Nigerianism, Strategic Culture and the Military.

 By Dr. Kunle Olawunmi

 Introduction

Nigerian military has not often exploit the services of its brightest Officers. One of the major explanations as to why the Nigerian military has not been deploying its First-Eleven is cultural. Though not homogenous. Nigeria is deprived of the services of it’s finest and brightest officers owing to the ‘Federal Character’ scheme which is meant to bridge perceived weaknesses by some ethnic nationalities in Nigeria. Unusually, the Nigerian Army is not excluded from this peculiarity. The military either retire or decline to promote its finest and cleverest officers to strategic-policy level because of ethnic coloration or often due to their religious belief. To attain strategic position in the military, state of origin is a major factor, trailed by religious faith and next is political affinity. Therefore, Nigeria’s influence has continued to diminish because the state has elevated mediocrity over a merit-based system. 

Philosophy of Demerit

Nigeria is burdened by the philosophy of demerit and this is widespread across Ministries, Departments and Agencies (MDAs) of government. But, there must be a limit to the implementation of a policy, particularly when it jeopardizes national security. Indeed, nation’s culture can significantly affect the way an army functions and formulates its grand strategy. The argument that culture influences national security policy is grounded in classic works, including the writings of Thucydides and Sun Tzu and backed by other school of thoughts. For instance, since it’s origin in the 1980s, constructivists made us to understand certain aspect of international security studies. Though it is less a theory of security, but of a broader social theory; constructivists argue that security is a social construction. Infact, their emphasis on the importance of social, cultural and historical factors, implies that we people do recreate the world we live in endlessly. 

Cultural approaches to strategic studies have existed in various forms for hundreds of years and Clausewitz advanced these ideas by recognizing war and war-fighting strategy as “a test of moral and physical forces.” Accordingly, the merit of doing without the best in favour of a broader goal cannot be discountenanced in Nigeria. However, if even a small fraction of those retired or rejected due to ungainly policies were retained, the Nigerian military could perhaps compare favourably with India, Brazil and Pakistan in areas of technology, research and development and in other areas of medicine. Because of partisanship, strategic military industrial complexes such as Defense Industrial Corporation (DIC) and support sectors like Ajaokuta steel rolling mills have remained moribund. Thus, as the state approaches two decades of democratic culture, it is about time to drop some of these ideas as it affects its security forces, which could be likened to a soccer team. At the World Cup, the first eleven is often merit based in other to compete favourably with other world champions. 

If we also examine constructivism as a form of reflectivist critique of scientific approach to the study of social sciences and as a paradigm or worldview, we may concede to the fact that learning is an active, constructive process. If an army has the culture of promoting mediocrity, or cultivate a policy of ‘doing without their best and brightest minds’ - the Officers (learner) as an information constructor could create their own subjective representations of the objective reality. This support the socio-political theory’s view that emphasizes the social construction of national affairs as opposed to the neorealists claim that political space is shaped by the rational-choice behaviour of egoist actors. The negative side of the realists’ emphasis on power and self-interest is often their skepticism regarding the relevance of ethical norms to relations in states with multiple ethnic nationalities such as Nigeria. As such, the philosophy captured here as ‘Nigerianism’ essentially portrays an interpretive metatheory of this social construction that breeds dishonesty, profits a few and jeopardizes growth and development of the state. A thinking that stems from National Spirit conception (Volksgeist) proposed in an earlier paper. 

The Nigerian Factor

Deriving from above, Nigerianism emerged as a metatheory supported by 35 years experience in the Nigerian military. This exposure reflects an outcome that is unique on its own; bringing out the fact that citizens must constantly remain on the wrong side of the law to make progress. Since 2009 when the military handed over power to the civilians, it could be assumed and rightly too, that eighty percent of politicians that have tasted power would not have made it to such position in other countries. Nigerian Factor over time has become the case rather than the exceptions - a tradition or value, belief, principle, philosophy and culture, as the case may be – a syndrome that pervades every facet of socio-political life and often-present Nigeria as a country where anything goes. These distresses relations with other countries of the world and reduce the country into a classic “Musical Chair” that goes nowhere, but in loops. 

Contingent upon earlier assertion, the oddities of Nigerianism includes; Federal character, gender bias, ethnic diversity, religious chauvinism and cultural differences - particularly the feeling of superiority by an ethnic group over the other, corruption, prejudice, conflicts, insecurities including ‘Nigerian time’ mentality. All these have crept, slowly but steadily into the nation’s defense and security culture.For instance in 2014, after little progress on female cadet training at the Nigerian Defense Academy (NDA), that policy became a debate within the Services that female cadet program should be scraped altogether. The reason adduced was that few of the girls got pregnant during training. As the Director Navy Transformation in 2014, at the time of this fiery consideration, my attention was drawn to the file with a view to argue for or against the Army proposal that the idea of female cadetship be discontinued at the NDA. A careful study of the file revealed previous court-martialed offences of sodomy in the same institution. The punishment ranges from suspension, to dismissal and warning in some instances. Thus, I reckoned that if men could get pregnant, we could have had similar situation on our hands, moreover, sodomy is a heinous crime in Nigeria. I therefore argue in the Navy memo on the issue that NDA should have discontinued male cadet training altogether as the problem of sodomy was widespread during that period. In the first quarter of 2016, a similar incidence occurred at the NDA, and when I entered NDA for the investigation, I was glad to see that female cadets were competing favourably with their male counterpart in sports. It was their sports week. Only this time, the investigation was directed to the DHQ, by the Minister of Defense who was not pleased with high rate of expulsion of cadets from the NDA. The Commandant Major General X was under probe for doing his job. Many cadets came in through the back door despite poor medical conditions, leading to an unusual fatality in training. Here, the culture of who you know has gone too far and in my recommendation to the Minister of Defense, through the Chief of Defense Staff (CDS), I was very explicit and advised the Minister of Defense to allow the Commandant to do the job he was posted to the NDA to do. Thus, the dismissal of those cadets was upheld and I also recommended punishment for those compromised medical examiners. The military in Nigeria has become an adjuncts to some politicians and retired Generals that belief that the next place outside politics is to influence their dependents into the Nigerian military. It is therefore, simplistic in the Nigerian case, to think that strategic culture is just a set of beliefs, attitudes and norms towards the use of military force but moulded according to historical experience (Chappell, 2009). It should include the spirit of a nation.

A Triple Heritage – The National Spirit.

Though the concepts of political culture and strategic defense were stated in the works of Carl von Clausewitz’s On War in 1831 and Quincy Wright’s “A Study of War” in 1942, it is yet significant to underscore that the universal nature of the idea remains nebulous. (Clausewitz, 1831) During the Cold War, the paradigm of strategic culture surfaced as a particular security and military vision, which later became dominant in policy making. Of course there can be little doubt that nations are not alike in foreign relations and will not act in the same manner on similar disputes at all time. What is significant is how a country’s behavior affects its domestic policy and project her international image. Nigeria has thus presented itself as a people with distinct incongruity.

The Nigerian military posture towards the management of its recruitment, posting, promotion and retirement is a threat to national security. Of grave concern, is how the country has conformed to typify a psychological epistemology, which asserts that humans generate knowledge and meaning from their experiences. Nigeria by its mien is far from the definition of what a nation-state connotes and symbolizes. Independent states of Nigeria is made up of combinations of different ethnic nationalities and is uniquely saddled with a triple heritage, which exemplified Africa's mix of indigenous, Arab, and Western forces (Mazrui, 1987). Contemporary Nigeria is the product of three major influences: an indigenous heritage, Western culture, and Islamic culture. Nigerianism is a product of these legacies particularly in the way the people co-exist, and their impact on the continent and the people who were called Africans. As we engage with this African exceptionalism, we tend to incrementally ascribe to it an idiosyncrasy that set the continent aside and upholds the fact that strategic culture greatly differs from the universal theory of neorealism. 

In Nigeria, the Yoruba, Hausa, and Ibo all share the same nation. Ali Mazrui presents the country as example of an arbitrary partitioning of Africa by the imperial powers. The Northern Hausa have received traditional Muslim education. The Southern Ibo have received Western education. In Hausaland, the Ibo took the technical jobs and prospered. In 1966, there was an Ibo-led military coup. In revenge, Hausa killed many Ibo. Thus, many Ibo people returned to Igboland. Ibo then seceded from Nigeria, creating their own nation, Biafra. A civil war ensued, called the Biafra war. One reason for the war was the fact that petroleum was in Biafra. The British and the Arabs supported the federal side. Biafra survived longer than expected because the French, Chinese, and Israelis backed Biafra. Nevertheless, Biafran starvation claimed as many lives as the fighting. When Biafra surrendered, the victors did not delight. This feature and the advent of non-state actors in national and international conflict present different nuances to the discussion. Of course, the war on terror though international in outlook, occurs mostly within targeted state, and every country has unique ways of responding to such domestic security threats culturally. Not only this, a populace's shared history and experiences shape the way its political and military leaders react to any crisis by providing the context for their decision-making (Colin, 2006). For instance, the gun culture in the United States of America differs greatly from that of Singapore. North Korea’s foreign policy outlook is completely misunderstood by the West, and despite numerous active shooter scenarios in the United States, gun lobbyists have maintained a narrative that supports the gun culture – a microcosm of how the United States would reacts to external threats that affects its ideology, believe and philosophy. Though compelling, the notion of strategic culture has little impact in the manner Africans approach issues of threats to its security for so many reasons, including a combustive-mix of its triple heritage mentioned earlier. As such, progress toward the development of a unified theory of strategic culture remains flawed.

