Modeling Petro after May 1st

Consider how the events of May 1st play into President Petro’s set of incentives (in case you haven’t heard, President Petro’ addressed a large crowd of supporters during Colombia’s Labor Day, was loudly cheered by the crowd, and went on to make his most radical speech so far; demonstrations were held in other cities too, partly as a response to the anti-government massive April 21st protests).

First, let’s consider incentives:

1. Arguably, President Petro’s strongest incentive is his view of himself as a historic, transformation leader of the Colombian people. Not really a normal President, not a chief executive, rather a figure of transcendent significance. 
2. Connected to this we have his view of governing, not as the task of running the affairs of the Executive branch, but rather as being the agent of such historic transformation. In that sense, executive performance becomes less important than the quest for transformation. 
3. President Petro seems to have a significant craving for admiration, both as an intellectual, but also as a political leader. Cheering crowds are a strong incentive for his actions and his behavior. This of course connects with our first point: addressing a large, cheering crowd confirms (in his view) his status as a historic leader of the Colombian people. 

The President, then, will probably conclude that radicalization is paying off for him in the following ways: 

1. It confirms his view of himself and his government. 
2. It activates his supporters, even moderate ones who had been growing disappointed in the past months because of the perceived chaos in the Petro government. 
3. Radicalization helps to make sense of that chaos. It helps excuse the lack of results of the administration. “Nobody said it was easy”, read the t-shirts worn by members of his government in the May 1st march. The view of the country as strongly captured by powerful elites who will not just let go easily, not only helps make sense of inefficacy in government, it almost makes it look heroic. It’s a struggle that will take time. 

In this framework, what should we expect from the President in the following months?

1. Greater radicalization, mostly symbolic and rhetorical. He’ll continue to crave the rush.
2. Efforts to find ways to change Colombia’s constitution, if not in an overtly illegal or violent manner, through subtle extra-institutional procedures (all of them bound to fail, nonetheless causing trouble in the process). 
3. Regarding legislation in Congress, a dilemma between going more radical and facing failure, or embracing the possibility of succeeding by admitting a degree of moderation in some cases (e.g. pension reform, healthcare reform). I believe this is far from decided, and will be a source of confrontation between the President and some of his ministers. 

The President will nonetheless encounter problems: 

1. Rhetoric only gets you so far (part 1): You only reach a section of the population, which will probably shrink gradually. Things could well get to a point where only hardcore believers, almost fanatical ones, are left listening.
2. Rhetoric only gets you so far (part 2): After every speech he’ll have to go back to being the President of the country, like it or not. Results are expected from him and his administration. Underperformance will continue to grow as a problem for his government.
3. Rhetoric only gets you so far (part 3): Being an essentially emotional mechanism, rhetoric is bound to have rapidly diminishing marginal effects. That is, the audience will probably be less excited and less energized every time. Remember when Petro took to the balcony every night after having been dismissed as Mayor of Bogota: the first day the square was full, a few days later the crowd was sparse. 

Consider now our simple model in which, in a complex democracy such as Colombia, getting things done requires compromise and moderation, and radicalization produces inefficacy. Given that, we should:

1. Expect the President to focus almost exclusively on symbolism and messaging. Expect him to disregard the executive tasks of government even more. 
2. Expect the President to escalate his calls for constitutional reform.
3. Expect bouts of radicalism in legislation, in some cases seeking the failure of the bills in order to prove a point about how power works in Colombia. 
4. Expect Ministers and other government officials to face growing pressure to be more true and loyal to the cause. Expect the Minister of Finance to struggle to maintain sound policy in the face of growing pressure. At some points, he’ll have no choice but to bend a little. 
5. Expect the President to escalate his claims that an attempt to oust him from power is underway. This will help him re-energize his base from time to time (remember, rhetoric has diminishing effects over time, you have to come up with something new to keep enthusiasm high). 
6. Expect the President and the entire government to focus more and more on the 2026 election. This will also help re-energize the base (at least part of it), and in a way will help make sense of the failures of the administration (by claiming time is short and pointing to a goalpost down the road). 

Red flags:

• Minister Bonilla leaving office. 
• Some kind of announcement that a constitutional reform process will officially be started. Given the fact that doing it by legal means requires time, procedures, and majorities that the President doesn’t have, he’ll be most likely to launch it as an extra-institutional initiative (probably tied to peace negotiations). And, given the fact that this will most certainly face strong public rejection, political turmoil would be certain to grow. In this context, the President would enjoy playing the role of a fighter of the people against the well-off classes who, in what is likely to be the framing of the situation, oppose constitutional change.