Official Statement To the attention of the media and the public Today, certain Ukrainian telegram channels and websites began spreading inaccurate information regarding the procurement of cable products by Ukrhydroenergo from Turkish company ALTAIR LOJISTIK VE TICARET ANONIM. To prevent further manipulation on this sensitive topic, especially given the current situation in the country, we urge everyone to refrain from spreading false information. We recommend relying on verified sources or contacting Ukrhydroenergo for official comments. The matter concerns the results of the procurement procedure conducted as an open tender on the Prozorro electronic procurement platform in 2023. As a result, Ukrhydroenergo and ALTAIR LOJISTIK VE TICARET ANONIM signed the contract for the supply of cable products. It is important to clarify that this procurement covers only a tiny part of the construction of protective structure and, unlike erroneously reported by some sources, has only indirect relation to the construction project. The open tender for 150 kV and 330 kV cables took place from November 29, 2023 to December 13, 2023, and the contract was signed on December 25, 2023. We confirm that during the procurement process and at the time of signing the contract, neither ALTAIR LOJISTIK VE TICARET ANONIM nor its potential beneficiary, Mr. Andrejs Bradens, was included in the list of individuals subject to special economic or other restrictive measures (sanctions). Ukrhydroenergo fully complied with all Ukrainian legislation, thoroughly verifying its contractors for connections to the Russian Federation. On December 4, 2024, it became publicly known that the potential beneficiary of ALTAIR LOJISTIK VE TICARET ANONIM, Mr. Andrejs Bradens, had been added to the U.S. sanctions list. As of December 4, 2024, ALTAIR LOJISTIK VE TICARET ANONIM, which was awarded the contract under the aforementioned tender, is not listed in any sanctions registers. Nevertheless, upon receiving on December 4, 2024 information regarding inclusion of Mr. Andrejs Bradens, the potential beneficiary of ALTAIR LOJISTIK VE TICARET ANONIM, in the U.S. sanctions list, Ukrhydroenergo immediately initiated additional inspections. Based on the results of these inspections, appropriate measures will be taken in accordance with the current contract and Ukrainian legislation. Ukrhydroenergo operates as an open and transparent business. For any inquiries, all the parties interested may contact the Company's press office.
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The Department of the Treasury's Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) is issuing Russia-related General License 25E - "Authorizing Transactions Related to Telecommunications and Certain Internet-Based Communications." Additionally, OFAC is publishing an alert, "Russian Attempts to Evade Sanctions Using New Overseas Branches and Subsidiaries," to warn foreign jurisdictions and financial institutions about Russia’s attempts to evade sanctions by opening new overseas branches and subsidiaries of Russian financial institutions. OFAC is also amending one Russia-related Frequently Asked Question (FAQ 1040). Lastly, the SDN list has recently been updated. Please visit this page to access the latest version of the SDN list. Check this page periodically as it may also be updated if a new list-related format or product is offered. Russia-related General License 25E: https://lnkd.in/dQ4iyDd2 Russian Attempts to Evade Sanctions Using New Overseas Branches and Subsidiaries: https://lnkd.in/d4YTd4-f FAQ 1040: https://lnkd.in/d6t6-jXV The latest version of the SDN list: https://lnkd.in/dggYu3Kf
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S&P Global’s report on Russia’s shadow fleet reveals critical compliance challenges in the maritime oil trade. These insights are highly relevant to the aerospace sector. What can we learn from it? It is crucial to shift to a proactive real-time approach and use the available technology, such as digital twins, AI, blockchain, etc. Real-Time Asset Monitoring: Real-time visibility detects non-compliant activities, like how shadow fleet vessels are addressed in maritime trade. Predictive Compliance Analytics: Analyze aerospace trade patterns and predict compliance risks. AI could help to identify suspicious transactions or route changes, mirroring its maritime application. Automate Compliance Monitoring: Monitor aerospace exports to respond to high-risk transactions, reducing the need for manual oversight. Enhance Compliance through Collaborative Networks: we can mirror the coordinated compliance actions required in maritime enforcement. Apply Predictive Models for Dynamic Risk Assessment: Use predictive models to assess compliance risks in aerospace dynamically- Prioritize monitoring efforts based on evolving risk profiles, like vessel tiering in maritime trade. Finally, Continuously Evolve Compliance Technologies to respond to new patterns and trends. Thank you, Byron McKinney - great article
