CASE OF THE DAY: AREA COUNCILS HAVE NO RIGHT OVER LANDS WITHIN ABUJA

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OLADIPO SEGUN & ANOR v. U.K. AMAH & ANOR

In the Court of Appeal

Thu Nov 10, 2022

Suit Number: CA/A/684/2016

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal.

ISSUES

The Court of Appeal determined the appeal based on the issues formulated by the respondents as follows:

1. Whether the lower Court was right in arriving at its decision that the Respondents where the trespassers in possession of the Plot in dispute vide the Exhibits on Record?

2. Whether the trial Court was right in awarding the Respondents a monetary compensation of N1,000,000.00? ME 

RATIONES DECIDENDI

FULL JUDGEMENT

1. BIOBELE ABRAHAM GEORGEWILL, J.C.A. (Delivering the Leading Judgment): This is an appeal against the Judgment of the High Court of Federal Capital Territory Abuja Division, Coram: Y. Halilu J, in Suit No. FCT/CV/2932/2012: U.K. Amah & Anor.V. Oladipo Segun & Anor delivered on 24/2/2016, in which the claims of the Respondents as Claimants against the Appellants as Defendants were granted.
3. The Appellants were dissatisfied with the said judgment and had appealed against it vide their Notice of Appeal filed on 19/4/2016 on Two Grounds of appeal. See pages 247 - 249 of the Record of Appeal. The Record of Appeal was compiled and transmitted to this Court on 4/5/2017 but was deemed as properly transmitted on 7/12/2021. Subsequently, with the leave of Court an Amended Notice of Appeal was filed 1/11/2017 on Five Grounds of appeal but was deemed as properly filed on 7/12/2021. The Parties filed and exchange their briefs, which were duly adopted as their arguments at the hearing of this appeal on 21/9/2022. The Appellants were represented by Rosemary Kogbodi Esq. The Respondents were represented by E. I. Nwude Esq.
5. By a Writ of Summons filed before the lower Court, the Respondents as Claimants claimed against the Appellants as Defendants the following reliefs, namely:
6. 1. A Declaration that the 2nd Plaintiff/Respondent is the bonafide allottee of the said plot of land known as Plot Number 17 Kubwa Annex Kubwa Bwari Area Council of the Federal Capital Territory by virtue of the Abuja Municipal Area Council, Abuja Municipal Planning Office, Conveyance of Provisional Approval dated 15/6/95.
7. 2. An order of perpetual injunction restraining the Defendants severally or jointly by themselves, their agents or privies howsoever called or any other persons claiming through them from trespassing on the Plaintiffs Plot of Land known as Plot No 17 Kubwa Annex Kubwa Bwari Area Council of the Federal Capital Territory Abuja.
8. 3. The sum of N5,000,000.00 as general damages for the trespass committed by the Defendants and the defacing of the intended use of the said plot.
10. SUCCINCT STATEMENT OF FACTS
11. The Respondents’ case briefly was that the 2nd Respondent was the original Allottee of Plot No 17 Kubwa Annex Kubwa Bwari Area Council of the Federal Capital Territory Abuja by virtue Abuja
12. Municipal Area Council, Abuja Municipal Planning Office, Conveyance of Provisional Approval dated 15/6/95 which was regularised by the Abuja Geographical Information Systems on 13/12/2009.
14. The 1st Respondent came into possession of the Plot in dispute in 2003 while the 2nd Respondent has been in quiet and undisturbed possession of the Plot in dispute since it was allocated to him in 1995. The Appellants denied the claims of the Respondents and stated that the Respondents were mere trespassers without any colour of title to the Plot in dispute. The parties filed and exchanged their pleadings and the matter proceeded to trial.
16. At the hearing, the Respondents led evidence and tendered some documents, which were admitted as Exhibits and closed their case. In their defence, the Appellants also led evidence and tendered some documents, which were also admitted as Exhibits and closed their case. The parties addressed the lower Court in their final arguments and on 4/2/2016, the lower Court delivered its judgment, in which it granted the claims of the Respondents against the Appellants, hence the appeal. See pages 221 - 246 and 247 - 249 of the Record of Appeal.
18. ISSUES FOR DETERMINATION
19. In the Appellants’ brief, issues for determination were formulated, to wit:
