Combating Drone Terrorism with Advanced Technology

Drones present a multifaceted challenge beyond just maritime infrastructure. They're being used in various sectors, and with that comes potential risks and concerns. In addition to maritime infrastructure, drones can pose security threats to critical infrastructure in sectors like energy, transportation, and telecommunications. They can also be used for illicit activities such as smuggling, surveillance, and even attacks on sensitive targets. As drones become more accessible and advanced, addressing these challenges requires a comprehensive approach that includes regulation, technology development, and security measures. Please follow up on the today´s newsletter.

Drones Beyond Maritime Infrastructure

While maritime infrastructure is undoubtedly a significant arena where drones are deployed, their reach extends far beyond. From energy to transportation and telecommunications, drones have found applications in diverse fields, revolutionizing operations and services.

Security Risks Across Sectors

One of the most pressing concerns surrounding drones is their potential to pose security threats to critical infrastructure. In sectors such as energy, transportation, and telecommunications, the misuse of drones can lead to disruptions and vulnerabilities that have far-reaching consequences.

Challenges of Illicit Activities

The versatility of drones also presents challenges in combating illicit activities. From smuggling contraband to conducting surveillance and even launching attacks on sensitive targets, the misuse of drones underscores the need for robust regulatory frameworks and security measures.

A Call for Comprehensive Solutions

As drones become increasingly accessible and advanced, addressing these challenges requires a multifaceted approach. Regulation, technology development, and security measures must work hand in hand to ensure the safe and responsible deployment of drones across various sectors.

Consider a violent drone attack on a major international airport such as Riyadh, Cairo, Munich or Frankfurt. Such an attack could involve a battery-powered, remote-controlled airplane with a plunger mechanism in its nose, designed to detonate several pounds of explosives upon impact with a ground target like a taxiing commercial airplane. Alternatively, it might involve a multirotor drone, constructed from hardened plastic and originally built for the consumer market, but modified to carry and deploy a bomb over a densely packed area such as a crowd waiting for a shuttle bus. These unmanned aerial systems (UAS) would be challenging to detect visually or via radar, making pre-emptive neutralization before reaching their targets exceedingly difficult.

The aftermath of such attacks would be catastrophic. The immediate consequences would include extensive damage to airport infrastructure, numerous injuries, and potentially significant fatalities. The disruption to the transportation network would be profound, causing widespread delays and cancellations, and triggering a cascade of logistical complications. Politically, the repercussions would be severe. The targeted nation's government would face intense scrutiny and criticism for the intelligence, security, and operational failures that allowed the attack to occur. This could result in substantial policy changes, increased funding for defence and security measures, and potential shifts in international relations and policies towards drone regulation and countermeasures.

Over the past years, ongoing conflicts in the Middle East and North Africa have seen personnel and critical infrastructure repeatedly attacked by small drones. Ansar Allah (the official name of the Houthi movement) has launched numerous attacks using Qasef and Samad drones against deep targets inside Saudi Arabia, including Saudi Aramco oil-pumping stations near al-Dawadmi and Afif, as well as commercial airports in Abha and Jizan. In Syria, militant groups opposing the Damascus regime have attacked the Russian-occupied Khmeimim airbase dozens of times. Russia reported in September last year that the airbase’s defences had defeated fifty-eight drones targeting Khmeimim, with many more attacks reported since. In the United Arab Emirates, Ansar Allah attacked Abu Dhabi International Airport with a large UAS, which detonated in a bright flash over ground-support vehicles parked just outside the airport’s main entrance.

These aircraft relied on components readily available to consumers globally through direct-to-consumer internet purchasing sites. Thus, the drone attacks seen in the Middle East and North Africa could feasibly occur anywhere. The precision and scale observed in recent Middle East drone strikes, exemplified by the September 2019 attack on the Saudi Aramco oil-processing plant at Abqaiq and oil fields at Khurais, necessitate a reassessment of UAS-defence strategies. Iranian drones damaged nine oil processing units, known as stabilizers, between the two locations. At Abqaiq, eleven spherical structures for gas extraction from crude oil were also hit, along with two tanks holding water removed from crude oil. These drones successfully navigated from their launch points to their targets, striking separator tanks at predetermined impact points with precision in a short amount of time.