Pleased to share with you, on the day that the EU's 14th Package on Russian Sanctions is announced, the latest research from S&P Global Market Intelligence and S&P Global Commodity Insights on 'Russia's Shadow Fleet - Formation, Operation and Continued Risks for Sanctions Compliance Teams'. Our research on this topic is unique. S&P Global Market Intelligence is the provider of the ship IMO number for all vessels 100GT+. We also collect and manage the ownership credentials for all vessels under the same terms as above, again on behalf of the IMO. This primary source content gives us the unique ability to understand vessels and their owners that make up the shadow fleet and those involved in the transportation of Russian oil. Key findings - * Shadow Fleet ships are up 33% in number between March'23-March'24 * Overall number of vessels involved in the shipment of Russian oil since Dec. 5, 2022, is 1,400+ * 24% of all in-service crude and product tankers have engaged in the shipment of Russian oil, with 10% of the tankers representing the shadow fleet. Many thanks to my colleagues Jérémy Domballe, Subject Matter Expert at S&P Global Market Intelligence; Mark Esposito, Sr. Principal Research Analyst – CI Research & Analytics and Max Tingyao Lin, Principal Journalist – CI Editorial at S&P Global Commodity Insights for their writing, contribution, insight and collaboration on this paper. The blog and introduction to the paper can be found here - https://lnkd.in/eGhfGN6D Direct download to the paper here - https://lnkd.in/en8MzHeB
Russia's shadow fleet − Formation, operation and continued risks for sanctions compliance teams
spglobal.com
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🚨 URGENT ALERT: Final Deadline for Compliance with EU Sanctions – December 19, 2024! 🚨 Do you supply sanction-relevant goods (e.g., electronics, aerospace components, petroleum products, transmission or reception devices)? Have you already included the "No Russia / No Belarus Clause" in your supply contracts? If not, now is the time to act! 🔎 What is the NRB Clause? This EU-mandated contractual clause requires companies to prohibit the re-export of specific goods to Russia or Belarus. Failure to comply exposes businesses to risks such as executive liability, enhanced criminal penalties, or contractual complications. 📌 Why you need to act now: The final deadline to amend existing contracts is December 19, 2024. Many companies are already under intense pressure to implement these requirements—don’t wait until it’s too late! The EU plans to enforce violations even more strictly in the future. 💼 How BC Legal can assist you: ✔️ Reviewing and adapting your contracts ✔️ Drafting and negotiating legally compliant NRB Clauses ✔️ Establishing effective compliance measures We have prepared a comprehensive—and straightforward—memo on this topic, which we would be happy to share upon request. It includes all key information, negotiation tips, and sample clauses. Contact us through LinkedIn. Let’s ensure your contracts meet the latest legal requirements—on time and without unnecessary stress! Best regards, Chris Mader, Tobias Fritz Attorneys at Law, BC Legal
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⚠️ Today the EC published FAQs on the "𝗯𝗲𝘀𝘁 𝗲𝗳𝗳𝗼𝗿𝘁𝘀" obligation under 𝗮𝗿𝘁𝗶𝗰𝗹𝗲 𝟴𝗮 (EU) 833/2014. Two main and welcome confirmations, in my opinion: 1️⃣ 𝗣𝗮𝗿𝘁𝗶𝗰𝗶𝗽𝗮𝘁𝗶𝗻𝗴 𝗶𝗻 𝗮 "𝗰𝗶𝗿𝗰𝘂𝗺𝘃𝗲𝗻𝘁𝗶𝗼𝗻" 𝘀𝗰𝗵𝗲𝗺𝗲 𝘃𝗲𝗿𝘀𝘂𝘀 "𝘂𝗻𝗱𝗲𝗿𝗺𝗶𝗻𝗶𝗻𝗴" 𝘁𝗵𝗲 𝘀𝗮𝗻𝗰𝘁𝗶𝗼𝗻𝘀. ➡️ Circumvention, including trough non-EU subsidiaries, has already been prohibited under Article 12 since 2014. For example, because of the prohibition under Article 2a, an EU parent company cannot use its non-EU subsidiaries to supply Annex VII items to Russia (i.e., to redirect or modify the supply chain in order to circumvent the sanctions). The EC confirms that, indeed, the purpose of circumvention is to enable its author - e.g., an EU company that wants to continue its trade activities with Russia - to avoid the