The Battle of the Bulge-A Small Vignette

                           19-20 December 1944

Upon detrucking at Werbomont, Belgium, late on 19 December after the 18 hour journey from Soissons, the 505 PIR of the 82d Airborne, began to infiltrate elements as they arrived in the disjointed convoys. Significant elements of each battalion did not arrive until 20 December, making the regimental commander's job, Col Bill Ekman, very difficult. He outposted his area but could not fill it in any true strength until he got all his men-and they would be at 3/4 strength as well.

Finally, by mid-morning of 20 December, the entire PIR had been accounted for and began occupation of assigned sectors.

Weapons were minimal as was ammunition. A number of the machine guns, as well as, BARs, mortars and artillery pieces were in ordnance repair depots. In sum, the division and the 2-505 left France with whatever troops were in the barracks and whatever was immediately available in personal and unit lockers and storerooms.

As MG Gavin explained to his commanders, this would be a hasty defense plan. The 82d would anchor the eastern portion of the shoulder, regiments on line, with the 2-505 at the very farthest eastern point, a small village on Gavin’s map named Trois Ponts, Three Bridges.

No one had any information as to the location other than the Germans were probably there or about to be there with heavy armored forces. The 2-505 was assigned the mission to hold Trois Ponts and to get there fast.

LTC Ben Vandervoort, the 2-505 commander, had a quick meeting with the regimental commander, Col Bill Eckman and the newly assigned Deputy CG, Ira Swift. Swift examined the map and noted immediately that the town was dominated by a high bluff to the east with only a small road connecting the eastern approaches with the town. Two rivers bordered the town below, the Salm and the Ambleve-both with a crucial bridge that must be either defended or blown. The German armor could not be allowed to cross.

Vandervoort was ordered by Swift to send only a screening element to the bluffs above for early warning, and place the main body to hold the crossings at all costs.

With these orders, Vandervoort and the 2-505 augmented by a single 57mm antitank gun from Battery “A”, 80th Airborne Anti-Aircraft Battalion, and a platoon from Co B, 307th Engineers, marched to the east. Both Swift and Ekman accompanied Vandervoort.

Upon arriving, Vandervoort found elements of C Company, 51st Engineer Battalion, 140 strong, already there and extremely happy to see the Airborne. The engineer company commander, Major Yates, had organized defenders along the bridges (the third was a footbridge next to one of the road bridges), had rigged them all for demolition and collected a number of stragglers from other retreating US elements.

Equally pleased was Vandervoort, who noted the engineers had already rigged the bridges for demolitions and had four .50 caliber machine guns deployed in the solid stone houses that fronted the bridges. The engineer force, previously part of a timber cutting and lumber element, also provided eight bazooka teams and four .30 caliber machine guns.

Earlier, the engineers had become home to a pair of 57mm anti-tank crews that had become separated from their main unit during the initial hasty retreat on 17 December. This would be a mutual defense combining a number of disparate elements-a common occurrence during this period.

Upon arrival, Ekman and Swift, with Vandervoort conducted a quick survey with Major Yates of the area. Swift re-iterated that no major force occupy the high ground. With that, he and Ekman departed. Vandervoort took his jeep and followed the narrow road from the village to the high ground. Along the way,approximately 3/4th of the way to the top, he encountered one of the 57MM guns and crew and directed they hold a hairpin turn that oversaw the approach.

Continuing further, on arrival at the top, he saw a large open field to the east with the main road emerging from the woods. Directly behind was another wooded area that paralleled another road leading north. He quickly determined that this was key terrain and must be held, despite BG Swift’s directive.

Using commander’s instinct gained from continuous battlefield experience, he chose selective disobedience and assigned a full rifle company to occupy the woods overlooking Trois Pont and controlling access to the road. 

Co E was directed to go up to the bluffs and find the best defensive terrain to block the road from the east-the only approach possible to the bridges below. Co D was directed to the southernmost bridge, a half mile from town, and given the Airborne engineers to prepare it for demolition, augmenting a small element of Co C, 51st Engineers. F Co and the battalion headquarters, with Co C of the 51st Engineers, would defend the primary crossing, directly under the bluffs. The battalion 81mm mortar platoon was placed to the right rear on sloping high ground where it had excellent overwatch of both the bridges and the bluff road higher to the east.

The E Company commander conducted a quick recon in the hip deep snow in the high ground. He found a large wooded area and broken open fields paralleling the approach road.

He placed the bulk of his troops in the wood line facing the road. The troops placed a number of anti-tank mines along it, to the front of their positions. He took six 2.36” bazooka teams and arranged them also overlooking the road net as early warning ambush positions.

A single 57mm was placed at a hairpin turn in the road and the other was integrated into the infantry over watching the road from the east. Any armor coming west along the road would have to pass these forces and then be subject to direct fire from Trois Ponts. The test of this defense would quickly come.

The night was bitterly cold and the troops were on 100% alert and no fires. Much later in life, Col Vandervoort related to me how intensely cold it was. That, combined with the very light clothing of the troops and the deep snow made this, in his opinion, the most difficult test his soldiers ever faced. Staying awake and staying alive and reasonably alert took every ounce of mental discipline on the part of the troopers and the leadership.

