THE BATTLES OF TAUNGUP AND TANLWE CHAUNG: 1945 Courtesy of Capt. R H Fulton

Rhodesian African Rifles

Assault on Bergner and Valerie On 22 April 1945, from its company positions about Tanlwe Chaung, the RAR found itself confronted by two prominent high features code-named Bergner and Valerie, Bergner being east of Valerie. Observation forward was very limited by the thick bamboo and a series of false crests between the battalion’s positions and the high ground. To ascertain whether these two features were occupied by the Japanese, two patrols were sent out on reconnaissance, one from D Company under Lieutenant Cummings and one from C Company led by Lieutenant Leask.

As Cummings and his patrol moved along a narrow track on the crest of the ridge approaching Bergner, they came under Japanese light machine gun fire from short range, which wounded an askari. Cummings estimated that he was being fired at by two LMGs but was prevented by the thick bamboo from seeing the source of the firing. He returned to report Bergner enemy-held. Lieutenant Leask took his C Company patrol up towards Valerie, but came up against such a steep slope that his patrol was unable to go on. Two askaris, however, scaled the ascent and returned to report the feature held by the Japanese, who were digging in and who were also seen operating a radio. The battalion now needed to pinpoint the enemy’s light machine guns and to see if another approach was available from which to outflank the enemy positions. To this end, three further patrols were sent out on 24 April, one from D Company under Lieutenant Sletcher to recce east of Bergner, and the second from C Company under Lieutenant Turner up towards Valerie. The third, a strong fighting patrol from B Company under the 2IC, was to clear Point 1232 (southeast of Bergner) and enable the intelligence officer Lieutenant Wright and a sapper recce section to report on the elephant track shown in air photos. The sapper section was also to ascertain whether a mule track could be made to Thanyet Chaung and survey a possible jeep track down the Kadok Chaung. Sletcher’s D Company patrol found the going very difficult and eventually discovered that Bergner was inaccessible from the east, access being prevented by a deep chaung.

Turner’s C Company patrol moved along the west side of Valerie in an attempt to find the track known to run south out of the position. They were unable to locate it owing to the steepness of the hill, but were able to confirm Valerie still enemy-held by drawing Japanese fire with a two-inch mortar ‘stir-up’ shoot. Later in the afternoon, D Company’s tireless Lieutenant Cummings again went out, following his previous route. When about 100 yards short of Bergner, his patrol came under fire and this time he was able to report that one LMG was firing at him from straight down the track and the other from his left (or eastern) side. He was also fired on by a medium machine gun but could not locate its position.

Meanwhile, B Company’s fighting patrol, heading for Point 1232, neared the ridge, where its leading section ran into very concentrated fire from two Japanese LMGs, which killed the Bren gunner and pinned down the rest of the section. The platoon commander, CSM Ferreira, having seen what happened, immediately seized the Bren from the dead askari and, with remarkable coolness and initiative, moved forward through the thick jungle vegetation, firing bursts from the hip in the direction of the enemy fire, thus enabling the section to extricate itself. (Ferreira was awarded a Mention in Dispatches for his part in this action.) The platoon then returned to its company base to report Point 1232 held. This meant that the intelligence officer’s recce had to be aborted and also that an attack could not be mounted on Bergner from the southeast. (Point 1232 was not visited again until 27 April.) Before the final attack plan was decided, D Company’s Lieutenant Sletcher was ordered to locate the MMG. His recce would be covered by Lieutenant Cummings whose patrol would include a two-inch mortar section with which to ‘stonck’ the Japanese positions as well as to provide Sletcher’s men with a smoke screen if they were forced to withdraw.

Sletcher and his men followed the ridge and managed to get close to an enemy position, which Sletcher shot up with his Bren. The Japanese immediately returned fire with their LMGs and the MMG, enabling Sletcher to re-confirm the positions of the former and to report that the MMG was sited on the northeast corner of Valerie, enfilading the approach to Bergner. Sletcher’s patrol returned without casualties, but Lieutenant Cummings and one askari in his patrol were wounded as they lay in their covering positions. The battalion now knew where the enemy’s machine guns were and that both positions were mutually supporting and, being useful OPs, would be well defended. Flank attacks would not be possible as the only direct line of approach was along a narrow ridge which was well covered by fire. Therefore it was decided that the attack plan outline would be: 0900– 0915: Preliminary bombing and strafing of Bergner and Valerie by air from north to south by 12 Hurribombers. 0915– 0935: Artillery concentration on Bergner by the two West African .37 Howitzer batteries, one troop of which would fire on Valerie. Artillery fire was to be superimposed by mortar fire from 1RAR Mortar Platoon firing on Bergner (from their position at HQ) and from 1KAR3 Mortar Platoon on Valerie (from their position with C Company code-named Cup).