application of the restrictions adopted by the EU. ➡️ Contrary to "circumventing", "undermining” does not involve attempts to redirect or disguise activities to avoid detection. Yet, when non-EU subsidiaries undermine the EU sanctions, their activities "result in an effect that the restrictive measures seek to prevent, for example, that a recipient in Russia obtains goods, technology, financing or services of a type that is subject to prohibitions under Regulation (EU) No 833/2014". ➡️ In my opinion, an EU parent company could therefore be held liable for the continuation of activities carried out by its non-EU subsidiary even when these activities existed before the adoption of the sanctions and are not an attempt by the EU parent company to avoid detection. Not only can EU companies not use their subsidiaries to circumvent the sanctions, but they must "perform all actions necessary and feasible to prevent the undermining of EU sanctions by them". 2️⃣ 𝗘𝗨 𝘀𝗮𝗻𝗰𝘁𝗶𝗼𝗻𝘀 𝗱𝗼 𝗻𝗼𝘁 𝗶𝗺𝗽𝗼𝘀𝗲 𝗼𝗯𝗹𝗶𝗴𝗮𝘁𝗶𝗼𝗻𝘀 𝗼𝗻 𝗲𝗻𝘁𝗶𝘁𝗶𝗲𝘀 𝘄𝗵𝗶𝗰𝗵 𝗮𝗿𝗲 𝗻𝗼𝘁 𝗲𝘀𝘁𝗮𝗯𝗹𝗶𝘀𝗵𝗲𝗱 𝘂𝗻𝗱𝗲𝗿 𝘁𝗵𝗲 𝗹𝗮𝘄 𝗼𝗳 𝗮𝗻 𝗘𝗨 𝗠𝗲𝗺𝗯𝗲𝗿 𝗦𝘁𝗮𝘁𝗲. ➡️ As explained in FAQs 5 & 7. This confirms that Article 8a does not establish EU jurisdiction through ownership and control, although it is seemingly stretching the EU’s influence past its territorial borders, . ➡️ In this context and as emphasized in the 5th FAQ a robust 𝗶𝗻𝘁𝗲𝗿𝗻𝗮𝗹 𝗰𝗼𝗺𝗽𝗹𝗶𝗮𝗻𝗰𝗲 𝗽𝗿𝗼𝗴𝗿𝗮𝗺 is crucial. If this topic interests you, we'll soon organize an event where we will discuss ways to develop and reinforce your ICP while keeping it dynamic. More information will be shared soon. #sanctions #bestefforts #ICP #compliance #circumvention
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We are pleased to share the latest complimentary white paper, ‘Russia’s Shadow Fleet – Formation, operation, and continued risks for sanctions compliance teams’ written by Byron McKinney, Product Management Director and Jeremy Domballe, Subject Matter Expert at S&P Global Market Intelligence; and Mark Esposito, Sr. Principal Research Analyst – CI Research & Analytics and Max Lin, Principal Journalist – CI Editorial at S&P Global Commodity Insights. Russian oil exports continue to divest from the use of “Western” covered services. A recent S&P Global Commodity Insights report noted nearly 80% of Russian exports are potentially shipped outside of the G7 oil price cap. A significant number of oil transactions and shipments are, therefore, probably evading sanctions. In response to this, regulatory authorities in the US and the UK have placed vessels, owners and charterers of Russian oil shipments on sanction watchlists. As the G7 oil price cap edges toward its second anniversary at the end of 2024 and in light of recent regulatory activities, the formation and operation of the Russian shadow fleet remains important to identify when working with maritime partners and firms. Some of the key takeaways from this paper: Market Intelligence and Commodity Insights estimate that there are approximately 591 tankers in the shadow fleet operating in the Russian oil trade. The shadow fleet in accordance with previous Market Intelligence estimates from 2023 has increased by 33%. The overall number of vessels involved in the shipment of Russian oil since Dec. 5, 2022, is 1,431. About 24% of all in-service crude and product tankers have engaged in the shipment of Russian oil, with 10% of the tankers representing the shadow fleet. Download the free paper to read the full analysis > https://okt.to/hwZ9Y5
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📜 On November 22, 2024, the European Commission has issued new FAQs on the application of Article 8a of Council Regulation (EU) No 833/2014, providing detailed guidance on the implementation of “best efforts” and sanctions #compliance to uphold the restrictive measures set by the Regulation. According to Article 8a, natural and legal persons, entities and bodies shall undertake their best efforts to ensure that any legal person, entity or body established outside the EU that they own or control does not participate in activities that undermine the restrictive measures provided for in the Regulation. 🌍 The document answers key practical questions that are also highly relevant for the subsidiaries of international companies operating in #Russia. The FAQs explicitly state that best-efforts obligations apply to entities owned or controlled by EU operators located anywhere outside the EU, including Russia. 