic system to launch high-velocity projectiles. € 5,400,000 financed TALOS for the development of Laser Directed Energy Weapon. ARTUS & iMUGS projects, funded for € 1.5 million through PADR and € 30.6 million through EDIDP, will produce unmanned ground vehicles such as tanks. LynKEUs project, with a budget of over € 6 million

from the EDIDP, will be used to develop Beyond Line-of-Sight missiles capable of autonomous object designation (ENAAT, 2020). Through PESCO, it will be develop the Integrated Unmanned Ground System to provide combat support. It will be also upgrade the European Attack Helicopters TIGER Mark III to improve its aggression capabilities, and it will be produced the European Drone and the Airborne Electronic Attack (AEA) for “suppression of enemy air defences, escort/ modified-escort role, non-traditional electronic attack” (PESCO, n.d.).

Summing up the essential points of this second answer, the new European discourse on security and defence includes an idea of hard power, which leads to highlight the presence of a new military *behaviour* in the European Union. Furthermore, the connected idea of strategic autonomy in the European discourse considers fundamental the importance of a *military builds up* that focuses not on defence but also on attack strategies.

Question 3: How has this representation of the ‘problem’ come about?

Aim: consideration of the contingent practices and processes through which this understanding of the ‘problem’ has emerged.

Answer 3: An analysis of the practices and the development process of governmental policies allows us to understand how the core policies problematisation is presented and created. The study of the problematization of security brings some considerations.

The first point is a historical analysis of security as politics in the European security discourse. In the recent European agenda, defence and security, along with many other policies, are considered one of the Union's priorities. The European Defence Union has merged with analogous projects as the European Economic and Monetary Union, the European Trade Union and the European Energy Union. Security took the same level of political themes as energy, economics, trade and finance. This leads to a critical consideration. Today security in Europe is part of what Andrew W. Neal called the ‘normal politics’ arena. The concept of security approached by the Union does not include the so-called Hobbesian trap that understands security policies as opposites as normal politics (Neal, 2019). In Europe, the dynamics in action to achieve security do not undermine the democratic system. Indeed, the Common Security and Defence Policy is legally framed in the founding treaties of the European Union (TUE, 2007. Howorth, 2012)

Andrew Neal provides some tools to analytically study the position of the concept of security in the political sphere. The author argues that to place security inside the normal politics arena (or perhaps outside), it is essential to study the role of the democratic institutions, particularly parliaments and governments, in defining defence policies. The author's study takes into consideration the case of the UK, where there have been many parliamentary committees that scrutinize security policies (Neal, 2019). Using the UK case as an example, it is possible to conduct a similar investigation studying the role and the structure of the European Parliament (EP).

Regarding the role of EP, the nature of the Common Security and Defence Policy is intergovernmental (Howorth, 2012). In fact, the Parliament does not have the same decision-making power as other supranational politics. However, Art. 37 and Art. 41 of the TUE enable the EP to scrutinise security and budget policies to issue political positions to the HR/VP and the Council (TUE, 2007).

Observing the structure, the European Parliament has two committees that discuss security policies, the Foreign Affairs Committee (AFET) and the Subcommittee on Security and Defence (SEDE) (Legrand, 2020). The Parliament, twice a year, holds public debates concerning the implementation of defence and foreign policies. Furthermore, at least once a year, the President of the Commission presents the State of the Union, addressing challenges and priorities of the Union to the Parliament, in order also to maintain constant collaboration between the European institutions. The HR/VP also has a close collaboration with the other democratic bodies. As a matter of fact, the EUGS was presented right in front of the Parliament in 2016 by the HR/VP (European Union Global Strategy, 2016. European Commission b, n.d.. Legrand, 2020). From this analysis on the role of democratic institutions, it is clear that in Europe, security is part of normal politics (and not anti-politics), but it also maintains some characteristics (the different intergovernmental decision-making process) that make it not entirely 'normal'.

This analysis of security as politics opens another important consideration that focuses on the distinction between civil security, link to the concept of soft power, and this new discourse regarding military security. As has been analysed previously, in the European policies before 2016 the term security was narrowed to a civil defence sphere through the persecution of actions not strictly related to the military sector. The policies undertaken in the aftermath of the Lisbon Treaty problematized civil issues such as the control system of the external borders, the creation or updating of databases and data exchanges, the use of surveillance and

identification systems etc. Many authors have argued that, particularly with border control policies, Europe had already then embarked on a militarization process (Jones, 2017. Rufanges, 2016). Yet, these policies were always inserted by Europe itself in a civil security discourse. Hard power represented a prerogative of the Member States and a non-acceptable area of action for the Union. Hence, before 2016 security in the form of civilian was intended as a normal policy while, differently, military security was not.

