“China’s Sea-Based Nuclear Deterrent: Organizational, Operational, and Strategic Implications”—China Maritime Report #33
Andrew Erickson
Professor of Strategy (tenured full professor) at Naval War College China Maritime Studies Institute
David C. Logan, China’s Sea-Based Nuclear Deterrent: Organizational, Operational, and Strategic Implications, China Maritime Report 33 (Newport, RI: Naval War College China Maritime Studies Institute, December 2023).
About the Author
Dr. David C. Logan is Assistant Professor of Security Studies at the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy at Tufts University. His research focuses on nuclear weapons, arms control, deterrence, and the U.S.-China security relationship. He previously taught in the National Security Affairs Department at the Naval War College and served as a Stanton Nuclear Security Fellow with the MIT Security Studies Program and a Fellow with the Princeton Center for International Security Studies, where he was also Director of the Strategic Education Initiative. Dr. Logan has conducted research for the Center for the Study of Chinese Military Affairs at National Defense University, the Defense Threat Reduction Agency, and the Office of Net Assessment. He has published in International Security, Journal of Strategic Studies, Georgetown University Press, National Defense University Press, Foreign Affairs, Los Angeles Times, and War on the Rocks, among other venues. He holds a B.A. from Grinnell College and an M.P.A., M.A., and Ph.D. from Princeton University.
The author wishes to thank Tom Stefanick, Liza Tobin, CDR Robert C. Watts IV, and the members of the China Maritime Studies Institute for helpful comments on earlier versions of this report.
Summary
China’s development of a credible sea-based deterrent has important implications for the PLAN, for China’s nuclear strategy, and for U.S.-China strategic stability. For the PLAN, the need to protect the SSBN force may divert resources away from other missions; it may also provide justification for further expansion of the PLAN fleet size. For China’s nuclear strategy and operations, the SSBN force may increase operational and bureaucratic pressures for adopting a more forward-leaning nuclear strategy. For U.S.-China strategic stability, the SSBN force will have complex effects, decreasing risks that Chinese decisionmakers confront use-or-lose escalation pressures, making China less susceptible to U.S. nuclear threats and intimidation and therefore perceiving lower costs to conventional aggression, and potentially introducing escalation risks from conventional-nuclear entanglement to the maritime domain.
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Introduction
China is undertaking a significant nuclear expansion and modernization. While China’s nuclear warhead stockpile numbered fewer than 300 bombs just a few years ago, the Department of Defense estimates that by 2030 the “the PRC will have about 1,000 operational nuclear warheads, most of which will be fielded on systems capable of ranging the continental United States (CONUS)” and could have as many as 1,500 warheads by 2035.”1 While the changes within the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) Rocket Force (PLARF) have received significant attention, the development of a credible fleet of nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarines (SSBNs) will also have important implications for China’s nuclear strategy and operations, the PLA Navy (PLAN), and U.S.-China strategic stability. Given the deterioration of U.S.-China relations, growing competition in the nuclear domain, and the prominence of the maritime domain to any future U.S.-China crisis or conflict, China’s SSBN force will assume greater importance. This report examines these developments and their implications.
China’s development of its first credible sea-based nuclear deterrent has several implications for China’s naval force structure and strategy, Chinese nuclear strategy and operations, and U.S.-China strategic stability. For the PLAN, a sea-based nuclear deterrent will likely impose new demands on the rest of the navy by requiring the service to dedicate other forces to the defense of SSBNs and may require the PLAN to develop personnel reliability and warhead handling programs, which could lead to changes from its historically centralized approach to nuclear weapons. For China’s nuclear strategy and operations, the realization of a full nuclear triad may lead the PLA to construct bodies and processes for maintaining real-time awareness of the status of China’s nuclear deterrent, and for targeting coordination and deconfliction among the nuclear capabilities of the PLARF, the Navy and the Air Force. The SSBN force may also require the establishment and empowerment of additional nuclear constituencies within the PLA, which might advocate for a greater role for nuclear weapons in China’s national security strategy, while the operational requirements of an SSBN force may encourage China to reconsider some of its longstanding nuclear weapons practices. Finally, for U.S.-China strategic stability, the development of a credible sea-based deterrent, to the extent it strengthens Chinese decisionmakers’ confidence in the survivability of the country’s nuclear deterrent, may strengthen some forms of crisis stability while weakening others, provide Beijing the option to use its stronger nuclear forces as a shield behind which to initiate conventional aggression, and introduce new forms of inadvertent escalation stemming from conventional-nuclear “entanglement.”
