Strategy: Safety, Security & Risk Management - Errors, Shortfalls & Oversights

The guiding safety, security and risk management strategy is typically only critiqued in detail following a significant failure, shortfall or public outrage.

That is, for the most part, strategy remains an unassailable assurance and declaration that all is well and being managed when it comes to safety, security and risk management.

In other words, strategy is seen to be the saviour...until it fails, which it routinely does but few people bother to adequate analyse the actual strategy, what was actually done and the specified outcome/s.

In short, strategy conceals many things and is rarely measured as a priori or posterior influence on safety, security and risk management. In particular, where safety, security and risk management not only mean the same thing, they overlap, share characteristics and become indiscernible from each other one more than one occasion.

"Success has many fathers whereas failure is an orphan"

More than one person or factor contributes considerably to any strategy's success and failure. However, when it works... one or a few names appear. When it doesn't work... not a single name appears, nor the full list of suspects.

As a result, greater analysis is required into the many areas influenced and responsible for effective and/or unsuccessful strategy creation and implementation.

Strategy is a ubiquitous term. Anyone can use the word but few have the commensurate qualification and experience to 'do' strategy at scale. Moreover, just because you used the word strategy, created a 'strategy' or think strategically... it doesn't mean you can self-author decrees of competency on strategy. Particularly where one or more person contributed, which is routinely the case. This applies for those that create, advise and invoke strategy discourse across various management functions and industries.

In short, strategy as it relates to safety, security and risk remain inherently specialised and require considerable technical and scientific input/s.

Supporting evidence of this can be found in countless case studies, research and analysis of safety, security and risk endeavours that when horribly wrong. Some are small scale, often considered 'mistakes', while other are fiascos, meaning the outcome, impact and failure was considered that reckless and egregious...fiasco what the most dramatic title for the occurrence.

Few strategies set out to fail, yet so many do in reality.

Despite all strategies appearing on a single ledger where they may be analysed as a complete set rather than the prevailing curation and other selective means in which they are considered...often only inclusive of the winners and a few select losers.

Human, group and societal factors contribute to and influence strategy.

It is therefore remarkable how few strategies and strategy creators understand or considered these dimensions in depth.

This includes governments.

Strategic agreement, dissonance and drift remain unequal yet essential criteria of any strategy analysis, at scale.

Consensus, power, discipline and group think or bounded rationality are more visible and therefore more likely to be celebrated at the time of creation or distribution.

It takes a brave soul to challenge, question or ask for more information when strategy is the work product of powerful people, organisations and influential collaborators.

None more so than in areas of safety, security and risk management.

Cognitive dissonance creates pain and emotive responses on both sides of the equation.

In sum, strategy within safety, security and risk management remains a highly complex, provisional and networked challenge rarely solved or simplified by a single, unassailable strategy or seemingly strategic solution.

Moreover, personal/group ideology, power, control and discipline contribute to both success and failure, often indiscernible from each other until something significant goes wrong, which at that time is much too late.

Especially in a room full of consensus, agreement or 'yes'.

Judgement and decision logs remain a conspicuous omission in many strategy developments. Along with the particular methods and process upon which information and knowledge is captured, evaluated and prioritised. In short, all the essential elements investigators, forensic consultants, researchers, lawyers and expert witnesses seek first.

Tony Ridley, MSc CSyP MSyI M.ISRM

Security, Risk & Management Sciences