Nate D.F. Allen’s Post

I am happy to share my perspective on the recent trilateral alliance among Egypt, Somalia, and Eritrea, which met in Eritrea on October 10. While my analysis covers various issues, the published summary in The Reporter, an English weekly, lacks essential context about Ethiopia's internal challenges, as well as Ethiopia's historical and ongoing disagreements with these three states. I invite you to read my brief perspective through the following link: https://lnkd.in/dvU_daVb

𝐇𝐈𝐍𝐓𝐒𝐀 𝐀𝐍𝐃𝐄𝐁𝐑𝐇𝐀𝐍: #AfricaFuture The AU’s inability to resolve crises independently raises concerns about its usefulness. The ongoing violence in Ethiopia and persistent instability in Somalia demonstrate the limitations the organisation faces. As Western diplomats step in, questions about the AU’s role and effectiveness can only grow louder. From Cold War proxy battles in the Democratic Republic of Congo to NATO’s intervention in Libya, Africa’s political crises often intersect with international interests. Understanding these dynamics is crucial for grasping the region’s current instability. Read more https://ow.ly/SCxK50RTLCb

My GAO colleagues recently released a report on U.S. Department of State and USAID's use of partners to implement humanitarian and development assistance in #Ukraine and recommended ways in which these agencies can ensure that they are working with high-quality partners. Learn more by checking out the report below!

Before three weeks ago I wrote about the Driving forces of Extra- Regional Powers in the horn of Africa. In relation to this the Dynamics in the alliance and partnership in the Horn has greatly becoming very vibrant. How? #Kenya's President has a collision with CSOs, and Elites and his Pro-democratic image is eroded. His leadership is questioned. Kenya has allowed CSOs to work from top to bottom. This in fact can impact political leadership locally and regionally. # Governments in the region have increased training Armies in large scale and even inviting Middle Power nations to forge alliance and military partnership. # Small arms movement is becoming large because non-State actors have increasing efforts to control resources and Big nations outside the region have started to use small nations ( Indirect involvement is preferred than direct involvement) # Ethiopia-Egypt have been in dispute due to GERD, which is very crucial for FDRE and its National security while Egyptians are afraid of the who takes what and when (Water -Politics) of the water # Egypt has stopped diplomatic agreement and whereas, South Sudan and Burundi have signed the CFA. This marks great success to FDRE and the other riparian's . #Drought and flood may have large challenges to the region that can involve different NGOs, INGOs and intergovernmental Organizations. This could have its own conditionalities and political leverages and impacts. What's Next? 1.The US election in November will change the Horn of Africa (HoA) largely. 2. The Dispute in Sudan will deter the competition between different actors in resource competition. 3. The Somalia Land #MoU with FDRE can occur soon with conditionalities 4. #South-Sudan and Ethiopia could deepen inter-dependence through infrastructure and trade 5. #Eritrea-Ethiopia relation might not change 6. #Djibouti- FDRE relation will have some changes. 7. #Somalia- Ethiopia can start Negotiations soon Solutions The world is becoming more competitive, and the panacea to it is win- win

The recent developments in Eastern DRC, present a multifaceted challenges to the East African Community. Let's delve into them, shall we?👇 First, the fall of Goma to M23 has escalated the existing diplomatic rift between DRC and Rwanda to the point of withdrawal of respective Ambassadors. This tensions has hinderered EAC efforts to foster regional intergration and Cooperation. The Tensions have yet again presented a humanitarian crisis.Millions have been displaced- mostly affecting the vulnerable-women and children.EAC through its peacekeeping mission- EACRF is tasked with coordinating humanitatian assistance, a task that had proven to be difficult. The conflict have also curtailed trade within the region. Goma, being an economic hub of DRC, would potentially disrupt the commerce in EAC- which will further deter investment and complicate efforts to enhance economic intergration.