An FOO (Forward Observation Officer) would accompany the attacking infantry to prolong or cut short both artillery and mortar fire on call. 0935: Assault on Bergner by two platoons of A Company. A third platoon (immediately behind the first attacking platoon) was to swing to the right on reaching Bergner and occupy Valerie. D Company was to follow up this third platoon, assist in occupying Valerie and thereafter exploit along the track running south from Valerie. Further down the track a section of 3NRR would be positioned as stop-group, ambushing any Japanese fleeing south from Valerie. B Company was to lay a smoke screen on Point 1232 to obscure the action from any enemy OP up there. On the morning of 26 April, dressed for war, the men of A and D companies formed up for the attack from their start point at D Company’s position, some 400 yards from the objective. At 0905 hours the Hurribombers appeared and the targets were indicated by three-inch mortar smoke bombs. The strike was accurate, 250lb bombs falling on Bergner with near misses on Valerie. Strafing was most effective and accurate. The air strike over, A Company, under cover of artillery and mortar fire and followed by D Company, moved forward along the spur running towards Bergner. Mortar fire on Valerie was inaccurate and was corrected by the forward observation officer who accompanied A Company’s No. 2 Platoon, which was heading the attack. The forward observation officer continued to control the artillery and mortar fire until the platoon was in its assaulting position 100 yards short of Bergner.

Fire on Bergner was then stopped but continued on Valerie. Led by CSM van Heerden, No. 2 Platoon went on the attack and got on to the lower slopes of Bergner where, to their great good luck, they found enemy foxholes vacant, with the Japanese now hurrying down from the top to re-occupy them. Seizing the opportunity, No. 2 Platoon charged on with such vigour and determination, everyone yelling battle cries and firing at will to such effect, that the Japanese, dismayed at their mistake, withdrew to the back slopes, from where they opened up futile and inaccurate fire. As 2 Platoon reached the top, they saw the enemy retiring into the chaung to the south, firing their grenade dischargers and throwing hand grenades as they went. Behind No. 2 Platoon had been Lieutenant Wilks’ No. 4 Platoon, which swung right to take Valerie as planned. Behind them was No. 3 Platoon, which carried on straight to reinforce No. 2 Platoon in consolidating on Bergner, which they mistook for Valerie. The error was soon realized when D Company, led by its OC Major S. E. Morris joined them just as the MMG on Valerie and a sniper in a tree opened up with heavy fire down the track along the connecting spur. Major Morris, a broad, towering six-footer with a most commanding voice and regarded by the askaris as their former great chiefs had been regarded, now took direct control of the battle and his company, along with a section of A Company’s No. 4 Platoon, bore the brunt of the final attack. No. 13 Platoon was the first to come under the intense fire of the enemy’s well-sited MMG and LMGs, which were not easy to locate partly because of the thickness of the bamboo and also because they changed fire positions frequently. The platoon, however, shot the sniper out of the tree, but not before its commander, Lieutenant Sletcher, was wounded in the arm.

The momentum of the attack was slowed by Sletcher’s evacuation but was restored by Major Morris personally coming forward and directing his troops on to their objective. In the face of heavy fire, the askaris followed their OC against the MMG position, in which they were aided by Armourer Sergeant M. W. Hesketh1 who, leading a section from No. 13 Platoon, slid down the slope around Valerie’s left side and put in flanking fire. His action enabled Major Morris and his platoon, despite suffering heavy casualties caused by the HMG fire, to gain their objective, having killed the MMG gunner at his post. Some other Japanese were also accounted for, being seen to drop and fall down the steep sides of the hill. Five more of the enemy, hoping to escape down the spur south of Valerie, were intercepted by the 3NRR stop-group. Bergner and Valerie were quickly consolidated by A and D companies, while Battalion HQ moved on to a spur just north of Bergner. The Japanese did not counterattack and the battalion set about examining the positions and assessing its casualties: seven askaris had been killed and 22 wounded, most of the casualties being from D Company. In addition, one officer (Lieutenant Sletcher) had been wounded. The examination of the locality, made it easy to see why the Japanese had intended to hold them, as both features were strong defensive positions with commanding views of the brigade’s lines of communication and dropping zone. After the battle, the brigade commander received the following signal from the divisional commander: ''A fine action by your RAR and NRR. Please convey my congratulations to all ranks on their splendid fighting spirit. Your battle is being followed with the closest interest and the result will bring a real victory in the Battle of Taungup.''

