The Race Between War and Diplomacy: From the Red Sea to the Mediterranean

Electoral pressures are piling on President Joe Biden's Democratic team, making it impossible for him to endure further humiliating blows from the Houthis in the Red Sea and the Popular Mobilization Forces in Iraq without mounting a response. Yet the Biden administration has been keen to convey to Iran that military escalation against some of its proxies does not imply a shift towards a full-fledged war against Tehran. Containing the conflict in Gaza and preventing its escalation into a regional war remains a shared objective that the Biden administration is earnestly and actively pursuing. Oman continues to serve as a crucial backchannel for US-Iranian communication not only to discuss bilateral issues but also regional arrangements. While Iran, for now, plays no direct role in these arrangements, there is implicit Iranian knowledge and approval as part of ‘dual guarantees’. 

Before delving into the diplomatic efforts of the Biden team in the Middle East last week, which included engagement on Lebanon and not solely the Gaza conflict, it’s important to first analyze the developments in the Red Sea. The United States and Britain have now carried out airstrikes on Houthi sites in Yemen, targeting the infrastructure supporting drones and missiles in retaliation against Houthi military operations in the Red Sea that threaten international navigation. 

This unfolding situation carries major economic and geopolitical implications. The Houthis, under the pretext of solidarity with Gaza, have intensified attacks on ships and tankers in the Red Sea, directly endangering the safety of maritime navigation. The statement from the US Central Command (CENTCOM) said that the strikes against the Houthis aimed at undermining their capabilities to continue such attacks. Importantly, the statement said the US-British strikes were unrelated to Operation Prosperity Guardian, which comprise over 20 countries operating in the Red Sea, Bab el Mandeb Strait, and the Gulf of Aden. 

CENTCOM’s statement held the “Houthi militants and their destabilizing Iranian sponsors” responsible for the attacks on international shipping. The Pentagon then underscored the military action sent a clear message to the Houthis that they will bear further costs if they do not end their illegal attacks. For its part, Saudi Arabia called for restraint and de-escalation in the Red Sea and Yemen, while the foreign ministers of Saudi Arabia and Iran continued their discussions on ways to develop bilateral relations and address regional developments. 

International reactions, for the most part, expressed understanding towards the US-British strikes, with the exception of Russia, which called for a United Nations Security Council session. The global majority is concerned about the potential impact on the world economy if Houthi attacks on international navigation persist but there is apprehension about a potential US-British confrontation with the Islamic Republic of Iran, accused of providing the Yemeni Houthis with weapons, missiles, and drones, either directly or through African countries. 

Economically, the surge in oil prices from the heightened tension and military escalation in the Red Sea could be the goal behind the Iranian and Russian implicit support for Houthi operations. Both nations desperately need higher oil prices; China has curtailed its oil imports from Iran in recent months, and Russia urgently needs an oil price boost to fund its Ukrainian war. 

Arab oil-producing countries are concerned for their oil fields and refineries, and do not want to be the ones who pay the price of war. Moreover, Saudi Arabia is particularly vigilant about its relations with Iran, especially during this delicate phase and the UAE, Kuwait, and Bahrain also aspire to cultivate positive relations with Iran, alongside Oman, Saudi Arabia, and Qatar. 

A pivotal question here is whether it is Iran as a state or entities within the Islamic Republic of Iran that are fueling Houthi aggression targeting international shipping. Alternatively, it could be that the Houthis, much like Hamas, have chosen to deviate from Iranian oversight, acting independently and on their own terms. Iranian reactions merit meticulous observation, particularly considering the key messaging conveyed by the US-British strikes against the Houthis in Yemen to the concerned entities within the Islamic Republic of Iran. 

Most probably, Iran will express political condemnation and protest, but will stop short of plunging itself into a military confrontation in the Red Sea. But danger will persist in the Red Sea and on the Lebanese-Israeli border until Iran makes a clear decision regarding the containment of the Houthi situation in Yemen and Hezbollah in Lebanon. Nevertheless, this does not negate Iran's silent yet pivotal role in regional arrangements that could prove decisive. 

The current phase in the efforts to contain the Israeli conflict in Gaza and prevent its escalation into a regional war involves American and Arab ‘dual guarantees’: Their objective extends beyond merely securing temporary ceasefires or transitional vacuum but seeks a long-term settlement for the Arab-Israeli conflict, particularly the Palestinian-Israeli conflict. While Saudi Arabia leads these efforts, the core of them revolves around Arab assurances on the Palestinian side in exchange for American- European guarantees to the Israeli side. The essence of the proposal lies in the idea that, alongside guarantees offered by the United States and Europe to Israel regarding its security within the framework of a two-state solution, Arab countries pledge similar assurances regarding the State of Palestine. This ensures that Palestine evolves into a peaceful and prosperous state coexisting with Israel. Implicitly, the aim is to achieve dual deterrence, transitioning the Middle East from a region of unrest into a stable region aspiring to coexistence and prosperity. The fear of a regional war isn't the sole driver behind these proposals; rather, the goal is also to pre-empt a new wave of global extremism and terrorism if permanent solution efforts falter. 