With the post-2016 policies, the approach to security has undergone a shift towards an explicitly and accepted militaristic discourse. The EU Global Strategy and the subsequent Winter Package have opened a new type of approach that includes the concept of security understood as militarism. For example, the aforementioned aspects of *behaviour* and *military builds up* have been previously analysed. Also, allowing Europe to dialogue with NATO (the first pillar of the Winter Package is, in fact, the Joint Declaration between the military alliance and the EU) represents a legitimization of a new European military action (European Council, 2016). As a result, the explicit - and no longer hidden - character of security as militarism in the post-2016 policies is a clear sign of a new discourse that also identifies military security as a normal policy together with the civil one.

Andrew Neal not only describes the idea of security as normal politics, but he also highlights the process of normalisation of the concept of security. The author argues that the economic and social changes triggered by the end of the Cold War influenced the shift of security from anti-democracy politics to normal politics (Neal, 2019). By studying state cases (primarily the UK case), Neal's analysis does not take into consideration an important and interconnected process necessary to understand the normalisation process of the concept of security in Europe. Indeed, in Europe, the normalisation of security did not occur following Neal's orthodoxy due to the different structure and history of the Union compared to nation-states. The historical analysis on the European integration process has, in fact, made it clear that during the Cold War, for the European institutions, security was an area of absolutely non-action politics. (EDA, 2021). This was completely different for states where in the same period, security was anti-politics but still remained a state political competence (Neal, 2019).

It is clear that Europeanization and normalization are closely interrelated and that they influence each other. It is no coincidence that the normalisation process that begins in the post-Cold War matches the Europeanization process temporally (Guay, 1998. Mabee, 2009). The transition of security into normal politics has resulted in security being moved more and more

into the European domain. Conversely, the Europeanization of security has led to a normalisation of the concept itself.

Another final consideration needs to be addressed in answering question number three regarding the process of understanding the political problem. It is very important to question the role of some external/private actors in the recent European defence and security policies' decision-making process.

Several authors have highlighted how, since World War II, there has been an increase of public and private actors interacting in the security arena to define state policies (M. E. Smith, 2010. Mills, 1956. Neal, 2019). In particular, many have pointed out that since 2001, with the creation of the GoP, the links between European institutions and private companies have been strengthened and structured. (Jones, 2017. Slijper, 2005).

The recent security policies as the EUGS and the Winter Package have re-proposed this structure between public decision-makers and private actors. According to some studies, the European Commission in office from 2014 to 2020 has, in fact, conducted a constant dialogue with the arms companies (Rufanges, 2016. Slijper, 2005). The European policies of 2016 would have been very different if the private industries had not put in place intense pressure on the high decision-making spheres (Jones, 2017).

The new 2015 GoP is a clear sign of this influence. European politicians and Commissioners have had the opportunity to come into contact institutionally with exponents of the private defence sector as CEOs of the main arms companies. Nine of the sixteen members of the new 2015 GoP represented defence companies with economic interests. The European Commissioner for Internal Market, Industry, Entrepreneurship and SMEs Elżbieta Bieńkowska wrote "The Group of Personalities (GoP), which I convened, has been critical in helping to shape the Commission's plans for the Preparatory Action and in providing strategic advice on the longer-term aspirations for EU-funded defence-related research" (Group of Personalities, 2016: 10). Moreover, besides the institutional way, Jones points out that some Commissioners were in a close relationship, through private meeting, dinners and closed-door events, with arms companies and research institutes (Jones, 2017).

The 2015 GoP and the EDF (that departed with the first fund PADR) have started a new privileged network between the European Commission and the arms industries, especially through a collaboration in the military R&D. This system of connections can be defined as "a spider's web of trust and influence" that has brought to "the emergence of an EU Military-Industrial Complex" (Vranken, 2016 p.3).