The battle, though small, had been stiff and amply justified the Rhodesian stand that Rhodesian askaris would be led by Rhodesians only. The loss of momentum of the attack on Valerie could only have been regained by an officer (Major Morris) 2 known and trusted by the Africans over many years. After dark the Japanese started shelling and mortaring Bergner with great accuracy. One slit trench in A Company’s perimeter received a direct hit, killing three askaris and wounding another. Later in the night, an unfortunate end to a very successful day occurred when Japanese ‘jitter parties’ visited the rear areas. One of their targets was the RAR Admin Box, which contained Indian muleteers, field ambulance personnel and a special stretcher bearer party. When a few grenades landed near the position’s perimeter, instead of holding fast in their slit trenches, certain elements panicked and got out, starting a general exodus which the British officers tried desperately to quell.

Confusion set in and there was much indiscriminate firing and throwing of grenades. In attempting to restore order, Sergeant Goddard was wounded by a grenade. Many askaris hid in a chaung where they were mistaken for Japanese and, by the time discipline was restored, four askaris had been killed and eight wounded, probably by fire from their own side. On the morning of the following day (27 April), a patrol from B Company moved cautiously up the slope to Point 1232, known to be still occupied. As he edged forward the leading scout was surprised to see a Japanese head pop put of the ground five yards in front of him. He promptly bayoneted the man but a second Japanese appeared and shot and wounded him.

The askari behind the scout now hurled a grenade and the whole area came alive with bursts of small arms fire and the roar of grenades. The patrol began to withdraw, and the commander of the leading section fell wounded. His 2IC crawled forward and dragged him away under covering fire from the Bren gunner, who actually knocked out the enemy MMG with a long burst. Carrying two wounded men, the patrol continued its withdrawal, leaving two askaris ambushing the track. As these two men lay hidden, a Japanese came downhill along the track and when he was a mere 15 yards away, one of the askaris fired and killed him, his body rolling down the hill until caught up by the bamboo. (It was estimated that Point 1232 was held by a platoon with two LMGs and was used as an OP.

There was no time to prepare an attack against it and it was decided instead to subject it to artillery fire, followed by a Spitfire air strike using delayed-action bombs. This was carried out on the nights of 28, 29 and 30 April and, when a patrol next went up the slope to Point 1232, no Japanese were found.) Later that same day, 27 April, Private Levi, an askari on sentry over a standing patrol 400 yards south of Valerie, saw movement some 30 yards away in the bamboo. He settled down to watch with interest as he saw an enemy soldier break cover followed by another carrying an LMG. Coolly allowing the first Japanese past him, Levi shot at and killed the second one and was in turn engaged by a third. Both askari and Japanese must have fired simultaneously as both were wounded. The first Japanese had disappeared and when no more showed up, Levi realized that he had ambushed a machine gun section; he reported back to his commander that there was a ‘dead Jap with a machine gun’ quite close if anyone wanted to fetch the gun. The weapon was promptly recovered.

Assault on Abbott and Powell:

While the RAR was fighting around Bergner and Valerie, the brigade had pressed on with 3NRR in the lead and very soon came up against another enemy position on a hillock code-named Abbott. On 27 April, C Company of 1RAR was called forward to assist 1KAR in attacking Abbott. The attack was stopped by very heavy defensive fire and, having sustained heavy casualties, C Company dug in for the night. Climbing on the next morning they found the enemy had moved further up the slope and by evening had abandoned the position. 1KAR occupied the hill, finding five Japanese dead. This day being the birthday of the Japanese emperor, his soldiers in the Taungup area celebrated the occasion with a heavy bombardment of the Battalion HQ area. Fortunately no casualties were incurred. The route to Mogyo was now clear and the brigade made for the Taungup Chaung, following it south for two miles before turning east to gain the Taungup– Prome road on the last stage of its task. At Mogyo the RAR took the lead on 2 May, moving through 1KAR, which was guarding the new dropping zone.

