PART 4 CTI Sharing. Sovereign Cybersecurity: Safeguarding Australia's Critical Infrastructure

Trust, control, and resilience: These principles are paramount in cybersecurity, especially when it comes to protecting national critical infrastructure. This fourth installment explores why sovereign capability is essential for secure information sharing and a stronger national cybersecurity posture.

In today's interconnected world, the battleground for modern warfare has expanded to include the digital realm. Critical infrastructure (CI) - encompassing vital systems like power grids, water networks, telecommunications, and transportation - is now on the front lines. No longer shielded by geographical distance or traditional military defences, these systems are highly vulnerable to crippling cyberattacks that can disrupt economies, undermine national security, and jeopardise public safety.

Protecting CI from these threats demands a resolute commitment to sovereign cybersecurity, with sovereign data storage and operational security as paramount considerations. Here's why:

1. Uncompromising Control & Espionage Mitigation: Using sovereign servers ensures that sensitive CI threat intelligence remains within national borders, shielded from foreign surveillance and potential exploitation. This aligns with the principles of NOFORN (Not Releasable to Foreign Nationals), recognizing that CI data deserves the same stringent protections afforded to classified military or economic intelligence.

By prioritising sovereign cybersecurity and implementing robust safeguards for international information sharing, Australia can best protect its critical infrastructure, maintain national resilience, and navigate the complex realities of the digital age. In the world of classified national intelligence, the term NOFORN (No Foreign Nationals) is a security handling classification used by various government and military organisations. Given critical infrastructure is now the front lines of modern warfare, all cyber threat intelligence relating to critical infrastructure should be handled under a NOFORN classification and not viewed by any foreign government or foreign ISAC until Australia understands the CTI it is looking at and takes appropriate actions. NOFORN indicates that information is not to be shared with foreign nationals or non-citizens. The NOFORN marking is often applied to sensitive materials, such as intelligence reports, that are restricted to Australian personnel only, even if the foreign nationals are allies or have security clearances in their own countries. The classification is intended to protect national security by limiting the dissemination of sensitive information to foreign governments, organizations, or individuals who might not have the same security interests as the country imposing the classification.

2. Data Sovereignty and Legal Protections: Storing CI data on foreign infrastructure exposes it to the legal frameworks and potential vulnerabilities of those jurisdictions. Sovereign data storage ensures that Australia maintains legal control over its critical information, minimising the risk of unauthorised access or compelled disclosure under foreign laws.

3. Strategic Autonomy and National Resilience: Relying on foreign entities for CI cybersecurity creates a dangerous dependency that can undermine national autonomy. By maintaining sovereign control over data and infrastructure, Australia strengthens its resilience against foreign pressure or interference, ensuring it can act decisively in its own national interest.

4. Fostering Trust and Domestic Capability: Sovereign cybersecurity solutions foster trust within Australia's CI ecosystem. Knowing that sensitive information is protected within national borders and subject to robust domestic regulations encourages greater collaboration and information sharing among critical sectors. This, in turn, bolsters national cybersecurity expertise and capabilities.

Given these compelling arguments, Australia must prioritise sovereign solutions for handling and sharing CI cyber threat information. Entrusting this vital data to foreign entities, even within the framework of international ISACs, introduces unacceptable risks.

Any sharing of Australian CI CTI with foreign entities must adhere to strict protocols, including:

• Prior Threat Assessment: Information sharing should only occur after a thorough assessment of potential risks and benefits, ensuring that Australia understands the nature of the threat before sharing sensitive data.
• Robust Legal Protections: Binding agreements must be in place to guarantee that foreign entities handling Australian CTI/CTI are subject to stringent oversight, security protocols, and accountability mechanisms under Australian law.
• Data Minimisation: Only the minimal necessary information should be shared, adhering to the principle of "need-to-know" to limit potential exposure.

By prioritising sovereign cybersecurity and implementing robust safeguards for international information sharing, Australia can best protect its critical infrastructure, maintain national resilience, and navigate the complex realities of the digital age.

#Strongertogether #Leavenoonebehind

Australian Department of Home Affairs

Cyber and Infrastructure Security Centre

National Cyber Security Coordinator

Australian Signals Directorate

Australian Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade