Héctor A.’s Post

▶️ In #OT environments, where system availability, integrity and safety are paramount, deploying security solutions can present significant operational risks. ▶️ The #Purdue model, which has become the de facto standard for segregating OT #networks, defines several layers of control systems and computing infrastructure, each with distinct characteristics and roles in the control process. ▶️ These characteristics influence the feasibility of implementing security controls at these layers. At the lower network levels, such as Levels 0 and 1, which encompass sensors, actuators, and controllers that directly interact with physical processes in Industrial Control Systems (#ICS), deploying security tools is often not feasible due to lack of hardware and software compatibility. ▶️ On Levels 2 and 3, which are responsible for controlling the automated control process, security controls are feasible but pose significant operational risks, with the primary concern of disrupting operational stability and affecting system safety. ▶️ The potential for severe consequences at these Purdue model levels makes organizations reluctant to deploy invasive tools like #EDRs, which can lead to system conflicts or performance degradation.  Learn more in Sygnia's latest blog: https://lnkd.in/e-kXauKT

▶️ In #OT environments, where system availability, integrity and safety are paramount, deploying security solutions can present significant operational risks. ▶️ The #Purdue model, which has become the de facto standard for segregating OT #networks, defines several layers of control systems and computing infrastructure, each with distinct characteristics and roles in the control process. ▶️ These characteristics influence the feasibility of implementing security controls at these layers. At the lower network levels, such as Levels 0 and 1, which encompass sensors, actuators, and controllers that directly interact with physical processes in Industrial Control Systems (#ICS), deploying security tools is often not feasible due to lack of hardware and software compatibility. ▶️ On Levels 2 and 3, which are responsible for controlling the automated control process, security controls are feasible but pose significant operational risks, with the primary concern of disrupting operational stability and affecting system safety. ▶️ The potential for severe consequences at these Purdue model levels makes organizations reluctant to deploy invasive tools like #EDRs, which can lead to system conflicts or performance degradation.  Learn more in Sygnia's latest blog: https://lnkd.in/gS7NBnAD

▶️ In #OT environments, where system availability, integrity and safety are paramount, deploying security solutions can present significant operational risks. ▶️ The #Purdue model, which has become the de facto standard for segregating OT #networks, defines several layers of control systems and computing infrastructure, each with distinct characteristics and roles in the control process. ▶️ These characteristics influence the feasibility of implementing security controls at these layers. At the lower network levels, such as Levels 0 and 1, which encompass sensors, actuators, and controllers that directly interact with physical processes in Industrial Control Systems (#ICS), deploying security tools is often not feasible due to lack of hardware and software compatibility. ▶️ On Levels 2 and 3, which are responsible for controlling the automated control process, security controls are feasible but pose significant operational risks, with the primary concern of disrupting operational stability and affecting system safety. ▶️ The potential for severe consequences at these Purdue model levels makes organizations reluctant to deploy invasive tools like #EDRs, which can lead to system conflicts or performance degradation.  Learn more in Sygnia's latest blog: https://lnkd.in/dqKNikCS

▶️ In #OT environments, where system availability, integrity and safety are paramount, deploying security solutions can present significant operational risks. ▶️ The #Purdue model, which has become the de facto standard for segregating OT #networks, defines several layers of control systems and computing infrastructure, each with distinct characteristics and roles in the control process. ▶️ These characteristics influence the feasibility of implementing security controls at these layers. At the lower network levels, such as Levels 0 and 1, which encompass sensors, actuators, and controllers that directly interact with physical processes in Industrial Control Systems (#ICS), deploying security tools is often not feasible due to lack of hardware and software compatibility. ▶️ On Levels 2 and 3, which are responsible for controlling the automated control process, security controls are feasible but pose significant operational risks, with the primary concern of disrupting operational stability and affecting system safety. ▶️ The potential for severe consequences at these Purdue model levels makes organizations reluctant to deploy invasive tools like #EDRs, which can lead to system conflicts or performance degradation.  Learn more in Sygnia's latest blog: https://lnkd.in/d_TwzY6d

Why Visibility is Critical in OT Cybersecurity: Evolving Threats Demand New Strategies In the world of Operational Technology (OT), relying on traditional IT security methods is no longer effective. As threats propagate from IT to OT networks, the stakes have never been higher. Achieving full visibility into OT environments is critical to understanding the threat landscape and responding swiftly. With actionable intelligence, organizations can detect and mitigate incidents before they cause damage to critical infrastructure. It’s clear—old methods won’t work in the modern OT environment. Is your OT security strategy evolving with today’s advanced threats? #OTCyberSecurity #ThreatLandscape #IncidentResponse #ActionableIntelligence #VisibilityMatters

