On Hegel's 'Science of Logic' : A Realm of Shadows - part seven.

'Autumn Journal' (excerpts)

by Frederick Louis MacNeice, (1907 – 1963)

Good-bye now, Plato and Hegel,

The shop is closing down;

They don’t want any philosopher-kings in England,

There ain’t no universals in this man’s town.

But certainly it was fun while it lasted

And I got my honours degree

And was stamped as a person of intelligence and culture

For ever wherever two or three

Persons of intelligence and culture

Are gathered together in talk

Writing definitions on invisible blackboards

In non-existent chalk.

But such sacramental occasions

Are nowadays comparatively rare;

There is always a wife or a boss or a dun or a client

Disturbing the air.

Barbarians always, life in the particular always,

Dozens of men in the street,

And the perennial if unimportant problem

Of getting enough to eat.

So blow the bugles over the metaphysicians,

Let the pure mind return to the Pure Mind;

I must be content to remain in the world of Appearance

And sit on the mere appearance of a behind.

But in case you should think my education was wasted

I hasten to explain

That having once been to the University of Oxford

You can never really again

Believe anything that anyone says and that of course is an asset

In a world like ours;

Why bother to water a garden

That is planted with paper flowers?

O the Freedom of the Press, the Late Night Final,

To-morrow’s pulp;

One should not gulp one’s port but as it isn’t

Port, I’ll gulp it if I want to gulp

'For he had great possessions', 1894, George Frederic Watts. 'And, behold, one came and said unto him, Good Master, what good thing shall I do, that I may have eternal life? And he said unto him, Why callest thou me good? there is none good but one, that is, God: but if thou wilt enter into life, keep the commandments. He saith unto him, Which? Jesus said, Thou shalt do no murder, Thou shalt not commit adultery, Thou shalt not steal, Thou shalt not bear false witness, Honour thy father and thy mother: and, Thou shalt love thy neighbour as thyself. The young man saith unto him, All these things have I kept from my youth up: what lack I yet? Jesus said unto him, If thou wilt be perfect, go and sell that thou hast, and give to the poor, and thou shalt have treasure in heaven: and come and follow me. But when the young man heard that saying, he went away sorrowful: for he had great possessions. Then said Jesus unto his disciples, Verily I say unto you, That a rich man shall hardly enter into the kingdom of heaven. And again I say unto you, It is easier for a camel to go through the eye of a needle, than for a rich man to enter into the kingdom of God'. - 'Matthew', 19.16-24.

In our excursion through Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel's, (1770 - 1831), 'Science of Logic' we have reached, 'Limitation and the Ought', a particularly rich and fascinating section for me, given that 'ought' is a word used either without much thought about what is means or on the assumption that we all do know what it means it is claimed that we cannot arrive at it from an 'is', see below, a claim we are just expected to accept as though it is obvious enough. Which it certainly is not.

The Understanding suppresses the negative voice, b, of Finitude, (see the diagram Finitude in the previous article), which dialectical Reason had summoned forth and designated Limitation (Schranke), although in the translation I am using it is translated as Restriction, the beyond of the Finite for if the Finite is limited there has to be a beyond and Limitation is not be confused with the earlier stage of Limit (Grenze) whereby Something's own limit thus posited by it as a negative which is at the same time is essential, is not merely limit as such, but limitation:

'Determination and constitution arose as sides for external reflection, but determination already contained otherness as belonging to the in-itself of something. On the one side, the externality of otherness is within the something’s own inwardness; on the other side, it remains as otherness distinguished from it; it is still externality as such, but in the something. But further, since otherness is determined as limit, itself as negation of the negation, the otherness immanent to the something is posited as the connection of the two sides, and the unity of the something with itself (to which both determination and constitution belong) is its reference turned back upon itself, the reference to it of its implicitly existing determination that in it negates its immanent limit. The self-identical in-itself thus refers itself to itself as to its own non-being, but as negation of the negation, as negating that which at the same time retains existence in it, for it is the quality of its in-itselfness. Something’s own limit, thus posited by it as a negative which is at the same time essential, is not only limit as such, but restriction. But restriction is not alone in being posited as negative; the negation cuts two ways, for that which it posits as negated is limit, and limit is in general what is common to something and other, and is also the determinateness of the in-itself of determination as such. This in-itself, consequently, as negative reference to its limit (which is also distinguished from it), as negative reference to itself as restriction, is the ought.

- 'The Science of Logic'

Limitation

In brief, Limitation is a negative version of Limit and concerning the above diagram Limitation in order that the limit should be a limitation something must at the same time transcend the limit, it must be related to the limit as to something which it is not:

'In order for the limit that is in every something to be a restriction, the something must at the same time transcend it in itself – must refer to it from within as to a non-existent. The existence of something lies quietly indifferent, as it were, alongside its limit. But the something transcends its limit only in so far as it is the sublatedness of the limit, the negative in-itselfness over against it. And inasmuch as the limit is as restriction in the determination itself, the something thereby transcends itself'.

- 'The Science of Logic'

Limitation, then, is c, the beyond of a's Limit and the determinate Being of Something, a, lies inertly indifferent in a manner of speaking alongside its limit b yet Something only transcends its limit in so far as it is the accomplished sublation of the limit, is the in-itself b as negatively related to it a and since the limit b is in the Finite itself as a limitation c Something transcends its own self. William Maker, (1949 - 2021), feeling the need to defend Hegel against preposterous accusations of totalitarianism stresses that Logic limits itself and posits its own beyond and that Limitation proves 'the necessity for thought of thinking something as having the character of not being determined by thought'. In Maker's opinion the self-determinations of Logic leave Nature intact and irreducible and also explain Nature's necessity from within the perspective of Logic.

Following on from this we come at once to the middle term, which is to say, the Ought, the most advanced moment of Finitude that demonstrates that the Finite is something which is not what it ought to be:

'The fact is that the infinite series contains the bad infinite because what the series is supposed to express remains an ought, and what it does express is encumbered by a beyond which does not go away, and it is diverse from what it is supposed to express. It is infinite not because of the posited terms, but because such terms are incomplete, since the other which belongs to them essentially is beyond them; what the series actually contains (let the terms posited be as many as one wishes) is only something finite, in the strict sense of being posited as finite, that is, as something which is not what it ought to be. On the other hand, what is called the finite expression of such a series, or the sum of it, is without lack; it contains whole the value which the series only seeks; the beyond is recalled from its flight; what it is and what it ought to be are not separated but are the same'.

- 'The Science of Logic'

Herbert Marcuse, (1898 – 1979), exploited this thought in the service of his Marxist ideology claiming that: 'Hegel's dialectic is permeated with the profound conviction that all immediate forms of existence - in nature and history - are 'bad,' because they do not permit thing to be what they can be'.' Finite things do not possess the complete reality of their Notion within themselves, but require other things to complete it. That actual things are not congruous with the Idea is the side of their finitude and untruth, and in accordance with this side they are objects:

'Since the idea is the unity of the concept and reality, being has attained the significance of truth; it now is, therefore, only what the idea is. Finite things are finite because, and to the extent that, they do not possess the reality of their concept completely within them but are in need of other things for it – or, conversely, because they are presupposed as objects and consequently the concept is in them as an external determination. The highest to which they attain on the side of this finitude is external purposiveness. That actual things are not congruent with the idea constitutes the side of their finitude, of their untruth, and it is according to this side that they are objects, each in accordance with its specific sphere, and, in the relations of objectivity, determined as mechanical, chemical, or by an external purpose'.