The next day, when D Company began to cross Taungup Chaung, they came under LMG fire. Reaching the far bank with two wounded, they dug in, now aware that the fire had come from a feature high up on the east bank of the chaung code named Powell. Battalion HQ came up to Padonda and was heavily bombarded during the night by the Japanese firing 90mm guns from a village southwest of Powell, down the Taungup Chaung. On the morning of 4 May, a report was received that the 2nd Gold Coast Regiment had reached Milestone 100 on the Taungup–Prome road. This meant that the RAR had to do something about Powell immediately because the battalion was required to link up with the West Africans on 5 May. A probing patrol set out from B Company and, climbing an unoccupied feature they believed to be Powell, reported the place clear. At the same time, a patrol from A Company, after brief contact with the enemy a short way north of the actual Powell, came across Japanese supply dumps and signs of recent evacuation. On the mistaken impression that the way forward was clear, B Company, closely followed by C Company, set off up the slope at first light on 5 May. They marched on until they reached a point where cover ended and they were facing a broad belt of open ground surrounding a bamboo-covered crest. Making for the top, they began to cross the open space and when the first of the two leading platoons was a few yards away from the crest, the Japanese, concealed in the bamboo, opened up from the immediate front with a 75mm gun, 90mm mortars and machine guns, killing four askaris outright and wounding a further six, one of whom died later. There was also enemy sniper fire from the right flank and heavy LMG and rifle fire from a feature 300 yards to the left. An ‘over’ from the 75mm landed in the leading section of C Company, which was following up, killing an askari and wounding the company commander. In their highly exposed position the RAR’s only option was withdrawal. B Company’s second platoon quickly moved round to the enemy flank with the idea of giving the stricken first platoon covering fire to enable its evacuation.

Sergeant Phillip, the leader of the first platoon, with quick thinking and great courage, took up a Bren and charged forward, spraying the enemy position so effectively that the Japanese fell further back into the bamboo. Phillip’s action allowed the platoon to withdraw with their wounded. For this he was awarded a Certificate of Gallantry. Retiring, both platoons began to make their way back, when they heard the Japanese shouting from the crest. Turning back, they saw their own CSM Elijah moving about the RAR dead, oblivious of the enemy fire and shouts. He then appeared to find the man he sought, an askari reported wounded but left behind in the battle confusion. The man died as the CSM reached his side. Elijah then began his long crawl away from imminent death. A smoke screen was put down, and under its cover he was able to dash to safety. He received a Mention in Dispatches. On 6 May, the battalion found itself on half-rations thanks to a very effective Japanese attack on the dropping zone and a spirited anti-aircraft attack on the Dakota bringing in supplies. On top of this, no move forward to the comparative safety of the Taungup–Prome road was possible until Powell was dealt with. The plan was now to direct an air strike and an artillery and mortar bombardment onto the enemy position on 7 May, to be followed by a frontal assault by B Company. That afternoon, to soften the enemy up for the next day’s attack, the mortars from 1RAR, 1KAR and 3NRR began registering on Powell. The Japanese counter-fired unsuccessfully and were later reported to be pulling out. While this was going on, A Company’s forward patrol reached Milestone 102 on the Taungup– Prome road, where they made contact with a patrol from the Gold Coast Regiment. They remained where they were as a Japanese roadblock was reported at Milestone 101.

The next morning, the Spitfires and Typhoons struck Powell with very accurate fire. The mortars then opened up and received a hearty reply from the Japanese, whose fire then slackened off, and when B Company went forward to investigate, they saw the enemy re-occupying their positions from which they were soon harassing the battalion with intensive artillery and mortar fire. That evening the brigade was ordered to leave Powell and slip through the hills to the west, gaining the Taungup– Prome road, from which they could be supplied by road rather than by air. The RAR now buried their dead killed in the action against Powell and, after firing a farewell salvo on the enemy position, marched away with the rest of the brigade to Milestone 106, having completed their task and linking up with the West Africans as pre-planned. Coinciding with this came the news that the European war was over, along with the hint that the Arakan Campaign was fading out. The series of fights that made up the Battle of Taungup had put the men of the Rhodesian African Rifles to the test, especially the intense action at Tanlwe Chaung. For 40 days they had hacked their way through the worst country in the world, heaving supplies along the way, seeking and being sought by the undaunted Japanese and beating them in a stand-up fight.

The end in Burma, 1945– 1946:

The final battles For the remainder of May 1945, the battalion spent its time building quarters against the coming monsoon from any timber it could find in old Japanese dumps and even in Taungup itself. So diligent and resourceful were the askaris in their search for material that on 6 June the battalion was obliged to announce that in response to local complaints about the theft of roofing materials that was taking place, this practice was to cease forthwith … Also on 6 June, the battalion, once more back in training, was able to mount its first quarter guard for many months— everything spick and span, with belts and gaiters scrubbed clean, boots gleaming and chinstraps of bush hats once more under point of chin. The battalion’s baggage had arrived from Ramree and they were ordered on to Letpan, en route for duty on the Irrawaddy’s left side where the brigade, as part of the 20th Indian Division (Stopford’s 12th Army), would relieve part of the 7th Indian Division, which was blocking the Japanese escape to the north as they retreated before Slim’s 14th Army.