20. 1. Whether it was right for the lower Court to give judgment to the Respondents when the Respondents’ case was based on Exhibit A, which is a Conveyance of Approval issued by Abuja Municipal Area Council, when this Court has held severally that Certificate of Occupancy/land title documents issued by Area Councils in the Federal Capital Territory are invalid?
21. 2. Whether the lower Court was right to have awarded damages of N1,000,000.00 to the Respondent if the claim for declaration fails?
22. 3. Whether the award of N1,000,000.00 as General damages can be sustained if the substantive claim fails?
24. In the Respondents’ brief, two issues for determination were formulated to wit:
25. 1. Whether the lower Court was right in arriving at its decision that the Respondents where the trespassers in possession of the Plot in dispute vide the Exhibits on Record?
26. 2. Whether the lower Court was right in awarding the Respondents a monetary compensation of N1,000,000.00?
28. I have taken time to consider the pleadings and evidence, both oral and documentary Exhibits led by the parties as in the Record of Appeal. I have also considered the submissions of learned counsel to the parties in their respective briefs in the light of the findings and decisions reached in the judgment of the lower Court, and I am of the view that the apt issues arising for determination in this appeal are the two issues as distilled in the Respondents’ brief, a consideration of which would involve a consideration of the three issues as distilled in the Appellants’ brief. I shall consider the two issues ad seriatim, commencing with issue one.
30. ISSUES ONE
31. APPELLANTS’ COUNSEL SUBMISSIONS
32. On his issue one, learned counsel for the Appellants had submitted inter alia that the lower Court was wrong to have given judgment to the Respondents when the Respondents’ claim to title to the plot in dispute was based on Exhibit A, which is a Conveyance of Provisional Approval issued by Abuja Municipal Area Council, and contended that the law vests absolute ownership of land within the Federal Capital Territory in the Federal Government of Nigeria and not in the Abuja Municipal
34. Area Council, and urged the Court to hold that that no Area Council within the FCT has the authority to do anything with or alienate any of the lands within the Federal Capital Territory contrary to the perverse decision of the lower Court and to allow the appeal, set aside the perverse judgment of the lower Court and dismiss the Respondents’ Suit for lacking in merit. Counsel referred to Section 297(2) of the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria 1999 (as amended); Section 1 (3) of the Federal Capital Territory Act 2004, and relied on Ona V. Atenda (2000) 1 NWLR (Pt. 656) 244.
36. It was also submitted that in the absence of any grant by the Minister of the FCT, the purported customary title of the Respondents was ineffective, null and void, and therefore, the alleged title of the Respondents was inchoate and inclusive and contended that in law mere holding of a Certificate of Occupancy, without more, does not confer any ownership right on such a person and urged the Court to hold that the lower Court in the circumstances ought to have dismissed the claims of the Respondents rather than making out a different case for the Respondents and
38. therefore erred gravely to have granted it and to allow the appeal, set aside the perverse judgment of the lower Court and dismiss the claims of the Respondents for lacking in merit. Counsel relied on Odunze V. Nwosu (2007) All FWLR (Pt. 379) 1295 @ pp. 1331 - 1332; Haido V. Usman (2003) All FWLR (Pt. 166) 640 @ p. 657; Ugheneyovwe V. State (2005) All FWLR (Pt. 245) 1006 @ p. 1027; Adetoun Oladeji (Nig.) Ltd. V. NB. Plc. (2007) All FWLR (Pt.357) 837 @ 858; Agbu V. CSC Nassarawa State (2015) All FWLR (Pt. 675)318 @ p. 326; Chidoka V. First City Finance Company Ltd (2013) All FWLR (Pt. 659)1; Ogbe V. Asade (2009) 18 NWLR (Pt. 1172) 106; Dantata V. Mohammed (2013) All FWLR (Pt. 675) 279 @ p. 303; Omokuwajo V. Federal Republic Of Nigeria (2013) All FWLR (Pt. 684) 1; Anjoke V. Anjoke (2013) All FWLR (Pt. 658) 975 @ p. 998; Dibal V. Eguma (2018) All FWLR (Pt. 935) 1386 @ p. 1401.
40. RESPONDENTS’ COUNSEL SUBMISSIONS
41. On his issue one, learned counsel for the Respondents had submitted inter alia that the lower Court was right in arriving at its decision that the Respondents where the trespassers in Possession of the Plot in dispute since there is a clear
