Escaping From a Strategic Impasse, the U.S. Has Subcontracted Israel to Eliminate Iran's Proxies

This week in New York, I had the opportunity to speak with a group of prominent American strategic thinkers, many of whom are influential in government policy and decision making. Some of the insights I gained are crucial for understanding the current American approach to the Middle East:

Israel’s assassination of the Hamas leader and mastermind behind the October 7 attacks on Thursday was a major event, comparable to the U.S. killing of al-Qaeda leader Osama bin Laden. It’s a significant achievement for Israel, less than a month after the assassination of Hezbollah’s Secretary-General Hassan Nasrallah and other senior military leaders in his party. This represents a major coup not just for Israel but also for the United States.

Israel's efforts to degrade Hamas and Hezbollah, even though still ongoing, are a relief for the U.S., as Israel has taken on the task independently. While the U.S. supplies Israel with advanced military equipment for its war with Hamas and Hezbollah, what’s crucial is that Israel is executing the mission, determined to eliminate leadership and dismantle the military infrastructures of both groups. Meanwhile, the U.S. looks on, tacitly— and sometimes openly—endorsing Israel’s actions in Gaza and Lebanon, supporting Israel’s stated goal of eliminating Hezbollah and Hamas.

President Joe Biden’s administration is focused on the upcoming presidential elections and is determined to avoid getting dragged into a war with Iran under any circumstances. The administration is confident that Israel has recognized the futility of dragging the U.S. into a conflict by attacking Iranian nuclear or oil facilities, which could provoke a large-scale Iranian retaliation and compel the U.S. to become involved. The deployment of the THAAD missile defence system, manned by American soldiers in Israel, is aimed at deterring Iran and reassuring Israel of the U.S. commitment to its security, albeit at a high cost.

There is broad consensus that neither Israel nor Iran is seeking a direct conventional war. Israel will likely strike key military sites inside Iran, and Iran would retaliate with significant strikes against Israel. In turn, Israel would focus its subsequent retaliatory actions on Hezbollah in Lebanon, Iran’s strongest proxy and weakest link. As a result, Lebanon will bear the brunt of the Iranian-Israeli confrontation as long as Hezbollah continues to regroup and position itself and Lebanon in the service of Iran, while Iran avoids a direct war with Israel.

Between now and January 20, the Biden administration is expected to disengage from the Middle East, regardless of developments in Gaza or Lebanon, as long as a serious conventional Iranian-Israeli war is avoided. The U.S. will observe from a distance as Israel works to destroy Hamas in Gaza and Hezbollah in Lebanon, without attempting to restrain its actions.

The U.S. will largely withdraw from the Middle East until next spring, due to the electoral calendar and the transition of power between November 5 and Inauguration Day after January 20, and the formation of a new administration.

Even if Vice President Kamala Harris wins the election, the Democrats are unlikely to engage in Middle Eastern affairs, leaving Israel to act as it wishes, possibly creating a new reality by destroying Hezbollah in Lebanon. This could eventually allow the U.S. to reassert its role in the region.

If former President Donald Trump loses, the U.S. is bracing for a period of significant turmoil at least until January 20. No one knows what Trump will do if he wins, except that he will continue to support Israel in achieving its goals against Hezbollah in Lebanon and Hamas in Gaza. He may also apply measured pressure on Iran, although during his previous term, he tolerated numerous provocations until an American soldier was killed in Iraq, leading to him ordering the assassination of Quds Force commander Qassem Soleimani.

In other words, if Trump becomes president, he is unlikely to issue a final ultimatum to Iran to stop using its proxies in Lebanon, Iraq, Yemen, and Syria. He would not be ready for the consequences of such an ultimatum because he does not intend to wage war against Iran. He has indicated that he would rather bankrupt the country. But like Harris, if she wins, Trump will not confront Iran militarily over Lebanon.

Regarding Lebanon, the belief that Hezbollah might agree to transition into a political party is seen as a fantasy. Hezbollah has not been weakened yet to the point where it would accept major concessions. Therefore, Lebanon is expected to pay the price for efforts to stabilize the Middle East. For the foreseeable future, instability in Lebanon will be the price of achieving broader regional stability. The reason is that Hezbollah remains capable of inflicting significant damage on Israel and its own domestic rivals.

