Market Multiples of Preproduction Gold Projects as of September 1, 2021
Crazy year. Covid rages on with new multiple variants, stock markets making new highs, restaurants can’t find workers to stay open, housing prices through the roof, the Jan 6th peace march runs amuck, conservative commentators succumb to the phantom virus, store shelves empty of bleach and horse dewormer, commodities begin a bull-run, inflation rears its ugly head, US asks middle east BFF to raise output to keep oil prices at manageable levels, shale has a rebirth, ESG goes mainstream, the Afghanistan “live in the moment, don’t plan ahead evacuation”, EU declares US a high risk covid country, Texas circumvents Row v Wade, Hurricane Ida gets the last word, and gold down 4.23% on the year to close at $1818.10 per ounce August 31, 2021. Crazy year indeed.
P/NAV seems to be a misunderstood metric: it’s the value the market is willing to pay for a non-controlling interest in a development stage gold asset. While NAV alone is the theoretical value of an asset before a buyer factors in all the things that could happen, need to happen, and will happen for that project cash flow to be realized. They are two different things: P/NAV reflects the reality of what the market will pay, NAV reflects the optimum risk-free case for a development stage project. Not to further confuse, but the in-situ total of M, I, I ounces and or the in-situ value of the resource in the ground DOES NOT reflect the purchase or acquisition cost for a willing buyer. Repeat the last sentence 10X.
While on the subject, suggest that P/NAV charting could also be used as a diagnostic tool for compensation committees to assess how a development stage management team is performing relative to a true peer group of companies. High relative P/NAVs reflect management performance and bonuses well earned; low relative P/NAVs indicate underperformance and perhaps a future house cleaning. Compensation committees, you are on P/NAV notice and managements need to change their messaging: less time on espousing the compelling nature of the investment opportunity because of underappreciation compared to peers and more time highlighting management efforts to de-risk the granting of permits by inclusive discussions with First Nations groups, and adoption of dry stack to mitigate tailings risk failure with concurrent reduction in water demand. ESG is mainstream and if you want to get your permits mind your Es & Ss.
Through all of this the value of North American PEA stage gold projects with forecast annual average gold production < 250,000 oz per year (at $1600 gold) comes in at 22.1% P/NAV for US projects and 18.2% P/NAV for Canadian projects. Interestingly, the more advanced North American PFS & FS stage gold projects show a valuation jump to 37.4% P/NAV, suggesting in this environment it is prudent to invest, drill and advance projects to the next stage and that the Lassonde “Orphan” period perhaps is overly pessimistic in the current gold bull market. And South American projects with average forecast gold production of < 250,000 of per year trade at a 10% to 27% discount P/NAV compared to the North American PEA stage market, which may reflect the underlying differences in risk-free jurisdictional rate embedded in the NPV calculation.
Project A-Tax NPV / LOM Capital (the “Profitability”) continue to perplex and mystify. While North American PEA stage gold projects with forecast annual average gold production < 250,000 oz per year calculate average Profitability of 125.3%, Canadian 135.5%, South American at 194.4%, the larger more advanced PFS and FS stage gold projects in North America have near breakeven average Profitability of only 105.3%. Assuming a constant $1600 gold price, the later group represents an at-the-money call which would require higher gold prices to make a profit. Why such interest in these projects?
We see an increasing influx into the sector of promoters and brokers rotating on from prior successes in the real estate and commodity booms. Be careful, their fundamental understanding of the underlying asset class is low, and often their business practices are suspect.
Valuation Methodology for the Junior Gold Sector
In the gold mining industry, it is common for analysts to consider an after-tax 5% real discount rate in conjunction with a net asset value (“NAV”) multiple to value an asset or company. More precisely, where a NAV multiple of less than 1.0 captures the incremental risk relative to the 5% real discount rate and a NAV multiple of greater than 1.0 implicitly ascribes value to upside. The NAV multiple fluctuates with metal prices, value increment attributable to management flexibility to slow or accelerate mining operations in response to metal prices, and the likelihood of mining for longer periods or at higher volumes than determinable from known reserves and resources which may result from further exploration and discovery of new mineable material.
Project De-Risking and Discounts
The value computed based on a 5% discount rate and an application of a NAV multiple is referred to as the Price/NPV5% ratio and at a given gold price deck provides a first level ranking of project and company relative valuations. For our purposes, “Price” equates to Total Enterprise Value (TEV):
Price (or TEV) = (share price x shares outstanding) – (cash and cash equivalents) + (debt)
Methodology
As every jurisdiction has its own unique permitting issues, political, operational, and other risks, I decided initially to keep things simple and restrict the analysis to: 1) mining projects located within Canada and the USA with < 250,000 ounces of annual AuEq production, 2) PEA’s that were published in the last 5 years, 3) a consensus analyst gold forward price deck of $1600 per ounce, 4) an effective corporate income tax-rate of 25% to convert before tax margins to after tax if required, 5) exchange rates of 0.75/1.00 CDN to US, 6) “risked” resources at 100% measured, 66% Indicated, and 33% Inferred, and 7) use the actual reported capital costs, operating costs, gold recoveries, as documented in NI 43-101 reports and resist the temptation to modify the particulars or add in the usually missing owner’s or financing costs required based on my own experiences to get the project into production.
48 gold projects were reviewed: 1) 13 at the PEA stage in the US (6 in NV, 1 AZ, 2 CA, 2 ID, 1 WY & 1 AK), 2)13 at the PEA stage in Canada (2 in YT, 2 BC, 4 ON, 2 NL, & 3 QE), 3) 14 at the PFS/FS stage in North America, and 4) 8 projects in Latin America. It’s assumed that the projects with mine plans and published NPV’s comprised most, if not all, of the related company’s TEV and no additional value was given in the analysis for resources delineated or potential of other properties.
PEA Valuation
Of the 13 PEA stage gold projects reviewed in the USA:
Of the 13 PEA stage gold projects reviewed in Canada
The mean and standard deviation are graphically displayed on the accompanying charts as diamond shapes (orange for Canadian gold projects, blue for US gold projects):
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Next let’s compare a diverse group of development stage gold projects at PFS & FEAS stages in North America and some South American projects with the series of Canadian-US PEA stage gold projects. Note the wide valuation spread of the North American PFS & FEAS megaprojects, with 4 (Donlin, Valentine, Back River, Eskay Creek) showing market NAV multiples exceeding 45% of NPV5%, for projects not yet financed or even under construction! As well, note the discount shown by the South American projects, perhaps reflecting underlying differences in risk-free jurisdictional rate embedded in NPV calculation.
PEA Risk
Of course, projects at the PEA stage still carry considerable “development” risk. Time and money still need to be invested in these projects that is above and beyond that detailed in the PEA studies to successfully advance through Lassonde’s “Orphan Period”. As well, there exist a number of risks that could derail the project’s timely development including failure to acquire the social license to operate, management inabilities to perform and cultivate a market following, permitting delays, capital and operating cost creep, geologic misinterpretations, process/scale up risk associated with moving from the metallurgical test lab to the real world, financing and access to capital difficulties, etc.
Profitability Index
It is worth noting that company presentations comparing in-situ grade or M, I, & I contained ounces only further confuse and don’t provide any meaningful insight into profitability as extraction costs (both capital and operating) and mineral recoveries can vary greatly from project to project. Notwithstanding that all of the projects included in the chart above currently trade at significant discounts to NPV5%, they still require significant amounts of capital to be brought into and sustain commercial production, and then complete a closure plan. For our purposes, “Profitability” equates to Return on Investment (ROI):
Profitability (or ROI) = (A-Tax NPV 5%) / (Life of Mine Capital Investment)
Note that LOM Capital Investment includes not only the initial capital to construct the project, but both sustaining capital to keep the operation running and net closure costs. It’s a "conservative" analytical approach to take, but then again gold mining is a risky business. If "mine profits" are in fact going to be required for reinvestment to keep the operation going, there is less free cash flow available for exploration, acquisitions, or distribution to shareholders.
Of the 13 PEA stage gold projects reviewed in the USA:
Of the 13 PEA stage gold projects reviewed in Canada:
Next let’s compare the projected profitability of the more advance PFS & FS stage gold projects in North America and a sampling of those in South America with the series of Canadian-US PEA stage gold projects.
Note the large number of well-known North American gold megaprojects that look to be marginal investments unless gold prices rise or significant resources can be upgraded from inferred into the mine plan. Assuming a constant $1600 gold price, the later group represents an at-the-money call which would require higher gold prices to make a profit. Why such interest in these projects?
Source of Data
I welcome your comments and please contact me if you have any thoughts on future studies and or analysis you would like to see. I can be reached at jschneyer@capstonepartners.com
Full Disclosure
These are not stock recommendations. Do your own research before investing in junior gold mining stocks. Gold mining is a risky business: caveat emptor. In the interests of full disclosure, the author of this article is an advisor to the board of directors of GMV Minerals Inc. and may receive compensation.
Independent Natural Resources Analyst (oil & gas and gold sector focus)
3yJoel, Great analysis that I hope all our mining connections read. Any thoughts on why strategic M&A has all but dried up despite the junior gold sector being in a severe bear market over past year (far more than seemingly warranted by the gold price decline). I have two theories: 1) current projects are not nearly as robust as advertised or 2) mining CEOs are reverting back to their pro-cyclical ways waiting to buy when things are hot again.
CAN WE DO THIS A BETTER WAY??
3yRepeat 10 times after me!! Good advice thanks Joel…
Thanks Joel, very informative!