As has been said, Mills and Rufanges have highlighted the link between industrialization and expansion of the military industry/establishment. The expansion of dominant quasi-monopolistic defence industries in the European market is a process that began in the late 1990s. However, the influence on these recent European policies represents another clear sign of a continuous expansion of the capabilities of arms companies. William D. Hartung, through an analysis of the American system, has shown that some private defence companies have the ability to influence more than others (Hartung, 2011). In the case of recent European defence policies Airbus, Leonardo, INDRA and Thales are (once again) the leading players. The dominant position of these private actors in national military markets has allowed them to influence state and European policies, including spending and purchasing decision. Indeed, the major beneficiaries of the 2017-2019 PADR and the 2019-2020 EDIDP funds are almost all members of the 2015 Group of Personalities (ENAAT, 2020).

To sum up, there are two key considerations about the practices and processes through which these policies (and their problematization) have been formed. The first is based on the analysis of security as politics in the European system, the different approach to civilian and military security before and after the 2016 watershed, and the different process of normalization of security for Europe. The second point concerns the strong influence of private actors/elites in the definition of these post-2016 policies (ENAAT, 2020. Jones, 2017. Vranken, 2016).

Question 4: What is left unproblematic in this problem representation? Where are the silences? Can the ‘problem’ be thought about differently?

Aim: careful scrutiny of possible gaps or limitations in this representation of the ‘problem’, accompanied by inventive imagining of potential alternatives.

Answer 4: The security discourse undertaken by the Union has opened some criticisms which have shown limits to the European approach. From an economic point of view, many scholars have highlighted problems in the security and defence discourse within the European security policies. Bartels and Kellner have indicated the irrelevance of the defence sector, representing only 1.5% of the total manufacturing sector in the EU (Bartels and Kellner, 2017). Dunne and Tian have criticized the lack of competitiveness and the enormous state financial aid that make the sector ‘economically dysfunctional’ and not a market system (Dunne and Tian, 2013). In studying the jobs market, Pollin and Peltier have argued that different sectors create more jobs for the same investment amount (Pollin and Peltier, 2011). Many others have pointed out that

defence industries do not innovate and develop technologies as they once did during the Cold War (Holden, 2016. Karampekios et al., 2018).

Alongside these economic issues, there are more intrinsic dilemmas within post-2016 security policies. To start an analysis on the limitations and the gaps of the recent European security discourse, however, it is necessary to return to discuss the different nature of the EUGS and the Winter Package. As has been analysed, the EU Global Strategy mainly represents a political document of intent that pursues to define goals and ways to archive results in the external action of the Union. The EUGS has a global and multidimensional view of the concept of security (European Union Global Strategy, 2016). Despite this, however, the document does not define organizational action systems and fails to mobilize necessary resources (K. E. Smith, 2017). The Winter Package, on the other hand, has a different organizational nature (especially PESCO, EDF and CARD). It is precisely in this second package of actions that limits and gaps of the security discourse are mainly identified. In fact, the Winter Package does not address the same multi-dimensional concept of security as the EUGS. PESCO, EDF and CARD, for example, are mechanisms that concern a very narrow vision of the concept of security linked to military power. These projects may in the future clash with the ideas of peace and stability listed in the Global Strategy. There is an inconsistency between the idea of peace, prosperity and stability listed in the EUGS and the race for the development of military defence armaments in the PESCO and the EDF.

The arms trade can be used as a case to study how Europe does not actually face a comprehensive discourse on security and defence. As Stohl and Grillot argues, the arms trade has a great impact on international peace and security. The proliferation of weapons leads to negative consequences for human security (Stohl and Grillot, 2009). Although the statements in the EUGS defining trade (but not specifically the arms trade) as a tool in possession of Europe to act in promoting peace and prosperity, the subsequent policies of the Winter Package clearly omit this aspect showing a limitation in the European discourse on security (Blockman, 2016. European Union Global Strategy, 2016).

■ Average % USA ■ Average % Russia ■ Average % China ■ Average % EU ■ Average % Others




Table 2: Average percentage share of global arms transfers of major exporters and EU member states 2008-2017

Source: European Parliament's Sub-committee on Security and Defence.

