Math Noortmann’s Post

A Must-Read for Legal Scholars and Practitioners! We're thrilled to see Sipho Nkosi’s insightful article, "International Law and Diplomatic Immunity: A Window into the Ugandan Courts," gaining recognition. Published in collaboration with the University of Johannesburg Faculty of Law and the esteemed Journal of South African Law (TSAR), this piece dives deep into a critical aspect of international law. Congratulations to the author, editors Jean Sonnekus and Philippa Van Aardt, and all involved in bringing this work to life! 🔗 Read more about it here: https://bit.ly/3CL0C8S #InternationalLaw #DiplomaticImmunity #TSAR #UJLaw #JutaLaw

This is my first publication in the Dutch newspaper. And I'm really proud to be a co-author with Martin Blaakman. In the article, we touched on the topic of changes in laws regarding the stay of Ukrainians under temporary protection in the Netherlands. This includes imprisonment at Schiphol airport, the introduction of fees for living in municipal schelters for working Ukrainians ets. In general, despite the fact that Ukrainians have lived in the Netherlands for more than 2 years, they still remain vulnerable for a number of reasons. Our task as researchers is not only to highlight the real situation of Ukrainians, but also to provide our vision of solving all issues. If you are interested in reading the full version of the article, you can follow link: https://lnkd.in/edpvxUkt Hogeschool Inholland Hogeschool Inholland Rotterdam & Dordrecht #TemporaryProtectionForUkrrainians #DutchLaw #Researchers #AccesToJustice #Oekraïense #Onderzoekers

Territorial dispute brewing in Gulf of Tonkin #Vietnam asks Beijing to abide by law while drawing baseline in Gulf of Tonkin. The baseline is deemed as “excessive” by analysts, with one suggesting the U.S. should conduct a freedom of navigation operation to challenge it. Analysts say China’s newly announced baseline is not in line with U.N. Law of the Sea. Vietnam has requested that China respect international law and bilateral agreements with Hanoi after Beijing drew a new baseline in the Gulf of Tonkin. Radio Free Asia was the first Western media to report the announcement earlier this month of a new baseline that defines China’s territory in the northern part of the area known in China as the Beibu Gulf. This baseline, which Beijing said was set in accordance with Chinese law, did not exist before. Vietnamese foreign ministry spokesperson Pham Thu Hang on Thursday said that “all coastal countries need to abide by the 1982 U.N. Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS)” when drawing the territorial baseline, used to calculate the width of the territorial waters and other maritime zones. She highlighted the necessity for these baselines to  not affect the lawful rights and interests of other countries, including the freedom of navigation and the freedom of transit passage through straits used for international maritime activities. The spokeswoman stopped short of rejecting the new Chinese baseline and instead called on Beijing to “respect and abide by the agreement on the delimitation of the territorial seas, exclusive economic zones and continental shelves of the two countries in the Gulf of Tonkin signed in 2000, as well as the 1982 UNCLOS.” Beijing has yet to respond to Hanoi’s statement but the Chinese foreign ministry’s Department of Boundary and Ocean Affairs said on its official WeChat account earlier that the announcement of the baseline was a necessary act to exercise national sovereignty and jurisdiction. Encroachment on shared waters The Gulf of Tonkin, or Vinh Bac Bo in Vietnamese, is highly important to both Vietnam and China not only in terms of economic development but also defense and security. After nine years of negotiation, in 2000 Hanoi and Beijing signed a Maritime Boundary Delimitation Agreement to clearly demarcate each other’s territorial seas, exclusive economic zones and continental shelves in the Gulf of Tonkin. Some analysts say the new baseline won’t affect Vietnam’s economic interests much as long as the signed agreement is observed but some are concerned that Beijing would use it as a pretext to push Hanoi to renegotiate the boundary agreement. “China's announcement of its baseline in the Gulf of Tonkin is a step up the ladder of escalation in its strategy of ratcheting up assertiveness in the South China Sea,” said Alexander Vuving, a professor at the Daniel K. Inouye Asia-Pacific Center for Security Studies in Hawaii.

