It’s Not the Beginning of the End. But It is the End of the Beginning

For months, I have raised critical concerns regarding the possible, even probable, stealth weaponization of deadly pathogens to be used in efforts to disable the US and its allies—or worse, destroy the fabric of our existence. In an article to follow, I argue that significant movement in this direction has already occurred. 

No person of sound mind disagrees that we must sustain a “reasonable level of biosecurity” here and abroad that prevents not just physical injury but mental/psychological injury to workers and their family members. 

As always, the base questions are: 

1. What constitutes a “reasonable” level of biosecurity?
2. When must that appropriate amount of biosecurity be in place and fully operational at each level of business and society (a) macro (international), (b) national, (c) regional, (d) state, (e) enterprise, and (f) micro (household)?

Regrettably, in the US, at least currently, this is a zero-sum game for political, social, and cultural reasons. Americans are unwilling to spend more. 

I have repeatedly argued publicly that nuclear security preparedness is needed “just in case.” But it has already been established at many more times than required to deter our enemies.

However, I realize the same political, social, and cultural forces will prevent significantly lowering the spending on “continuous massive upgrading” of the nuclear part of our national security arsenal. 

Neither others nor I can change that now. So, the only feasible strategy for tipping the scale even slightly in the direction of biosecurity preparedness is creating demand from our leaders, especially our “more at-risk” healthcare leaders.

This is a prelude to my fundamental arguments:

1. The over-50-year-old strategy of creating an enormous stockpile of nuclear weapons to be used at a massive scale in a crisis needs to be updated. It is obsolete. With a high degree of certainty, none of this stockpile of doomsday weapons will ever be used. They can readily be sourced and retaliated against. So why add to it?
2. Lobbyists for our nuclear weapon manufacturers will viciously oppose moving even 1% of the annual national security budget from atomic security to fulfilling our biosecurity needs, even though this is critical to the nation’s and world’s interests.
3. A massive number of deadly pathogens capable of being weaponized have recently been stolen from a lab. Solutions to America’s and its allies’ needs must be deployed and fully activated soon.
4. The only remaining solution is to convince as many of America’s political, union, trade association, banking, insurance, and other business leaders, workers, and their spouses as possible to take a strong stand now to protect their interests through bio-preparedness.

It’s not the beginning of the end. But it is the end of the beginning.