At 3AM, a German scout car passed down the road and promptly hit the mines. The airborne troops closest to the mines, then re-positioned them to make the dead vehicle a roadblock. A second German scout hit those mines and was also destroyed, effectively blocking the road at that point.

At first light, German infantry deployed, supported by a number of tanks, and attempted to pry out the 2-505 troopers. They were finally stopped almost within the platoon perimeters. The tanks withdrew. A search of the dead bodies and several POWs identified the Germans as members of the 1st SS Panzer Division-one of Hitler’s best and the spearhead of the overall effort. Trois Pont had become the most important real estate of the war for this moment in time.

The Germans now began to pound the E Company positions with artillery and mortar fire and maneuvered forces against the Alamo position established by the company commander. Massed tanks and infantry could be seen from Trois Ponts. Vandervoort immediately reacted and exercised what would again be termed selective disobedience.

He asked for authority to withdraw Co E on his call. BG Swift denied that and ordered him to hold regardless. Vandervoort then sent the bulk of Co F, against prior instructions, up the bluff to the south and east of E Company to flank the building German attack. He also placed the second 57mm about halfway up the bluff road at the last concealed position available.

Most importantly, he left the command post and took his jeep up the cliff face to personally assess the situation. The hallmark of 82d leadership was “Up Front” and Vandervoort was the greatest acolyte.

In addition to Vandervoort, the battalion XO also deployed to the E Co command post as did an FO from the mortar platoon. The 82d artillery, pack 75s, and the 81s, temporarily held the Germans at bay. But, it was clear to Vandervoort, that the next attack would overrun the unit. Happily, BG Swift arrived at Trois Ponts, saw the unfolding calamity and radioed Vandervoort to evacuate the position.

Vandervoort had already decided this and had just ordered the company to begin a fighting withdrawal. This was conducted in the face of a major tank-infantry attack with the Panzer grenadier infantry leading.

Nothing is harder than a withdrawal under pressure with the enemy almost on the dis-engaging elements. The E Company troops, well experienced in Market Garden, rose to the occasion.

The troopers, in waist deep snow began to withdraw through the woods in echelon, firing as they went. They took aimed slow fire rotating with their buddies. The German’s, equally handicapped crossing the open snow fields, took heavy casualties.

Soon, the combined weight of infantry and tank fire overran the positions. As the troops approached the cliff face, they scattered across the road and under intense fire, slid down the cliff, in some places, more than 200 meters down near vertical slope.

Quickly, the F Co elements re-joined the main body of troops at Trois Ponts. Now reinforced by the engineer .50 calibers, the 2-505 rained direct fire death on any German that approached the cliff face. The Co E troops, with their wounded, in singles and small groups, raced across the bridge and gained the safety of the stone houses. There, they were met by elements of the main body and re-organized in the defense. The bridge was blown as the last Co E troops gained the village.

Vandervoort now had the entire 2-505, reinforced, facing the bulk of an SS Panzer regiment. The Panzers were desperate to break through and behind schedule. They needed the bridges and fast.

A tank appeared on the bluff and began direct fire at less than 300 yards against the houses below. The 2-505 mortar platoon fired white phosphorous, and with a miraculous first round, hit the tank square on. It hastily pulled back not to re-appear.

The 82d Div Arty, now clear of friendly troops on the high ground, began a methodical traverse of the bluff. The Germans now had to consider the price of taking Trois Ponts. The problem they faced was that only the two bridges at Trois Ponts could take the heavy armor and one was already blown. It was now Co D’s turn to take the brunt of the assault.

Co D had seen the bridge rigged for demolition and augmented that with a series of daisy chained mines as booby traps on the bridge. Anyone crossing from the east would trip the mines simultaneously, providing instant alert to the defenders.

Overwatching the bridge, in addition to a small engineer demo detachment, was a three man OP led by the BAR gunner, Native American, Herbert Buffalo Boy. The remainder of the force was placed to the rear, defending both sides of the bridge and filling the gap between them and the bridge at Trois Ponts. Following the unit SOP developed in Sicily, the company had acquired a number of panzerfaust anti-tank systems which they distributed to positions across the front.

That night, 21 December, the booby traps went off. The BAR immediately fired across the bridge. Two platoons of Germans attempted to cross the river and were immediately engaged by Co D and the attached engineers. On command, the engineers attempted to detonate the bridge charges but only partially succeeded.

Under fire, a combined element of engineers and D Company, waded into the chest deep icy Ambleve and established several Comp B explosive charges on the key support structures on those portions of the bridge roadway that remained intact. The bridge was successfully blown, denying any suitable crossing site in this area. The German attempt to reach the Meuse River would have to go elsewhere.

The 2-505 with attached engineers had successfully blunted the main German assault of the lead elements of the entire German offensive. Kampfgruppe Peiper, tasked with driving to the Meuse River, now was forced to attempt a penetration of the remaining 82d Airborne positions, which he did in vain.

A lightly armed, weakly equipped and minimally supported Airborne Division and its attached units, had successfully stopped an overwhelming first rate German SS Panzer Corps.

This was done largely due to exceptional up front command, selective disobedience of orders and the overwhelming Esprit and professionalism of the Airborne soldiers. In the words of a captured SS soldier- “You didn’t fight like the others. They always ran. You didn’t