The Dutch establishment, from their laughable "left" (eco-fascists like GroenLinks and D66) to its abundant extreme right (national-socialists like the PVV, BBB, JA21, NSC, and VVD), is made up of a feral pack of rabid Antisemites (or Islamophobes, which, as Edward Said put it, is but another side of the same coin). These incestuous political class — and the parochial media that serves as its loudspeaker — would have you believe that white supremacists are anti racists and that life-long anti-fascists — including anti Zionist Jews — are the new racists. The truth is that, 𝗷𝘂𝘀𝘁 𝗹𝗶𝗸𝗲 𝘁𝗵𝗲 𝗽𝗿𝗼-𝗭𝗶𝗼𝗻𝗶𝘀𝘁 𝗚𝗲𝗿𝗺𝗮𝗻 𝗡𝗮𝘇𝗶𝘀 𝗹𝗲𝗱 𝗯𝘆 𝗦𝗰𝗵𝗼𝗹𝘇, 𝘁𝗵𝗲 𝗗𝘂𝘁𝗰𝗵 𝗿𝘂𝗹𝗶𝗻𝗴 𝗰𝗹𝗮𝘀𝘀 𝗼𝗻𝗹𝘆 𝗰𝗮𝗿𝗲𝘀 𝗮𝗯𝗼𝘂𝘁 𝗝𝗲𝘄𝘀 𝗮𝘀 𝗹𝗼𝗻𝗴 𝗮𝘀 𝘁𝗵𝗲𝘆 𝗰𝗮𝗻 𝘂𝘀𝗲 𝘁𝗵𝗲𝗺 𝗮𝘀 𝗰𝗼𝘃𝗲𝗿 𝗳𝗼𝗿 𝘁𝗵𝗲𝗶𝗿 𝗻𝗲𝘄 𝗰𝗼𝗹𝗼𝗻𝗶𝗮𝗹𝗶𝘀𝗺 𝗮𝗻𝗱 𝗶𝗺𝗽𝗲𝗿𝗶𝗮𝗹𝗶𝘀𝗺. 𝗙𝗼𝗿𝘁𝘂𝗻𝗮𝘁𝗲𝗹𝘆, 𝗗𝘂𝘁𝗰𝗵 𝗝𝗲𝘄𝘀 𝗮𝗿𝗲 𝘀𝗽𝗲𝗮𝗸𝗶𝗻𝗴 𝘂𝗽 𝘁𝗼 𝗽𝗿𝗲𝘃𝗲𝗻𝘁 𝘁𝗵𝗶𝘀 𝗻𝗲𝘄 𝗗𝘂𝘁𝗰𝗵 𝗡𝗮𝘇𝗶𝘀𝗺 𝗳𝗿𝗼𝗺 𝗯𝗲𝗶𝗻𝗴 𝗽𝗿𝗼𝗺𝗼𝘁𝗲𝗱 𝗶𝗻 𝘁𝗵𝗲𝗶𝗿 𝗻𝗮𝗺𝗲.