Can Ghana's president foster the return of junta leaders to ECOWAS? 1. Despite diplomatic tensions in Africa, about 17 heads of state, including Nigeria's president and ECOWAS chair, Bola Tinubu, and Burkina Faso's Junta leader, Ibrahim Traoré, attended John Mahama's inauguration in Accra. 2. The gathering raises questions about Ghana's potential role in facilitating a comeback of the AES nations to ECOWAS. ECOWAS leaders approved military-ruled Mali, Burkina Faso, and Niger's withdrawal from the bloc, offering a six-month grace period for reconsideration. 3. In fact, after the vigor for democracy in Senegal led to the election of Bashirou Diomaye Faye in March 2024, ECOWAS, at its 65th ordinary session in Abuja, appointed Senegal's youngest leader as a special mediator to persuade the breakaway confederation of Burkina Faso, Mali, and Niger to rescind their decision. 4. However, military leaders of the three countries that were founding members of the bloc in 1975 have failed to rescind their decision as they seek to improve AES for security, economic, and political integration. 5. Following a series of coups in Sub-Saharan Africa, junta leaders in Burkina Faso, Mali, and Niger strained their relationship with ECOWAS, forming a common defense organization (AES) and threatening to protect their sovereignty against ECOWAS military intervention. And so, what? 6. Ghana and Senegal could mediate together within this 6-month period in ECOWAS's bid to bring back AES countries, as the junta leader's visit to Accra may signal solidifying relations from the tensions that arose when former president Akufo-Addo accused Traoré of harboring Russian mercenaries during the US-Africa summit in 2022. 7. Also, there must be a significant compromise between leaders of ECOWAS and AES should there be another round of mediation that could possibly make junta leaders rescind their decision. 8. There are economic and security consequences attached to the exit of AES countries; the bloc leaders must work to reduce militant jihadist insurgency that poses a threat to coastal West African states should AES fail to return to ECOWAS. #Africa #ECOWAS #AES

🚨 M23 Rebels Resurge in DRC: What We Know So Far 🚨 The security situation in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) has escalated dramatically with the resurgence of the M23 rebel group in the eastern region. Here's a quick update on the ongoing developments: 🔴 M23 Captures Goma – On January 26, 2025, M23 rebels seized the strategic city of Goma, violating a previous ceasefire. The capture has fueled growing humanitarian concerns in the region. 🔴 Expansion into South Kivu – M23 has advanced into South Kivu, with plans to march towards Bukavu and possibly Kinshasa, escalating the conflict to new heights. 🔴 Allegations of Rwandan Support – The DRC government has accused Rwanda of backing M23, a claim Rwanda denies. This has increased tensions between the two nations, with calls for military restraint and diplomatic resolution. 🔴 Humanitarian Crisis – Thousands have been displaced, and essential services have been disrupted. The situation is dire, with both local and international communities calling for urgent action. 🔴 International Response – The United Nations, European Union, and other international bodies have condemned the violence, urging both sides to return to peace talks and prioritize the welfare of civilians. The conflict continues to evolve, and its impact on the DRC's stability and regional security is undeniable. The call for dialogue, diplomacy, and sustained humanitarian aid has never been more urgent. What are your thoughts on the situation? Let’s discuss in the comments. #M23 #DRC #Security #HumanRights #Africa #ConflictResolution #InternationalRelations #HumanitarianCrisis