Precisely flown, massed drone attacks against critical infrastructure are exceedingly difficult to defend against, as attackers can potentially overwhelm defenders. Airports, in particular, are hard to protect due to the extensive area they cover, which can stretch defences thin. With precision and mass, attackers can more easily target and strike critical components of infrastructure, groups of people, or even specific individuals based on their political and military strategies.

The perception of drones transformed when the Israeli Defense Forces (IDF) operationalized unmanned aerial systems (UAS) using their Scout drones for reconnaissance and surveillance missions during the 1982 Lebanon War. Following Israel’s success, global military powers began to invest heavily in drone technology, albeit with gradual progress. In the 1991 US war in Iraq, the only drone deployed was the RQ-2B Pioneer UAV, tasked with day/night reconnaissance, surveillance, and target acquisition. The Pioneer, with a fourteen-foot fuselage and a seventeen-foot wingspan, was powered by a twenty-six horsepower snowmobile engine. Despite its limited range of one hundred miles and its high cost of over one million dollars, the Pioneer represented a safer and more cost-effective alternative to manned aircraft for similar missions. Recognizing the strategic value of drones demonstrated by the Pioneer and other programs, Congress in 2000 mandated that one-third of all attack aircraft be unmanned within a decade.

Parallel to the military evolution of drones, significant technological advancements were occurring in the commercial sector. While the defence industry focused on developing high-altitude, long-endurance unmanned spy planes and tactical attack drones capable of being piloted remotely from great distances, the commercial drone industry targeted the development of smaller, more affordable, and user-friendly platforms designed for mass appeal. Innovations in wireless communication technology and satellite navigation, the transition from hardware to software-based components, enhancements in battery life, and the integration of high-resolution onboard cameras have collectively increased the appeal, reduced the costs, and enhanced the user experience of drones. These advancements have significantly expanded the popularity and adoption of drones for both personal and commercial applications.

The West stands to gain valuable insights by examining the experiences of Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, and Russia in countering unmanned aerial system (UAS) threats in the Middle East. Additionally, by leveraging current knowledge of UAS technology and considering the pragmatic factors influencing terrorist planning, one can extrapolate potential characteristics of such attacks. It is reasonable to infer that, for various reasons, the UAS employed in such attacks would likely be smaller than those utilized against Middle Eastern airports.

The larger drones utilized by groups like Ansar Allah pose logistical challenges and require significant support and state sponsorship, factors that may not be readily available outside the Middle East. Terrorist groups targeting locations such as airports, military bases, or port facilities in regions like the Western Hemisphere, Europe, or Asia would likely opt for smaller, more discreet UAS with reduced chances of attribution. Medium-sized multirotor or small fixed-wing UAVs represent plausible options for such attacks. For instance, an octocopter with six to eight motors and propellers could be custom configured to carry substantial explosives, facilitating payloads of approximately six kilograms or more.

To illustrate, Greenpeace employed a similarly sized multirotor to drop a large smoke bomb on the French nuclear-processing facility at La Hague in January 2019. This same platform could be repurposed to deliver lethal munitions, altering the outcome drastically. Alternatively, terrorist groups might opt for fixed-wing UAS, leveraging commercially available hobbyist kits constructed from durable materials like EPO foam. This approach mirrors the strategy employed by groups like ISIS and Ansar Allah, with the latter's Rased UAV being a derivative of the widely used Skywalker X8 remote-control airplane design.