- 'The Science of Logic'

The Ought is posited as the in-itself:

'The finite has thus determined itself as connecting determination and limit; in this connection, the determination is the ought and the limit is the restriction. Thus the two are both moments of the finite, and therefore both themselves finite, the ought as well as the restriction. But only restriction is posited as the finite; the ought is restricted only in itself, and therefore only for us. It is restricted by virtue of its reference to the limit already immanent within it, though this restriction in it is shrouded in in-itselfness, for according to its determinate being, that is, according to its determinateness in contrast to restriction, it is posited as being-in-itself'.

- 'The Science of Logic'

The Ought of the Finite is that it ought to cease to be, this is the in itself of Finite things. So long as they have not passed away, they are not what they should be. 'All finite beings are dependent beings and thus not fully real. But if finite beings are dependent, it follows that there must be some non-finite being upon which they are dependent', explains Thomas E. Wartenberg.

The Ought

And so, what is commonly meant by ought? You ought to study philosophy. Why? Behind such an observation lies a statement concerning what is and what is not, hence what is actually being said is that you have the potential to hone your philosophical skills such as they are and become a better philosopher for which philosophical training is advisable and such potential is actually there in the first place. In addition what is also being stated is that at the moment to be blunt you are not yet very good at philosophy (although who is? If anyone was we would have sorted out these philosophical issues a long time ago) and so some training is in order, your talent is merely potential and is not now actual, which is to say your talent is lacking in actuality. In both cases something, potentiality, is present, and something, actuality. is absent. These statements are replete with Becoming whereby the potential should cease-to-be what it is and should become something else and actuality should come-to-be and should cease being only potential (although of course we can also ask what 'should' means without taking it for granted that everybody knows).

According to empiricism one cannot prove an ought from an is (see below, this is a widely accepted point of view that happens to be wrong) as it suppresses the in-itself and never advances beyond the Understanding, and for Hegel this is so wrong-headed because anything that ought to be is, the Ought is in the present, if not, then it will never come-to-be. And the proof of the Ought is precisely whether it does come-to-be and if it never does it was never possible. In the eye of God the Ought always comes-to-be and is indistinguishable from the is, with which probability theory in in agreement, given infinite time what is possible will become actual. Physicists refer to this as the ergodic hypothesis. Take this box for instance (I don't really need to show a diagram of a box I just like playing with Microsoft Paint as you may have noticed. I am a very visual thinker, hence the accompanying paintings as well):

A physical system is said to be ergodic (Greek: ergon = work, hodos = path) if any representative point of the system eventually comes to visit the entire volume of the system, so within our box this implies that any given atom not only visits every part of the box W x H x L with uniform probability but it does so with every possible velocity and with probability in accordance with some probability measure or other that I won't go into that is given by distribution for that velocity and so is uniform with respect to that measure, and the ergodic hypothesis states that physical systems actually are ergodic, but we are talking about multiple time scales in operation here maybe millions of years, there is much dispute over this hence it is an hypothesis. Hegel's point is of the same order, the Ought becomes the is in the eye of God. Such a point of view may shed some light on Immanuel Kant's, (1724 - 1804), 'Critique of Practical Reason' where he amongst other things presents a defence of belief in the immortality of the soul because only this makes possible the attainment of absolute moral perfection, for of course this moral perfection is an Ought to us mere mortals but to God moral perfection is. What ought to be is and at the same time is not, the ought has, therefore, essentially a limitation:

'What ought to be is, and at the same time is not. If it were, it would not be what merely ought to be. The ought has therefore a restriction essentially. This restriction is not anything alien; that which only ought to be is determination now posited as it is in fact, namely as at the same time only a determinateness'.

- 'The Science of Logic'

This Limitation is the not of the Ought, its significance is that the Ought represents the positing of the unposited in-itself and Being-in-itself logically must become for-itself whereby the potential must become the actual. For the moment, the Ought is not yet, the Being-in-itself of the something reduces itself therefore to an ought-to-be through the fact that its in-itself is a non-Being:

'The being-in-itself of the something is thus reduced in its determination to the ought because the very thing that constitutes the something’s in-itselfness is, in one and the same respect, as non-being; or again, because in the in-itselfness, in the negation of the negation, the said being-in-itself is as one negation (what negates) a unity with the other, and this other, as qualitatively other, is the limit by virtue of which that unity is as reference to it. The restriction of the finite is not anything external, but the finite’s own determination is rather also its restriction; and this restriction is both itself and the ought; it is that which is common to both, or rather that in which the two are identical'.

- 'The Science of Logic'

The Ought is nothing special but explicitly defines the true relation that obtains between any subject and its predicate, the subject is its predicate while at the same time being distinguished from it and he relation between the two is therefore always one of identity but at a distance as the predicate is what the subject is destined or said to be. Bestimmung in German means both determination and destiny or vocation. And further a subject is reflectively what it is by negating that its predicate otherwise qualitatively other than it is truly an other and the subject is that predicate as other, it negates the predicate as a would-be other , that is to say, as a negative with respect to it, hence the subject is reflectively what the predicate is qualitatively that is immediately, it is what the predicate is, but at a distance as it were. Its self-identity, the negation of the negation that constitutes its internal being, is thereby modified by carrying a reference to the would-be qualitatively independent predicate and the latter is what the subject ought to be, what it is destined or said to be.

The non-Being of the Ought is d, e, f of the diagram The Ought yet the Ought transcends its non-Being, its Limitation, in g for g is the Being-in-itself of the Ought which is something of a paradox in virtue of g being an immediacy and Being-in-itself is always a mediated determinateness. In effect Being-in-itself is posited as expressly implicit and the Ought has recently played a great part in philosophy especially in connection with morality and also in metaphysics generally:

'The ought has of late played a major role in philosophy, especially in connection with morality but also in metaphysics in general, as the final and absolute concept of the identity of the in-itself or of self-reference, and of determinateness or the limit. 'You can because you ought'. This expression, which is supposed to say a lot, is implied in the concept of the ought. For the ought is the transcendence of restriction; restriction is sublated in it, the in-itself of the ought is thus identical self-reference, and consequently the abstraction of 'being able'. – But, conversely, 'you cannot, even though you ought' is just as correct. For the restriction as restriction is equally implied in the ought; the one formalism of possibility has in it a reality, a qualitative otherness, that stands opposed to it, and the connection of each to the other is a contradiction, and thus a “cannot” or rather an impossibility'.

- 'The Science of Logic'

Hegel is referring to Kantian moral theory that declares: 'You can because you ought' to which he counters with it is equally correct that you cannot just because you ought. The Ought contains Limitation and so long as the Ought is before us, actuality is not:

'– But in the actual order of things, reason and law are not in such a sad state of affairs that they only ought to be (only the abstraction of the in-itself stays at this); equally, the ought does not perpetuate itself nor, which is the same, is finitude absolute. The philosophy of Kant and Fichte holds out the ought as the resolution of the contradictions of reason – though it is rather only a standpoint that remains fixed in finitude and therefore in contradiction'.

- 'The Science of Logic'

In the world of actuality itself Reason and Law are not in such a bad way that they only ought to be, it is only the abstraction of the in-itself that stops at this for the Ought is only the standpoint which clings to finitude and thus to contradiction.

'Love or Duty', 1873, Gabriele Castagnola. 'Stern Daughter of the Voice of God!/O Duty! if that name thou love'/Who art a light to guide, a rod/To check the erring, and reprove;/Thou, who art victory and law/When empty terrors overawe;/From vain temptations dost set free;/And calm'st the weary strife of frail humanity!' - William Wordsworth, (1770 – 1850).

