Aviation Security Screening - “One Size Fits All” - A Sober Evaluation of Risk-Based Approach
The aviation industry, enveloped in a dichotomy of facilitation and security, is continuously evolving.
Advances in technology like Artificial Intelligence, biometrics and other emerging and developing technologies together with attested risk assessment methodologies, feed a shift towards a risk-based approach in aviation security (AVSEC) screening. Nevertheless, questions remain about the efficacy of a generic "one size fits all" approach as a facet of the risk-based modus operandi.
At the heart of the issue, resides the pivotal principle of the “declared” risk based AVSEC by Regulatory Authorities. Risk applied to people, is basically (amongst many other parameters) primarily about deviation and diversity, necessitating individualised assessments. In short, it would be believed that the fundamental principle of risk-based AVSEC would take into consideration that every passenger, by their behaviour, travel arrangements, booking, payment methods, routes selected, logic behind the travel, items transported during the trip, travel class, and other travel circumstances which I would not go into here, captures a different risk level for the risk assessor - being a technological system or a person(s) performing the evaluation.
It is this hypothesis that casts doubt upon the efficacy of a universal risk-based approach in AVSEC, which is frequently referenced and mentioned within the industry across various platforms and official documentation.
Implementing a "one size fits all" approach suggests a standardised risk approach; however, such a tactic would be incompatible with the fundamentals of risk-based screening. This method would apply a standard protocol uniformly amongst passengers and persons other than passengers, while purposely neglecting the fact that every person bears a characteristically different risk. Thus, a "one size fits all" strategy does not fit with the qualities and approach of risk based AVSEC.
The main objective of AVSEC is basically to detect and stop malicious persons and prohibited items from accessing the security restricted areas (SRA) of airports, and who could then also possibly access aircraft. Nevertheless, a one-size fits all screening approach, may be good enough to recover prohibited articles from being carried or transported into the SRA, however, would then fail to efficiently identify high-risk classified persons or persons with malicious intents accessing the SRA.
This continuous, one-size, repetitive, and tedious screening approach(currently being used) may also weaken the focus and motivation of security personnel, when compared with a targeted approach which besides making security personnel feel more useful, motivated, focused, and authoritative, might prove more efficient and effective within the industry.
One must also not oversee the economic implications with a one-size fits all approach.
The current generic AVSEC methodology involves the need for the allocation of airport expensive floor areas which may be used to generate money – e.g. retail, the procurement and use of high-end security equipment, together with the extensive numbers of trained and certified security personnel– all this without discerning the level of risk-assessment.
On the other hand, a risk-based security approach would provide a seamless approach for persons or groups classified as ‘low risk’, uses an intelligent allocation of resources, based on specific security needs, and optimises a cost-effectiveness within the process. Breaking down this statement, the current universally standardized technique is also in adverse to facilitation and to the principles of economic efficiency relevant to the risk-based approach.
Nevertheless, the argument in favour of the "one size fits all" approach currently being used world-wide, often begins with proclaiming simplicity, non-failing in implementation, easy to control, easy to implement, and straightforwardness in operations - as it is just a repetition of same functions for all people and groups. However, in the complex world of AVSEC risk assessments, and in an industry that many times strives to make money, such virtues may also come at the expense of costs, effectiveness, and in some cases individual rights.
It is understood that such a decision to move away from a “one size fits all” AVSEC methodology, to a “risk based differentiated approach” is a highly political decision which would need the buy-in of many industry players. However, politicians and the aviation industry should have the courage and based on reliable data and trials, to pivot away from this universal illusion, recognising risk diversity and adopting an approach that appreciates the individual or group variances within the industry. In many regions and states, this is already partly being done by categorising passengers and persons other than passengers as different in risk – hence treated differently at security check-points.
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Viewing the AVSEC situation through the above lens, the "one size fits all" AVSEC strategy, fundamentally disqualifies as a risk-based methodology within AVSEC screening.
Instead, if the industry wants to remain competitive and focused on actual business and people oriented needs, it must seek a calibrated, dynamic and personalised methodology to screening that truly respects the paradigm of risk.
Patrick Cuschieri 06.04.2024 Qatar
Security Regulation and Compliance Manager at Edinburgh Airport
7moI agree: one size does not fit all. To Jim's point raised eloquently 2 weeks ago, it's more about "how" we deliver rather than "what" we deliver. Make sure all the layers of security are delivered well: a good hand search, effective use of ETD, comprehensive supervision and assurance techniques. Similarly a good SeMS needs to be appropriate, flexible and people-focussed. Just because you have all the fancy tools and equipment don't assume you have the best standards!
International Consultant: Risk Management - Compliance - Strategy - Security - AViation SECurity (ICAO PMC)
7moThanks and congrats for this relevant questionning. Embedding different sources (PNR, API, departure intelligence) different lines could be implemented to address the random and umpredictible principle (many AVSEC staff and Officiers do not understand the difference in between these two words and how to implement) to gain facilitation and AVSEC effectiveness as per ICAO SARP'S.
Aviation Consultant chez Self-employed
7moThank you for sharing I fully agree that "One size fits all' should be left for a customized screening method which will depend on available resources, effective stakeholders collaboration and willigness to share timely information. Starting the screening process (not the physical one and not only before accessing SRA) the most upstream, we would be able to detect the threat earlier and thus to apply the appropriate screening method.
Head of AVSEC/FAL,Gambia CAA, AVSEC-PM,CERTIFIED ICAO AVSEC Instructor/USAP CMA Auditor, AFCAC AFI-CES(AVSEC),National AVSEC/FAL INSTRUCTOR,Global Goodwill Ambassador-GGA,MBA,Aviation Security specialist,
7moI would rather agree differently. The configuration and setup of CSP is another ring in the stepped up approach to security. It should not be described or seen as a 'one-size fits all'. By default, CSP regimes do perform 'risk-based' security. Although, this is done in most cases unconsciously. We have to remember AVSEC is a layered approach and CSP is one of those layers. Some CSP have BDO functions which role at times is fused into that if the supervisor or the WTMD observer or even the pax flow controller. The document verification personnel who normally is the lastman standing before entry into the SRA also have some risk-based role function. The egornomics of the CSP is what needs to be clearly defined in most SOPs.
Flight Officer, avsec expert , logistic supervisor& instructor/inspector/ manager& philanthropist at SAC K LTD
7moIt is 100% True the narrative on this needs to change too.