Innovative tactics include integrating bombs within the body of the aircraft, primed to detonate upon reaching a designated GPS coordinate or upon impact with the target. Notably, a particularly perilous option involves employing remote-control turbine-powered jets. These jets, often assembled from kits and commercially available components, present a formidable threat due to their inherent incendiary capabilities. Unlike electrically powered or gas-driven UAS, turbine-powered jets can ignite fuel upon impact, resulting in fiery explosions without the need for additional payloads.

An example is the AMD, a turbine-powered jet designed by Ahmad Bawadir Abeidi, showcased in a recent video on the social media platform Telegram. Despite being largely aspirational, the utilization of turbine-powered jet technology for weaponry should be regarded as a credible threat. These jets can achieve speeds exceeding two hundred miles per hour, covering vast distances swiftly and minimizing response times for counter-UAS systems. While older models required auxiliary propane start systems and manual preparation, newer engines offer self-contained functionality, simplifying launch procedures. Nonetheless, challenges such as environmental constraints, pilot proficiency requirements, and limited flight durations warrant consideration.

Detecting, tracking, and identifying unmanned aerial systems (UAS) necessitates a multifaceted approach, comprising sensor systems, countermeasure systems, and communications infrastructure. Sensor systems, categorized by the phenomena they detect, include radio-frequency (RF) sensors, radar, electro-optical/infrared (EO/IR) cameras, and acoustic sensors. RF sensors discern UAS signal transmissions and compare them against databases for positive identification. While individual RF sensors typically operate within a 3-5-kilometer range, networked arrangements can enhance coverage. RF detectors, focused on unlicensed industrial, scientific, and medical (ISM) bands, optimize detection within common frequencies, though newer frequency-hopping spread spectrum (FHSS) technology poses challenges by swiftly switching channels.

Radars complement RF detectors by extending detection range and response time. Despite their efficacy, radars encounter limitations, including the difficulty of detecting small UAS due to their size, composition, and potential modifications to radar cross-section. Weather conditions, terrain features, and flight profiles further diminish radar effectiveness, particularly with Doppler radars, which analyse microwave pulses altered by moving objects. Strategic air defence systems, tailored for larger, faster threats at higher altitudes, are unsuitable for countering drones due to drones' smaller size, slower speeds, and lower flight altitudes.

EO/IR cameras play a crucial role in classification and positive identification of UAS. Although their field of view may be narrower than RF detectors, EO/IR cameras offer extended range and are indispensable for confirming UAS sightings. Their ability to discern between drones and biological entities like birds enhances identification accuracy within counter-UAS systems.

Effectively countering small unmanned aerial systems (UAS) entails implementing a layered defence strategy, acknowledging the inherent vulnerabilities of counter-drone systems. This approach necessitates integrating various counter-UAS systems into a cohesive framework, tailored to the unique characteristics of each protected asset and its operating environment. The deployment of overlapping sensor arrays should prioritize potential approach vectors while maintaining coverage across all possible avenues of approach.

Central to this defence strategy is the establishment of a unified common operating picture (COP), wherein data from all sensors is consolidated into a standardized format. Empowering a designated individual at the COP with authority to make real-time decisions is essential for timely response to UAS threats. While redundant COPs may exist at other incident-command locations, decisive authority must remain centralized to minimize response delays that could escalate into critical situations.

Given the rapid speed of UAS, reaction time is severely constrained, often leaving mere seconds for initiating countermeasures upon detection. Consequently, the individual in charge must possess the autonomy to determine when to engage or withhold engagement of threatening UAS. Additionally, this individual serves as the liaison with law enforcement, facilitating coordination to address non-malicious UAS intrusions resulting from accidents or pilot errors.

With RF-detection systems potentially uncovering both the UAS and pilot's location, the person in charge assumes responsibility for directing security personnel to mitigate the situation appropriately. This proactive approach ensures swift resolution of UAS incidents while minimizing disruptions to protected assets.

COUNTERING UAS THREATS

In the foreseeable future, directed-energy weapons, such as microwave and laser systems, are poised to evolve into proficient countermeasures against unmanned aerial system (UAS) threats. Leveraging their attributes of rapid response, precision targeting, extended range, and minimized collateral damage, directed-energy weapons represent a promising approach to neutralizing malicious UAS activity.

