My interview with Vijay Gokhale: A paranoic China may open opportunities for India

Vijay Gokhale needs no introduction. An astute China watcher and a bestselling author, Gokhale’s new book, After Tiananmen: The Rise of China, is receiving rave reviews. It fills a critical gap in understanding of China from India’s perspective. Since retirement from his career as a diplomat spanning nearly four decades, Gokhale has penned two more books, The Long Game: How the Chinese Negotiate with India, and Tiananmen Square: The Making of a Protest. A prolific columnist on everything related to China, Gokhale also teaches at a university in Pune and is a nonresident senior fellow at Carnegie India. The former foreign secretary took some questions from me on the recently concluded 20th party congress of the Communist Party of China (CPC) and Sino-Indian ties. Here goes:

Last month a rumour raged through India that Xi Jinping has been upstaged in a palace coup. It was baseless, but the rumour curiously proved sticky and gained legs in India where the media obsessed over it for nearly two days, driven mostly by social media chatter. Do you agree that it reflects the fact that there is poor understanding in India of China’s political system, and we need to get better at it?

Although China is a significant neighbour with whom we have a troubled relationship, there are relatively few well-researched writings about developments in China that are accessible to the Indian public. The public discourse is episodic and tends to sensationalize news about China. We, therefore, depend on western writings to interpret China for us. It is of great importance that we cultivate Indian perspectives about China based on deep research, by encouraging the small but growing group of young researchers to explore various facets, both historical and contemporary. This will happen only when the larger ecosystem, including the national security structures, the media, business and industry recognize the value of such research and are willing to finance it.

Much has already been written about Xi Jinping’s move of lining up the CPC Central Committee, Politburo and Politburo Standing Committee with his trusted men. Do you think this cornering of absolute power by Xi — moving away from even a semblance of collective leadership — leaves him vulnerable since there won’t be anyone else to blame if things go south? What does this prospect mean from a policy perspective?

Personnel changes are important in any system, but in the larger perspective what is more important is that CPC general secretary Xi Jinping has political control. From a policy perspective this means that there will be a further centralization of authority and top-down direction of policy. In my new book, After Tiananmen – The Rise of China, I argue that the twin policies of decentralization and competition were responsible for the unleashing of massive entrepreneurial forces that led to China’s spectacular growth in the period from 1990 to 2010. The more restrictive and centralized decision-making that general secretary Xi has introduced, might constrain these forces and, consequently, impact on China’s domestic and foreign policies. That having been said, the world has underestimated China’s leadership in the past 40 years, and it should not be presumed that greater controls will automatically lead to a precipitous decline. However, when a once predictable political system with norm-bound succession rules is replaced by the uncertainties that inevitably arise when individuals dominate, the chances of a smooth transition are less, and hence the risk of political turmoil in China further down the road should be factored into any analysis.

China likes to claim that its political system is driven by meritocracy. Given the fact that absolute loyalty to Xi Jinping seems to be the calling card for getting a seat at the high table, how credible is this claim? Has Xi lowered China’s global stock?

For the past 40 years the Communist Party of China has devoted attention and resources to recruiting well educated and technically qualified persons. To that extent the Chinese political system is run by professionally competent people. However, as Deng Xiaoping’s vision of reform-and-opening up through decentralization of power is being supplanted by Xi Jinping’s credo of a centralized unified leadership, political loyalty appears to have risen above professional qualification is terms of promotion to higher office. The recent appointments to the Politburo and its Standing Committee bear witness to this trend. One should not be quick to presume that this lowers the ability or competence of the new leadership. It remains to be seen whether the stress on political loyalty will reduce the drive for bold reform and decision-making.

For the first time in decades, a minister of state security, who’s also a former spy chief, is in the Politburo. A police chief has found place in Central Secretariat. What, in your view, does it signify that Xi has promoted two security officials to the upper echelons of the CPC? Does he sense a growing internal threat?

The inclusion of more members of the national security community in the Politburo and Secretariat reflects the concerns articulated by Xi at the recently concluded party congress that there is, as yet, “inadequate & insufficient response capacity” of the national security framework for tackling major risks. He thinks that “external attempts to suppress and contain China may escalate at any time”. The inclusion of party members from the national security structures reflects Xi’s desire to harden the system to thwart any attempts to challenge the party’s hold on power. That having been said, a growing sense of threat might also produce paranoia which, in the medium to long term, affects economic activity and innovation. This is what we need to look out for because it opens opportunities for India.

What is your take on the Hu Jintao incident? Do you interpret it as a benign, health-related issue or something more sinister? Would you agree that either way, it symbolizes the formal end of factionalism in Chinese elite politics?

Given the opaqueness of the Chinese system, it is not clear at this time as to why Hu Jintao left the podium on the penultimate day. The Communist Youth League faction, of which Hu Jintao was also a member, has been steadily losing ground since 2012. This does not, however, mean the end of factionalism. A reading of the party history tells us that factionalism is systemic. Even Mao was unable to fully control or eliminate them. We simply do not know enough about internal political dynamics within the party to conclude that the 20th congress symbolizes the formal end of factionalism in Chinese elite politics. New factions will form in due course as potential successors to Xi jockey for power.

Xi’s work report to party congress stressed on a faster move to stronger, world-class military force to ‘win regional wars’. Should India interpret this as a cause for immediate alarm?

The modernization of the Chinese military (PLA) began under Hu Jintao. Xi Jinping has continued the practice through significant reform of structures, operating methods and equipment modernization. There are three elements in his speech that bear close watching. His announcement that China will modernize its strategic deterrence suggests the beginning of a qualitative upgradation of nuclear forces. He has also talked of building advanced capabilities for ‘local wars’ which will have outcomes in terms of their capacities along their boundaries.

China is also systematically working towards having a semi-permanent naval presence in the Indian Ocean. There is no need to be alarmed. We need to be prepared.

What would it take for India and China to develop a new modus vivendi in bilateral ties?

I have said elsewhere that we have moved from the state of peaceful co-existence to a state of armed co-existence. This does not necessarily imply grave danger provided a new modus vivendi is crafted. Mutual trust is the basis for crafting such arrangements, and China must take necessary steps to address our concerns on the Line of Actual Control, as well as on long-standing concerns like the unsustainable trade deficit. Equality must be the guiding principle where mutual respect, mutual interests and mutual sensitivity are concerned. There is wisdom on both sides to craft a new modus vivendi, but it is difficult to set a time-frame as to when this may happen.