Dr. Steven Wilson’s Post

Even without the astronomical cost of the Sentinel program, I question the need for a land-based nuclear force. So far, the best answers I have gotten are “we’ve always had one” and/or “we need redundancy.” Neither of these answers are sufficient when it is draining increasing amounts of critical money from the rest of the military. https://lnkd.in/eFw2mn6j

Congress will hold a hearing about the Sentinel missile’s exploding budget, but is it too little, too late? "The Pentagon’s new multibillion-dollar intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) program has come under fire as a continual offender of overspending, but there has been little reaction on the issue from Congress. The most recent cost overrun for the Sentinel ICBM (previously known as the Ground Based Strategic Deterrent or GBSD) put the program’s budget an unprecedented 37 percent higher than previous estimates and extended its operational schedule by at least two years. As a result, the Pentagon is critically reviewing the program to determine if it will continue or be canceled. Critics have called the land-based missile modernization project 'wasteful and dangerous.' But much to the dismay of Sentinel’s many naysayers, the costly program is expected to be recertified." Read more in the new article by Bulletin nuclear risk editorial fellow, Chloe Shrager: https://lnkd.in/et2yA-e6

More broadly we need a concerted effort to invest in the workforce of the future to support these and other vital programs. At a time when future generations worry about being replaced by automation and AI we have a global shortage of skilled technical workers required to build ships (military and Comercial), aircraft and other key manufactured products being knocked off with stolen IP in China. We can't focus on the systems without building the foundation human and industrial capital to not only build but sustain these critical systems

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So each minutemen iii missile (currently) costs about $33 million each. With 450 needing replacement. But the launch control facilities… that’s a whole different ballgame. If we merely stated that the current $160 billion estimated budget is correct… big assumption since it started at closer to $70 billion… that’s about $350 million for every 1 missile (going towards an LCF). Now… the real problem is not $350 million to $33 million a pop. It’s the entire reconfiguration of these facilities. If you’ve ever been in one - or toured a decommissioned one… this is not an easy engineering feat. Especially if you want speed, quality, reliability, and security. It would be great if you could plop a new missile in an existing LCF. But ya can’t. The problem seems to be less about the cost and more about the ability to adequately forecast the true costs. This is not just a nuclear weapons problem.

Faster, longer-range, more precise and capable of destroying multiple ICBMs at one time are merely a few of the characteristics expected to define the Pentagon’s new Next-Generation Interceptor effort, a fast-evolving, high-tech effort to keep pace with the growing nuclear threat landscape.

The United States, our allies, and partners absolutely need a viable land leg of the strategic triad. The strategic forces of the US underpin our security and that of our allies and partners. Russia and PRC will be watching what we do next and whether we remain committed to nuclear deterrence and the stabilizing effect that a large, geographically dispersed IC force provides.

Come join the discussion!

The discourse surrounding the modernization of the U.S. nuclear arsenal encapsulates a strategic conundrum that transcends purely fiscal considerations. The historical persistence of land-based ICBMs as a deterrent, rooted in Cold War exigencies, underscores the enduring complexity of nuclear strategy in the post-Cold War era. The escalation in the Sentinel program's cost and timeline raises pivotal questions about fiscal prudence and strategic necessity in an era where the geopolitical landscape is markedly different, yet the specter of nuclear threat remains palpable as evidenced by President Putin’s recent periodic rhetoric. The decision to retain a sizeable fleet of land-based ICBMs reflects a nuanced understanding of strategic stability, informed by decades of deterrence theory and arms control dynamics. The intricate interplay between arms control agreements and the strategic calculus of maintaining a triad, including land-based ICBMs, reveals a sophisticated appreciation for the deterrent value of nuclear forces amid evolving global threats. Moreover, the dialogue surrounding nuclear modernization encapsulates the broader discussion on defense acquisition practices and the inherent challenges of forecasting costs and technological hurdles in long-term military projects. The argument for continuity in nuclear capabilities underscores a pragmatic recognition of the enduring role of nuclear deterrence in national security strategy and the ever eroding effectiveness of conventional deterrence. Ultimately, the discourse on nuclear modernization invites a deeper discussion of the intricate balance between fiscal responsibility, strategic foresight, and the immutable imperatives of national defense in an uncertain global order. The dialogue must continue to foster a nuanced understanding among policymakers, scholars, and the public to navigate the complexities of maintaining a credible deterrent in a dynamic geopolitical landscape.

If you frame the requirement as a “land-based ICBM” there may not be an alternative. However, if you frame the requirement as the most strategic deterrence for the dollar - there are plenty of possible alternatives such as sea-based nuclear missiles, defensive systems, or even improving and increasing conventional forces. You could do a lot for $150+ billion dollars that doesn’t attract a barrage of enemy nuclear weapons to our nation’s heartland. https://lnkd.in/ehbqtCkT