Dual-Process Theories of Higher Cognition: Advancing the Debate

I think it’s fair to say that Kahneman has been central in the general awareness of cognitive processing concepts, like System 1 / System 2.

Dual processing concepts (but also tri-processing), have a long history, but also have their critics. Moreover, system 1 / system 2 isn’t currently the preferred nomenclature.

If this topic interests you, then the attached is a cool overview of the challenges and debates within dual processing and provides some rebuttals to critics.

Tl;dr:

·         many processing concepts exist;

·         many criticisms exist, but the bulk of evidence still supports dual processing concepts;

·         type 1 and type 2 language is preferred (and better substantiated) than system 1 /2.

This was meant to be a mini-post, but I’m too lazy cutting back the length. So here we are.

I’ve done a really poor job of this paper – in hindsight, I regret taking it on 😁.

Some points:

·         “The distinction between two kinds of thinking, one fast and intuitive, the other slow and deliberative, is both ancient in origin and widespread in philosophical and psychological writing”

·         Many models and theories proposing two forms of processing exist, some competing; some argue that evolutionary distinct brain systems are responsible for these processing streams – often in the system 1 / 2 concepts

·         Despite the popularity of system 1/2 “we both have recognized problems with this terminology in our recent writing”; for one, it may suggest exactly two systems underlie processing

·         Some “have discussed how terms such as System 1 or heuristic system are really misnomers because they imply that what is being referred to is a singular system. In actuality, the term System 1 should be plural because it refers to a set of systems in the brain”

·         A wide diversity of autonomous processes have been “lumped together under the heading of System 1”

·         These authors, and others, “have recently reverted to the older terminology of Type 1 and 2 processing. These terms indicate qualitatively distinct forms of processing but allow that multiple cognitive or neural systems may underlie them”

·         [Noting here that Kahneman in Thinking Fast & Slow included a line item about how types are now preferred over systems]

·         Confusion also exists between dual types and dual modes of thinking (see attached image). Modes of processing are “cognitive styles and are manifest within the domain of what we regard as Type 2 thinking”

·         Some nuances exist, like type 1 processing in the brain isn’t always an evolutionary old facet, conscious thinking isn’t always in control of behaviour; rules can be concrete as well as

·         They cover some fallacies, like a) Type 1 processes are always responsible for cognitive bias and Type 2 processing is always responsible for correct responses, (b) Type 1 processing is contextualized and Type 2 processing abstract, and (c) fast processing is necessarily indicative of Type 1 processing

·         As per the attached table, the italicised items are “defining characteristics of the two types of processing”, whereas the other items may be typical but not necessary correlates

·         “Type 2 processing is distinguished from autonomous Type 1 processing by its nature—involving cognitive decoupling and hypothetical thinking—and by its strong loading on the working memory resources that this requires”

·         It’s noted that type 2 processing has a more consistent and coherent definition, whereas type 1 processing “can vary considerably between different dual process theories and applications”

·         They argue that type 1 and 2 distinction is “supported by a wide range of converging evidence”, but not all dual process concepts are equal

Next they address five criticisms of dual processing (I’m not covering all of these), which includes big names like Gerd Gigerenzer as a critic:  

(1) Multiple and vague definitions;

(2) attribute clusters associated with dual systems do not consistently hold together;

(3) distinctions refer to a continuum of processing type rather than qualitatively distinct processes; (4) single-process accounts can be offered for apparent dual-process phenomena; and

(5) the evidence base for dual-process theory is questionable.

For criticism 1: They agree that the “proliferation of dual-process labels has not been helpful”. There are many associated labels, including “implicit/explicit, associative/rule-based, impulsive/reflective, automatic/controlled, experiential/ rational, nonconscious/conscious, intuitive/reflective, heuristic/ analytic, reflexive/reflective” and “each carries with it some semantic baggage”

Although these authors have no simple black/white alternative to counter all of these, and there is of course some vague and ambiguous attributes among these, there are still some defining features that connects many of them.

One example is the “popular in social psychology” distinction of conscious / nonconscious processes, which is “ highly problematic on account of both vague and disputable definitions of consciousness’, or the point that both type 1 and 2 processing “can have conscious and nonconscious aspects”.

Criticism 2: They say that the main critic of dual processing concepts is the “idea that there are two cognitive systems with a cluster of defining attributes”. Criticisms are that the many lists of defining features of both types are not always observed together.

The current authors agree that many of the features found in the lists of type 1 / 2 attributes are only correlates—not defining features—and many correlates have been associated with type 1 and 2 as defining features, when they’re not.

Interestingly they counter the “most persistent fallacy in the perception of dual-process theories”, being the idea that “Type 1 processes (intuitive, heuristic) are responsible for all bad thinking and that Type 2 processes (reflective, analytic) necessarily lead to correct”.

They discuss this fallacy and the ways that type 1 processes often are protective and sensemaking when obvious cues and stored patterns aren’t available.

Criticism 3: This criticism relates to the idea that there’s a continuum of processing styles, not discrete types. They raise a few points here which I’ve skipped. However, there is often confusion between types and modes.

Modes are “often confused with types” and actually have “different cognitive styles applied in Type 2 processing”. And unlike types, “modes can vary continuously”.

They give an example of type 2 analytical reasoning and if it’s considered as “the explicit processing of rules through working memory, then such processing could be engaged in a slow and careful but also a quick and casual manner or any point in between”.

Modes, unlike types, can “also be culturally sensitive and must underlie the holistic and analytic styles observed to differ between those living in Eastern and Western cultures”.

They also discuss thinking dispositions. Type 2, being the more algorithmic level, is subordinate to “higher level goal states and epistemic thinking dispositions”.

Thinking dispositions are:

“measures of the higher level regulatory states of the reflective mind: the tendency to collect information before making up one’s mind, the tendency to seek various points of view before coming to a conclusion, the disposition to think extensively about a problem before responding, the tendency to calibrate the degree of strength of one’s opinion to the degree of evidence available, the tendency to think about future consequences before taking action, and the tendency to explicitly weigh pluses and minuses of situations before making a decision”.

They also discuss the misguided approach to describe system 2 as rule-based, since this implies system 1 cognition as not involving rules; this is problematic since rules can be concrete as well as abstract, and “any automatic cognitive system that can be modelled computationally can in some sense be described as following rules”.

I’ve skipped criticism 4.

Criticism 5: They next discuss the criticism that “Evidence for dual processing is ambiguous or unconvincing”; or that single-process concepts can account for the qualitatively distinct types of mental processing.

They believe that this argument is the least convincing of those covered in this paper. They believe some critics have used straw man arguments to break down.

In conclusion:

·         “Our view of the literature is that autonomous processing is the defining feature of Type 1 processing”

·         “Even more convincing is the converging evidence that the key feature of Type 2 processing is the ability to sustain the decoupling of secondary representations—a key feature of all working memory tasks”

·         This is a “foundational cognitive requirement for hypothetical thinking. In short, we do not support dual-processing approaches on the basis of whim and fashion”

Ref: Evans, J. S. B., & Stanovich, K. E. (2013). Dual-process theories of higher cognition: Advancing the debate. Perspectives on psychological science, 8(3), 223-241.