The battalion set off on 21 June by motor transport, which had to be abandoned after 37 miles, the state of the roads making driving conditions impossible. No strangers to marching, the RAR set off again on foot, this time climbing the 3,500ft Taungup Pass and crossing the Irrawaddy River, and arrived at Prome on 29 June, having marched 69 miles. They were then trucked a further 16 miles to relieve the 4/ 10 Gurkhas of the 33rd Indian Infantry Brigade at Gyobingawk on the fringes of the Pegu Yomas where they arrived on 30 June. The battalion now joined in the task of clearing the western foothills of the Pegu Yomas of Japanese stragglers and small parties drifting southwards to join their 28th Army for the anticipated and inevitable Japanese breakout in July. The RAR was operating under appalling monsoon conditions. The war diary of one participating unit records: Hill tracks in a terrible state, either so slippery that men can hardly walk, or knee-deep in mud. Administration difficulties considerable. Half a company took ten hours to carry two stretcher cases four miles. A party of men without packs took seven hours to cover five miles. The RAR was now patrolling in country so flat that any rain flooded the whole area. Information from local Karens was unreliable or exaggerated, as they were afraid of reprisals and raids from marauding Japanese. Enemy agents were operating all over the area and intelligence had to be got at first hand by long, wary and weary marches over terrible country. The battalion received great assistance from Father Moran, a Catholic missionary known to and trusted by the Karens. Major Morris now commanded two RAR companies based up at Waing with detachments in Yeda and Uyingi, their supplies being ferried from Battalion HQ by bullocks. The Karens quickly opened up a market selling chickens, eggs and bananas, along with an ‘under-the-counter’ liquor of such intoxicating potency, that it was immediately outlawed, with heavy fines being imposed on any askari found with it in his possession. Despite continuous patrolling, the first five days of July brought no success. But on 6 July, the Japanese engaged an RAR patrol, which withdrew to report to the company commander who immediately sent it back to find out more. This time the enemy was awaiting the men with an LMG and a sniper. A firefight ensued during which the sniper was killed and one of the Japanese LMG section was wounded, this in exchange for six RAR wounded. Two of these injuries were ‘self-inflicted’ when a mortar bomb fired by the patrol struck a bamboo cane and bounced back onto the men.

Patrolling was immediately intensified now that the enemy was known to be in the vicinity and on 8 July, the company came under fire from a dug-in position occupied by about 16 men with an MMG and a British Bren gun. Holding the enemy from the front, the company commander sent a platoon on a left-flanking attack against the position. The Japanese spotted the tactic and moved back to recommence firing from a fresh position. This tactic was repeated and it became clear that the enemy was withdrawing into the yomas around Zamai, which was already suspected of being heavily occupied.

During this particular action the company came across the bodies of two Gurkhas, which they buried, returning the dead men’s kukris to their regiment. The hoped-for encounter proved fruitless and the patrol experienced further misfortune when the men discovered that the bridge over the now-raging chaung had been swept away, with the result that they had to spend four miserable days on the wrong side of the river. Some of the RAR companies went to the extent of building makeshift watercraft in which to patrol the now fast-flowing chaungs, adding the excitement of possible shipwreck to the ever-hopeful prospect of meeting the Japanese. These enterprising groups were greatly envied by those ever hacking their way through the maddening and endless bamboo in the vain hope of excitement of any sort. Some patrols stumbled upon former enemy hideouts ranging in size from platoon positions to large brigade encampments. The intense pressure of constant patrolling was forcing the Japanese further and further into the hills. During the second week of July, the brigade left the 7th Indian Division to join the 19th Indian Division where it was to relieve the 62nd Indian Infantry Brigade.

The last battle in the Burma Campaign— the Battle of the Sittang Breakout— was fought and lost by the Japanese, whose army was in a very bad state. Refusing to surrender and ignoring the leaflets dropped by air, which promised good treatment, the Japanese General Sakurai gathered his broken and starving army into five groups, which then attempted to break out across the Rangoon road on a front of 150 miles. The physical and mental condition of the individual Japanese soldier can scarcely be imagined. The sick and wounded were simply left wherever they were and the emaciated, halfcrazed human beings that emerged from the yomas to cross both the Rangoon road and the Sittang River bore no resemblance to the former Japanese supermen.

