PLAIN ENGLISH AND HOW TO ACQUIRE IT

Summary: It is about the books for writing in plain, simple English.

In the initial years, I was fascinated by Latin maxims, foreign words, and legalese—the complicated and obscure language of the legal world. I thought this was a measure of intelligence and was way to impress teachers, judges, and clients. Perhaps, centuries of foreign rule deformed my psyche, as it has affected nation’s character. We wrongly accept fairness to be measure of beauty and difficult language to be the level of intelligence. We forget that our Gods have always been dark; and simplicity, not only is elegant but is measure of intelligence as well. Only, intelligent people can write it.

With passage of time—the truth dawned—my fascination was over. I realised expressing in simple language, to be understood by common person, is the best way of communication. Good legal writing does not have to sound as though written by a lawyer. In this realisation, two of the greatest judges of the last century—one British (Lord Denning) and one Indian (Krishna Iyer J.)—played an important role.

During emergency, my father was detained under MISA, the preventive detention law. The High Court decided preliminary point of maintainability of the habeas corpus in our favour. The State took the matter to the Supreme Court. There were other appeals as well. They were decided against us in ADM Jabalpur v. Shiv Kant Shukla AIR 1976 SC 1207: (1976)2 SCC 521 (the Habeas Corpus case).

I was present in the Supreme Court during arguments. Some rulings of Krishna Iyer J. were cited. They were in favour of the detenues. However, they used some words that were not part of any dictionary. No one could explain their meaning. The court refused to consider them.

During the same time (January-February 1976), Lord Denning came to India and delivered four talks in different cities. I attended the one that was in Delhi. All judges, including the members of the bench hearing Habeas Corpus case, were present. The theme of the talk was, how judges in England maintained rule of law—even at the displeasure of the executive. It was, as if, he purposely chose the topic for Delhi talk and was admonishing them about the case. But, alas, it fell on deaf ears.

Lord Denning did not read from written text or refer to any notes during talk. He was fluent in his language; his style conversational; and language, plain, simple, and easy to understand. It is the finest talk that I have ever heard. It is still embedded in my mind.

The talk inspired me to read judgements and books of Lord Denning. I read all of them. He wrote in the short sentences and plain language. I tried to copy him; follow his style of speaking and writing. I don’t agree with some of his judgements and views. He had life peerage but had to resign because of his remarks that he regretted. But, do read books and judgements books written by him. They give very good idea, how plain and simple English should be written.

Lord Denning and Krishna Iyer J. were great judges. Perhaps, the greatest British and Indian judge of the last century. However, the former left much greater impact. He used plain and simple language and simplified complicated concepts. This is where Krishna Iyer J. lost. He not only used difficult and often invented words but also complicated simple concepts.

During my earlier stint as a lawyer, we used to run, a lawyers’ club called, ‘Samvaad’. Its main purpose was to organise talks. In 1990s, Samvaad organised a talk by Martin Cutts. It was an interesting talk, on how to write in plain English and communicate better. He has also written a book titled ‘The Plain English Guide’. It is worth reading, worth following.

During intervening years, I read more than a dozen of books on how to write in plain and simple language. In substance, they say:

1. Think about others (your readers and hearers);
2. Use active voice;
3. Avoid negatives;
4. Omit surplus words;
5. Use short sentences; 
6. Break the page with paragraphs;
7. Punctuate carefully;
8. Don't use Latin, foreign or difficult words—write to express and not to impress; and
9. Avoid unparliamentary language.

Among the books that I read, there are many good ones. But if I have to recommend one, then ‘Plain English for Lawyers’ by Richard C. Wydick is the one to read. It covers almost entire area. Each chapter explains a point and has exercises. The answers are provided in the end. You can always check, how much, have you understood the point.

The other good book worth reading is ‘Eats, Shoots & leaves’ by Lynne Truss. It is about punctuation. The book cover has picture of a ‘panda on a ladder’ in between ‘&’ and ‘Leaves’. He is trying to erase the comma between ‘Eats’ and ‘Shoots’. The comma between them connotes one meaning and its absence, an entirely different meaning. This indicates value of punctuation.

One of the mistakes that I used to make (perhaps still do) was of tense. It required revision of grammar. I purchased three ‘Cambridge English Grammar books’ (Essential, Intermediate, and Advanced). They are self study, practise books with answers. They are useful. The best thing is that on left page, they explain the rule with examples. The opposite right page has exercises, with the answers in the end. You can check, whether you have properly understood the rule or not.