To the Kantians who insist that Limitation cannot be transcended Hegel responds that to make such an assertion is to be unaware that the very fact that something is determined as a limitation implies that the limitation is already transcended:

'Regarding the form of restriction and of the ought, two prejudices deserve more detailed criticism. First, much is commonly made of the restrictions of thought, of reason, and so forth, and the claim is made that it is impossible to transcend such restrictions. What is lost track of in this claim is that something is already transcended by the very fact of being determined as a restriction. For a determinateness, a limit, is determined as restriction only in opposition to its other in general, that is, in opposition to that which is without its restriction; the other of a restriction is precisely the beyond with respect to it'.

- 'The Science of Logic'

Limitation is the negative of the Finite and as such the Finite is already beyond Limitation, even before Limitation comes to be, and it is in the nature of reason to transcend the Limitation of the particular and manifest what is universal. In the light of which if Limitation is already overcome in them one may reasonably inquire as to why stones do not rise up from the earth and become self-conscious beings?

DUKE SENIOR:

Now, my co-mates and brothers in exile,

Hath not old custom made this life more sweet

Than that of painted pomp? Are not these woods

More free from peril than the envious court?

Here feel we not the penalty of Adam,

The seasons' difference; as the icy fang

And churlish chiding of the winter's wind,

Which when it bites and blows upon my body,

Even till I shrink with cold, I smile and say

'This is no flattery; these are counsellors

That feelingly persuade me what I am.'

Sweet are the uses of adversity,

Which, like the toad, ugly and venomous,

Wears yet a precious jewel in his head;

And this our life, exempt from public haunt,

Finds tongues in trees, books in the running brooks,

Sermons in stones, and good in everything.

I would not change it.

- William Shakespeare, (1564 – 1616), 'As You Like It', Act 2, Scene 1

An issue that may strike the initiate as somewhat troublesome, for if the object has in fact been elevated to subjectivity in the Logic why do not trees speak and stones sermonise, literally that is? Yet Hegel insists that stone and metal do not transcend their limitation because this is not a limitation for them.

'Stone, metal, do not transcend their restriction, for the simple reason that the restriction is not a restriction for them. However, with respect to such general propositions that are typical of the way the understanding thinks, as that it is impossible to transcend restriction, if thought will not apply itself to see what is implied in the concept, it can then be referred to actuality, where the propositions prove themselves to be completely unrealistic. Just because thought ought to be something higher than actuality, just because it ought to dwell in higher regions remote from it, and therefore be itself determined as an ought, it fails on the one hand to advance to the concept, and on the other hand it manages to be equally untrue both in its relation to actuality and to the concept. – Because a stone does not think, does not even feel, its determinateness is not a restriction for it, that is, it is not in it a negation for the sensation, the representation, the thought, and so on, which it does not have. But the stone too is as a something distinguished in its determination or its in-itself and existence, and to this extent it too transcends its restriction; the concept which the stone is in itself contains the identity with its other. If it is a base receptive to acids then it is oxidizable, neutralizable, and so on. In the process of oxidization, neutralization, and so on, its restriction to being only a base is sublated; the base transcends it; similarly, the acid transcends its restriction to being an acid, and in the acid just as in the caustic base the ought, the imperative to transcend their restriction, is so strong that it is only with violence that they can be kept fixed as acid and caustic base (as waterless, that is, purely non-neutral).

- 'The Science of Logic'

[As it happens as far as Hegel's credentials in metallurgy are concerned the original 1807 edition of the 'Phenomenology of Spirit' has a title page identifying Hegel as 'Dr. and Professor of Philosophy at Jena, assessor in the Ducal Mineralogical Society and member of other learned societies'. Perhaps I should join some 'learned societies' myself though they usually charge a subscription].

Stones have already been exiled from Spirit upon physical Nature being demonstrated to be self-alienated Spirit. Being finite things, '[t]hey cannot develop their potentialities except by perishing', Marcuse explains. Limitation is a feature of sentient beings yet Hegel goes on to say that perhaps stones and metals do transcend their Limitation, they have Being-in-itself, they ought to become something different. If oxidizable they potentially can be burned, and in the eye of God, they will be burned, and God's timeless nature dissolves all difference between potential and actual. Only by force can unoxidized metal be kept from its rusty destiny. And so this raises again the possibility that stones will speak to us.

'28 And when he had thus spoken, he went before, ascending up to Jerusalem. 29 And it came to pass, when he was come nigh to Bethphage and Bethany, at the mount called the mount of Olives, he sent two of his disciples, 30 Saying, Go ye into the village over against you; in the which at your entering ye shall find a colt tied, whereon yet never man sat: loose him, and bring him hither. 31 And if any man ask you, Why do ye loose him? thus shall ye say unto him, Because the Lord hath need of him. 32 And they that were sent went their way, and found even as he had said unto them. 33 And as they were loosing the colt, the owners thereof said unto them, Why loose ye the colt? 34 And they said, The Lord hath need of him. 35 And they brought him to Jesus: and they cast their garments upon the colt, and they set Jesus thereon. 36 And as he went, they spread their clothes in the way. 37 And when he was come nigh, even now at the descent of the mount of Olives, the whole multitude of the disciples began to rejoice and praise God with a loud voice for all the mighty works that they had seen; 38 Saying, Blessed be the King that cometh in the name of the Lord: peace in heaven, and glory in the highest. 39 And some of the Pharisees from among the multitude said unto him, Master, rebuke thy disciples. 40 And he answered and said unto them, I tell you that, if these should hold their peace, the stones would immediately cry out. 41 And when he was come near, he beheld the city, and wept over it, 42 Saying, If thou hadst known, even thou, at least in this thy day, the things which belong unto thy peace! but now they are hid from thine eyes. 43 For the days shall come upon thee, that thine enemies shall cast a trench about thee, and compass thee round, and keep thee in on every side, 44 And shall lay thee even with the ground, and thy children within thee; and they shall not leave in thee one stone upon another; because thou knewest not the time of thy visitation'.

- 'Luke' 19:28 - 44

And as Hegel writes elsewhere:

'The thinking view of nature must note the implicit process by which nature sublates its otherness to become spirit, and the way in which the Idea is present in each stage of nature itself Estranged from the Idea, nature is merely the corpse of the understanding. Nature is the Idea, but only implicitly. That was why Schelling called it a petrified (versteinerte) intelligence, which others have even said is frozen. God does not remain petrified and moribund however, the stones cry out and lift themselves up to spirit. God is subjectivity, activity, infinite actuosity, within which the other is only momentary, and remains implicit within the unity of the Idea, because it is itself this totality of the Idea. Since nature is the Idea in the form of otherness, according to the Notion of the Idea, the Idea is not within it as it is in and for itself, although nature is nevertheless one of the modes in which the Idea manifests itself, and in which it must come forth'.

- 'The Philosophy of Nature'

Stones will surmount their objectivity and become subject which as it happens they do for rocks and stones crumble and become soil, soil yields plants, humans eat the plants and participate in thought and all the while there has to be rocks stones. Objectivity is a valid moment in need of being exhibited. 'The essence of the inorganic thing is in fact a particular determination, which is why it becomes concept only in its connection to other things. But the thing does not preserve itself in that connection; it is only for-some-other; it does not reflect on itself in the process of relating to other things ... These elements are particular determinations, and they lack reflection on themselves, that is, they present themselves as being for others', explains Jean Hyppolite, (1907 – 1968). If all objects must become subjects over time this already will have occurred long ago but instead some objects have to be left behind so that Nature can make itself useful to Spirit while human beings are allowed the entitlement of subjectivity in which self-consciousness constitutes objects albeit as humans beings we are unable to shuffle off our Finitude which remains a valid moment in us and upon the seed of our decease germinate then we are rendered as mute as the stones.

