How can you train power engineering staff to recognize control system security risks?

2 Implement the standards

The second step to train power engineering staff to recognize control system security risks is to ensure that they follow relevant standards and guidelines for control system security and resilience. This includes NERC CIP, a set of mandatory and enforceable standards developed by the North American Electric Reliability Corporation (NERC) to protect the bulk power system, IEC 62443, a series of international standards developed by the International Electrotechnical Commission (IEC) to secure industrial automation and control systems, and NIST SP 800-82, a special publication issued by the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST). Power engineering staff should be familiar with the requirements and objectives of these standards and guidelines, as well as their roles and responsibilities in ensuring compliance. They should also be aware of the roles and responsibilities of different stakeholders such as system owners, operators, vendors, regulators, and auditors in ensuring accountability. With this knowledge, they can apply it to their daily operations and activities.

3 Adopt the best practices

The third step to train power engineering staff to recognize control system security risks is to adopt the best practices and techniques for enhancing the security and resilience of the control system. These include defense-in-depth, segmentation, encryption, authentication, and backup and recovery. Power engineering staff should be trained to implement these techniques, monitor their effectiveness and performance, and update their skills and knowledge. It is also important to encourage them to share their experiences and feedback with their peers and managers. This will help ensure that they are well equipped to recognize potential security risks and take the necessary steps to protect the control system.

4 Conduct the exercises

The fourth step to train power engineering staff to recognize control system security risks is to conduct regular and realistic exercises and drills to test and improve their readiness and response. Tabletop exercises involve presenting a hypothetical scenario and asking the participants to describe their actions and decisions, while functional exercises involve activating a response team and using tools and systems to respond to a simulated scenario. Full-scale exercises are high-stress, live-based activities where actual resources and personnel are deployed to respond to a realistic scenario. Power engineering staff should actively participate in these exercises, treating them as learning opportunities. They should be debriefed with feedback and recommendations for improvement, as well as document the lessons learned for implementation.

5 Engage the stakeholders

The fifth step to train power engineering staff to recognize control system security risks is to engage and collaborate with the relevant stakeholders, both internal and external, to foster a culture of security and resilience. This should include management, vendors, regulators, and peers. Power engineering staff must communicate and cooperate with these stakeholders regularly and effectively in order to build trust and rapport. They should also seek and provide feedback and input, leveraging their expertise and resources. This will help ensure that the vision, direction, support, resources, budget, technical support, compliance performance standards, best practices, and lessons learned are all taken into consideration when it comes to control system security and resilience initiatives.

6 Learn from the incidents

The sixth and final step to train power engineering staff to recognize control system security risks is to learn from the incidents and events that occur in the real world, using them as case studies and examples. For instance, Stuxnet was a sophisticated malware that targeted and damaged the centrifuges of the Iranian nuclear program, exploiting the vulnerabilities of the SCADA systems. Additionally, BlackEnergy was a malicious campaign that used a variant of the BlackEnergy malware to infiltrate and disrupt the Ukrainian power grid, causing widespread blackouts and outages. Moreover, SolarWinds was a massive cyberattack that compromised the software supply chain of the SolarWinds Orion platform, affecting several critical infrastructure sectors, including the power sector. Power engineering staff should study and analyze these incidents and events in order to understand their causes, impacts, and lessons. They should also use them as opportunities to review and update their control system security and resilience policies and practices, as well as identify and address any gaps or weaknesses.