Before delving into the intricate details of these proposals, note that Turkey is playing a role behind the scenes, albeit with the primary focus on dual guarantees—American and Arab. Indeed, Turkey is a significant player in dealing with the Hamas movement within any Palestinian equation, alongside Qatar. 

The discussion centers around an Arab coalition offering guarantees related to Palestine. One obstacle may lie in intra-Palestinian relations given the historical disputes among Palestinian factions and movements. The Palestinian reconciliation necessary for any future Palestinian state is an Arab responsibility, as per the Arab coalition's vision of ‘dual guarantees’. There is a firm commitment that, in exchange for the United States guaranteeing Israel's acceptance of a two-state solution and the establishment of a Palestinian state, Arab guarantees for Palestinians and Palestine as a peaceful state would be unequivocal. 

Another big dilemma lies in the Israeli doctrine that rejects the establishment of a Palestinian state alongside Israel and opposes the two-state solution. This poses a vital challenge for the United States. What the Biden administration aims to emphasize in its proposals is that the reward for enduring peace for Israel is far more valuable than the costs of wars and the siege mentality. There is Arab and Islamic readiness backed by unequivocal guarantees that sustainable peace will lead to prosperity and a qualitative leap in the lives of people in the Middle East. 

But if Israeli obstinacy against the two-state solution persists, and if Israel insists on involving the United States in a war with Iran or other conflicts, the American people will not approve, irrespective of whether the administration is Democratic or Republican. This is the main message that Israel is getting from the Americans. 

In other words, what Israel is hearing from the Biden team is that expanded and exceptional security guarantees for Israel will ensure its security, while Arab guarantees will ensure its prosperity, but it’s all contingent on its acceptance of the two-state solution. 

Right now, from the devastation in Gaza due to Israeli actions, and the displacement of over a million Palestinians, to the illusions and equations of Palestinian victory or defeat, and Houthi and Arab one-upmanship—it's evident that everyone is teetering on the brink of an abyss. Lebanon remains in the eye of the storm, despite somewhat moving away from the precipice and edging towards a miraculous escape. 

The current race is between the path of war and the intensive diplomacy for Lebanon, led by Amos Hochstein – appointed by President Joe Biden and Secretary of State Antony Blinken, and closely coordinating with Brett McGurk, the man overseeing the Middle East file at the White House and who is focused on the hostages held by Hamas and Palestinian prisoners in Israeli prisons. Blinken is working towards stopping Israeli military operations in Gaza as swiftly as possible. Simultaneously, he is capitalizing on his meetings with Middle Eastern leaders to push for sustainable solutions, stating from assigning them with the responsibility of halting the chaos and confusion in determining who represents Palestinians in Gaza. 

There is an ongoing discussion about testing transitional arrangements for the administration of areas in northern Gaza under the supervision of unarmed international forces to monitor any ceasefire until permanent negotiations are settled. Various ideas are being proposed with the aim of expanding efforts to halt bloodshed, prevent destruction, and address the de facto forced displacement in Gaza. 

On the Lebanese front, the interpretation of Hochstein's visit, based on conversations with informed sources, leads to several conclusions, while it's noteworthy that Hochstein visited Israel and Saudi Arabia before his visit to Lebanon: Firstly, he stated that no one desires war, including within Israeli society, which has retreated from its enthusiasm for war relative to the immediate aftermath of October 7. Secondly, the race between the option of war and the option of diplomacy is not open-ended, but the Israeli government is willing to give a specific deadline based on the implementation of Resolution 1701 and Hezbollah's retreat to 10 kilometers beyond the Blue Line as a goodwill gesture to halt Israel's aggression. This is considering that Israel has previously demanded Hezbollah's withdrawal to north of the Litani River. 

Hochstein's meetings with both Speaker of Parliament Nabih Berri and Prime Minister Najib Mikati were not mere courtesy visits; rather, they delved into important details. Speaker Berri, like Prime Minister Mikati, was involved in demarcating maritime boundaries, which Hochstein has facilitated negotiations on. They are keen on resolving differences to fully amend the Blue Line between Lebanon and Israel in accordance with Resolution 1701, and not partially. Additionally, Berri is close to Hezbollah, and he can act as a messenger between the two parties. 

Military experts, part of Mikati's team, joined the meeting with Hochstein with the goal of emphasizing Lebanon's positions related to the 13 disputed border points. They also aimed to exchange opinions on how to address these points, noting that discussions were ongoing before the Gaza war through the tripartite military committee involving Lebanon, the United Nations, and Israel. 

Today, the proposal is to not completely freeze the diplomatic option until after a complete ceasefire in Gaza, as demanded by Hezbollah, but to continue reviving diplomatic prospects then fully implement Resolution 1701 during any humanitarian ceasefire in Gaza and negotiations on hostages in Qatar. These negotiations may take a transitional period of three months, assuming diplomacy prevails over war in the fateful race between them.