Which brings us to the transition of the Finite into the Infinite whereby no new terms are introduced and yet in a short space a new advance is delineated and what we are given are enriched observations pertaining to The Ought. 'Assuming that the Logic is then a machine functioning along [an] immediacy/negation/mediation blueprint, divided into 'trinities', into three subsections each with the moments, is misleading. In fact, the tripartite structure is continually interrupted; for example, in 'Quality', the section entitled 'Transition' is a supplement (it is not a third and has no three)', suggests Andrew Haas. But can we not discover triunity in this subsection of chapter two?

First, the Understanding isolates the mediated portions of the Ought d, e, f. Here the Ought contains limitation, and limitation contains the Ought. Their relation to each other is the Finite itself which contains them both in its Being-within-self:

'The ought contains restriction explicitly, for itself, and restriction contains the ought. Their mutual connection is the finite itself, which contains them both in its in-itself. These moments of its determination are qualitatively opposed; restriction is determined as the negative of the ought, and the ought equally as the negative of restriction. The finite is thus in itself the contradiction of itself; it sublates itself, it goes away and ceases to be. But this, its result, the negative as such, is (a) its very determination; for it is the negative of the negative. So, in going away and ceasing to be, the finite has not ceased; it has only become momentarily an other finite which equally is, however, a going-away as a going-over into another finite, and so forth to infinity. But, (b) if we consider this result more closely, in its going-away and ceasing-to-be, in this negation of itself, the finite has attained its being-in-itself; in it, it has rejoined itself. Each of its moments contains precisely this result; the ought transcends the restriction, that is, it transcends itself; but its beyond, or its other, is only restriction itself. Restriction, for its part, immediately points beyond itself to its other, and this is the ought; but this ought is the same diremption of in-itselfness and determinateness as is restriction; it is the same thing; in going beyond itself, restriction thus equally rejoins itself. This identity with itself, the negation of negation, is affirmative being, is thus the other of the finite which is supposed to have the first negation for its determinateness; this other is the infinite'.

- 'The Science of Logic'

Note: 'It goes away or ceases to be' = vergeht. The translator uses both expressions to retain Hegel’s play on words.

The Being-within-self of the Finite is e and in e the Finite contains both the Ought and Limitation and by virtue of these observations the Finite of the transition is more powerful than the Finite of The Ought whereby the Ought and Limitation were merely implicit. Gialectical Reason emphasizes that what appears to be a self-identity, a, has a negative voice, b, which implies Another Finite, c, and as Finite, a, ceases-to-be the new Finite, c, comes-to-be as the first Finite's negative. The other Finite, c, likewise ceases to be and becomes the former Finite, a, and there is now a ceaseless seething turmoil of a - c - a. Of this process of birth and death, Hegel says, the finite in its ceasing-to-be has attained its Being-in-itself, is united with itself. The in-itself has manifested itself in this ceaseless activity and the in-Itself of the Finite is the act of dying for here we have a harbinger preceding still the fates and prologue to the omens coming on for Being is on the brink of dying.

'The Poet in the Flames of First Love', 1883, Henry John Stock. 'Give me that man/That is not passion's slave'. - Shakespeare, 'Hamlet', Act 3, Scene 2.

Not only is the Finite for itself when it ceases to be but it points to its other, the ought transcends the Limitation, that is, transcends itself, but beyond itself or its other is only the Limitation itself. The Limitation, however, points directly beyond itself to its other, which is the Ought. So each extreme ceases to be and points to the Other as what really is and each extreme declares I am not it which is tantamount to declaring my Other is it and this negative positing is precisely the move of Reflection much later in the Logic. It is presaged early in the 'Doctrine of Being' as the stance of rightward inclining Finitude. In its activity, the Enriched Finite which Hegel here designates the Ought becomes what it is by ceasing to be and going beyond itself.

Enriched Finite

In going beyond itself it equally only unites with itself. This going beyond while remaining united is Infinity, the middle term between the two Finites.

Another Finite

Which brings us to the Absolute for the Infinite is to be regarded as a fresh definition of the absolute:

'The infinite in its simple concept can be regarded, first of all, as a fresh definition of the absolute; as self-reference devoid of determination, it is posited as being and becoming. The forms of existence have no place in the series of determinations that can be regarded as definitions of the absolute, since the forms of that sphere are immediately posited for themselves only as determinacies, as finite in general. But the infinite is accepted unqualifiedly as absolute, since it is explicitly determined as the negation of the finite; the restrictedness – to which being and becoming would somehow be susceptible even if they do not have it or exhibit it – is thereby both explicitly referred to and denied in it'.

- 'The Science of Logic'

Here, for the first time Hegel associates the middle term with the Absolute and as the Logic progresses the Absolute becomes increasingly richer until it is Absolute Idea that encompasses all mediations. Of the Absolute Hegel declares that the forms of determinate Being find no place in the series of those determinations which can be regarded as definitions of the Absolute, for the individual forms of that sphere are immediately posited only as determinatenesses, as Finite in general. The forms of determinate Being are determinatenesses which dialectical Reason describes in such dialectic forms as are shown in the diagram Another Finite. Only two ellipses are invoked here and the form of the Absolute is more advanced, as the diagram Infinity displays whereby it invokes all three ellipses.

Elsewhere, however, Hegel more broadly contends that every step of the way has been a proposed definition of the Absolute:

'Being itself, as well as the following determinations (the logical determinations in general, not just those of being), may be looked upon as definitions of the Absolute, as the metaphysical definitions of God; more precisely, however, it is always just the first simple determination of a sphere that can be so regarded and again the third, the one which is the return from difference to simple self-relation. For to define God metaphysically means to express his nature in thoughts as such; but the Logic embraces all thoughts while they are still in the form of thoughts. The second determinations, on the other hand, which constitute a sphere in its difference, are the definition of the finite . But if the form of definitions were used, then this form would entail the hovering of a substrate of representation before the mind; for even the Absolute, as what is supposed to express God in the sense and form of thought, remains in its relationship to the predicate (which is its determinate and actual expression in thought) only what is meant to be a thought,- a substrate that is not determined on its own account. Because the thought, the matter which is all that we are here concerned about, is contained only in the predicate, the propositional form, as well as the subject [of the proposition], is something completely superfluous'.

- 'The Encyclopedia Logic'

'Hegel is nowhere so indiscriminate as to say that qualitative being is a definition of the absolute', declares Clark Butler, either oblivious to or forgetful of the above passage. At least the first and third category in every triad may, the first where the thought form of the triad is formulated in its simplicity, and the third, being the return from differentiation to a simple self-reference. The second step of dialectical Reason on the other hand is simply a negative critique of the Understanding's proposition and on its own it does not lay claim to putting forward a definition of the Absolute.

Infinity

_____________________________________

Addendum: The Is/Ought Problem

'In every system of morality, which I have hitherto met with, I have always remarked, that the author proceeds for some time in the ordinary way of reasoning, and establishes the being of a God, or makes observations concerning human affairs; when of a sudden I am surprised to find, that instead of the usual copulations of propositions, is, and is not, I meet with no proposition that is not connected with an ought, or an ought not. This change is imperceptible; but is, however, of the last consequence. For as this ought, or ought not, expresses some new relation or affirmation, it's necessary that it should be observed and explained; and at the same time that a reason should be given, for what seems altogether inconceivable, how this new relation can be a deduction from others, which are entirely different from it. But as authors do not commonly use this precaution, I shall presume to recommend it to the readers; and am persuaded, that this small attention would subvert all the vulgar systems of morality, and let us see, that the distinction of vice and virtue is not founded merely on the relations of objects, nor is perceived by reason'.