Recently, the Somalia have become part of #UNSC. And the Next time in the Horn of Africa relations will be competitive and cooperation 1. Somalia's membership in the #United Nations Security Council is expected to have a significant impact on Ethiopia and the larger Horn of Africa region. 2. #Somalia's UNSC membership and its development offers numerous collaborative opportunities while introducing a range of diplomatic complexities and competition. 3. The political and security landscape of the region is likely to evolve due to Somalia's influence in international decision-making circles. 4. For Ethiopia, having a neighboring country on the Security Council could lead to closer diplomatic engagement and increased cooperation on mutual issues, including terrorism, border disputes, water resource navigation and political instability. 5. Ethiopia will need to carefully navigate potential contentions and differing national interests that may arise. Especially, managing the regional politics which has attracted the extra- regional powers competition in the Horn of Africa. 6. Somalia's presence in the Security Council could catalyze more robust peace-building and conflict resolution strategies for the broader Horn of Africa. 7. Somalia's unique perspective, shaped by its internal strife, could provide valuable insights into addressing the region's complex challenges. 8.The membership might attract more international attention and resources to the Horn of Africa, leading to increased support for development initiatives, humanitarian aid efforts, and peacekeeping missions. Such support has the potential to enhance regional stability and drive economic prosperity. Somalia's involvement in the United Nations Security Council is anticipated to bring notable changes for Ethiopia and the greater Horn of Africa, presenting a mix of collaborative opportunities and intricate diplomatic challenges that will shape the future of regional politics and security dynamics. On the other hand the UNSC membership of Somalia may not have such effective role to the Region as well as to the continent because UNSC's non-permanent membership is only effective on non- procedural decisions. Therefore it will not be impactful. Wondering the third view of being a membership in UNSC can benefit the continent if #IGAD and AU utilized Somalia's' membership to convey Africa's' continental benefit and development. #Somalia could be a voice of Africa if it aspires for African continental Agendas likewise AfCTFA, AGA and Agenda 2063. As Nelson #Mandela said, “It always seems impossible until it’s done.” ,The next period will have two options.

📰 A great article from former Albany colleague Guy Gabriel on the current situation in #Sudan. The ongoing conflict there has left the nation devastated, with no resolution in sight. More than 8.8 million people are displaced, and up to 18 million face famine. Despite multiple diplomatic efforts, a unified peace process remains elusive, hindering the path to stability.   At Albany, we have consistently supported Sudan's journey towards peace and reconstruction since 2006. We commend the efforts of the Forces for Freedom and Change and other #civilsociety groups working towards a unified front for peace. The recent conference in Addis Ababa, which gathered diverse Sudanese voices, is a promising step towards #inclusive representation. By unifying diplomatic tracks and including genuine, representative Sudanese voices in peace negotiations, we can help lay the foundation for a stable, democratic Sudan, ensuring that all voices are heard and contributing to a brighter future for the nation. https://lnkd.in/eWfy6EMp

Some History on M23 and Goma By mid-2022, M23 took over the capital of North Kivu, Goma (DRC), in an incident that amplified the ongoing conflict in the zone. The Tutsi-led militia named M23 was formed as a breakaway army faction of the former CNDP (National Congress for Defence of People) in 2012 following the failure of peace agreements. It re-emerged in 2021, citing several unresolved grievances. There has been speculation that it is supported by Rwanda, but this has been hotly disputed. The capture of Goma is significant because Goma is strategically and economically significant, given that it is a trade centre close to Lake Kivu and the Rwanda-Uganda boundaries. Significantly, the regional standoff has been agitated by countries like Rwanda and Uganda, playing complex roles against the M23. The M23 has tumbled a humanitarian crisis on top of what was happening already, with hundreds of thousands compelled to flee while severe human rights violations were taking place. Goma is caught in the crosshairs, further straining the humanitarian aid operations just as the city had already seen two severe rounds of displacement. Even though over 18,000 blue helmets belonging to the MONUC presence are in the region, the response from the international community has been insufficient in arresting the progression of the M23. Diplomatic efforts of the region, including calls for ceasefires and dialogues, have been marred by regional arguments over foreign interference and frustrations on the part of the government of the DRC towards external parties. In order to reach peace in the DRC, it is apparent that many deep-seated political, ethnic, and economic matters need to be addressed. Situations in Goma clearly indicate the fragile nature of peace in the region and call for all diplomatic and peace-making endeavours to continue without interruption. The M23 has proven to be a backward march as well as an opportunity to focus regional cooperation and work on finding sustainable foundations and resolution to the crisis.