42. dichotomy or cleavage in property law between the claim of title and that of trespass to land and contended whilst in a claim for declaration of title to land, the Claimant must prove ownership of the land. It is not so in a claim for trespass to land, which is based on exclusive possession and urged the Court to hold that the lower Court was therefore, correct when it held that the Respondents who were the trespassers in exclusive possession of the plot in dispute to the right of true owner - Minister of Federal Capital Territory, were entitled to their claims against the Appellants, who failed to show any better title to the said plot in dispute, and to dismiss the appeal for lacking in merit and affirm the sound judgment of the lower Court. Counsel referred to Section 134 of Evidence Act 2011, and relied on Oyedare V. Keji & Anor. Vo. 5 SCJL 1 @ p. 13; Amakor V. Obiefuna (1974) 3 SC 67 @ pp. 75 - 76; Mayaleke V. Okenla (2015) 29 WRN 97 @ p. 119: Akinrinde V. Bello (2015) 37 WRN 47 @ p. 78; FBN Plc. V. M. O. Nwadialu & Sons Ltd (2015) 22 WRN 103 @ p. 159.
44. It was also submitted that Exhibits A, B, D, E and F were the means through which the
46. Respondents came into possession as trespassers on the right of the true owner -Minister of Federal Capital Territory of the plot in dispute as Exhibit B discloses acknowledgment from Minister of FCT of the Respondent’s steps to obtain Minister’s consent of Respondents occupation of the plot in dispute, and contended that the lower Court was right in holding that the Respondents were trespassers in possession and not owners of the said Plot on account of Exhibits A, B, D E and F and urged the Court to hold that in law the Respondents being trespassers in exclusive possession can sue for trespass even if they are neither the owner nor a privy of the owner as was rightly held by the lower Court since the Minister of F.C.T was not a party to the cases and the issue of absolute legal ownership of land in F.C.T did not arise before the lower Court and to dismiss the appeal for lacking in merit and affirm the sound judgment of the lower Court. Counsel relied on Amakor V. Obiefuna (1974) 3 SC 67 @ pp. 75 - 76.
48. RESOLUTION OF ISSUE ONE
49. My lords, a due consideration of issue one for determination, which encompasses the Appellants’ issue
51. one, would involve the consideration of the nature of the claim of the Respondents against the Appellant, the evidence led by the parties and the findings and decisions made thereon by the lower Court to determine whether or not the judgment of the lower Court appealed against by the Appellant is correct.
53. In considering and answering these pertinent questions on the pleadings and evidence as led by the parties as in the Record of Appeal and in the light of the findings of the lower Court in the judgment appealed against, I bear in mind that generally in civil proceedings the burden of proof, though said not to be static, is on the Claimant who usually asserts his rights and who may lose if no evidence was called. See Ewo V. Ani (2004) 3 NWLR (Pt. 861) 610. See also Mr. Frank Anyi & Ors V. Chief Harry Ayoade Akande & Ors (2017) LPELR - 41973 (CA) per Sir Biobele Abraham Georgewill JCA; Osawaru V. Ezeiruka (1978) 7 – 9 SC 135; Onwuama V. Ezeokoli (2002) 94 LRCN 246; Enikwe V. IMB Ltd. (146) LRCN 842; Garba V. Yahya (2007) 145 LRCN 549.
55. It is settled law that in a claim for declaration of title to land, exactly what is the relief one of
57. the Respondents as Claimants before the lower Court, a party claiming title to land must do so by proving with credible evidence one or more of the five methods of proving title to land, namely:
58. I. Evidence of traditional history of title;
59. II. Production of genuine and valid documents of title;
60. III. Acts of ownership numerous enough;
61. IV. Acts of possession over a long period of time, and
62. V. Acts of possession of adjacent land long enough to make it probable that the owner of the adjacent land is also the owner of the land in dispute.
63. See Idundun V. Okumagba (1976) 6 - 10 SC 48. See also Mr. Frank Anyi & Ors V. Chief Harry Ayoade Akande & Ors (2017) LPELR - 41973 (CA) per Sir Biobele Abraham Georgewill JCA; Nruamah V. Ebuzoeme (2013) All FWLR (Pt. 681) 1426; Romaine V. Romaine (1992) NWLR (Pt. 238) 650.
64. The Respondents thus had open to them one or more of the above five methods to prove their title to the land in dispute and the law is that proof of any of these methods by credible evidence would be sufficient to ground an action for declaration of title to land. 