- David Hume, (1711 – 1776), 'A Treatise on Human Nature'

The is-ought problem that arises, according to Hume, upon making claims about what ought to be that are grounded only upon statements about what is. Hume discovered that there appears to be a significant difference between descriptive or positive statements concerning what is and prescriptive or normative statements about what ought to be, and that it is not at all apparent how one can coherently move from descriptive statements to prescriptive ones. Hume's guillotine is the thesis that if a reasoner only has access to non-moral and non-evaluative factual premises he or she cannot logically infer the truth of moral statements. Similar to G. E. Moore's, (1873 – 1958), naturalistic fallacy, an informal logical fallacy which argues that if something is natural' it must be good whereas with the is-ought fallacy someone is endeavouring to infer what ought to be done from what is. More precisely the naturalistic fallacy arises once there is a reductive explanation of good in terms of natural properties such as pleasant or desirable, is false. It is clear what has gone wrong there in thinking of this as a fallacy. A reductive explanation of good? What does that mean? Good? Good for whom, or for what?

As for the is-ought fallacy Christian apologists such as John Lennox, (1943 -), especially like to slap it on the table in a debate and without argument as though it is so obvious who is going to challenge it? And indeed it seldom is challenged. Though it is never explained by the apologist how it supports their case, that without God morality can have no rational grounding, because even it is true that you cannot infer an ought from an is how does bringing God into it improve matters?

So, let us now derive an ought from an is. We are told that from whatever happens to be the case in the world that we experience we cannot thereby conclude that what is ought to be or indeed that anything else ought to be. By Hume's guillotine it is logically impermissible to pass from it is the case to the claim that it ought to be the case and this is generally understood to be about empirical cases, for instance upon observing a dog running around and wagging its tail and generally doing what a dog does we conclude that the dog should (that's another word whereby there is an assumption that it is known what is meant by it; it ought to be, it should be, are they the same claims?) be about its doggy business, or that if the world exists as it is then it should (or ought to) exist as it is. From descriptive statements about how things are we go to normative statements about how things ought to be. To formulate it as a purely abstract propositional argument if X occurs then Y occurs, and if X occurs then Y ought to occur. Hume protests we are unjustified to link the is and the ought in this manner but let us probe into more deeply. By doing so we can unearth an equivocation underlying it concerning Being and empirical evidence.

Hegel does not address Hume directly but instead is responding to Kant and Johann Gottlieb Fichte, (1762 – 1814), on the issue of the Ought. Indeed he does not address the question as it is commonly posed: Can we derive an ought from an is? Rather the issue is dealt with in the context of thought's reflective activity whereby the thing-in-itself can be known through its showing, and through Hegel’s treatment and immanent development of the concept of Being two significant conclusions emerge. First, that what is has no immediate identification to be made with the sensuous appearances experienced about an external world, that is to say, there is no reason to equate the empirically immediate given with what is. Second, that what is is not truly anything that is immediately apprehended by the senses or by thought at all. Even in the realm of empirical experience one effortlessly comprehends that there is in fact a difference between what seems to be, and what actually is. Consider the fable of the the blind men and the elephant.

'The Blind Men and the Elephant'

A Hindoo Fable

by John Godfrey Saxe (1716 – 1769)

IT was six men of Indostan

To learning much inclined,

Who went to see the Elephant

(Though all of them were blind),

That each by observation

Might satisfy his mind.

The First approached the Elephant,

And happening to fall

Against his broad and sturdy side,

At once began to bawl:

'God bless me!—but the Elephant

Is very like a wall!'

The Second, feeling of the tusk,

Cried: 'Ho!—what have we here

So very round and smooth and sharp?

To me 't is mighty clear

This wonder of an Elephant

Is very like a spear!'

The Third approached the animal,

And happening to take

The squirming trunk within his hands,

Thus boldly up and spake:

'I see', quoth he, 'the Elephant

Is very like a snake!'

The Fourth reached out his eager hand,

And felt about the knee.

'What most this wondrous beast is like

Is mighty plain', quoth he;

''T is clear enough the Elephant

Is very like a tree!'

The Fifth, who chanced to touch the ear,

Said: 'E'en the blindest man

Can tell what this resembles most;

Deny the fact who can,

This marvel of an Elephant

Is very like a fan!'

The Sixth no sooner had begun

About the beast to grope,

Than, seizing on the swinging tail

That fell within his scope,

'I see', quoth he, 'the Elephant

Is very like a rope!'

And so these men of Indostan

Disputed loud and long,

Each in his own opinion

Exceeding stiff and strong,

Though each was partly in the right,

And all were in the wrong!

MORAL.

So, oft in theologic wars

The disputants, I ween,

Rail on in utter ignorance

Of what each other mean,

And prate about an Elephant

Not one of them has seen!

Each man appraising their immediate experience when touching smelling and hearing the elephant judges that what is before them is a particular thing, the fable varies but grab a leg and he thinks it's a solid pillar, hear it toot and he thinks it is a sort of instrument, grab the trunk and he thinks it's a hose, and so on, but if they were they to let go of their immediate intuition and attend to the whole then they would know it is none of those things but is in fact an elephant. And even were they to apprehend that it is indeed an elephant they would merely apprehend an elephant that just is that adult animal that faces them and they again are taken in by a mere seeming for an elephant is not always an adult and it is not always alive and it is not forever situated in one place and doing one thing, rather, an elephant has a life, it has a life cycle, hence there is, a quite real distinction to be made between what happens to be before one and how it appears to be and what it actually is and this is significant concerning the issue of what ought to be.

With Being Hegel demonstrates a matter irrespective of whatever possible stance we adopt concerning Being, that is were we to assume the Parmenedian view of Being as the immutable and unchanging then we must come to the conclusion that immediate sensuous experience is not true Being because in scrutinising it we discover that immediate sense experience discloses everything to be contingent, mutable, and mere insubstantial vanishing. If we assume an empiricist view of Being as that which is experienced as particular or singular then we must conclude that more than Being is in play and that Being gives ground to something else and both conclusions direct us towards the Hegelian way whereby what is is to be comprehended to in truth be something that is beyond empirical immediacies and which is apprehended as a determining process underlying it and that what is necessarily yields not simply to what it is not but also to what it should be, a twofold conclusion generating an intriguing argument.

'The Elephant Celebes', 1921, Max Ernst. 'About them frisking played / All beasts of the earth, since wild, and of all chase / In wood or wilderness, forest or den; /Sporting the lion ramped, and in his paw / Dandled the kid; bears, tigers, ounces, pards, / Gambolled before them; the unwieldy elephant, / To make them mirth, used all his might, and wreathed / His lithe proboscis; close the serpent sly, / Insinuating, wove with Gordian twine / His braided train, and of his fatal guile / Gave proof unheeded ...' - John Milton, (1608 – 1674), 'Paradise Lost'.

And so from Being to Ought, what is or what is not as what ought to or ought not to be. Being, Nothing, and Becoming as we have seen are discussed in the Logic, so what of from Being to Being? Being is not a being neither can it be specified as the Being of beings it merely is and it is not something special just as I would mean nothing special in everyday activities were I to say to someone here is a pear or here is a rose or here it is or it is what it is so too Being as merely the concept of positive immediacy, it is before us, it is, but we cannot specify it as anything, for me and you and we are simply as much as all else is. Being here is simply the is that which has not yet specified differences at all and so for that very reason has not specified any thing whatsoever. Parmenides, (fl. late sixth or early fifth century BC), see my article On Plato's 'Parmenides' - Being and non-Being, took Being to be an inescapable all encompassing immutable and undifferentiated identity whereby all things are and Being is what is in and as all thing and the truth of the matter is that Being alone is. And yet, pace Parmenides, Being evidently is not all there is to be said, conceived, or experienced, indeed we must think Being and to attend to the fact that against all belief otherwise we are compelled to declare something that by the standard of Being simply ought (?) to be impossible.

