December 2023
Sibylline Ltd
Sibylline is a leading strategic risk consultancy, delivering timely, accurate, relevant and actionable intelligence.
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Global Overview:
Whilst the events that followed Hamas’ incursion into southern Israel have understandably dominated the headlines, Sibylline’s global intelligence team has as ever, been hard at work monitoring threats and emerging trends across the globe, ensuring decision makers have the insight they need to mitigate risk.
However, the Israel-Hamas war has most certainly shaped much of the global threat landscape over the last month. In Europe we have seen a marked increase in domestic unrest, ethno-religious tensions, and attacks. Meanwhile, tensions between Kosovo and Serbia remain high following and armed clash in September.
Hopes that Armenia will sign a peace treaty will potentially reduce the risk of armed conflict in the region. As ever, our Eursia team continue to produce regular reporting on the Ukraine conflict. This month, they cite that the Israel-Hamas war could impact long-term provision of US military assistance to Ukraine.
Cyber
During November, the software supply chain was frequently targeted via software vulnerabilities to obtain access to customers’ networks. Both pre-existing and zero-day vulnerabilities were used in financially and politically motivated attacks from cyber criminals and state-sponsored threat actors. Software vulnerabilities in vendors’ technology will remain a key risk to firms globally into December and 2024. Ransomware activity persisted highlighting the persistent operational and financial risks businesses continue to face, despite sustained crackdowns on ransomware operations by international law enforcement.
North America
In the US, pro-Palestine and pro-Israel demonstrations increased the risk of domestic unrest and disruption in major cities, with protests beginning to focus on the involvement of defence firms in the conflict. For the US, bilateral tensions with China have eased in the short term following the 15 November meeting between US President Joe Biden and Chinese President Xi Jinping. Regulatory and compliance risks remain for firms using sensitive technologies. Also on 15 November, US Congress passed a continuing resolution averting a government shutdown. In the following days, the US Treasury Department, and the Department of Justice, respectively, released sanctions and violations against UAE and UK- and UK-based firms. Reputational and compliance risks have increased in the medium term, particularly for multinational firms with operations in foreign jurisdictions. In Canada, Prime Minister Justin Trudeau’s government faces increasing scrutiny from the provinces amidst a cost-of-living crisis, increasing the risks of policy stagnation.
Latin America
Ongoing government instability and security risks sustained regional political uncertainty. Persistent energy and water security risks, as evidenced by Mexico's severe drought since 14 November and Ecuador's power generation shortfalls since 1 November, have critically reduced supply, significantly elevating energy security risks and impacting residents and businesses. Argentina's 19 November presidential runoff results have heightened policy and socio-economic risks. This is further exacerbated by the opposition's fracturing, elevating prospects for domestic unrest following Javier Milei's election. Panama's Supreme Court's October ruling on the unconstitutionality of the mining project at Cobre Panama mine also risks medium-to-long-term socio-economic risks. Nicaragua's withdrawal from the OAS will likely exacerbate the persecution of opposition groups ahead of the March regional elections, elevating human rights concerns. Growing political polarisation and widespread discontentment are likely to remain key drivers of instability and violence across the region.
Europe
Following highly significant general elections in Poland and Slovakia, Sibylline assessed the consequences of these elections, as well as the direction of both Hungary and the Czech Republic in 2024 in a Visegrad 4 Special report. Elsewhere, a shock election victory for the hard-right populist Freedom Party (PVV), led by Geert Wilders, in the Netherlands will pose policy and domestic unrest risks. Coalition negotiations are likely to be protracted, given other mainstream parties have historically excluded the PVV from coalitions after previous elections. Finally, violent rioting broke out overnight in the Irish capital, Dublin, following a stabbing attack near a school in Parnell Square East. A senior police commissioner blamed the violent outbreak on ‘far-right ideology’, with allegations surrounding the nationality of the perpetrator of the knife attack driving protest activity.
Eurasia
On 8 November, the European Commission (EC) recommended starting accession negotiations with Moldova and Ukraine, as well as granting Georgia candidate status. EU member states will take a formal decision in December. The EC’s recommendation to grant Georgia candidate status is conditional, requiring Tbilisi to pursue important reforms. The EU recommendation will likely bolster the pro-EU reform agenda in Moldova and Ukraine. However, there is a realistic possibility that Hungary will block the beginning of accession talks with Kyiv, with Budapest threatening to hinder all EU aid to Ukraine. Following Moldova’s local elections last month, the ruling pro-West Party of Action and Solidarity (PAS) controls around a third of the country’s nearly 900 councils. Meanwhile, in Russia, there have been reports of crypto-mobilisation efforts targeting migrants over the past month. We have assessed that Moscow’s military recruitment efforts that have been disproportionately targeting ethnic minorities will represent a trigger for separatist sentiment in regions with strong ethnic identities.
Middle East, North Africa and Turkey
On the evening of 27 October, the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) launched its ground operation into Gaza. Throughout the month, the IDF continued its ground advances, limiting them to northern Gaza, capturing al-Shifa hospital which it believed held hostages, overnight on 14-15 November. Throughout the following weeks, there was a gradual increase in clashes between the IDF and Hizballah and/or affiliated militants on the Israel-Lebanon border. Clashes on both fronts, however, halted following the entry into force of a ceasefire between Israel and Hamas on 24 November, which also included the limited release of Israeli hostages. With the end of the ceasefire on 1 December, hostilities resumed on both fronts, sustaining elevated security risks in Israel, the Palestinian Territories and southern Lebanon.
Sub-Saharan Africa
In Sudan, the paramilitary Rapid Support Forces (RSF) made significant territorial gains in the capital Khartoum as well as Darfur, establishing control in Nyala (South Darfur), El Geneina (West Darfur), Um Kadada (North Darfur) and Zalingei (Central Darfur). Renewed RSF-SAF clashes have resulted in mass civilian casualties and destroyed critical infrastructure including healthcare facilities. Elsewhere, Malian armed forces made significant progress in November, recapturing the strategic city of Kidal (Kidal region) from Tuareg rebel groups which previously governed the city under the now largely defunct 2015 Algiers peace agreement.
South Asia
Bangladesh’s ruling Awami League (AL) continued to crack down on the opposition ahead of January’s general elections despite international calls for free elections. This has driven anti-government protests, which have simultaneously occurred as workers in the country’s vital garment industry protest for an increase in the minimum wage, resulting in violent clashes with the country’s heavy-handed security forces. India was again implicated in a plot to assassinate a leader of the Sikh separatist movement in a foreign country, this time the US; however, the situation is unlikely to damage relations to the same extent that the previous accusation from Canada did given Washington’s strategic importance for New Delhi.
East Asia & Pacific
On 23 November, the two main opposition candidates in Taiwan’s presidential race failed to reach an agreement on a unified ticket ahead of the candidate registration deadline, weakening their electoral prospects ahead of the January 2024 elections. Relations between Beijing and Washington showed signs of further stabilisation after their respective leaders met; however, China will remain a challenging operating environment for foreign firms. The security environment in the Korean Peninsula has deteriorated over the past month. After North Korea successfully launched its first spy satellite on 22 November, South Korea suspended part of a 2018 military accord between the two countries. In New Zealand, the new right-of-centre government was sworn in on 27 November, with planned policy changes including implementing a single mandate for the central bank and lifting a ban on oil and gas exploration. Meanwhile, the junta in Myanmar have struggled to contain a renewed offensive from resistance forces across the country.
Thought Leadership:
Embracing Imperfection: Israel-Hamas and the reality of intelligence estimation
Written by Jack Nott-Bower, Sibylline’s Head of Training and Consulting
“How did Israeli intelligence fail to stop major attack in Gaza?” (BBC)
“Hamas’s attack was an Israeli intelligence failure on multiple fronts” (The Economist)
“Hamas’s murderous attack will be remembered as Israeli intelligence failure for the ages” (The Guardian)
As the term “intelligence failure” resonates again through the corridors of media outlets and government agencies around the world, recent events in Israel and Gaza are a haunting reminder of the imperfections of our craft.