66. In the instant appeal, the Respondents by their pleadings had relied on production of title document, and therefore, in order to succeed the Respondents must prove their title in line with the means relied upon by them, namely: by production of title document to the plot in dispute. In Ezukwu V. Ukachukwu (2000) 1 NWLR (Pt. 642) 657 @ p. 679, it was reiterated inter alia thus:
67. “A Claimant of title to land, of course, need not rely on more than one of the five methods. No. Where, however, he relies on a pleaded method or way as a root of his title, then, if the pleaded root fails, the alleged acts of ownership or possession derivative of the root necessarily ought to fail. Why? Because the title or the root title needs must be, firstly established before the exercise of the rights of ownership may exercisable.”
69. In considering the evidence of the parties as led through their witnesses and the findings of the Court below, I thought I should remind myself at once that in law evidence of a party which is unchallenged and uncontroverted by the adverse party is good evidence on which the Court should act. See Saipem SPA Vs. India Tefa (2001) FWLR (Pt. 74) 377 @ p. 394, where this
71. Court had held firmly inter alia
72. “Where evidence of a witness has not been challenged, contradicted or shaken under cross- examination and such evidence is not inadmissible in law, provided the evidence is in line with the facts so pleaded, the evidence must be accepted as the correct version of what was expected to be proved. The Court is not only entitled to but also has no reason not to accept it”
73. See also Igbinovia V. Agboifo (2002) FWLR (Pt. 103) 505 @ p. 514.
75. On the averments in the pleadings and evidence, both oral and documentary of the Respondents as Claimants before the lower Court seeking a declaration of title to the plot in dispute, and having based their claim to the title to the plot in dispute on Exhibit A, which can be seen at page 10 of the Record of Appeal and is a Conveyance of Provisional Approval issued by Abuja Municipal Area Council, they must either swim with it in the boat of victory or sink with it in the boat of defeat as regards their claim to title to the plot in dispute. Thus, the Respondents having relied on Exhibit A, as their primary mode of title to the plot in dispute and having considered both
77. the evidence and the current state of the law, it seems very clear to me and I so hold that the law vests absolute ownership of all lands within the Federal Capital Territory in the Federal Government of Nigeria and not in any of Area Councils, including the Abuja Municipal Area Council from which Exhibit A emanated in favour of the Respondents in and over the plot in dispute.
78. Thus, no Area Council within the FCT, including the Abuja Municipal Area Council, the purveyor of Exhibit A to the Respondents, has the authority to do anything with or alienate any of the lands within the Federal Capital Territory. See Section 297(2) of the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria 1999 (as amended); Section 1 (3) of the Federal Capital Territory Act 2004, and relied on Ona V. Atenda (2000) 1 NWLR (Pt. 656) 244
79. My lords, in law and has been severally pronounced upon by the Supreme Court and this Court, it seems fairly settled to me that no Area Council Chairman/Administrator within the Federal Capital Territory has the power to allot land to any person or group of persons as in Exhibit A, since no land within the Federal Capital Territory exist as non urban
80. land where customary title could he conferred. Consequently, to the extent of non - compliance with the statutory provisions of law, any of such allocation made by any of the Area Council in the FCT is null, void and unconstitutional. Thus, in law only the Minister of the Federal Capital Territory can, in conformity with the relevant Constitutional and Statutory Provisions issue a statutory right of occupancy to land situate in the Federal Capital Territory.
81. In Mohammed Munir Hassan (Sued As Persons Unknown In Occupation Of Property Of This Action) V. Hasiya K. Liman (Suing Through Her Lawful Attorney, Monkas Gas Nigeria Ltd (2022) LPELR - 58120 (CA), this Court had per Sir Biobele Abraham Georgewill JCA, stated inter alia thus:
82. “Now, even assuming, but without so deciding, that the counter - affidavit of the Appellant was proper and ought to be countenanced, I do not therefore, see any much conflicts in the affidavit of the parties as would warrant the ordering of filing of pleadings by the lower Court in the light of the settled position of the law that the ultimate authority which can issue a valid grant of land by means of a Certificate of