Give in to this thought and set in motion its cognition and we have a failure to think, that is to say the thought fails to be and what we have with Being is the entire absence that is Nothing and with Being we now may draw an analogy with a material atom with zero dimension and indivisible and with Nothing we endeavour to rupture and delve into what cannot be ruptured and is bereft of constitution for within the atom there are no further atoms and no space no more matter for it is just empty and without matter akin to a one-dimensional line whereby no width is discoverable in it. This is absolute immediacy in virtue of it being immediate with no determinate features inside it or outside it for nothing is sustaining it neither apart from itself nor together with itself and this absence in opposition to all who declare only the positivity of Being to be actual is here for us in thought itself and we cannot ignore it rather we notice it and we announce it. Stare directly upon the sun of Being and we will be left incapable of seeing just as much as staring into the darkest abyss and the fact that Nothing is apparent to us is a contradiction albeit it is merely what we naturally conceptualise in endeavouring to set going the immediate immediately and by the power of thinking we effortlessly take heed of this immediate absence of thought within thought itself. We discover that Being is Nothing or that Nothing is Being to the extent that they are not each other and here we are once again called upon to think and yet no more to think Being or Nothing but to composedly and freely step back and watch their complete process cognisant of being stuck in a self-generating loop and this circuit of thought is.  

The matter of this stepping back from the dialectical circuit is the coming forth of the third facet which they are as a total circuit, that is to say, Becoming appears from the immediacy of Being and Nothing and it appears as that which truly is enduring in and through them and what is is not the petrified (recall that Hegel said of Friedrich Wilhelm Joseph von Schelling, (1775–1854), that he described Nature as petrified intelligence although I am not sure where Schelling says that assuming that he did), and abiding and changeless immediacy but the fluid and fluctuating unseparated character of a self-mediated immediacy, and yet Becoming in addition is not merely the immediate as such, not only does it have internal structure and dynamic with Being and Nothing it also has an inescapable activation as Becoming, an activation that again presents us two facets. Becoming is coming to be and ceasing to be, and each is not simply a description or operation of Being and Nothing but also a reflexive operation of each other. That which is ceases to be and ends as Nothing yet this ceasing to be, the moment that it completes its operation and finalizes Nothing, itself has been the coming to be of Nothing and hence itself is its own ceasing to be an the same is true of coming to be and thus what comes to be is only ceasing to be and what ceases to be is coming to be. There is not merely a singular circuit of one side going over to the other side but two circuits inverting themselves from within and never reaching across for each moment of Becoming is a totality of the negative unity of Being and Nothing and in virtue of their being immediately self-subverting the moment they are they become the other and in becoming that other they are immediately back to themselves as what they began.

What is here is Becoming now self-inverted as a whole Becoming becomes and moves from ceaseless fluidity and changeability to stillness and fixity and the sides in mutual opposition finalize themselves through ceasing to be as actualized settles itself to Nothing and coming to be as actualized settles itself to Being. To put it another way when Becoming becomes, that is to say when it is permitted to actuate its operation free from being interfered with the thought must under its own impulse become stable and non-fluctuating for what moves only moves in virtue of it moving somewhere and hence all motion must resolve itself even if for a moment into a place in order that it be motion at all. Such self-sublation of both sides of Becoming and Becoming as a whole is first Being and Nothing and these in virtue of being no longer able to fall back into fluctuations without merely coming back to themselves stand within and juxtaposed to each other as a unity of both. Being is Becoming which has come to be and so already ceased to be Nothing and Nothing is Becoming that has ceased to be and so has ceased to be Being and so again we stand back and observe this constancy of inconstancy whereby what is is not Becoming, fluctuations, yet Being and Nothing as inseparable and constant, as immediate unity that has vanished its intermediary and so is this unity as Being which is equally non-Being at once and so the Being and Nothing that are now next to each other and inseparable in truth are that which Hegel designates existence.

Being as we now understand it only seemed to be and what is is not Being but Existence, the Being of non-Being and the non-Being of Being which is to say the Nothingness of Being and the Being of Nothingness and behind the first immediacy which enticed thinking by being posited as the truth without anything left over we discovered that so much remained that we could not rest in the illusions of one-sided immediacy as such for we now know that the immediacy is immediate merely in virtue of there being two entangled in the rhythmic movement of what is just as a mirage vanishes upon approaching it so too has Being disappeared as the immediacy that we first observed from a distance in the beginning whereby we drew near and we engaged with it and similar to misty illusions it gave up its truth while we apprehend it and that which is is imperishable for it is ubiquitous and even in Nothing. What is the case is inescapable and what is is existence and that which exists is that which comes to the fore from the indeterminate blinding light or darkness for we see as much in pure light as in pure darkness and in so coming to the foreground it is by not being this background.

So what is it that is emerging here? The split of the realms of the ought-to-be and the world-that-is is becoming somewhat frail for just as a mirage is not the case the immediate world of experience displays itself continually to not be the case either, that is the world that is for us in common terms is in fact what we all know to be a world that is not and those that appeal to this immediate world of the senses, those who appeal to the mere seeming of the state of the world’s affairs, are not pointing to the true being of this world. They indeed are unjustified in their claims that what is ought to be in virtue of them not even clearly apprehending what truly is, and yet here we have not yet reached the self-creating identity of Being and what ought to be, here we have merely arrived at the immanent and necessary consequence that what is is existence, but ought it be existence? Ought it be anything else? If what things ought to be were already what they were then the ought would be redundant to requirements yet were what is is not in some way already what it ought to be then the ought would be an impossible abstraction whose projection on the world would be a mental fiction.

 And so on to the determinacy of Something. With Existence in the Logic there is a formal appearance to the development whereby the concept of Existence up to Something is replete with explicitly self-referential operations that are discovered neither in the chapter before it nor found in the sections after it and while only three genuinely operatively different concepts come into operation the manner by which these concepts relate to each other is somewhat complex and difficult to represent diagrammatically. Existence is as much as it is not and it is this unity hence Existence accentuates and privileges its being, its sheer immediacy, and conceals its nothingness, it simply is. Insofar as existence is, however, it is not to the extent that it comes unified with Nothing beside it. Being exists precisely because it is not the Nothing juxtaposed to it and the explicitness of non-Being which is within this unity’s being, or the non-being which it is, is determinateness. That which exists is in virtue of its negative relation to an opposite and in the widest sense Existence is Being that stands out from the indeterminate background of immediate Being and Nothing and the distinction of Existence and Determinateness is expressed in a somewhat complex manner whereby Existence and determinacy are both the being of the unity of Being and Nothing. But they are also different which is made evident through the manner by which these concepts are distinct for us in common language. Existence not only has an accent on Being it is practically as synonymous with it and so Existence refers to Being as immediate and almost as if without reference to Nothing but it is explicit in not being Nothing and Existence in common parlance is taken as indicating a purely positive being against an implicit negative even when that negative is the void of Nothingness itself. Determinacy, however, is Nothing which is not juxtaposed to or along with Being but is Nothing taken up into Being explicitly. Existence explicitly expresses merely this necessary duality of Being and Nothing as bound to shadow each other and determinateness expresses the explicit binding of Nothing, non-Being, as internal to Being itself and in the immediacy of determinateness as such determinateness is quality in general.

 (Pear and Rose), from 'Les Moyens d'Existence' ('The Means of Existence'), 1950, René Magritte. 'EXISTENCE, n. A transient, horrible, fantastic dream, / Wherein is nothing yet all things do seem: / From which we're wakened by a friendly nudge / Of our bedfellow Death, and cry: O fudge!'' - Ambrose Gwinnett Bierce, (1842 – c. 1914), 'The Devil's Dictionary'.