▶️ In #OT environments, where system availability, integrity and safety are paramount, deploying security solutions can present significant operational risks. ▶️ The #Purdue model, which has become the de facto standard for segregating OT #networks, defines several layers of control systems and computing infrastructure, each with distinct characteristics and roles in the control process. ▶️ These characteristics influence the feasibility of implementing security controls at these layers. At the lower network levels, such as Levels 0 and 1, which encompass sensors, actuators, and controllers that directly interact with physical processes in Industrial Control Systems (#ICS), deploying security tools is often not feasible due to lack of hardware and software compatibility. ▶️ On Levels 2 and 3, which are responsible for controlling the automated control process, security controls are feasible but pose significant operational risks, with the primary concern of disrupting operational stability and affecting system safety. ▶️ The potential for severe consequences at these Purdue model levels makes organizations reluctant to deploy invasive tools like #EDRs, which can lead to system conflicts or performance degradation. Learn more in Sygnia's latest blog: https://lnkd.in/dzUqj4T8

In today’s rapidly evolving digital landscape, finding the right balance between robust cybersecurity measures and operational performance is essential. Organizations must tailor security controls to specific asset roles and risks, applying more intrusive protections to internet-facing systems while allowing for less disruptive methods on internal assets. This approach not only enhances security but also minimizes operational disruptions, ensuring that business continuity remains intact. 🔒💼 Moreover, implementing detective controls alongside preventive measures allows for effective threat detection without hindering system performance. Techniques like network segmentation and out-of-band scanning can significantly reduce exposure to vulnerabilities while maintaining a seamless operational flow. By prioritizing these strategies, businesses can enhance their cybersecurity posture without sacrificing efficiency. #Cybersecurity #OperationalEfficiency #RiskManagement #NetworkSecurity #ThreatDetection

▶️ In #OT environments, where system availability, integrity and safety are paramount, deploying security solutions can present significant operational risks. ▶️ The #Purdue model, which has become the de facto standard for segregating OT #networks, defines several layers of control systems and computing infrastructure, each with distinct characteristics and roles in the control process. ▶️ These characteristics influence the feasibility of implementing security controls at these layers. At the lower network levels, such as Levels 0 and 1, which encompass sensors, actuators, and controllers that directly interact with physical processes in Industrial Control Systems (#ICS), deploying security tools is often not feasible due to lack of hardware and software compatibility. ▶️ On Levels 2 and 3, which are responsible for controlling the automated control process, security controls are feasible but pose significant operational risks, with the primary concern of disrupting operational stability and affecting system safety. ▶️ The potential for severe consequences at these Purdue model levels makes organizations reluctant to deploy invasive tools like #EDRs, which can lead to system conflicts or performance degradation.  Learn more in Sygnia's latest blog: https://lnkd.in/dXk_afs9

▶️ In #OT environments, where system availability, integrity and safety are paramount, deploying security solutions can present significant operational risks. ▶️ The #Purdue model, which has become the de facto standard for segregating OT #networks, defines several layers of control systems and computing infrastructure, each with distinct characteristics and roles in the control process. ▶️ These characteristics influence the feasibility of implementing security controls at these layers. At the lower network levels, such as Levels 0 and 1, which encompass sensors, actuators, and controllers that directly interact with physical processes in Industrial Control Systems (#ICS), deploying security tools is often not feasible due to lack of hardware and software compatibility. ▶️ On Levels 2 and 3, which are responsible for controlling the automated control process, security controls are feasible but pose significant operational risks, with the primary concern of disrupting operational stability and affecting system safety. ▶️ The potential for severe consequences at these Purdue model levels makes organizations reluctant to deploy invasive tools like #EDRs, which can lead to system conflicts or performance degradation.  Learn more in Sygnia's latest blog: https://lnkd.in/d6eD42fk

Thank you, International Security Journal (ISJ), for featuring our SIL2 Certification for Aura Ai-X technology and software, and for highlighting our steadfast commitment to enhancing safety for our customers. "Achieving SIL 2 certification sets a new benchmark for reliability in fibre sensing. Our Aura controllers now operate with a mean time between failures (MTBF) in the millions of hours, significantly boosting safety and operational continuity. This gives our customers the assurance that any safety risk is minimized to an acceptable level.” — Group CEO, Mal Maginnis Learn more about Aura Ai -X and how it's delivering results that truly matter. https://lnkd.in/gDSQd3UF #AuraAiX #AuraAiXS #physicalsecurity #criticalinfrastructure #futurefibretechnologies #intrusiondetection #DAS #PIDS