Redistribution and Recognition.

Since the start of the 21st century, debates about #justice have become structured around a divide between two competing conceptions of what justice demands. According to the first of these paradigms, the central injustice in the world today stems from #inequality and #exploitation, an injustice that should be remedied by #redistributing society's material resources. 

The second paradigm shifts the focus from material inequities to issues of #identity and #culture. On this view, injustice stems primarily from the domination of some racial, national, or cultural minorities by others. Rectifying injustice in this paradigm requires recognition and respect for the groups that have been marginalised.

These two paradigms of justice/injustice are not incompatible with one another, but how exactly do they fit together? Should policymakers and activists prioritise one over the other? I have debated these issues by reflecting on the work of the foremost theorist of #social justice: Nancy Fraser.

According to Michael Arfken, recognition and redistribution are two key concepts in critical theory that are often seen as being in tension (Arfken, 2014).  Recognition refers to how individuals and groups are valued and respected within society, while redistribution refers to how resources and opportunities are distributed among different groups. Some scholars have argued that recognition and redistribution are complementary goals that can work together to achieve social justice; others have suggested that they are fundamentally at odds with one another. (Markell, 2009). 

Nancy Fraser's works are a fusion of recognition and redistribution concepts. She questions the recognition definition to make it more practical and closer to redistribution (Frazer, 1995).  

My reflection on Frazer’s writings led me to reflect that her recognition theories present culture as the main factor behind all social criticism, which I think is problematic. It leads to a social monism, where culture solves all claims and conflicts.  

It is vital to acknowledge the significance of the economy in such cases. Instead of a monistic framework, my reflection leads me to conclude that a dualistic one analyses the imbrications between the economy and culture. By doing so, we can understand how both economy and status, as defined in cultural, ethnic, or sexual approaches to recognition, could work together to minimise the importance of civil and political rights, which liberal thinkers uphold. 

Fraser’s ideas intrigued me to further my reflection on these concepts. Fraser explains that recognition can be a cultural group that recognises differences, whereas redistribution is classified as a transfer or reduction of socioeconomic classes (Frazer).  

Does redistribution include a progression of taxes according to income? If this is true, I can see how valuable this could be. If I were very wealthy and received tax breaks, tax reductions, and other loopholes to prevent me from paying higher amounts of taxes, even I would recognise that such policies hurt the middle classes and the lower classes.  

This concept explains why if I had little wealth, I may not have a solid drive to develop or gain more wealth. Redistribution can provide those with little wealth to earn more and may give them that incentive to embark on a new career, return to school or get a promotion (Arfken).  

I ask is this due to perceived thoughts rather than actual data. For example, if I were living in poverty, working two jobs to be able to live, might I see a redistribution of wealth as an easy way out compared to working to continue the latter?  

This is where recognition comes to the surface. Recognition is the first step to be addressed before redistribution can be accomplished. An individual who does not recognise that they need assistance may not see the importance of redistribution. This is an example of when an individual does not have a perceived susceptibility. Perceived susceptibility shows that people decide to act when they believe they are susceptible to a problem. (Robyns, 2003). 

Recognition is based on cultural decision-making, and redistribution is made from an economic standpoint. These would be two different mixtures of injustice.  

To solve the redistribution of economic wealth, you would base this on fair tax rates and restructuring the system.  But, from a recognition standpoint, you would need to focus on some form of cultural or symbolic justice (Leani).  

These ways would include changing the identity or communication towards certain marginalised groups. So, as my reflection has shown, these two concepts are separate in that they can be used entirely differently depending on the situation and scenario. 

The question I reflect on is, ethically, what is the matter of the good, and what is the value of the right? Who determines what is morally correct and what is ethically sound? These questions are important to me because we can recognise what is ethically right according to our standards and beliefs, but, I ask who decides what is morally good?  

A prime example of this would be if I could not pay for health insurance but used the emergency departments of hospitals for my primary care so I do not have to pay for health costs. Many governments see this as a problem, but we choose not to redistribute any form of stipulations on those of us who continue to use hospital ER as a free service.  

This paper's word count limit prevents me from reflecting on the subject at the length it deserves. Therefore, I concentrate on Fraser's philosophical framework of justice during the 1990s -the establishment of redistribution, linked to the allocation of economic goods and recognition - related to the assignment of social status (Frazer).  

This division distinguishes between transformative strategies that intervene in the causes of social injustices and affirmative strategies that focus on their effects. However, I believe Frazer’s treatment of her “two-dimensional category,” which combines inequalities of redistribution and recognition, limits the functioning of specific systems of social subordination and the situation of certain social groups.   

I use my own perspective to argue that heterosexism and ableism are two-dimensional categories since they structure an unequal status system. They also sustain, define, and naturalise the capitalist mode of production and are functional to its distribution of economic goods (Leani 2023). 

Fraser’s ideas intrigued me to further my reflection on these concepts. Fraser explains that recognition can be a cultural group recognising differences, whereas redistribution is classified as a transfer or reduction of socioeconomic classes (Frazer). The distinction between the two is not always necessary. For the purpose of my reflection, I believe we need not commit ourselves to any one theoretical account. We need only subscribe to a rough and general understanding of socioeconomic injustice informed by a commitment to egalitarianism (Frazer, 1997, p.14 

It would be remiss of me not to reflect upon a core theory upon which this module is based: utilitarianism, which focuses on maximising overall happiness or pleasure, and how it contrasts with Frazer’s writings on critical theory regarding recognition and redistribution. 

Frazer emphasises the importance of addressing structural inequalities within society. She recognises that systems of power and domination perpetuate these inequalities and can only be addressed through collective action and social change (Frazer). 

Utilitarianism is a consequentialist ethical theory that emphasises the maximisation of overall happiness or pleasure; critical theory on recognition and redistribution is a political theory.