They were slaughtered wherever they staggered to, over 12,000 being killed, compared to a mere and astonishing British casualty list of a total of 95 dead. On 14 July, Japan surrendered unconditionally, leaving in Burma only a few parties of hard-core ‘no-surrender’ groups to be cleared up.

Most of these moved northwards and were dealt with by the RAR among other units. The following account of operations in Burma at this time was given to Brigadier Heppenstall by Geoff Betts, a subaltern in the RAR at that time:

''Towards the end of the war, when we were in the Arakan and the Japs were retreating, the RAR was given the task of rounding up snipers and stragglers by sending out fighting patrols of platoon strength lasting one week each. We had good aerial survey maps from which we could identify features to cover our roughly circular route despite the thick bamboo jungle. After four days, I thought that it was time to commence our way back to Company HQ. My African sergeant and I studied the map and I, not having a good sense of direction, indicated the feature we should aim for the next day, but my sergeant disagreed, indicating a feature some 40– 50 degrees in a different direction. I studied the map again, retracing the route we had already done and still thought I was right! After more discussion and knowing the Africans’ reputation for direction-finding, having largely grown up in the bush, I decided reluctantly to follow his advice. Within three days we were back at base! It was quite an experience for a ‘townie’ to be alone in the wilds of Burma loaded up with a week’s rations, half a blanket, mosquito net to cover your head, poncho/ ground sheet, arms and ammunition, in heavy rain. At night we used to cut a number of forked supports for bamboo poles so we would not be sleeping on the wet mud. The poncho/ groundsheet acted as the roof to keep off as much rain as possible. As it happened we made no contact with any live Japs, but saw a few bodies lying in the chaungs (streams). These patrols took place near the Manchi Road area where we were located prior to moving across the Salween River into Siam. Fortunately the bombs were dropped on Japan which halted the war and saved us from what would have been a savage campaign against a defeated but fanatical enemy who would have fought to the last man. MacKay writes: However, the regiment still had to conduct patrols because some of the Japanese stragglers had no knowledge of their country’s surrender due to lack of radio communication and isolation.''

Admiral Mountbatten received the formal unconditional surrender of all Japanese forces in South-East Asia on September 12th at Singapore. The war in the East was finally over. With the war strain now over, the askaris reverted to their normal happy way of life, giving displays of tribal dancing around Thitsedaung and being entertained by other African units in their turn. In early September, as part of the brigade’s athletic team participating in the divisional sports, the battalion won two firsts in the 440 yards and 220 yards. In November and December the regimental choir so impressed the 2nd Welsh Regiment that they soon had the choir adding Land of my Fathers, All through the Night and ’Twas a Lover and his Lass to their already extensive African repertoire. Within six weeks of the war’s end, the regimental sergeant-major and the adjutant were holding their parades as if a war had never occurred.

In the granting of awards the battalion achieved two MBEs, two certificates of gallantry and two commendations for gallantry, as well as 13 Mentioned Dispatches.

MacKay says: “Eulogies must be expected by soldiers after returning home from the war and some of the most generous praise comes from the enemy. After the war, the former Japanese commanders in Burma were asked at a conference to list in order of merit as fighting men, the troops which had opposed them in Burma. In reply, the Africans were given the astonishingly high place of fourth on the list. The reasons given were that their fire power was always dangerous and concentrated and their enthusiasm in action unbounded”.

MacKay fails to mention that there was a wide-spread belief among the Japanese that the Africans were cannibals. This false belief had a terrifying psychological effect on the Japanese. A diary found on a captured Japanese soldier contains the following tribute to the Africans: Fighting against these soldiers is somewhat troublesome. They are very brave with an excellent physique and because of their beliefs are not afraid to die. So even if their comrades have fallen, they keep advancing as if nothing had happened.

MacKay continues: ''Regimental Sergeant-Major Machado captured the spirit of the African soldier when he wrote: “I am proud to be in this battalion of brave men who fight, even as do the elephants, in this deep green jungle. We met the enemy who shelled us violently with his great guns, but they failed to make us turn away from the fight. We fought on until the enemy was outwitted and defeated, and through bravery and the help of God our losses were not big. Since the birth of the regiment I have known it. Since its formation I have done what I could to teach these men of the Rhodesian African Rifles. I have seen the glorious results of that teaching of mine and of the officers of the regiment. And today, we all smile together. For have we not fought and risked our lives side by side to keep our land safe from the horrible things we have seen here? And the war being over, we feel that we may think of our fighting comrades and— having seen what the war can cause to people and lands— may humbly say, Ishe komberera Africa (God save Africa). We, who have known, sing these words with our thoughts resting on them, and our eyes seeing desolate lands, and the graves of the soldiers of the Rhodesian African Rifles”.

