Classic Battlefield Tours’ Post

This is the second of three volumes, with the first focusing on Preparation for War and the Infantry, and the third will major on siege warfare, crucial to an understanding of this period of warfare. In the late 17th century, war was an important profession. It was for this reason that the greatest generals laboured to acquire every ounce of knowledge, and went on to perfect the military art. These men judged that nothing was so necessary for the preservation of their states as the science of arms. They saw that it was by this means that nations repelled public and private insults. It was through the application of war, that citizens defended the liberty of their country and maintained order within their own territories. As a result, these men became professionals, and in so doing aroused the virtue of their fellow citizens and ensured the happiness of their people. These words are not new but adapted from the opening chapter of the 'Tracte de la Guerre ou Politique Militaire' published in 1677. By then, the French Army had reached the peak of military perfection and 'Science of Arms' draws on this expertise to create the definitive manual on the art of war, split across three volumes. The second volume of 'Science of Arms' explains the duties and disciplines of the cavalry, how the artillery and ordnance operated, and how the general conducted a military campaign and engaged the enemy. The first volume covers the preparations for a just war, the artillery park, the general and his staff plus the exercise and functions of the infantry. The third volume will cover the construction, defence, and the attack of fortifications in the age of Vauban. For the first time the historian, writer, re-enactor, or military enthusiast can fully comprehend the spontaneous actions of the greatest generals. Science of Arms fills in the gaps found in eyewitness accounts, clarifies the unconscious behaviour of the officers, and brings to life the battle plans. This outstanding work combines all the great military treatise of the 17th century, with the original illustrations to form a unique depiction of the art of war as learnt by all the officers, and generals of the age. Science of Arms is everything needed to fully understand the military art as practised in the century of the soldier. More on this book here: https://lnkd.in/eeUMPBdk

My latest historical piece touches on themes that remain relevant to contemporary military practice and theory. The evolution of Napoleonic artillery demonstrates that innovation is rarely straightforward and often faces resistance. Despite initial limitations and prolonged debates on deployment, French artillery eventually advanced over decades from a limited siege role to a dominant force on the battlefield. https://lnkd.in/exadgFEy

“While armies 🪖 win battles, the economy💰wins the war”. But in general, war Can_Not be converted to a mathematical equation. Anyway, let’s fool around with numbers a bit: In 2024, Russian occupation forces captured about 3,325 km² of Ukrainian territory. They lost: Personnel – 430,790 bodies; Tanks – 3,689; BBM – 8,956; Barrel artillery – 13,050 units; MLRS – 310; Air defense – 407; Motor transport – 21,345 units; Special equipment – 2,396 units. So, 1 km² of Ukrainian territory was obtained at the price of: Personnel – 129 bodies; Tanks – 1-2 units; BBM – 2-3 units; Barrel artillery – 3-4 units; Motor transport – 6-7 units; Special equipment – 1 unit. Area of Ukraine is 603 628 km², 80% of it is unoccupied => 482 400 km². At last year’s rate the price would be: over 62 million enemy bodies, close to 1 million tanks and 145 years 🧐. Population of Russia: 144 million and North-Korea: 26 million. So, mathematically, there are enough bodies... But, fortunately, Ukrainian spirit 🌻 and hearts are stronger than any enemy or any calculations. Слава Україні 🇺🇦! Photo: Aleksi Lysander 8/2022

Glen of Imaal marks 125 years in the firing line Wicklow historian and author Liam Kenny charts the evolution of the Irish Army’s Glen Of Imaal base as it celebrates its 125th year of operation “The peace of the historic Glen of Imaal was much disturbed by the thundering of artillery” … so ran the opening line from a report in a local newspaper 125 years ago, which described the first salvos to be unleashed in the west Wicklow firing range. A century-and-a -quarter later Imaal remains the primary training ground for Ireland’s military. For generations of gunners and, indeed, most arms of the army, the Glen has been a familiar environment, with its place names such as Camara, Cannow and Coolmooney imprinted in the memory of all who have passed a summer camp or participated in United Nations pre-deployment exercise within the embrace of its granite crags. For locals too there is hardly an eyebrow raised as sounds resembling thunder echo from the valley, while pyrotechnics illuminate the sky above Keadeen mountain. How did this remote corner of County Wicklow become so associated with the arts of warfare? Its military origins date from the closing decades of the 19th century, when armies were making the transition from short-range canons to the longer-range rifled barrels made possible by the precision engineering of the industrial revolution. Such potent weapons demanded ranges with a safety margin greater than could be found on the Curragh plains of Kildare and, in a country which had a dispersed rural population, such clear expanses were difficult to come by. From the 1880s the Royal Artillery decamped to the distant location of Glenbeigh on the west Kerry coastline - much to the consternation of the local cockle-pickers. Read the full article here: https://lnkd.in/eUi6zugD #DefenceForces #IrishArmy #Army #Military #Veterans #Defence #Security