Initial trials of high-energy lasers have demonstrated encouraging efficacy against small UAS, albeit with certain limitations. These limitations encompass substantial energy demands, ranging from 3 to 5 kilowatts (kW) or higher, and the potential for UAS surfaces to deflect laser beams, diminishing effectiveness and potentially endangering ground personnel or other aerial assets. Consequently, high-power microwave (HPM) weapons emerge as a viable alternative.

HPM weaponry utilizes electromagnetic radiation to swiftly incapacitate UAS by disrupting their internal electronics within seconds. Despite its promise, HPM technology encounters several hurdles that necessitate resolution for optimal effectiveness. These challenges encompass the expansion of operational range, understanding the impact of aircraft composition on radiation absorption, and mitigating potential risks to human operators.

While the potential of high-power microwave (HPM) and laser countermeasures lies in the future, current unmanned aerial system (UAS) countermeasures exist and offer various methodologies to neutralize threats. These countermeasures include signal jamming, code injection, capture with nets, and aerial interception.

Signal jamming techniques primarily target two communication avenues: radio frequency (RF) and Global Navigation Satellite System (GNSS). RF jammers disrupt the RF link between the UAS and its ground controller, affecting UAS operating within controlled airspace. However, autonomous UAS may exhibit different responses, such as returning to launch sites or entering a holding pattern. GNSS jammers complement RF jamming by disrupting navigation signals, potentially inducing immediate landing or uncontrolled flight. Nevertheless, the reliance of other GNSS-dependent technologies poses collateral damage risks.

RF hijacking presents a more advanced approach, allowing electronic takeover of UAS control and redirection to a safe location. However, this method demands intricate knowledge of UAS data-link protocols and encryption systems, posing challenges for implementation, particularly against autonomous UAS conducting one-way attacks.

Physical capture systems, including net-based and hard-kill mechanisms, offer additional defensive options. Nets are effective within limited ranges and require precise targeting of hovering or slow-moving UAS. Meanwhile, hard-kill systems, such as firearms equipped with smart-aiming technology, mitigate collateral damage risks by optimizing accuracy. Despite their short operational ranges, these systems serve as vital components in defensive strategies, especially in scenarios where jamming or hijacking proves ineffective against weaponized UAS.

Addressing the challenge posed by unmanned aerial systems (UAS) to critical infrastructure requires a proactive and multifaceted approach. Immediate action is essential, necessitating centralized control of monitoring and response to UAS incidents, even in the absence of technical solutions. This centralized control empowers personnel to make rapid decisions crucial for effective defense.

A Common Operating Picture (COP) serves as a focal point for decision-making, necessitating investment in communication and information technology. Standardized protocols and geospatial visualization tools enable efficient integration of sensor data, enhancing situational awareness.

Independent vulnerability assessments, conducted by a "red team" comprising pilots, threat analysts, and law enforcement, aid in identifying potential weaknesses and defining realistic threats. Implementing a defence-in-depth strategy involves deploying both fixed and mobile counter-UAS platforms to cover expansive areas effectively.

Technological advancements such as UAS remote identification facilitate distinguishing between legitimate and malicious operators, enhancing airspace security. Clear delineation of authority is crucial, addressing policy and regulatory challenges to balance security needs with the burgeoning demand for drone usage.

Utilizing Electro-Optical/Infrared (EO/IR) cameras enables positive identification of threats, complementing RF detection systems and enhancing decision-making speed. Additionally, leveraging technology for forensics, such as Wide-Area Motion Imagery (WAMI), aids in reconstructing UAS events for investigative purposes.

Rather than waiting for a perfect solution, incremental investments in existing technologies and strengthening response plans are imperative. This approach ensures readiness to address evolving UAS threats while maximizing current capabilities.