Yet, proponents (Katzenstein, 1996)have been concerned that culture remained “the explanation of last resort for arcane state behavior (Lucian,1997) Samuel Huntington in ‘Clash Of Civilization And The Remaking World Order’ (Huntington, 1996) - remark that differences would increase the likelihood of international conflict, as evident from the events of September 11, 2001, and the subsequent war on terrorism. While America went after the adversary without recourse to sovereignty clauses ‘an offensive defensive strategy’, Nigeria on the other hand continue to contain the enemy combatant within its territory with great caution and has to devise joint taskforces with neighboring states in extreme cases. Again, the place of technology in reducing attrition was a deliberate United States policy because of a political culture that entertains zero tolerance to war of attrition since the Vietnam War. Accordingly, the old culture of putting Officers and Men in harms way - as ensured during the Nigerian (1967-1970) Civil War, at the period of the Liberia and Sierra Leonean conflicts has ominously become the norm in the way the Nigerian government prosecutes the Boko Haram insurgency. 

This provokes three exploratory questions as regards strategic culture in Nigeria: The first question is why couldn’t we finish with the rebels in the North Eastern Nigeria quickly? Second, can a strategic cultural framework be applied to a non-state actor such as Boko-Haram? And thirdly, how valuable are cultural explanations of security policy in combating the menace.  Can state behavior be explained without reference to its culture or national character? 

National Character as Culture

For a decade and a half, Nigeria has been fighting the Boko-Haram upsurge without a clear success. Its counter insurgency efforts have endured frequent setbacks despite a Nigerian Armed Forces that is vastly superior to the dissenters. How does culture influences strategic decisions made by a nation’s leadership. This is the question the article attempt to provide answers as we focus on the eccentricity of Boko Haram insurgent in Nigeria. 

New developments such as democratic consolidation in a post-military dictatorship period, and the advent of Counter Insurgent Operations (COINO) have generated a requirement to think anew about the relationship between culture and strategic policy outcomes. This is more so, as Nigerian contingents seem to do well fighting insurgents outside its shores. The conduct of defense and foreign policies was more offensive in nature during the military period. Essentially, Nigeria was a member of the Frontline states during the South Africa apartheid regime and Nigerians exploit in Liberia and Sierra Leone in the 90s were equally proactive. In fact, the ECOMOG Operations was the first of its kind globally. It was an Offensive – Defensive strategy that reduces the refugee inflow from embattled Liberia and the Peace Enforcement mechanism was a Humanitarian viaduct. Nigeria during the military equally prosecuted Chadian operations very decisively (by Gen M Buhari) among others.  The article therefore, identifies a number of concepts that are associated with the development of literatures in this area. Particularly, because there is a dearth of analysis on how culture influences strategic decisions made by leadership in this country. Most relevant to this enquiry is what are the sources of these strategic cultures and how does national character influences decision making process?

Another intricate question that is overarching relates not to what types of actors are most likely to have defined strategic culture, but what influences their behavior. For instance, we shall look at the relationship between culture, strategy and security policy that emerged during the fight against Boko-Haram in the past 15 years. We shall examine strategic culture as raised by new paradigm of constructivism (Vygotsky, 1980) in security studies, which may not be applicable to the Nigerian situation - save that Nigeria often create its own subjective depictions of objective reality in the fight against the Boko-Haram element. 

There are several approaches to this study. Out of these, three main approaches stood out. The first relates to theoretical linkage between culture and national character. In this wise, culture supplements theories that centered on ethno-religious influences in state affair. The two (ethnicity and religion) blocs distinguish concepts of ‘state’ from that of a ‘nation-state’. Meanwhile in this clime, culture is considered a variable that may influence behavior; it is second nature to systemic pressures of nepotism. Secondly, in a homogenous geographical mien, culture is seen as a theoretical model that could be use to explain some, if not all, strategic behavior. In this sense, culture is an independent variable that could explain security policy much definitely in a ‘nation-state’. The third issue has to do with to what extent could culture be measured as an influence on policy.

 While culture is incredibly powerful, its influence in Nigeria is somewhat narrow and rooted in ethno-religious distinction of leadership across time and genre.  The diversity in the country and a unique culture of balancing, deeply influence permanence or lack of continuity in strategic culture in Nigeria. Yet, as we shall highlight later in this paper, a semblance of Nigerian strategic culture has endured from its military custom.