4 Nov 08:45: ‘Losses of Russian 👺👺occupation troops in #Ukraine 🇺🇦 by year: ◾ 2022 Personnel - 92,920 bodies; Tanks - 2,820; TBMS - 5,222; Barrel artillery - 1,936; MLRS - 383; AIR DEFENSE - 204; Motor vehicles - 4,290; Special vehicles - 171. ◾ 2023 Personnel - 253,290 bodies; Tanks - 2,954; TBMS - 5,003; Barrel artillery - 6,461; MLRS - 520; AIR DEFENSE - 412; Motor vehicles - 6,610; Special vehicles - 1,096. ◾ 2024 (01.01.2024-31.10.2024) Personnel - 336,400 bodies, 3.6 times increase in losses compared to 2022; Tanks - 3,179, deficit in ROV troops 60%; TBMs - 7,383, deficit in the ROV 70%; Barrel artillery - 11,557, 5.9-fold increase in losses compared to 2022, 1.7-fold increase compared to 2023. More artillery systems have already been destroyed in 2024 than in 2022 and 2023 combined; MLRS - 298, critical shortage of RWOs; Air Defense Systems - 369, critical shortfall in RWO forces; Motorized vehicles - 16,708, an increase in losses of 3.8 and 2.5 times, respectively. More vehicles have already been destroyed in 2024 than in 2022 and 2023 combined; Special vehicles - 2,302, increase in losses by 13.4 and 2.1 times respectively. In 2024 more special vehicles have already been destroyed than in 2022 and 2023. The USSR army has never suffered such losses since World War II. In total, in all wars and conflicts in which the USSR participated after World War II, the losses were less than in the incomplete 3 years of Russia's war with Ukraine. Particular growth of losses is noted in 2024! Moreover, RWO losses continue to grow, and only those categories of equipment that become critically scarce do not show progression. https://lnkd.in/d6sAMSHW’: Thank you, Yuriy Jexenev 🇪🇺🇪🇪🇰🇿 … and Nikki Searancke 🇳🇿🇺🇦:

The comparisons of World War One with the Russo-Ukrainian war are frequent and generally surface level, missing the great complexity of the battle space. That being said, there are important parallels that can be drawn. When you really dive into it, the actual similarities that do exist between the two wars might have even more far reaching implications than just a return to the use of positional trench warfare. This is an outstanding historical analysis piece from Captain Randy Noorman MA, an officer in the Royal Netherlands Army who works as a military historian at the Netherlands Institute for Military History, part of the Netherlands Defense Academy. "...There are those who argue that the return to trenches on the battlefields of Ukraine is in itself an indication that, despite technological advances, the character of warfare has essentially not changed—not realizing that these technological advances are actually the driving force behind the return to trench warfare. Now, as in World War I, increases in firepower force troops to once again disperse, dig in, or both, in order to be able to survive. The casualty-intensive, attritional nature of World War I encouraged the search for new tactics and technologies. Above all, it led to the development of combined arms warfare on different tactical levels, which attempted to combine effects in order to substitute for mass and reestablish conditions that enable maneuver." Modern War Institute at West Point #ukraine #ukrainewar

https://lnkd.in/e3AFcq9y The article "Nazi Germany’s Last-Ditch D-Day Defenses" by Tom Laemlein, published on The Armory Life, delves into how Nazi Germany recycled captured weaponry to fortify the Atlantic Wall during World War II. The author's personal memories of frugality during the Great Depression segue into the main narrative about how German troops defending the Atlantic Wall had to make use of an extensive stockpile of captured machinery from earlier campaigns in Poland, Belgium, France, and Russia. Due to the overstretched German weapons industry, the repurposing of older or captured armaments was a necessity, albeit one fraught with logistical challenges, including issues with ammunition supply and the need for specialized training to use foreign weapons. The article outlines several key artillery pieces used in the defense. Significant weapons include the French "Canon de 105 L mle 1936" and the Soviet 122mm "Puska obr. 1931," both of which were capable of long-range firepower. Other weapons like the Czech "15 cm hruba houfnice vz. 25" and the French 155mm "Canon de 155 GPF," which had origins as far back as World War I, were also employed. Even antiquated artillery like the modified German “7.5 cm FK 16nA” found their place in coastal defenses, particularly when equipped with modern high-explosive ammunition. The narrative stresses the creativity and desperation of the German defenses, making extensive use of recycled and retrofitted equipment. Examples included not just heavy artillery, but also anti-tank and anti-aircraft guns, as well as repurposed tank turrets. Despite these efforts and the resourcefulness shown, the Atlantic Wall's defenses ultimately failed to prevent the Allied forces' successful landing on D-Day, leading to the eventual defeat of Nazi Germany in Europe. This underlines the temporary and ultimately insufficient nature of the makeshift defenses created under the pressure of war.