📋 Several key points: ✅ Scope of Obligations: The "best efforts" obligations apply to all Non-EU entities controlled by EU Operators, including those located in Russia. ✅ Targeted Activities: Activities that undermine EU sanctions include actions that negate the intended effects of these measures, such as supplying goods subject to export controls or trading goods produced in Russia that are restricted under EU regulations. ✅ Required Actions: Implementation Obligations: The assessment of an EU operator's best efforts will be based on its nature, size, and relevant factual circumstances. Practical implementation can include: - Internal compliance programs - Sharing corporate compliance standards - Sending newsletters and sanctions advisories - Mandatory reporting and training for staff - Procedures for rapid response to sanctions violations ✅ Liability Conditions: An EU Operator may face liability if it is aware of its Non-EU Subsidiary's undermining activities but does not act to prevent them or fails to conduct necessary due diligence regarding those activities. ✅ Guidance Impact: While the FAQs are not legally binding, they reflect the Commission's interpretation and may influence enforcement authorities across the EU. Thus, EU Operators should take these guidelines seriously to ensure compliance with sanctions regulations. https://lnkd.in/e3JkRnb3 💼🌍 #SanctionsCompliance #EURegulations #BestEfforts #Regulation833 #CrossBorderCompliance #DueDiligence #Sanctions #BusinessEthics #InternationalTrade #BusinessinRussia #InternationalBusiness #SanctionsLaw
FAQs on sanctions against Russia and Belarus, with focus on the following provision: Article 8a of Council Regulation (EU) No 833/2014
finance.ec.europa.eu
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We can assist you with the EU Sanctions Reporting Obligations in Force as of 1 May 2024. If you are an EU legal person, entity or body and more than 40% of your proprietary rights are owned by a legal person, entity or body established in Russia; a Russian national; or a natural person residing in Russia, this concerns you. The European Commission has implemented Article 5r of Council Regulation 833/2014 which sets out a reporting obligation that applies to: 1. legal persons, entities and bodies established in the Union whose proprietary rights are directly or indirectly owned for more than 40 % by a legal person, entity or body established in Russia; a Russian national; or a natural person residing in Russia. 2. credit and financial institutions. The new measure covers all types of funds transfers out of the European Union. The obligation to report applies for any transfer of funds exceeding 100 000 EUR out of the Union made directly or indirectly in one or several operations. The report must be submitted to the competent authorities of each Member State within two weeks following the end of each quarter. This obligation commences on 1 May 2024, covering the first quarter of 2024 (1 January 2024 to 31 March 2024). For more detailed information, refer to Council Regulation (EU) 2023/2878 of 18 December 2023 amending Regulation (EU) No 833/2014 concerning restrictive measures in view of Russia’s actions destabilising the situation in Ukraine and the Frequently Asked Questions issued by the European Commission on 12 April 2024. MK Compliance Limited can assist you in complying with this newly implemented reporting obligation under Article 5r of Council Regulation 833/2014. With our expertise in navigating regulatory requirements, we can support your organisation in ensuring compliance with the procedure involved in reporting fund transfers outside of the EU as explained above. For more information, please contact us at info@compliancemk.com and we will respond as soon as possible.
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The future of trade compliance is here. As the expectations, regulatory requirements, and complexities of export controls, sanctions, and customs compliance grow exponentially, the demand for innovation in our industry is clear. I am so proud of the work that we do at SEIA GmbH to empower trade compliance organizations to meet these strategic challenges, by not only allowing them to have more effective compliance but also to be better business partners. Recently we launched SEIA PERCEIVE, a #Riskcognition (tm) solution that moves beyond red flag identification and digital risk assessments, to highlight the root causes that are driving areas of risk exposure. Check us out at SEIA GmbH to learn more!