In the immediacy of existent determinateness, quality is reality as the immediate unity or being of determinateness and it is negation as the immediate distinction or non-Being of the unity of determinateness, which is to say, reality is the identity of the unity of Being and Nothing and negation is the difference of the unity and hence Quality is determinate only through being real and negated but it is no longer mere quality just as it is not mere determinateness or mere existence. It is now existent existence, determinate determinateness, qualified quality, or negated negation and this being of the unity of reality and negation is something, the immediate being which is taken as having the implied meaning of being-in-itself in that here what is in existence is existence itself.

 And so from Something to Limit or Restriction. Insofar as something is it exists and insofar as it exists it is qualified and distinguished but the immediacy of Something delivers to us merely the poverty of this determinacy, something existent is not simply reality but reality which is in addition just as negative and hence just as something is a real unity it is also a negative distinction, and the negativity of something, the distinction concealed in the positive face of immediacy, is that it is as not being the unity of reality and negation, it is their distinction, and this non-Being of something is the otherness which it opposes to itself as its unreality or negation, for something’s existence requires its negation of an opposite in order to step forth as something, hence something is the other of this otherness and yet in being this immediate other it loses its being as something and is the abstract other.

Otherness, being that it is other, is not initially the other of something but only the other of the other which opposes it and this other is itself, the other, hence it does not go outside itself as other in this relation or movement, but remains within itself for the other outside it is the other, itself, yet if otherness returns to itself only as the same it thereby fails to be other, it is not distinguished at all, and so it only displays itself to be something, the unity of that which is self-identical and in-itself. But if in being other it is other to the other, in being this it is opposed to itself as other to otherness and so does not return to itself as other, but as something, that to which otherness is external as otherness. Hence Something and other fall into each other while also distinguishing themselves from each other as mutual others which are independent only on their surface.

As separate and distinguished Something and Other are being-for-other in their mutual otherness and non-Being and this mutual non-Being is from each side the non-Being of the opposed non-Being, that is Being by not being Nothing, reality by not being negation, something by not being the other. And when Being-for-other itself is it is merely in operating its own logic upon itself, and what, pray, is the Other which Being-for-other is other to? Another Being-for-other which negates it yet just like Otherness it falls immediately into its opposite, and if it remains itself in this movement we discover that it remains within its concept and so it is no Being-for-other but rather Being-in-itself. If it is Being-for-other opposite a true being-for-other what is this first to which the other is negatively for? Being-in-itself. Just as something is the necessary consequence of the Otherness of the other, Being-in-itself is the necessary consequence of the self-Otherness of Being-for-other. Or to put it another way in Being-for-other the implicit condition is that there is an otherness to which a thing is other to for were this not so there would be no Being-for-other at all and so the Other to which there is an Otherness to has a Being which is not collapsed into and by the other, a Being-in-itself.

As immediately unified reality in Something Being-for-other and Being-in-itself are determinations in that this unity is the recollection (Erinnerung, a crucial Hegelian concept), of Being-for-other as the identity with Being-in-itself as the total process of the dialectic, as negation of negation, for what is in-itself is this Being-for-other. This concept makes explicit that what is in something is also its Being-for-other, that is that insofar as it is-for-other it is to that extent in-itself precisely as the non-Being of this Otherness, or in other words, as the Being-for-other of Being-for-other. As a reality and as in Something determination covers over its inherent negativity and appears only as the positive immediate. To have the determination to be X in this context is not to invoke the concept of determinism but rather it is a statement that something is within us and not as an abstraction of an indeterminate in-itself but as a Something which definitively holds itself against the external world and furthermore actively resists this external world’s setbacks on the realization of this determination. To have determination is to declare one resistant if not imperturbable and indifferent to the Otherness of the world.

But if what is in something is in it it also for that very reason distinguishes itself as inner from something as outer and so it is other to it, is not truly in it but is outside it and this is confirmed by empirical experience in the very fact that we experience our inner lives as external to ourselves when our conscious will and unconscious desires and mental events do not cohere. Determination as the determinateness of Being-in-itself taking up Being-for-other thereby passes of its own Existence into its Otherness, into Constitution, for what is in something now can only be by virtue of what is outside it, by negating this Otherness thereby becoming an Otherness itself. But as Constitution Being-for-other has outside it Being-in-itself yet this distinction is precisely the otherness of Being-for-other in which what is is by not being and thus Being-in-itself is not outside Being-for-other precisely because it is the Being-for-other of it, and so it is in it but that which has in it what is for other is Determination.

Once again the dialectic is recollected and Determination and Constitution’s cycle is apprehended as Limit and Limit is unusual in that unlike something its immediate accent is not of Being, but of non-Being. Through Limit Something sets the non-Being of its Other, but in doing so it also is impinged with non-Being by this Other which is itself Something and so is itself Limited. And in virtue of the Other being Something and the Something is just as much an Other, as Something both confront their true Other in the Limit which determines and constitutes them alike and at once as their Being through non-Being. Something both is and is not through the Limit, is in and outside it, and yet this is exactly the reason for the Limit being the true Other, for Something discovers its Being and non-Being inside and outside this Limit and while not immediately this Limit it nevertheless is only through its internally negative relation to the Limit. The Other however is already known to already be internal to Something and thus the Limit is not outside it nor originating from an alien power but within it as its own creation. In the absence of the Limit something and other fall away as indistinct and return to existence in general and the limit falls just as much outside something as it does within it and is itself limited by the Something which it splits apart into the constituted and determined each appearing as two sides outside the limit, as others, and so equally as somethings. As such Something discloses the Limit as internal to it and the Limit discloses itself as the negative unity of Something with Something, that is. of Something with itself. The Limit as limit is only as the negative unity of Something and Other, of Determination and Constitution, and so falls apart as them, and this dialectic recollected the limited Something is the concept of the Finite as such.

The Finite as such is contradictory for it declares itself as non-Being, a stance that privileges the negativity of Something as inherently limited and that comes to be and ceases to be. The Finite if first determinate as Restriction and Ought. In brief and to speak more plainly Restriction is the concept of something negated by its Limit, and the ought is the Something’s Determination which sets itself as the positive against and beyond this limited Being. To translate into everyday terms as what is is not what it ought to be and stands restricted in becoming it what ought to be likewise is restricted in not being what is. The Ought is held to be a superior truth, a higher reality in comparison to what is, ans yet the Ought is also restricted to non-Being just as much as Restriction itself is.

The negative unity of Limit and Something’s determination is Restriction for here Determination refers negatively to its Limit as internal yet Other to itself a reiteration of the initial logic of Something as Otherness that is Other to Otherness and the immediate unity of Determination and Limit wherein Determination is itself a limit to Limit, Limit here references itself in this reflexive operation, the unity wherein they are identical and positive self-reference which is in-itself is the Ought, a reiteration of the logic of Something that has Being-in-itself as positive Being against Being-for-other as a merely negative Being. Expressed thus the development may be correct and yet it is not true to the concepts as immanently linked to each other. Restriction, being that it is restricted, must be restricted by an Other and this Other that is immediately juxtaposed to it as its seeming positive, for Restriction is evidently stressing the Negative, is the Ought. This can be illustrated by imagining the surface of a rubber balloon (I shall resist the temptation of going into Microsoft Paint to draw a balloon) restricting the air within it while the air also restricts the rubber surface and which is the Restriction, and which is the Ought in the balloon is entirely a matter of perspective.