Before we scrutinize what focus strategic culture in terms of continuity or semi-permanence, it is central to engage with Clausewitz’s claim about the trinity. Interplay among three constituents that make up of a state including the people, its military and the Government has become essential in acquiescent to the Nigerian system. This is instructive so as not to gaffe the trinity as a concept in a largely homogenous European states such as Denmark, Germany and Norway to that of Turkey, Egypt or Pakistan that are comparable to Nigeria. As I mentioned above, there is a symbiosis between strategic culture and influence of the military and this could be evaluated from a stronger military inspiration on the Nigerian polity, unlike what is obtainable in many European states. 

Boko-Haram is Homegrown

It is important to recognize the origin of Boko Haram in Nigeria. Why do we have a homegrown Boko Haram insurgency in the first place? In comparism to home grown terrorism in the United States, we must realize the dialectics. Many commentators have attributed three premises to describe the Nigerian insurgents: The first is ideology, the second is economic and the third is political. The coefficient of these three rest on three symbiotic molds of Human Development Index, Democracy Index and Corruption Perception Index in Nigeria. These are completely at variance with a psychosomatic American case. 

Nigeria’s Triple Heritage and Strategic Culture

Nigeria inherited a combustive mix of a triple heritage typified by colonial Patrimonium, local tradition and foreign religion. The effect has been strong ethnic dichotomy, religious bigotry and unprecedented corruption level as political attributes. Thus, ethnic nationalities that rule Nigeria since 2003 comprising the South West (Olusegun Obasanjo) North (Shehu Musa Yar Adua) South-South (Goodluck Ebele Jonathan) and North (Buhari) have approach national security issues and challenges differently. Given credence to the supremacy of political culture in the quest to understand what influence strategic culture in Nigeria. The later (Buhari) though fighting corruption, has not succeeded in tackling nepotism. Because of fear of being overthrown in a coup d’état, the Defense structure and leadership is greatly tainted by prejudice. 

This often affects the implementation of National Defense Strategy and by extension strategic culture of dealing with the Boko-Haram insurgency. It also explains the overall lack of continuity or commitment to the Boko Haram scourge. The HDI is still slowly rising at (0.527, 2017) and the DI remains low at (4.44, 2017). Thus, if the CPIis being addressed albeit skewed, the strategic culture is still affected by the HDI and DI. Global Democracy Index report considers irregularities in elections, increasing atrocities against religious beliefs as well as other dissenting voices, according to the EIU.

An inept political class has compromised the military hierarchy particularly since the head of the three services and the CDS have to be cleared by the Senate, which is unprecedented in the history of the country. This dangerous leaning, impacted directly on military appointments and promotion across the three services. 

As the last hope of the strategic culture is being traumatized, the country may be heading in the iniquitous direction. Recently, a wrongly retired Police staff orchestrated the kidnap of his erstwhile commander for ransom. Many retired personnel in the three Services are alleged to be joining the insurgents in droves. Culture of nepotism could be said to characterize the Nigerian security clime. A culture that influence the way the armed forces conduct its strategy and therefore, a catalyst for unwarranted weakness and ensuing failure of the Nigerian state.

Hepatic Culture of National Security

A state is a triangle made up of the Government, Military and the People. The Government arm is made up of the Executive, the Legislature and the Judiciary. While the Judiciary has lost its independence to the Executive, tension has remained between the Legislative and the Executive arm in Nigeria. The area of contention is mostly in the way the Executive has chosen to wage its war against corruption. However, this is healthy for the Buhari’s government. Erstwhile president Obasanjo recently criticizes the government of Buhari of not aligning with the principle of national character in the appointment of Defense, Intelligence and security chiefs. The Legislators have been having a running battle with the appointment of the Economic and Financial Crime Commission (EFCC) Chief - it goes for the appointment of Director of the Directorate of State Services (DSS). The recent tumult is about the appointment of the Director General of the National Intelligence Agency (NIA). Aside that most of these appointees are misfit and grossly incompetent and corrupt – they are from the Northern part of Nigeria. Not just these, mostly qualified candidates often get retired to pave way for mediocrity and imprudence – a trend that has further undermined government institutions. Aside from insiders sabotage, apathy and subversion, the planning and direction of these important organs of security architecture is often skewed towards preserving the hegemon. National security is seen as preserving the presidency and his passion for tribal and Islamic agenda. The Fulani Herdsmen and crime of genocide is not only orchestrated by these cronies, but also seen as a way to preserve the Northern political agenda. The Boko Haram equally started this way before it was high jacked by other foreign terrorist organization. Thus, strategic culture of previous presidents of Nigeria since 2003 has followed similar pattern without exception. The Niger Delta militants were the work of Goodluck Ebele Jonathan cronies as a means of siphoning huge Federal resources and as a means to strengthen his position and grip on power to mention just a few.

Probably, 2019 could be the watershed in Nigeria as everyone has become wiser to these aforesaid schemes, it is a period of uncertainty, and pregnant with anarchism.