Proponents of this view believe that Hezbollah still retains the ability to launch rockets and has, according to estimates, a significant arsenal even after Israel’s destruction of much of its military infrastructure and leadership. Thus, Hezbollah is unlikely to facilitate the full implementation of Resolution 1701, which calls for its withdrawal from the area between the Israeli border and the Litani River, and for it to surrender its weapons to the Lebanese state.

This strengthens Israel’s resolve to clear the buffer zone of Hezbollah elements to neutralize the threat of rocket and drone launches from the region, which are preventing Israelis from returning to northern Israel. How long this will take remains uncertain. Israel does not seek to occupy southern Lebanon but will not withdraw from the buffer zone before its objectives are fully achieved.

Iran is unlikely to pressure Hezbollah to withdraw from the buffer zone between the border and the Litani River, particularly after Tehran announced its withdrawal from indirect negotiations with the U.S. aimed at reaching a significant breakthrough and a comprehensive deal. Such a deal would normalize bilateral relations, lift sanctions on Iran, and require it to curb its proxies, particularly in Lebanon and Iraq. These negotiations and the potential deal are now postponed until after the U.S. presidential elections.

The conclusion is that Iran is not negotiating in good faith regarding its regional behavior and its strategy of maintaining proxies as part of its regional expansion.

Thus, the only option is to impose a new reality concerning these proxies, particularly Hezbollah in Lebanon and Hamas in Gaza. The entity capable of enforcing this reality, and practically tasked with doing so, is Israel—with solid, practical, moral, and political support from both the Democratic and Republican sides of the U.S political divide.

This situation will lead to continuous escalation between Iran and Israel, whether because of direct tit-for-tat attacks even if limited, or Israel's determination to weaken Hezbollah’s capabilities in Lebanon. Iran has demonstrated, through its military actions and its practical abandonment of both Hezbollah and Hamas in the face of Israeli strikes, that its military capabilities are not as formidable as it claims. However, concerns about Iran persist as long as it maintains leverage over its proxies in Lebanon, Gaza, and Iraq, funding them and supplying them with missiles and drones.

After the assassination of Yahya Sinwar in Gaza, some believe that the Biden administration will make only minimal efforts, perhaps demanding Israel heed its concerns about the humanitarian cost and threatening measures over Israel’s excessive use of U.S.-made weapons against civilians. Others suggest that Israel should take advantage of this moment, after Sinwar's elimination, to declare a new phase in its war on Gaza based on two pillars: ensuring genuine security for the people of Gaza and improving their living conditions through concrete measures to alleviate their suffering.

Regarding security, this could be achieved gradually by securing one area at a time, ensuring it is free of fighters and Hamas elements. The area could then be transformed into a closed zone with improved living conditions, supervised by Palestinian forces trained by the U.S. and Jordan.

This political vision for Gaza starts with security, with Israel simultaneously announcing that it does not intend to remain in Gaza and is ready to secure areas one by one, allowing people to return to their homes. If Israel continues with intermittent raids followed by withdrawals, it will create a vacuum that Hamas will fill. However, if Israel commits to a new phase in its war on Gaza, based on a public pledge not to encourage Israeli settlements in Gaza, reoccupy the area, or displace the people of Gaza, but instead seeks to provide security and better living conditions, it could attract financial support from Arab and European nations and advance a "day after" strategy. This would require bold political decisions, which are yet to be seen from the Israeli leadership.

Similarly, in southern Lebanon, the return of displaced persons is a key element of any lasting solution. But the return of Palestinian refugees to their homes may be easier than the return of displaced Lebanese to southern Lebanon and the southern suburbs of Beirut. However, reconstruction and rehabilitation are essential components of any solution based on a long-term vision for the day after.

The ideas being discussed by influential decision-makers are unlikely to be implemented immediately. However, beginning to push these ideas forward without imposing strict deadlines may help major and minor players in the Middle East escape the current strategic impasse.

The U.S. has extracted itself from this quagmire by stepping away from the constant pressure of shuttle diplomacy by the Secretary of State and his team, seeking a ceasefire in Gaza, preventing a wider Israeli-Iranian war, or chasing after a grand deal in the Middle East.

But in Lebanon, the internal turmoil, coupled with Iran’s renewed management of Hezbollah, places the small country at the heart of the storm until it becomes clear how far Israel will go in achieving its objectives against Hezbollah.