We’ve been here before. In 2003, the Iraq War exposed the vulnerability of intelligence to political pressures as decision-makers built a compelling case for military intervention based on flawed assessments. Two years earlier, US intelligence and security agencies noticed suspicious activities but failed to connect the dots before the events of September 11th. In 1982, British officials underestimated the Argentine military’s capabilities and intentions concerning the Falkland Islands. These are all examples of widely known “intelligence failures” of our time.
We don’t know how much Prime Minister Netanyahu knew before 7 October, but it was likely only fragments of a puzzle and not the complete picture. We must remember that intelligence is not, and cannot be, a precise science. No matter how sophisticated, intelligence assessments can only offer a reduced image of the threat or risk landscape. Analysts try to focus this image based on relevance, using a variety of sources to guide leaders through a cacophony of information towards informed and timely decisions. This is known as an “all-source” approach, where we stitch together what we know from human sources (HUMINT), intercepted signals and communications (SIGINT), and open-source information (OSINT) to create a reasonable estimate. Despite all this effort, we still only ever have a straw to peer through.
Faced by this reality of uncertainty and challenges to information reliability, analysts can use structured analytical techniques to minimise the risk of failure and achieve more scrupulous assessments. For instance, a SWOT analysis (Strengths, Weaknesses, Opportunities, Threats) helps us to assess the relative vigour behind a particular scenario or entity of concern. An ACH (Analysis of Competing Hypotheses) provides a critical assessment of scenarios against known intelligence, while plausibility cones help us to illustrate the most likely outcomes. Other methods such as red teaming and devil’s advocacy can also reveal blind spots and biases, particularly with protective intelligence.
But we also limit the value of intelligence if we narrow the question down to the “most likely” scenario. A probability yardstick, such as that of the UK’s Professional Head of Intelligence Assessment (PHIA), helps to put assessments into perspective. However, a well-reasoned consideration of “best-case” and “worst-case” scenarios, to include potential indicators or warnings of changing risk, will always separate a good assessment from a great one. There is little reason to believe that Israel, with one of the most capable intelligence functions in the world, was not sitting on a first-rate assessment of the “most likely” scenario before 7 October – but whether the military was prepared for the “worst case” and monitoring for a rainy day is another matter.
Both the Israel-Hamas and Russia-Ukraine conflicts also underline the sophisticated role of visual media manipulation in today’s environment. Analysts of all trades face the daunting task of traversing false narratives amplified by bots and coordinated networks, highlighting the importance of close relationships with credible, independent sources. Meanwhile, our executives face more pressure than ever to know and act when geopolitical events are liable to trigger harmful speech, which so easily permeates the workplace.
Continuous improvement in our ability to diversify analytical methods and check sources of information is only half the battle. In the private sector, it is even more vital to learn the audience and frame intelligence assessments within the organisation’s context and goals. Verbal, written, and visual communication all have their strengths and weaknesses; if we do not present sufficient detail in a way that resonates with the consumer, an intelligence estimate can easily go ignored, even if it’s onto something major.
Those who consume intelligence also have a key role to play. Decision-makers should embrace a culture that learns from the past, values dissent, and encourages analysts to voice differing opinions. Constructive criticism and cognitive diversity are essential for producing well-rounded assessments and challenging assumptions or “group think.” It is also just as crucial to protect those who suggest alternative ways of thinking from repercussions or backlash if an assessment later proves to be incorrect after swaying a decision.
Offering clear guidance on intelligence requirements and decision-making needs pays dividends. Part of this means giving analysts the right access to security managers, risk professionals or executives, and facilitating two-way dialogue with realistic expectations. If we champion after-action reviews and share feedback on the utility of intelligence reports, we open the door to further improvement – and a better chance of noticing something further left of the next bang.
Embracing imperfection in intelligence is not a sign of weakness, but rather a recognition of the complexity of our mission and a commitment to always improving. This responsibility to commit lies with both intelligence analysts and the decision-makers they serve.
To read the full edition of the newsletter on our website, please click here.