Restriction itself, insofar as it is is itself restricting of an opposing other as well as restricted by it, that is in being limited it also limits what limits it, but if Restriction remains itself in being constituted by this other Restriction it is then not restricted by a limiting Other for the other is itself, Restriction, and so what restricts Restriction is Restriction itself, it is then not constituted at all, its other is merely itself, and it in fact has this Otherness in-itself as its own self and so its restriction stands as its determination. Determination is a positive inner content, and Restriction being restricted passes over to the other, Restriction, only to return to itself again, and so it discloses that it, Restriction, in actual fact is what it ought to be precisely as Restriction. Which is to say when a Restriction is restricted and not absolute it must pass through and over itself as a constituting Limit, as Restriction, and so transcends itself as Restriction, displays itself to be within itself all along and thus it is in-Itself and not constituted and yet is the positive Being that is what it ought to be and to be restricted is its positive Determination and what it ought to be.

If Restriction were immediately absolute it would be unrestricted since it would not be bound through Existence to a Negative other, it would have no Limit and thus would no longer be Restriction at all, it would not exist, but if Restriction is or is not, it exists, and it is Something confronted with the Other as Limit and Restriction is what it is precisely because it is restricted by the Ought beside it, however this ought is likewise restricted by Restriction which in turn appears as the Ought to the Ought and what is is restricted and ought to be other than it is, but what ought to be likewise ought to be other than it is as a non-Being, it should be what is, and thus it is restricted precisely because it is not already what is, what it ought to be. Both restriction and Ought are mutually limited and limiting and yet if Restriction truly is what it is then it is restricted and not absolute and thereby it passes over itself into its beyond and the Ought likewise passes over into its beyond as the restricted negative existent. Ergo, what is is now what ought to be and we have derived the Ought from what is.

'Phantoms in the Studio – Despair', between 1883 and 1885, Piotr Stachiewicz. 'Natural consciousness will show itself to be only the Notion of knowledge, or in other words, not to be real knowledge. But since it directly takes itself to be real knowledge, this path has a negative significance for it, and what is in fact the realization of the Notion, counts for it rather as the loss of its own self; for it does lose its truth on this path. The road can therefore be regarded as the pathway of doubt , or more precisely as the way of despair'. - Hegel, 'The Phenomenology of Spirit'.

Some examples are in order to make things clearer. A propos the concreteness of movement from Restriction and The Ought Hegel writes:

'The ought has of late played a major role in philosophy, especially in connection with morality but also in metaphysics in general, as the final and absolute concept of the identity of the in-itself or of self-reference, and of determinateness or the limit. 'You can because you ought'. This expression, which is supposed to say a lot, is implied in the concept of the ought. For the ought is the transcendence of restriction; restriction is sublated in it, the in-itself of the ought is thus identical self-reference, and consequently the abstraction of 'being able'. – But, conversely, 'you cannot, even though you ought' is just as correct. For the restriction as restriction is equally implied in the ought; the one formalism of possibility has in it a reality, a qualitative otherness, that stands opposed to it, and the connection of each to the other is a contradiction, and thus a 'cannot' or rather an impossibility'.

- Hegel, 'The Science of Logic'

And furthermore:

'If, however, a concrete existence contains the concept not merely as abstract in-itselfness, but as a totality existing for itself, as instinct, life, sensation, representation, and so forth, it itself then brings about, by itself, this transcendence and this transcending. The plant transcends the restriction of being a seed, similarly, of being blossom, fruit, leaf; the seed becomes the developed plant, the blossom fades, and so forth. In the grip of hunger, thirst, and so forth, the sentient is the impulse to transcend this restriction, and it does transcend it. It feels pain, and to feel pain is the privilege of sentient nature. Pain is a negation within the sentient’s self, and this negation is determined as a restriction in the sentient’s feeling just because the sentient has a feeling of its self, and this self is the totality that transcends the determinateness of the negation. If the sentient did not transcend it, it would not feel it as its negation and would have no pain. – But reason, thought, is not supposed to be able to transcend this restriction: reason, which is the universal, which is for itself the beyond of particularity as such, that is, of all particularity, only is the transcendence of restriction. – To be sure, not every transcending, not every transcendence beyond restriction, is a true liberation from it, a true affirmation; even the 'ought' itself is this kind of imperfect transcending, and so abstraction in general. But the mention of a totally abstract universal is sufficient to counter the equally abstract pronouncement that restriction cannot be transcended, or, again, the mention of the infinite in general is sufficient to counter the pronouncement that the finite cannot be transcended'.

- 'The Science of Logic'

The plant transcends its restriction as seed and the thirsty animal transcends the restriction which manifests as thirst, all of this occurs every day effortlessly on the part of Nature never mind on the part of Spirit which means that upon something truly appearing as a limit, that is as a restriction, it is because the being which feels and is conscious of this restriction is already at an ontological level beyond such restriction, and further, the restriction is manifesting so that it be transcended into its ought. Were the plant seed fully what it ought to be then it would not be restricted and would have no impetus to become anything more but precisely because restriction would not arise immanently, for it it would also fail to be what it ought to be, perhaps not as seed, but as the realization of absolute being,  free and self-determining.

It is here with the Finite as such that the recalcitrant Limit that putatively eternally divides the is and the Ought is brought to its absolute divide and absolute collapse and what is and what ought to be are indeed not one, cannot be one, and will never be one and the same. The restricted as restricted is what it ought to be and yet the Ought as what ought to be is restricted by positing itself against the restricted existent and what is becomes what it ought to be precisely because what it ought to be is internal to what it is and what it is is the becoming of what it ought to be. There is no requirement for consciousness to force anything upon Being so that it traverse existence to the Infinite for the seed is what it is only in the fulfillment of its conditions of soil and water and precisely because these trigger the activation of its true being does it develop into the mature plant by no external force. A seed ought to grow into a tree and precisely because of this it will but precisely because of this it has not and may never do so. As the Ought the tree it is immanent to it but as the finite stage of the seed it is restricted from immediately achieving this fulfillment at the moment of the seed.

The negative side of the unity and identity of Restriction and the Ought, however, is that what is truly limited cannot for that very reason ever overcome this Limit but this judgment and state of Being is only for a truly finite thing and when something or someone, a conscious subject, is fully bounded by a limit, this limit will never come to exist for it in its perspective. The stone will never experience its immobile and silent life as a restriction or a manacle, the idiot will never experience their idiocy as an object of awareness, and a Covid virus will never experience their lack of mental states as an issue. Such a limit which does not appear is an infinite limit and the beyond of this restriction, the Ought which it should be, shall for this reason never come to be in this restricted Being. Nature ought to be conscious and free but it is not and will not be so long as it remains mere Nature but Nature for this same reason shows that it ought to be precisely this restricted Being for if it were capable of being more it would of its own nature rise above it. Conditions have arisen in Nature however,for conscious and thinking beings to attain embodiment with brains fit for universal free cognition and they are the proof that Nature was always already capable of more just as Being is not mere immediacy and in virtue of Being being in truth dynamic Becoming what is has no problem in becoming what it ought for what it ought to be is that becoming of its purpose and within Being is what ought to be. ____________________________________

'How pleasant it is to have money'

by Arthur Hugh Clough (1819 - 1861)

As I sat at the cafe, I said to myself,

They may talk as they please about what they call pelf,

They may sneer as they like about eating and drinking,

But help it I cannot, I cannot help thinking

How pleasant it is to have money, heigh ho!

How pleasant it is to have money.

They may talk as they please about what they call pelf,

And how one ought never to think of one's self,

how pleasures of thought surpass eating and drinking,

My pleasure of thought is the pleasure of thinking

How pleasant it is to have money, heigh ho!

How pleasant it is to have money.

'The Miser', ('The Old Bailiff Woman'), Balthazar Denner, (1685 – 1749)

She said, I'm sorry, baby, I'm leaving you tonight

I found someone new, he's waitin' in the car outside

Ah honey, how could you do it

We swore each other everlasting love

She said, well yeah, I know, but when we did

There was one thing we weren't really thinking of and that's money .....

Coming up next:

Infinity

To be continued ...