The other mistake that I used to make was in using definite and indefinite articles. This was commented by friends, who read my articles written for general public. I understood the problem only, when I read ‘Garner’s Dictionary of Legal Usage’.

You speak and write—as you hear and read. While explaining the word ‘Articles’, Garner says,

“It is convention in legal writing to omit both definite and indefinite articles before words such as plaintiff, defendant, petitioner, respondent, appellant, and appellee. It is almost as if these designations in the legal writing have become proper nouns, that denote the person or persons.”

I was influenced by the legal convention and was applying it to my general writing. This book is also a must, in every library. Consult it, to understand proper use of a word; or if you are in doubt.

Legal world prefers to express itself in legalese—the language that is obscure and not easy to understand. Simple, plain language is not a virtue here. But, who says that you cannot acquire it: you just have to make efforts.

(The following two appendices are part of judgements of Krishna Iyer J. and Lord Denning. See the difference in style and how easy is the one, written by Lord Denning)

Appendix-1

The following paragraphs are part of a unanimous judgement written by Krishna Iyer J.. It is reported in Fatehchand v. State Of Maharashtra 1977 (2) SCR 828; AIR 1977 SC 1825; 1977 (2) SCC 670. It involved with validity Maharashtra Debt Relief Act, 1976. The first paragraph below refers to the problem, the next to the reason and the last the conclusion:

“The distance between societal realities and constitutional dilettantism often makes for the dilemma of statutory validity and the arguments addressed in the present batch of certificated appeals and writ petitions evidence this forensic quandary. Likewise, the proximity between rural-cum-slum economics and social relief legislation makes for veering away from verbal obsessions in legal construction. A constitution is the documentation of the rounding faiths of a nation and the fundamental directions for their fulfilment. So much so, an organic, not pedantic, approach to interpretation, must guide the judicial process. The healing art of harmonious construction, not the tempting game of hair-splitting, promotes the rhythm of the rule of law.

...

We have no hesitation, in our hearts and our heads, to hold that every systematic, profit-oriented activity, however sinister, suppressive or socially diabolic, cannot, ipso facto, exalt itself into a trade. Incorporation of Directive Principles of State Policy casting the high duty upon the State to strive to promote the welfare of the people by securing and protecting as effectively as it may a social order in which justice—social, economic and political—shall inform all the institutions of the national life, is not idle print but command to action. We can never forget, except at our peril, that the Constitution obligates the State to ensure an adequate means of livelihood to its citizens and to see that the health and strength of workers, men and women, are not abused, that exploitation, moral and material, shall be extradited. In short, State action defending the weaker sections from social injustice and all forms of exploitation and raising the standard of living of the people, necessarily imply that economic activities, attired as trade or business or commerce, can be derecognized as trade or business. At this point, the legal culture and the public morals of a nation may merge, economic justice and taboo of traumatic trade may meet and jurisprudence may frown upon dark and deadly dealings. The constitutional refusal to consecrate exploitation as 'trade' in a socialist Republic like ours argues itself.

...

A concluding caveat. The poignant purpose of ending exploitative rural-urban lending to the weaker members of society is the validating virtue of this legislation, viewed from the constitutional angle. But, as Shri Nariman at some stage mentioned—and the learned Attorney General also concurred—mere farewell to existing debts is prone to prove a teasing illusion or promise of unreality unless the Administration fills the credit gap by an easy, accessible and need based network of humane credit agencies, coupled with employment opportunities for the small man. The experience of the past has not inspired adequate confidence.”

Appendix-2

The following paragraph is from a judgement by Lord Denning in Deeble v. Robinson [1954] 1 QB 77. It sets out the fact and point involved in the case.

"Mr Deeble has a milk round. He sells milk to people at the doors of their houses. He runs his business from a dairy building where he keeps his equipment, refrigerator, spare milk bottles, and so forth, and a stable where he keeps his horse and float. His round is seven streets adjoining the premises. He does not actually have a shop as ordinarily understood. His lease of these premises is coming to an end, and he wants to stay on there. This depends on whether the premises come within the definition of a ‘shop’ in the Leasehold Property (Temporary Provisions) Act, 1951."