11/11/2024 Asia Pacific Indonesia says it has no overlapping South China Sea claims with China, despite deal November 11, 20249:18 AM GMT+1Updated a min ago JAKARTA, Nov 11 - Indonesia said on Monday it does not recognise China's claims over the South China Sea, despite signing a maritime development deal with Beijing, as some analysts warned the pact risked compromising its sovereign rights. Beijing has long clashed with Southeast Asian neighbours over the South China Sea, which it claims almost in its entirety, based on a "nine-dash line",  on its maps that cuts into the exclusive economic zones (EEZ) of several countries. Joint agreements with China in the strategic waterway have been sensitive for years, with some nations wary of deals they fear could be interpreted as legitimising Beijing's vast claims. In 2016, an arbitral tribunal said the Chinese claim, based on its old maps, has no basis in international law, a decision China refuses to recognize. A joint statement issued at the weekend during Indonesian President Prabowo Subianto's visit to Beijing mentioned the two countries had "reached important common understanding on joint development in areas of overlapping claims". NO LEGAL BASIS Indonesia's foreign ministry has repeatedly said the country is a non-claimant state in the South China Sea and has no overlapping jurisdiction with China. On Monday, the ministry said its position was unchanged and the agreement would have no impact on its sovereign rights. "Indonesia reiterates its position that those (Chinese) claims have no international legal basis," it said. "The partnership does not impact sovereignty, sovereign rights or Indonesia's jurisdiction in the North Natuna Sea." China's foreign ministry said the clause "clarifies the political consensus and direction of co-operation between the two sides on joint development in the overlapping maritime areas claimed by the two countries." A ministry spokesperson, Lin Jian, said Indonesia and China would further explore topics such as the content and mode of co-operation, adding there was a historical basis for China's South China Sea claims and that consensus would benefit both. China's U-shaped line, based on its old maps, begins off central Vietnam and runs into waters off Indonesia's Natuna islands, more than 1,000 km (620 miles) south of the island of Hainan. It crosses into the EEZs of Brunei, Malaysia, the Philippines and Vietnam, and is patrolled by an armada of the Chinese coast guard, which neighbours accuse of aggression and seeking to disrupt energy and fisheries activity. China typically says its vessels are preventing incursions into its territory. Page 1 continue Chinese President Xi Jinping and Indonesian President Prabowo Subianto attend a welcome ceremony at the Great Hall of the People in Beijing, China November 9, 2024. 

🔔 International Organisations, international agreements and EU law : two new judgments from the General Court examining international law in the EU legal order 🔸 Case T- ‑381/15 RENV II and Case T-509/21 address the alleged status of IMG as an ‘international organisation’ for the purposes of applying the EU’s financial regulation 🔹 The European Commission was entitled to re-evaluate the status of IMG on the basis of new evidential elements. The Court of Justice of the European Union may verify whether, in conducting that assessment, the Commission made an obvious error. 🔸 Relationship EU/IL: In the absence of a more precise definition, the terms ‘international organisation’ and ‘international agreement’ as used in the Financial Regulation should be understood to correspond to those terms as used in international law. Customary international law and the Vienna Convention are relevant! 🔹 International agreement? There was - but not one that had the objective of establishing an IO; 🔸 And if the Commission is wrong? The Court recognises the theoretical possibility that if the Commission were to unlawfully refuses to conclude a delegation agreement with an international organisation, this could result in damages corresponding to the lost opportunity to be awarded that delegation agreement. On the facts, no such loss of opportunity applies. Facts ◼ In 2013, the Commission entrusted the entity IMG with the indirect management of the Union’s budget in the context of development cooperation. Under the rules in the EU financial regulation, a condition for that entrustment was that IMG enjoyed the status of an international organisation. ◼ In 2014, relations were suspended on the grounds that the Commission had doubts that IMG has that status. ◼ In a series of court cases, IMG has challenged that decision and the Commission's subsequent assessment. These latest judgments examine the nature of the analysis that the Commission is required to conduct when applying the financial regulation, what constitutes an international organisation,  the conditions under IL relevant for identifying an international agreement as well as the scope of any liability in damages for errors that could (theoretically arise) in that assessment by the Commission. #eulaw #internationallaw #cjeu Julio Baquero Cruz, brakeland jean-francois Laura Puccio, PhD Sandrine Delaude Josephine Norris 👇 https://lnkd.in/eiUhyMgZ

Een thema dat met enige regelmaat opduikt in Belgische rechtspraak. "Under current foreign sovereign immunity doctrine, sovereigns are not immune from suit when they engage in “private” acts, such as entering into contracts—in other words, when they act as participants in, rather than regulators of, the market. This Note argues that the distinction between a state’s public and private acts is far less stable and clear-cut than it first appears. Many acts in which sovereigns engage are of a mixed nature. Choosing to see an act or transaction as essentially private or public often obscures other features that complicate that characterization."

