The Inevitable Diminishment of Gaza

Graphic above from CNN displays how Israel is progressively killing internet connectivity across Gaza as part of its "siege."

It got me thinking: From Israel's perspective, it needs to out-punch Hamas right now -- to show that, no matter what Hamas is capable of, Israel can top that, rendering strategically meaningless any such effort. Hamas refers to the IDF as a "paper tiger"? Well, then you need to bring out the real one.

That's the proximate requirement -- completely internal, with no real direct role for the US outside of supply, intelligence, and related coordination.

The ultimate requirement is to signal more broadly across the region the same basic message: However far you (Iran and its proxies) are willing to go right now, we're willing to go far beyond that. In this external dynamic, the US has a role to play as offshore balancer (carrier groups). Ideally, Israel accomplishes this on its own without US help (worst case: we do some air strikes to scare off Hezbollah in the north), but why not take advantage of America's safety net when the going gets really tough? And things are going to get far tougher ...

Those are the basic requirements, and when you toss in the national trauma factor (worst loss of Jewish life since Holocaust), which clearly recalls America's response to 9/11 (worst attack on US soil since Pearl Harbor), then we've pretty clearly entered the territory of very big and impactful responses. Otherwise, what's the point of the Israeli state?

Meanwhile, Israel's publicly-stated requirement (destroying Hamas) is a good rallying cry but one that's hard to imagine actually unfolding. That insurgent force has largely gone to ground for the beating to come, with leadership having left the Strip by all accounts. We have to expect some level of left-behind resistance, but those will be largely pawns sacrificed to make Israel's efforts as costly as possible.

So, if Israel can't really hope to "destroy" Hamas, then what can it accomplish here to signal to both Hamas and the larger Iran-led regional cohort that this recent surprise attack will actually fail to achieve something of value?

To me, the disappearing internet suggests the path: Gaza itself is made to disappear as a problem set. For Hamas, that would be a heavy price to pay, forcing it down another path. But from Israel's perspective, it can make some genuine sense.

I mean, how can Israel ever go back to Gaza being what it was?

You can say, the goal should be limited to restricting Hamas' ability to operate out of there and to eliminate its leadership there. But both of those goals are hard to imagine without eliminating or significantly diminishing Gaza itself.

There are two vectors along which we could contemplate Gaza's diminishment: vertical (governance status) and horizontal (sheer geographic size). Those two vectors would give us four potential paths:

1. No vertical and no horizontal diminishment: Return to pre-attack situation while somehow denying Hamas renewed local leadership. This is hard to imagine being acceptable to Israel, as it would be an illusory victory at best. All you'd be doing here is the usual "mowing the lawn" bit, which is what got you this outcome in the first place, many will say.
2. Vertical diminishment without horizontal diminishment: This feels like military occupation and some form of martial law for the foreseeable future. This is the instinctual path but one without a good exit strategy and likely to be slow and painful for all involved. Plus, when you're done, what have you really changed if you end up giving Gaza back to some internal controlling element likely to be overrun by a resurgent Hamas?
3. Horizontal diminishment without vertical diminishment: This would involve squeezing Gaza down in territory and annexing the rest. This starts to look good by comparison. You keep pushing the population southward as you clean out the Strip, north to south. Once you've reduced the Strip to a fraction (one-half? one-third?), you tell the trapped population that they're free to make do with that or leave (completely or transfer over to the West Bank) -- logically giving some portion a chance at a life in Israel proper once they are approved in some review process. Harsh and certain to elicit blowback throughout the region, but, again, if you want to signal bad, then this would accomplish that.
4. Both vertical and horizontal diminishment: Basically, a lockdown in a smaller "open-air prison" (a frequent descriptor long applied to the Strip). This to me is the boldest and most radical move, but, if that's what you're looking for here, this is what it looks like. You slice down Gaza into something far smaller and you deny it self-rule for the foreseeable future.

I would have to expect that, the harsher the choice of the four paths, the more Israel would have to offer some "give" with regard to the West Bank. Whatever those concessions are, they could be signaled quietly to outside powers like the US, Europe, and China to assuage their fearful reactions to the harsh choice made.

Again, I just don't see how Israel can be satisfied with some sort of "cutting the grass" variant here, because it just won't work and nobody in Israel is going to buy it as a solution. Thus, the return to the pre-attack situation is completely untenable, putting the other three paths in play, the question being, How far does Israel want to go in out-Hamas-ing Hamas at this point in history?

My guess is, pretty damn far and beyond.

My advice would be the same, along with the admonition of speed in execution.