[https://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/STUD/2018/603876/EXPO_STU\(2018\)603876_EN.pdf](https://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/STUD/2018/603876/EXPO_STU(2018)603876_EN.pdf)

Over time, the European Union has tried in various ways to regulate Member States' arms trade. In 1998, the EU issued a first action with the Code of Conduct on Arms Trade, which was subsequently updated in 2013. Another important step was taken in 2009 when the EU proposed to update the dual-use export control (Whang, 2021). The purpose of Regulation 428/2009 was to improve the regulatory structure called Community General Export Authorization (CGEA), which, although approved at the European level, was based on registration and reporting requirements of items at the national level. Regulation 428/2009 was approved after a long process on May 2021, and it included for the first-time considerations on human security and respect for human rights for the export of technologies that can be used in civil and military security (Whang, 2021. Naugès, 2021).

Notwithstanding these regulations, the arms exports case has indicated that in the European discourse on security and defence there are no reflections around the global arms economy. Policies such as PESCO and EDF aim to develop large-scale armaments also for boosting European export of new military inventions. In this way, the global arms market will suffer a proliferation (and perhaps a surplus) of new and more lethal products. European weapons export policies, such as the Regulation 428/2009, do not address the issue of the international arms trade. It is clear that European security and defence discourse is limited into the European regional perimeter and does not address global problems. Although the global prospective of

security address in the EUGS, the implementing policies are based on the European regional level.

The growing action of the European Union in the field of security and defence leads to consider another gap. In answering question number three of the WPR method, I studied the notion of security as politics, also considering its different forms as civil security and military security. Through this previous analysis, I have highlighted in which way security can be considered a normal politics and, at the same time, it can maintain some exceptional characteristics. The different decision-making system of security policies (intergovernmental and non-supranational) is the first and foremost example. The European Parliament, the symbol of European citizens power and the heart of the European democratic system, has limited decision-making power in the subject of defence and security (Howorth, 2012). This factor represents a gap when it is considered in a more general discussion of civil democratic control of military power.

Born, Caparini, Haltiner and Kuhlmann define democratic control as the power of democratic civil institutions to prevent an uncontrolled growth of the military power against the civilian one (Born et al. 2006 pp 4,6). The European Union has some fundamental rules that are part of the democratic civilian control mechanism of the military system. For example, to join the Union, Member States must ensure that at the national level, military power is controlled by democratic civil power (Born et al. 2006). However, recent security and military policies in Europe have opened a new question. How can democracies control the military power if the decision-making process is shared only by the intergovernmental institutions like the European Commission and the European Council? The ability to scrutinize security policies does not allow the European Parliament - the only institution elected by European citizens - to fully control (for example rejecting a specific policy) the decision-making process of security policies (Howorth, 2012). If Europe intends to take on more responsibilities in matters of security, it must also consider increasing the democratic civil control system on these decisions; otherwise, the European security system will be incomplete.

To sum up, in addressing question fourth of Bacchi's WPR method, I have pointed out some limitations and gaps in the European discourse on security and defence. As an initial consideration, I have used the research of several authors who have highlighted the economic problems of security discourse within European security policies. Then I discussed the lack of a truly global, comprehensive and multidimensional representation of the security issue in subsequent EUGS policies. This limitation is clearly presented in the case of European policies

on arms exports. Finally, another gap was shown in the weak democratic control in the European discourse on security and defence.

Question 5: What effects are produced by this representation of the ‘problem’?

Aim: considered assessment of how identified problem representations limit what can be talked about as relevant, shape people’s understandings of themselves and the issues, and impact materially on people’s lives.

Answer 5: The European security decision-making process is mainly of an intergovernmental nature (Howorth, 2012). Although the unique character of the Global Strategy that seeks to address a message to the entire European society, the targets of these policies are mainly Member States and the private defence sector (Biscop, 2020. European Union Global Strategy, 2016). Hence, the role of individual European citizens is not fully addressed. For this reason, I must reformulate the aim of this question by shifting the focus. In particular, I will investigate how the recent European defence and security policies have changed the logic of understanding/approaching the security issue for national states and private actors.

As has been said, these recent policies mark a watershed for the European integration project. Tocci argues that EUGS, PESCO, EDF and CARD lay the foundations for a future European Defence Union (Tocci, 2018). The impact of these policies does not stop only at the mere organisational nature. According to Biscop, these policies moved a step towards a new conceptual/logical attitude of the Europeanization integration process (Biscop, 2020). PESCO, in particular, is characterised by a regulation system that makes this initiative unique in the European structure. Although it is a voluntary initiative of the Member States, once signed, it obliges the States to “invest, plan, develop and manage defence capabilities more together, within the framework of the Union”. PESCO differs from other policies by its legally binding nature of the duties undertaken by its participants (PESCO, n.d.)