The officers of the Rhodesian African Rifles were originally drawn from the Native Affairs Department and it was their enthusiasm and patience that turned the Africans into first-rate soldiers. Their leadership was inspiring and the Africans had great praise for the men who led them:

''Our officers are wonderful … they fear nothing and so we lost our uneasiness … how could we come to harm with our ‘fathers’ and teachers marching, fighting and swearing at the Japs by our sides.''

To conclude the chapter, mention must be made of the fact that sergeants Muchapara and Mwembe and Private Davids were the men fortunate enough to be selected to represent the regiment as part of the Southern Rhodesia contingent taking part in the Victory Parade in London on 8 June 1946.

South African and Southern Rhodesian contingents marching in the London Victory Parade of 1946

As the contingent drew near the saluting dais, the bands at its base broke into Sweet Banana,a proud and fitting tribute to the dead and wounded. RAR Marching Song - Sweet Banana

That's RAR, in war and peace

In war, in war, in war

Muhondo RAR, inorwa nokushinga

In war, she fights with bravery

An account of the men’s experiences, as told to Captain Phayre in the vernacular and rendered into English by him was discovered among the association’s records in Harare in April 2005 and presented almost verbatim, a rare glimpse into another time and another age.

Presentation of the Colours:

On the afternoon of 12 July 1953, a crowd of over 10,000 Africans and Europeans gathered at Borrowdale Camp to witness the presentation of the colours to the regiment by Her Majesty Queen Elizabeth, the Queen Mother. There was ticketed seating for 5,000 spectators and all awaited events with eager anticipation. At precisely a quarter to four the band marched on, leading the four guards of 120 men each, every single one of them aware of the ceremonial importance of the event and of the part he was playing in it. At the tap of a drum, they halted as one man, a movement so superbly synchronised that it brought a hush to the crowd, which was witnessing the regiment at the peak of training precision. At ten to four, His Excellency the Governor arrived, being received with the appropriate salute. At four o’clock a rippling wave of cheers announced the arrival of Her Majesty, who was driven slowly past the seating provided for African ex-servicemen and regimental guests to the saluting dais. There she was presented with bouquets by two small children on behalf of the regiment. This was followed by the Royal Salute, after which the commanding officer, Lieutenant Colonel Kim Rule OBE reported that ‘15 officers, 14 British warrant officers and non-commissioned officers and 535 African ranks’ were present. Her Majesty inspected the parade, moving down the line and speaking to a number of askaris, after which the bishop of Southern Rhodesia, the Very Reverend Kennedy-Grant, assisted by the regiment’s European and African chaplains performed the ceremony of the consecration of the colours over the drums of the regiment.

Her Majesty presented both the Queen’s Colour and the Regimental Colour to the ensigns who then faced the parade, were saluted and joined the line to the tune of the national anthem. From the dais Her Majesty addressed the regiment: Colonel Rule, officers and men of the Rhodesian African Rifles: ''I am proud to be here today to present you these colours on behalf of my daughter, the queen. Your regiment is young compared to some of those in the British Army whose histories date back for several hundred years. But it is a matter of great pride to the queen and me that her African subjects should have provided men for the regiment, a regiment which in so short a time, has built such fine traditions. I know that Her Majesty also is proud that, in addition to Africans from Southern Rhodesia, Africans from Nyasaland also serve in your ranks and Africans from Northern Rhodesia and Africans from Tanganyika and Africans from Bechuanaland. Your regiment, like many others in the British Army, was formed from two different volunteer corps, both raised in 1940. The Rhodesian African Rifles was formed to take part in the defence of the colony and the Rhodesian Air Askari Corps was raised to assist in the maintenance of the Empire Training Group of the Royal Air Force. In 1946 they were united into one and today you join those many other regiments of the British Army who bear their colours as an outward symbol of their allegiance. I should like to say something to you of the significance of these colours. At all times and in all countries, soldiers have served under some emblem in whose defence they fought and, if necessary died.