83. Occupancy to any person or institution in the Federal Capital Territory, Abuja is the Hon Minister of the Federal Capital Territory as delegated to him by the President and Commander in Chief of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, and none other. See Ona V. Atenda (2000) 5 NWLR (Pt. 656) 244 @ p. 244 @ p. 248.”
84. It follows therefore, that in law in the absence of any grant by the Minister of the FCT, to the Respondents, the purported grant of title to the Respondents by the Abuja Municipal Area Council as in Exhibit A was not only inchoate, ineffective, null and void, but also the alleged title of the Respondents to the plot in dispute null and void and of no effect whatsoever as was even correctly found by the lower Court in its judgment.
86. Indeed, in law even the mere holding of a Certificate of Occupancy, without more, does not confer any ownership right on such a person. In the proved circumstances of this case therefore, the lower Court, having found as fact that the Respondents do not have the title which they claim over the plot in dispute, ought to have dismissed the claims of the Respondents rather than making out a different case of first
87. trespasser to the rightful owner, the Minister of the FCT, for the Respondents and in error granting the unproved claims of the Respondents against the Appellants. See Anjoke V. Anjoke (2013) All FWLR (Pt. 658) 975 @ p. 998; Dibal V. Eguma (2018) All FWLR (Pt. 935) 1386 @ p. 1401.
89. Honestly, I am even at a loss how the lower Court, which at page 239 of the Record of Appeal had made the definite finding of fact that the allocation held by both parties, that is the Respondents as Claimants and the Appellants as Defendants, are null, void and unconstitutional since in law no Area Council Chairman/Administrator within the Federal Capital Territory has the power to allot land to any person or group of persons as no land within the Federal Capital Territory exist as non - urban land where customary title could be conferred, would still summersault in the same judgment to award title to the Respondents on the ground, which is stranger than fiction, that they were the first trespassers on the plot in dispute, which was not the source of title relied upon by the Respondents who had relied solely on letter of allocation as their source of title to the plot in dispute.
90. The Respondents, as well as the Appellants, and indeed even the lower Court as well as this Court, are all bound by the pleadings of the parties. See Adetoun Oladeji (Nig.) Ltd. V. NB. Plc. (2007) All FWLR (Pt.357) 837 @ 858. See also Agbu V. CSC Nassarawa State (2015) All FWLR (Pt. 675)318 @ p. 326; Chidoka V. First City Finance Company Ltd (2013) All FWLR (Pt. 659)1; Ogbe V. Asade (2009) 18 NWLR (Pt. 1172) 106; Dantata V. Mohammed (2013) All FWLR (Pt. 675) 279 @ p. 303; Omokuwajo V. Federal Republic of Nigeria (2013) All FWLR (Pt. 684) 1; Anjoke V. Anjoke (2013) All FWLR (Pt. 658) 975 @ p. 998; Dibal V. Eguma (2018) All FWLR (Pt. 935) 1386 @ p. 1401.
92. Thus, in law once a Claimant to declaration of title to land fails to prove his title to the land in dispute, not even a weak defence would entitle such a Claimant to be awarded title to the land in dispute whose ownership he has failed to prove as required of him by law. 
94. In law, a Court of law just as the parties are under a duty and are therefore, enjoined to be consistent in the case they plead and set out to prove at the trial, so also a Court of law is under a duty to be consistent in its
96. conclusions on facts proved before it. It follows therefore, a Court does not also enjoy any liberty of being inconsistent and indulging in summersaults in its judgment, and any such judgment is one which is liable to, and ought to, be set aside. See Governor of Lagos State & Ors V. Ohaigo Nig Ltd & Anor (2018) LPELR - 45552 (CA0 per Sir Biobele Abraham Georgewill JCA.
98. I have borne in mind the well - established principle of law that in every civil action in which a declaration is sought from the Court, a Claimant who seeks a declaratory relief must succeed on the strength of his own case as made out creditably in the evidence put forward by him in support of his case and not to merely rely on the weakness or even absence of the Defendant’s case. However, I am aware and it is the law that where the evidence of the Defendant supports the case of the Claimant, he is perfectly entitled to rely on such evidence. See Nsirim V. Nsirim (2002) FWLR (Pt. 96) 433 @ p. 441.