Impacts & Policy Briefs the road to overwhelming amount of luxury. 904 000 000 000 euro i året. Nine-hundred-and-four BILLION Euros a year to share Norways 'share' of corruption based on average numbers approx 11 BILLION Euros a year. Exchange rate 1 Euro = 11,78 NOKs Population EU + EEC = 448 million people #romsenter #esa #nfd #corruption #integrity #eu #leyen Corruption and severe lack of integrity cost West Europe almost one thousand billions Euro per year. No big surprise really apart from the huge amount of cash involved. Who you know determines whether you receive research funding from the EU Want EU money? Then you should have gotten it before, you should know the right people – and preferably you should hire your own specialists to describe why the project is useful. https://lnkd.in/dhWMQ-FU

Credit to Alyssa Chen 2 Aug 2024 Legal complexities add to Beijing’s South China Sea disputes with its neighbours | South China Morning Post https://lnkd.in/gsuKgeP5 In recent weeks, two of the countries with competing territorial claims in the South China Sea have asked the United Nations to recognise that the outer limits of their boundaries should extend beyond 200 nautical miles (370km) Vietnam’s proposal in July to the UN Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf (CLCS) followed a similar submission the previous month by the Philippines. The latest requests bring the total ECS submissions in the South China Sea to five, with the first dating back as far as 2009. None have been resolved and the outer limits outlined in the proposals frequently overlap. Chinese experts are keeping a keen eye on the potential repercussions they could have on Beijing’s claims in the waters. The area within 200 nautical miles of a state’s coastline is generally recognised as its exclusive economic zone, with the waters beyond designated as the high seas. if a state has a continental shelf that extends beyond 200 nautical miles of its coastline, the CLCS is the only viable channel to establish sovereign rights over the area. However, the CLCS “is purely a scientific body, not a legal body. The Philippines’ claims have so far been rejected by China, Vietnam and Malaysia and other states are likely to reject the Vietnamese claim, potentially stalling the progress of both submissions. The invocation of the ECS represents a strategic move from Manila to effectively challenge Beijing, “compelling it to stretch its resources in response”. Vietnam and the Philippines might demonstrate a certain level of coordination, or at least convergence of interests in their latest actions. “There appears to be some coordination between them, or at least shared sympathies and momentum towards making clear In late 2022, Hanoi and Jakarta also successfully finalised long-running negotiations to delineate the borders of their exclusive economic zones in the region. Ultimately, the path to resolving the disputes will necessitate a return to the negotiation table and claimant states engaging in thorough consultations.”

Prohibition on Hostage-Taking, Right To Rescue Under Customary International Law & Application of UNSCR 579, 638, 1566, 2728 & October 7 The prohibition on hostage-taking is a rule of customary international law. International criminal tribunals concluded regarding its customary character (ICTY, Tadic, Decision on the Defence Motion for Interlocutory Appeal, para. 98 and ICTR, Akayesu's Judgment, paras. 608-09). The deicison of the UNSC in SCR 1566 adopted under Chapter VII called on countries to prevent and punish "criminal acts, including against civilians, committed with the intent to cause death or serious bodily injury, or taking of hostages, with the purpose to provoke a state of terror in the general public or in a group of persons or particular persons, intimidate a population or compel a government or an international organization to do or to abstain from doing any act" and such acts were "under no circumstances justifiable by considerations of a political, philosophical, ideological, racial, ethnic, religious or other similar nature." The acts of terrorism on October 7 clearly fall in this category. There is sufficient State Practice which concludes that military intervention for rescuing nationals abroad in mortal danger is allowed by a norm of customary international law, which constitutes an autonomous exception to the prohibition of the use of force in international relations. The ICJ does not have any enforcement mechanism to ensure that International Terrorists release the October 7 hostages immediately and unconditionally. Who can blame the aggrieved UN member-state when it exercises it customary right of rescuing its nationals and other nationalities taken hostage on October 7?