The Buy SEIA Clause? Last Week the European Commission provided additional guidance related to the expected wording of certain requirements associated with the "No Russia Clause" in ARTICLE 12g OF COUNCIL REGULATION 833/2014. In addition to requiring additional contractual clauses and mechanisms to prevent circumvention, the authorities have also extended these requirements to implementing an adequate monitoring system. "(3) The [Importer/Buyer] shall set up and maintain an adequate monitoring mechanism to detect conduct by any third parties further down the commercial chain, including by possible resellers, that would frustrate the purpose of paragraph (1)." This is an excellent example of our requirements to not only build strong compliance programs but also implement monitoring solutions that ensure our own programs are working effectively, but also to detect potentially suspicious behavior or red flags in dealings with business partners. These growing requirements fuel our motivation at SEIA to provide new and state of the art solutions to better leverage our own data and knowledge to more effectivelly identify areas of risk exposure and define targeted mitigation actions. Further, beyond reporting and limited samples, we offer continuous internal monitoring to strategically empower trade compliance. Regarding "No Russia", our approach supports the identification of risk areas related to sanctions violations. For example we can identify root causes of diversion, such as the circumvention of items with HS codes subject to Russia Sanctions, or unusual delivery and transactional patterns. Please reach out if you would like to learn more about how SEIA's PERCEIVE uses #riskcognition and #advanceddataanalytics to provide trade compliance risk monitoring in this capacity. www.seiatech.com contact@seiatech.com #sanctions #tradecompliance #exportcontrols #customs#internationaltrade #russiaukrainewar #norussiaclause#europeancommission #EU
Frequently asked questions concerning the “No re-export to Russia” clause and sanctions adopted following Russia’s military aggression against Ukraine
finance.ec.europa.eu
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📣 🔔 𝐄𝐔 𝐂𝐨𝐮𝐧𝐜𝐢𝐥 𝐀𝐝𝐨𝐩𝐭𝐞𝐝 𝐭𝐡𝐞 𝐄𝐔’𝐬 𝟏𝟒𝐭𝐡 𝐩𝐚𝐜𝐤𝐚𝐠𝐞 𝐨𝐟 𝐬𝐚𝐧𝐜𝐭𝐢𝐨𝐧𝐬 ❗ The 14th package includes, among other measures: • The 𝐛𝐥𝐚𝐜𝐤𝐥𝐢𝐬𝐭𝐢𝐧𝐠 of an additional 116 individuals and entities. • The imposition of a 𝐛𝐚𝐧 𝐨𝐧 𝐭𝐡𝐞 𝐫𝐞𝐥𝐨𝐚𝐝𝐢𝐧𝐠 𝐨𝐟 𝐑𝐮𝐬𝐬𝐢𝐚𝐧 𝐋𝐢𝐪𝐮𝐞𝐟𝐢𝐞𝐝 𝐍𝐚𝐭𝐮𝐫𝐚𝐥 𝐆𝐚𝐬 (LNG) within the territories of the EU Member States, aimed at preventing transshipment to third countries. • The 𝐨𝐛𝐥𝐢𝐠𝐚𝐭𝐢𝐨𝐧 𝐟𝐨𝐫 𝐄𝐔-𝐛𝐚𝐬𝐞𝐝 𝐩𝐚𝐫𝐞𝐧𝐭 𝐜𝐨𝐦𝐩𝐚𝐧𝐢𝐞𝐬 to make their utmost efforts to ensure that their subsidiaries located in third countries refrain from participating in any actions that could lead to results which the sanctions aim to avert. • The 𝐫𝐞𝐪𝐮𝐢𝐫𝐞𝐦𝐞𝐧𝐭 𝐟𝐨𝐫 𝐄𝐔 𝐨𝐩𝐞𝐫𝐚𝐭𝐨𝐫𝐬 𝐞𝐧𝐠𝐚𝐠𝐞𝐝 𝐢𝐧 𝐭𝐡𝐞 𝐬𝐚𝐥𝐞 𝐨𝐟 𝐛𝐚𝐭𝐭𝐥𝐞𝐟𝐢𝐞𝐥𝐝 𝐠𝐨𝐨𝐝𝐬 to third countries to establish and apply due diligence procedures. These procedures should be able to detect, evaluate, and alleviate the risks associated with the goods being re-exported to Russia. • The 𝐫𝐞𝐪𝐮𝐢𝐫𝐞𝐦𝐞𝐧𝐭 𝐟𝐨𝐫 𝐄𝐔 𝐨𝐩𝐞𝐫𝐚𝐭𝐨𝐫𝐬 𝐬𝐡𝐚𝐫𝐢𝐧𝐠 𝐢𝐧𝐝𝐮𝐬𝐭𝐫𝐢𝐚𝐥 𝐞𝐱𝐩𝐞𝐫𝐭𝐢𝐬𝐞 for manufacturing battlefield goods with entities in third countries to incorporate contractual terms. These terms are to guarantee that such expertise will not be utilized for products destined for Russia. You have questions, do not hesitate to reach out! Attached below is the Council’s press release for your reference. 👇
Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine: comprehensive EU’s 14th package of sanctions cracks down on circumvention and adopts energy measures
consilium.europa.eu
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