100. Now, it is true that in law trespass to land is actionable at the Suit of the person in possession of the land, who need not be neither the owner nor a privy of the owner. See
102. Oyedare V. Keji & Anor. Vo. 5 SCJL 1 @ p. 13. See also Amakor V. Obiefuna(1974) 3 SC 67 @ pp. 75 - 76.
104. Yet where a claim is based on declaration of title to land as in relief one claimed by the Respondents and the mean of proof of title to the land is by production of document, the Respondents cannot upon their clear failure to prove their title by the means relied upon now attempt to fall back on a means of title not relied upon by them and be rewarded with their claim over the plot in dispute by the lower Court on a means, first trespassers, a means not relied upon by them as proof of title to the plot in dispute. The Respondents’ claim is not one simply for damages for trespass but for declaration of title to land and the consequential damages for trespass to land allegedly belonging to the Respondents.
105. Thus, the Respondents must prove their claim to the title to the plot in dispute by the means pleaded and relied upon by them, and certainly not in any other way not pleaded and relied upon by them. See Ezukwu V. Ukachukwu(2000) 1 NWLR (Pt. 642) 657 @ p. 67.
107. My lords, I subscribe fully to the well settled position of the law that an appellate Court which had not seen the witnesses testify and observed their demeanour in the witness stand, should respect the views of a trial Court and should not readily substitute its own views except where it is shown that the conclusion reached by the Court below was perverse. An appellate Court or any Court exercising appellate jurisdiction must always bear in mind that the primary function of assessing the quality of evidence and ascribing probative value thereto is that of the trial Court, which heard and saw the witnesses testify.
108. However, when the findings of the trial Court have been demonstrated, as in the instant appeal, to be perverse as not flowing from the established and proved evidence and the law, then an appellate Court would intervene to disturb such findings of facts and re - evaluate the evidence on the printed Record of Appeal, if so called upon by the Appellant, to make proper findings in accordance with the dictates of justice. This is exactly what I have done in this judgment having found and held firmly that the judgment of the lower Court is perverse. See Sa’eed V. Yakowa (2013) All FWLR (Pt. 692) 1650 @ p.1681. See also
110. Layinka V. Makinde (2002) FWLR (Pt. 109) 1557 @ p. 1570; Obajimi V. Adeobi (2008) 3 NWLR (Pt. 1075) 1 @ p. 19; Sogbamu V. Odunaiya (2013) All FWLR (Pt. 700) 1247 @ p. 1307.
112. My lords, I think the Appellants have both the facts and the law on their side in the circumstances of this case on the pleadings and evidence, both oral and documentary as led by the parties. The law is and has always been nemo dat quod non habet, meaning one cannot give out what he does not have. The Abuja Municipal Area Council cannot give and could not in fact have given to the Respondents the plot in dispute over which it had not the powers or right so to give out or alienate or deal with otherwise by law. See Okelola V. Adeleke (2004) 13 NWLR (Pt. 890) 307 @ pp. 323 - 324. See also Mohammed Munir Hassan (Sued As Persons Unknown In Occupation Of Property Of This Action) V. Hasiya K. Liman (Suing Through Her Lawful Attorney, Monkas Gas Nigeria Ltd) (2022) LPELR - 58120 (CA) per Sir Biobele Abraham Georgewill JCA; Ona V. Atenda (2000) 5 NWLR (Pt. 656) 244 @ p. 244 @ p. 248.
114. In the light of all I have stated and found as above, issue one is hereby resolved in favour of the
116. Appellants against the Respondents. The Respondent’s Suit is therefore, liable to be dismissed.
118. ISSUE TWO
119. My lords, I have reviewed the evidence and considered the submissions of counsel for the parties on issue two for determination. However, I have already held firmly that the Respondents as Claimants before the lower Court failed to prove any title to the plot in dispute and there claim ought to have been dismissed in its entirety by the lower Court. The claim of the Respondents was not based on possession but solely on a letter of location of the plot in dispute by the Area Council of the FCT rather than from the Minister of the FCT, who alone has the legal authority to allocate the plot in dispute to any person, including the Respondents, who was not proved to have done so to the Respondents.
