Afghanistan – Discord between Taliban leaders and Haqqani Network will lead to sporadic violence in near term
Written by: Tarun Nair. First published: 21 February 2023
Torchlight Predictions
Developments
Insights
The rift is unsurprising given the history of intra-Taliban tensions. Since the group came to power in 2021, these disagreements have stemmed from divergent visions of state-building. Haqqani and allies like deputy leader Mullah Yaqoob have pushed for increased international engagement, while backing the active participation of women in public life. By contrast, Taliban leader Haibatullah Akhunzada and the Kandahar-based leadership have espoused a narrow foreign policy vision and an exclusionist domestic agenda. Akhunzada is unlikely to completely roll back contentious decisions like his ban on education for women, prolonging this discord over the coming months.
Haqqani’s comments appear to be a direct rebuke of Akhunzada’s policies. This is indicated by Mujahid’s statement and the Kandahar governor’s rebuttal of Haqqani on 12 February, saying “obedience to Shaikh is a religious obligation”. The comments are the first public spillover of differences between the Kandahar-based leadership and the Haqqani-led power centre since 2021. This highlights the failure of internal conflict resolution mechanisms, given Haqqani chose to defy unwritten rules of conduct for senior officials. The remarks are also a low-cost means to test the limits of open dissent, considering they were made in Khost, a traditional Haqqani stronghold.
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Regardless, a coup against Akhunzada remains highly unlikely in the coming months. Despite his efforts to accumulate power, checks and balances against centralisation and coups are inherent to the Taliban’s organisational structure. The structure consists of multiple power fronts that engage in consultative decision making on overarching ideological and strategic issues, allowing significant autonomy on all other matters. One of the consequences of this model is factionalism and, resultantly, distrust. This will help prevent regime change by undercutting any alignment between Haqqani, Yaqoob, and other important stakeholders like Abdul Ghani Baradar.
Strategic Outlook
The General Directorate of Intelligence, a key state instrument to combat the Islamic State Khorasan Province (ISKP), is under Haqqani’s control. Haqqani will likely use the ongoing ISKP campaign to push for an increase in the organisation’s role, thereby solidifying his power. He will also continue to exert greater influence within the Ministry of Virtue and Vice, increasing friction between the Haqqani Network and Taliban commanders loyal to Akhunzada. Resultant disagreements will likely lead to occasional bouts of violence in the medium term, particularly in Kabul. However such disputes will be quickly contained and their coverage suppressed.
The Haqqani Network was suspected of collaborating with ISKP at a tactical level to conduct some attacks between 2019 and 2021. At best, this was most likely a consequence of connections between isolated cells in Kabul, as there is no evidence of wider organisational alignment. Alternatively, the attacks may have been conducted by militants who switched allegiances from the Haqqani Network to ISKP, given the fluidity of militant loyalties in the Afghanistan-Pakistan region. This, alongside the Haqqani Network’s longstanding ties with Al-Qaeda, indicates that the group is unlikely to form an alliance with ISKP irrespective of differences with the Kandahari Taliban.
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1yIn the medium term, i hope they slaughter each other. The rest can be stuffed into a cage with some big apes in heat.