IRGC and Iranian Unrest Delay JCPOA Revival

Negotiations to revive the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) have been stalled in their final stages since March. There are a number of geopolitical issues delaying finalization. However, among the primary reasons given regarding why Iran has not yet accepted its terms is that the US refuses to lift its designation of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corp (IRGC) as a terrorist organization. Statements have been made from Iran both supporting and dismissing that issue as one of the final sticking points. However, understanding the Iranian position regarding revival of the JCPOA, and the IRGC’s role in it, requires contextualizing the deal’s implications within Iran’s current political and economic circumstances. 

Protests over political corruption and economic mismanagement

Protests over fuel and food prices, water and heating shortages, and other issues stemming from government corruption and mismanagement are nothing new in Iran. However, they are currently at a relative high point. Just this May, bus drivers went on strike demanding wage increases. Unwilling and unable to meet the strikers’ demands, on May 17 city officials closed the schools and government offices, unconvincingly citing high levels of pollution as the pretext. 

One week prior, on May 11, protests had erupted in cities across the country in response to the government's announcement that it was cutting its subsidies on food staples. This action sent prices of eggs, milk, and cooking oil up 400% overnight. To try to impede the organization of massive demonstrations in response, the government cut the internet in cities with protests. 

On May 23, a tower under construction suddenly collapsed in Abadan, a major southwestern port and oil refinery town. As thirty-four bodies were removed from the rubble, additional protests erupted around the country calling for an investigation and blaming government corruption for failing to protect the workers. 

The government’s response to all of these protests has been brutal. The IRGC and its local Basij militias, tasked with suppressing the unrest, have reportedly shot and killed a handful of demonstrators over the past several weeks, and arrested many more.

If the government of President Ebrahim Raisi were to announce the revival of the JCPOA while these protests were ongoing, the news of this major diplomatic achievement, with enormous and positive economic potential would be drowned out by calls for his death, as well as that of Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamene’i.  

When the government announces the revival of the JCPOA, it will want to take a victory lap, squeezing as much political legitimacy as it can out of the deal. It would be difficult to claim to have begun the process toward economic salvation while the streets were filled with people protesting the cancellation of subsidies for food staples.

Furthermore, when it announces the revival of the JCPOA, the government expects establishment factions opposed to the deal to express their own disapproval. 

IRGC Opposition to the JCPOA

The most significant institutional supporter of the regime to oppose the JCPOA is the IRGC. It has several reasons. 

Economically, opening up the country to global markets would create market opportunities for Iranian companies. This would infringe upon the monopolies held by the IRGC’s collection of conglomerates. As a result, the IRGC would lose market share and be forced, over time, to become price-competitive.

Presumably, once sanctions are lifted, the government would authorize the legal expansion of the market to handle foreign demand and allow the population the chance to participate. Doing so, however, would undermine IRGC influence in Iran’s national security structure by reducing economic reliance on the black market, in which the IRGC is heavily involved, ironically both participating and combating. From a political standpoint, removal of US sanctions in line with the JCPOA would also reduce the effectiveness of the Guards’ propaganda trope that the US, through sanctions, is responsible for the country’s economic and diplomatic isolation. 

Ideologically, the IRGC opposes Western cultural influences, fearing that increased global trade will flood Iranian society with foreign social mores. As a result, their societal influences would be weakened as the country would be exposed to concepts which the IRGC is unprepared to combat.  

Additionally, the IRGC does not trust international inspectors, believing them to be cover for Western spy agencies. It also wants Iran to achieve nuclear weapons proliferation, which the JCPOA is designed to prevent. 

Since the IRGC is responsible for “protecting” the regime, reviving the JCPOA will likely erode its morale and willingness to suppress anti-regime government movements. However, the IRGC is nothing if not pragmatic. 

Ultimately, the Revolutionary Guards derives its power from the Islamic Revolutionary regime. It will therefore acquiesce to the deal at the order of Ayatollah Khamene’i. After all, the JCPOA has the potential, if handled properly, to help preserve/restore the government’s legitimacy, and stave off the efforts of opposition groups to overthrow it and the regime. By protecting the government’s acceptance of the JCPOA, the IRGC will be effectively protecting itself as an institution. In light of the current protests, its leaders are therefore likely leveraging their influence with government officials and regime advisers in order to strengthen their positions in exchange for their support once the deal is finalized.

Conclusion

Having come to power through violent revolution, the Islamic Revolutionary regime is acutely aware that it is safer to make “concessions” from positions of strength, than out of desperation in response to widespread unrest. In order to earn political legitimacy from the brokering of the revived JCPOA, it will first need to quell the unrest and stabilize the political atmosphere. Only once it has done that, will it be in a position to rely upon the IRGC, which opposes the deal and is currently embattled on the streets, to hold the line.