For Steven Biscop, PESCO had two effects. The first most tangible results are the 49 military projects. The second most intrinsic and hidden effect is to create a legal basis for the Europeanisation of the concept of security through a joint effort in funding, development, purchasing and organisation in the military sector. The binding commitments intend to justify, in the eyes of European governments, the Europeanisation of the security sector in the name of better efficiency and effectiveness (Firott et al. 2017. Biscop, 2020). By entering the PESCO project, the subscriber state must participate in specific mechanisms and implement specific

actions defined in the twenty binding commitments (PESCO, n.d.). The twenty binding obligations are based on the Protocol (No. 10), art. 2. of the Lisbon Treaty and are divided into five general principles (TUE, 2007). The first principle concerns the need to work together with equal economic efforts to develop military capabilities. In fact, all PESCO members have to invest 20% of national defence spending in joint defence capability projects and 2% into joint research and technology. Second, align the national defence systems as much as possible (specifically through CARD) and boost cooperation in training and logistics. The third principle, “take concrete measures to enhance the availability, interoperability, flexibility and deplorability of their forces”. Forth, work together to addresses commonly identified capability shortfalls, including through multinational approaches (NATO). Last, take part in the European Defence Agency framework projects of development of major joint or European equipment (PESCO b, n.d.)

Recent European security policies, particularly PESCO and EDF, have not only influenced nation-states. In fact, private actors have also participated and have been influenced in this redefinition of structures and relations in the sphere of security in Europe. Previously, in answering question number three of the WPR method, I studied how private actors were parts of the ‘causes’ at the beginning of post-2016 European policies. However, at the same time, it is important to consider that from the same policies, these actors have been parallelly affected.

European security policies subsequent to 2016 have not only represented a continuous creation of relationships between individuals and institutions but given their pioneering scope in military security, the EUGS and the Winter Package have opened up to new consequences. Through policies, especially PESCO and EDF, the military market - historically restricted to the national level - has undergone a shift that has led to the creation of solid structures at the European level.

At the national level, research, development and sales are organized in a quasi-monopolist structure, where the national champions have close relationships with the state they belong to (Guay, 1998). The Winter Package allows to recreate this structure, usually limited to national states, in a quasi-oligopolistic way, given the existence of more dominant players. In fact, EDF and PESCO have enormously nourished the major European companies financially, making arms firms even more dominant (ENAAAN, 2021. Jones, 2017. Vranken, 2016).

This type of structure can lead to an upgrade and a solidification of a possible European Military Industrial Complex, similar to the American one defined by Mills. This will have a

strong impact on the role of European companies as increasingly key, dominant and permanent players not only in the security discourse for Europe but also for the world. Indeed, Stephanie Anderson highlighted how the need to compete and emulate the American Military-Economic Cycle and structures of production is the engine of these recent European military security policies (Anderson, 2010). The EUGS and the European Defence Action Plan explicitly focus on the need to compete with the military production structures of foreign countries such as the US, China and Russia. Especially the European Defence Action Plan points out that there is a need to reform the European development, research and buying system by looking at the Military-Economic Cycles of other countries (European Union Global Strategy, 2016. European Commission, 2016). This means linking the private defence companies even more to the European Union's interests.

By implication, the EU wants to use the role of arms producer as a tool of power in the global arena. In this discourse on security, it is understood that for Europe being able to quantitatively influence the international arms market and possessing cutting-edge technologies will allow a strategic position in the global context.

To sum up this section, the recent European security and defence discourse has a strong impact on states and private actors. Through the recent documents and policies, the European Union tries to give shape and logic to its discourse on security and defence, which is increasingly going to replicate and replace the Military-Industrial Complexes that were previously organized mainly on the Member States level. Once again, this consideration leads to the question of whether this discourse on security and defence could clash with the EU's global ambitions of peace and stability. Besides, there may be an incompatibility between the definition of the EU as a peacebuilding actor who practices soft power and the development and this new militarist thrust that reinforces the conception of a discourse on military and economic competition between the nations of the world.

4. Chapter IV: Conclusion

In this section, I want to conclude my thesis. Here I want to take into consideration my initial research question and answer it in a direct and concise manner, highlighting the results that I obtained through my analysis. Furthermore, I want to open a discussion on these results and subsequently suggest openings for future research.