121. In the circumstances therefore, the issue of damages for trespass and to the successful litigant as was thought and granted by the lower Court has become a mere misnomer and amounting to a mere academic issue to be further considered in this appeal in which the claim to title of the Respondents have been found and held to be lacking in merit and consequently, dismissed.
122. Indeed, the Courts are loath to and do not saddle themselves with the consideration of matters which had become merely academic and therefore, of no utilitarian value to either of the parties. To embark on such exercise of jurisdiction of the Courts over matters which are no longer live would clearly amount to nothing but sheer waste of the very precious and, if I may say scarce, judicial time. In Global Fleet Oil & Gas Ltd V. Allen (2021) LPELR - 54583 (CA), this Court had per Sir Biobele Abraham Georgewill JCA, had cause to reiterate inter alia thus:
123. “Courts are loath to spend their precious and scarce judicial time considering and resolving merely academic questions in its judgment, which are better left for scholars in the Faculties of Law in our Universities to grapple with. An issue becomes merely academic once it is no longer of any utilitarian value to the determination of the appeal one way or the other.”
124. See also Charles Oke & Anor V. Dr. Rahman Mimiko & Ors(2013) All FWLR (Pt. 693) 1853; Uba Plc V. Dana Drugs Ltd (2018) LPELR - 44103 (CA), per Sir Biobele Abraham Georgewill JCA.
125. On the whole therefore, having resolved both issues one and two in favour of the Appellant against the Respondents, I hold that this appeal has merit and ought to be allowed. Accordingly, it is hereby allowed.
127. In the result, the Judgment of the High Court of Federal Capital Territory Abuja Division, Coram: Y. Halilu J, in Suit No. FCT/CV/2932/2012: U.K. Amah & Anor.V. Oladipo Segun & Anor delivered on 24/2/2016, in which the claims of the Respondents as Claimants were granted against the Appellants as Defendants, is hereby set aside.
129. In its stead, the Respondents’ Suit No. FCT/CV/2932/2012: U.K. Amah & Anor. V. Oladipo Segun & Anor is hereby dismissed for lacking in merit.
131. There shall be cost of N50,000.00 against the Respondents in favour of the Appellants.
133. STEPHEN JONAH ADAH, J.C.A.: I was availed a copy of the Judgment just delivered by my learned brother Sir, Biobele Abrahram Georgewill, JCA. I agree fully with the reasoning and the conclusion allowing the appeal.
135. The claim initiated at the trial Court is for title to the plot of land in dispute. The claim was not primarily for trespass. 
137. The requirement of the law for the prove of title to land is different from the proof of trespass to the land. If the respondent was claiming title to the land at the trial Court, he must follow the law as clearly laid down in our laws. In the case of Iseogbekun & Ors., v. Adelakun & Anor. (2013) 2 NWLR (Pt. 1337) 140, the Supreme Court held that in a claim for declaration of title to land the law is trite that a party who claims such remedy in Court must prove its case with cogent uncontradicted evidence that remains credible and reliable. As clearly found out in the lead judgment, the respondent who was the claimant at the trial Court did not prove his title to the land as required. It follows therefore, that the trial Court cannot grant title to the respondent as it did.
139. I therefore, concur with my learned brother in the lead judgment that the appeal be allowed. I accordingly allow the appeal and I abide by the consequential orders made therein.
141. BATURE ISAH GAFAI, J.C.A.: I read in advance the draft of the Judgment delivered by my learned brother Sir Biobele Abraham Georgewill, JCA.
143. I agree entirely with and adopt the reasonings and conclusion expressed therein. My lord’s leading Judgment has demonstrably covered all the significant aspect of this Appeal such that I have nothing more useful to add.
145. In consequence and upon the reasonings profoundly expressed in the leading Judgment, I too set aside the Judgment of the lower Court and dismiss the Respondent’s Suit before it as unmeritorious.
146. I abide by the Order on cost made in the leading Judgment.

COUNSEL

Rosemary Kogbodi, Esq.For Appellant(s)

E. I. Nwude, Esq.For Respondent(s)