This report draw on a wide-range of sources.2 It prioritize sources traditionally viewed as authoritative, including China’s Defense White Papers, high-level curricular materials published by PLA research institutions, such as the Science of Military Strategy volumes published by the Academy of Military Science and National Defense University, and academic writings published by researchers affiliated with PLA institutions, including both the PLAN Submarine Academy and the Rocket Force Engineering University.3 This report also reviews articles appearing in major Chineselanguage venues, particularly those published by influential think tanks and research centers.4 This report examines military reporting and commentary as well as secondary sources discussing Chinese views of strategic stability. Finally, it draws on U.S. sources, including unclassified U.S. intelligence estimates and public assessments from the Department of Defense, as well as public statements from senior U.S. military officials. One caveat on any open-source analysis of Chinese nuclear views is the limits created by the historical division between China’s strategic community, consisting of researchers and strategists at civilian and PLA-affiliated institutions, and the operator community, consisting of the military professionals in the PLA and, specifically, the missile forces charged with operating the country’s nuclear missiles.5 The views of the strategic community are more accessible than those of operators. However, as of the early 2000s, there were signs of greater interaction between these two communities, including strategists briefing operators, operators pursuing Ph.Ds. at civilian institutions, and participation by operators in Track-1.5 dialogues with American colleagues.6
The report proceeds in five parts. First, it summarizes key features of China’s SSBN force, including recent developments, technical capabilities, and operational practices. Second, it reviews potential implications of the SSBN force for the PLAN, including naval force development and force allocation. Third, it assesses implications for China’s nuclear strategy and operations, including the unique role of the SSBN force within China’s nuclear deterrent and the pressures the force may create for China to change its nuclear operations and strategy. Fourth, it reviews implications of the SSBN force for U.S.-China strategic stability. Finally, it concludes with a discussion of implications for U.S. policy and future research on China’s nuclear forces.
Conclusion
China’s development of a credible sea-based deterrent has important implications for the PLAN, for China’s nuclear strategy, and for U.S.-China strategic stability. For the PLAN, the need to protect the SSBN force may divert resources away from other missions; it may also provide justification for further expansion of the PLAN fleet size.83 For China’s nuclear strategy and operations, the SSBN force may increase operational and bureaucratic pressures for adopting a more forward-leaning nuclear strategy. For U.S.-China strategic stability, the SSBN force will have complex effects, decreasing risks that Chinese decisionmakers confront use-or-lose escalation pressures, making China less susceptible to U.S. nuclear threats and intimidation and therefore perceiving lower costs to conventional aggression, and potentially introducing escalation risks from conventional-nuclear entanglement to the maritime domain.
The findings reported here have important implications for both U.S. policy and for future research on the PLA. First, the U.S. Navy and intelligence community should identify and assess the escalation risks stemming from conventional-nuclear entanglement at sea. U.S. decisionmakers and operational plans must account for these risks. Addressing the risks may require tradeoffs between maximizing conventional advantages and limiting the risks of nuclear use by, for instance, limiting ASW against Chinese SSBNs and supporting capabilities. Second, possible nuclear arms control agreements between China and the United States must account for other legs of the Chinese deterrent. While the current poor state of U.S.-China relations makes near-term arms control unlikely, decision makers can lay the foundation now for future agreements.84 Proposals for U.S.- China arms control have largely focused on China’s land-based missiles.85 However, potential arms control efforts will need to consider how to incorporate the specific challenges of other legs of a Chinese nuclear triad. Third, the U.S. Navy will have to weigh the costs, benefits, and risks of allocating military assets to either the strategic ASW mission targeting Chinese SSBNs or to conventional military operations.86 In a crisis or conflict, tracking or targeting Chinese SSBNs might provide the United States coercive leverage or help support a damage limitation nuclear strategy, but it would reduce the resources available for other missions and might be viewed as an escalatory attempt to undermine China’s strategic deterrent. Finally, China analysts may need to increasingly consider domestic, non-strategic drivers of the country’s nuclear strategy and operations. While China’s nuclear strategy likely remains sensitive to U.S. policy choices, factors rooted in bureaucratic posturing, domestic politics, and international prestige may become increasingly important for Beijing. It may be more challenging for the United States to influence these factors.