In Europe for many centuries it has been a flag. Your own forefathers carried a shield in battle. By the colour of the flag or shield, all knew friend from foe and recognised comrades of their own regiment or impi. In the impi, I am told, it was a disgrace to let the shield fall. So in a regiment it was a disgrace to let the colours be captured while there was a man standing to defend them. Today, although the colours are no longer carried in battle, they have become a symbol that the soldier puts his allegiance to the queen and Commonwealth before everything, including himself. Upon their colours regiments have emblazoned names of great battles and campaigns. And not only victories— they include all those battles where honour and glory have been added to the history of the regiment by heroic deeds of valour and endurance. In peacetime too, by your bearing you may add further lustre to your traditions.

In the short history of the Rhodesian African Rifles you have proved by your service in Burma that you can hold your own in battle. By your service since the war you have shown that you carry out your duties to the queen, the colony and its people with smartness and efficiency. I know how many of you volunteered to serve in the Middle East when help was needed. By this you have shown that you are ready to take your share in the welfare of the Commonwealth. By all these things you have won the honour of carrying your colours. I present them to you in recognition of your loyalty in the past and in the faith that you, and those who follow you in the regiment, will always guard its tradition and strive to bring new honour to its name''.

To which the commanding officer replied for the regiment:

"Your Majesty, we, the Rhodesian African Rifles, humbly desire to express our thanks to Your Majesty for giving us this time from the crowded hours of Your Majesty’s tour of the colony to present the colours granted by His Late Majesty King George the Sixth of hallowed memory and approved by Her Most Gracious Majesty Queen Elizabeth the Second. During the tour of this colony in 1947 His Late Majesty was pleased to remember that our enemies in Burma feared us because they said 'we ate our enemies'. May it please Your Majesty to convey to Her Majesty the Queen our humble duties and a reminder that in Her service our teeth are still, and will remain, sharp. Your Majesty, we pray that Your Majesty will consent to accept this token with which, by his share therein, every man of the regiment pledges himself to remember during his service and to pass on to those who follow the words of guidance with which Your Majesty placed in our keeping the heart of a regiment, its colours."

The token, in the form of the regimental badge shaped into a brooch, was in white gold studded with diamonds and presented on a silk cushion of regimental colour, made up in such a fashion as to represent the regimental badge. The gift was truly voluntary; every man of the regiment contributing as he wished. In the event, the commanding officer had had to place a limit on the individual contributions lest the askari in his enthusiasm should give more than he could afford. The finished brooch was seen by every man and approved as a fitting gift from them all. The regiment then marched past in column of platoons in slow time with the colours flying at its head, and returned in quick time with the colours in their position in the regiment’s ranks. The parade then re-formed line and advanced in review order to give the Royal Salute and ‘three cheers for Her Majesty’.

Cpl Nduna (RAR Mascot) and his Handler, giving a Royal Salute

Masodja ''Rhodesian Native Regiment saw action in East Africa, pitted against the wily von Lettow-Vorbeck and his army of German askaris. Disbanded and later re-formed, the regiment was to distinguish itself during World War II in the North African and Burma campaigns. Using the counter-insurgency experience gleaned from the Malayan Campaign of the 1950s, the RAR provided the frontline troops in the battle for Rhodesia during that country’s bitter civil war of the 1960s and 1970s. The contents include the formation of the Rhodesia Native Regiment, RNR operations in East Africa during WWI, armistice and the disbandment of the RNR, the formation of the RAR, the RAR in the Burma campaign, the RAR in the Malayan Emergency, the Nyasaland Emergency and the RAR in the Rhodesian bush war. Also included with the book is the award-winning BBC documentary DVD, Frontline Rhodesia''

Chibaya Moyo 2

''Chibaya Moyo, 'Strike to the Heart' in chiShona, is an anthology of stories and anecdotes from those who served with the Masodja, the all-volunteer black soldiers of the Rhodesian African Rifles, a proud regiment that fought with distinction in two world wars, the Malayan Emergency and the Rhodesian bush war.

Chibaya Moyo also brings together so many voices with tales of such contrasting topics that it is, by its unique nature, fascinating, tragic, humourous, intense, inspirational and filled with pathos; above all, it is honest. It is the story of a brotherhood that transcended race and tribe, and it is a lasting memory of, and testament to, a proud and distinguished regiment, its soldiers and their actions. To have served with this regiment was an honour and a privilege.''

https://www.armyupress.army.mil/Portals/7/combat-studies-institute/csi-books/ArtOfWar_RhodesianAfricanRifles.pdf

This article is credited to Capt. R. H. Fulton who wrote and compiled it, my contribution was to merely add photographs, and links.