The #British-#American towed howitzer #M777, which is in service with the #Ukrainian Armed Forces, has long been a favorite of the Ukrainian military. One of the soldiers of the 44th Separate Artillery Brigade named after Hetman Danylo Apostol, which belongs to the Operational Command "West," shared his impressions of the advantages of this weapon. The video was published on the Telegram channel of the General Staff of the Armed Forces of Ukraine. Artilleryman Maksym noted that compared to Soviet guns, every detail in the M777 is carefully thought out, making it extremely effective, a kind of Rolls-Royce among artillery systems. "The three-seven is a sniper, so to speak. It hits the third or fourth shell. We started with Hyacinths, D-20s, and the M777 howitzer is like a Rolls-Royce among guns. We traveled a bit with it, and I fought with this gun for a year and a half," said artillerist Maksym. Thus, according to the military, the "fattest catch" of the M777 Howitzer calculation was five destroyed enemy targets in a day. "In one day, with 5 targets, there were two self-propelled artillery systems, two BM-27 Uragan MLRSs, and one more enemy object," Maksym said. What is known about the M777 Howitzer The M777 howitzer is a British-American trailed artillery system with a 155 mm barrel caliber and 39 caliber length. Its main advantages include high accuracy and efficiency. When manually loaded, it can fire up to five rounds per minute, and the range of shots, depending on the type of projectile, ranges from 24 to 40 km. An important feature is the digital fire control system, which quickly calculates the parameters for accurate targeting. Due to its relatively lightweight, the M777 is easy to operate, allowing it to quickly change direction and hit various targets. The cost of this howitzer is about 2.03 million US dollars per unit. M777 howitzer - characteristics Caliber: 155 mm Barrel length: 39 caliber ERFB firing range: 30 km Calculation: from 5 to 8 Maximum rate of fire: 7 Earlier, Defense Minister Rustem Umerov said that French Mirage 2000 fighters would arrive in Ukraine in the first quarter of next year. They will be equipped to give Ukrainian pilots an advantage over the enemy. https://lnkd.in/g_XF8j_f

Losses of Russian occupation troops in #Ukraine by year: ◾ 2022 Personnel - 92,920 bodies; Tanks - 2,820; TBMS - 5,222; Barrel artillery - 1,936; MLRS - 383; AIR DEFENSE - 204; Motor vehicles - 4,290; Special vehicles - 171. ◾ 2023 Personnel - 253,290 bodies; Tanks - 2,954; TBMS - 5,003; Barrel artillery - 6,461; MLRS - 520; AIR DEFENSE - 412; Motor vehicles - 6,610; Special vehicles - 1,096. ◾ 2024 (01.01.2024-31.10.2024) Personnel - 336,400 bodies, 3.6 times increase in losses compared to 2022; Tanks - 3,179, deficit in ROV troops 60%; TBMs - 7,383, deficit in the ROV 70%; Barrel artillery - 11,557, 5.9-fold increase in losses compared to 2022, 1.7-fold increase compared to 2023. More artillery systems have already been destroyed in 2024 than in 2022 and 2023 combined; MLRS - 298, critical shortage of RWOs; Air Defense Systems - 369, critical shortfall in RWO forces; Motorized vehicles - 16,708, an increase in losses of 3.8 and 2.5 times, respectively. More vehicles have already been destroyed in 2024 than in 2022 and 2023 combined; Special vehicles - 2,302, increase in losses by 13.4 and 2.1 times respectively. In 2024 more special vehicles have already been destroyed than in 2022 and 2023. The USSR army has never suffered such losses since World War II. In total, in all wars and conflicts in which the USSR participated after World War II, the losses were less than in the incomplete 3 years of Russia's war with Ukraine. Particular growth of losses is noted in 2024! Moreover, RWO losses continue to grow, and only those categories of equipment that become critically scarce do not show progression. https://lnkd.in/d6sAMSHW