As I said at the beginning of my thesis, the relentless changes and transformations in the European security and defence domain lead to a need for new research. This thesis tries to be part of the research that run parallel to the implementation of new European policies. I took inspiration from the previous studies of many scholars, such as Jones, Rufanges, Tocci, and others, to develop a Critical Discourse Analysis on the European security policies post-2016.

My research is based on the concept of security and defence discourse intended not merely as the language but also as a way to create knowledge, meanings, social structures and actions in the field of security. I wanted to study the European discourse on the security and defence problem, how this issue is translated into policies, what is the implementation process, what structures are created, and what are the principles and ideas behind these security problem representations. This research aimed to study the security and defence discourse underlying the recent European security and defence policies starting from 2016 and to consider in particular the role of arms companies within this particular security discourse.

Hence, my research question has been:

How has the security and defence discourse been represented in Europe since the promulgation of the 2016 EU Global Strategy? What are the main implications of this specific security and defence discourse, particularly for European arms companies?

I answered these questions through the ‘What's the Problem Represented to be’ method by Carol Bacchi. The five questions I explicitly answered allowed me to analytically study the problem of security at the basis of the European post-2016 policies.

Through the problematization tactic at the base of the WPR method, I have analysed what is the problem that these specific policies try to face (Question 1), what are the presuppositions or assumptions in it (Question 2), what are the practices and implementation processes (Question 3), what are they the limitations and the gaps (Question 4), and finally what are the effects (Question 5).

In the analysis section (Chapter III), I applied the method to the empirical material - specifically the European Union Global Strategy and the Winter Package policies - and I used the framework theories to reach the following results.

The first result of my analysis is that the post-2016 European security policies problematize the lack of a common and coherent vision on security in Europe and Europe's weakness in creating security. Furthermore, these policies problematize the European Defence Economy and its Military-Economic Cycle that cause scarcity and inefficiency of national military public spending.

The problematization of these problems is based on a military approach to the concept of security. In fact, I came to the result that through the EUGS and the Winter Package, the European discourse incorporates the concept of military security through a particular *behaviour*, understood as an inclination to use force to solve problems, and a correlated *military build-up* that considers the importance of military spending and acquisition of technologies for the persecution of hard power.

The process of implementation of these defence and security policies have highlighted how security considered within the political system is defined as normal politics, that is, as a political issue that does not undermine freedom and that uses democratic structures and processes. The implementation process also underlined the importance of private actors, in particular the dominant European defence industries, in influence the European discourse on civil and military security.

I have also pointed out that there are gaps and limitations to the current European discourse on security and defence. *In primis*, the lack of a real global European action on the security problem. Then another gap is found in the intergovernmental process of the European defence policies. This decision-making process marks the lack of an effective capacity of democratic control over security as politics.

The post-2016 European policies analysed in this thesis have also had an important impact on third actors. First of all, it was highlighted how PESCO, with its binding commitments, has

created a legal basis for the Europeanization of military security. Moreover, these policies have redeemed the relationship with the private and public sectors by creating a stable configuration of public-private relations that tries to emulate the nation-state structures.

In conclusion, I argue that the European policies subsequent to 2016 have embarked on a security discourse that encapsulates the concept of military security. In these policies, militarism is not only understood as the “preparation for and conduct of organized violence” (Stavrianakis and Selby, 2014 p. 3), but it is also a process of expansion of a particular sector (the military-industrial one) with the creation of new relational networks that go beyond the private-public division.

The post-2016 security and defence European policies can be studied as a final step in the long process of integration and Europeanization. Differently, in this thesis, I tried to look at them with a perspective open to the future and to the long term. Indeed, the recent European security policies are considered as a watershed in a longer process that will lead the European Union to emulate the role, the capabilities, and the decision-making structures of the nation-states in defence matters. Europe is increasingly trying to replicate the national Military-Economic Cycles, proposing itself as the true promoter of security and defence on the continent. This consequently leads to the consolidation and solidification of a Military-Industrial Complex at the European level. Katarina Engberg wrote that now that the European Union has a comprehensive and solid long-term defence project (which can be translated as comprehensive and solid security discourse), integration progress can proceed towards the European Defence Union. (Engberg, 2021). In the future, this process may also be consolidated with the idea, not new in European circles, of a European army.

For this reason, I believe it is important to continue to conduct future studies on the future European defence policies to analyse the relentless changes and transformation on the security discourse.

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