Tito Versus Stalin: The Shakeup of World Communism

“In politics, more than in anything else, the beginning of everything lies in moral indignation and in doubt of the good intentions of others.”[1]—Milovan Djilas, Conversations with Stalin                                                                                                               

           The shakeup of world Communism following Yugoslavia’s 1948 expulsion from the Cominform was one of 20th Century history’s foremost political developments. From the misty knolls of Belgrade to the cobbled streets of Moscow, the unassailable iron curtain had developed a corrosive underbelly and foundation. The Stalinist paradigm, a foreboding imperialist influence centered upon Eastern Europe, was challenged both literally and figuratively by Josip Broz Tito’s Yugoslav state. Indeed, following the devastation wrought by Hitler’s mania and Wehrmacht brutality, much of Eastern Europe lay in rubble and in waste. It is in this context, that Stalin sought to exert Soviet influence(s) via the formation of acquiescent people’s democracies—guided by the dictates of Moscow. Unfortunately for Stalin, his capacity to undermine Yugoslav authority failed on both tangible and philosophical grounds. To be sure, while Yugoslavia has been described, “as a country where anything can happen and generally does,”[2] Josip Broz Tito’s rule is equally mystifying. Namely, how did Tito, a man from nowhere, as nobody with nothing, largely succeed in managing a territory of “two alphabets, three religions, four languages, and five nationalities,”[3] while concomitantly withstanding Stalinist meddling? Moreover, how and why did one of East Europe’s most devout Communist regimes receive the ire of the Kremlin, and what were Stalin’s true aims? While the opening of new archives has revealed further clues, it is irrefutable that Stalin’s primary objective was “control.” Thus, in order to gauge how/why Tito was able to defy Stalin, one must examine not only personal and philosophical truths, but also tangible political and economic realities.                                                                                                               

           Joseph Stalin was a man who craved both personal as well as political modes of power. These two spheres intersected one another and thus formed the core of Stalin’s twisted personality. Deriving power and at times pleasure from others’ demise, Stalin was a master of cold calculation and selfish political design(s).[4] Approximately 20 million purported traitors perished under his name.[5] To be sure, Stalin was cold, suspicious, as well as manipulative, and the seminary student turned Soviet dictator carefully scrutinized both friend and foe alike.[6] Men as dissimilar as Vyacheslav Molotov, Boris Bazhanov, Leon Trotsky, and Milovan Djilas, all lend credence to this reality. While Molotov and Bazhanov commented that, “Stalin trusted no one . . . he saw enemies and conspiracies everywhere,”[7] and that “he smoked his pipe and spoke very little,”[8] both Trotsky and Djilas viewed Stalin more as an unremarkable man obsessed with personal and political authority. While Trotsky stated that the substance of Stalin’s personality was “the personification of the bureaucracy,”[9] Djilas argued that Stalin represented the “unscrupulous ascent of the new class” i.e. an emotionless group who “did not preach, but rather made decisions.”[10] To be sure, Stalin was a reincarnated Red-Tsar possessed of an iron will—a tyrant who demanded personal as well as political loyalty.                                        

Stalin’s Anti-Titoist Motives: Political, Strategic, and Psychopathological Concerns                          

           In addition to Stalin’s lust for personal influence among his innermost-circle, as well as among disparate foreign dignitaries, Stalin also sought to exert Soviet “soft” and “hard” power abroad e.g. Soviet advisors and military hardware. Although U.S. diplomat George F. Kennan stipulated that Stalin’s primary motive was to “realize Marxism-Leninism’s vision of ultimate world Communist revolution,”[11] new archival sources reveal a much less enlightened raison d’être. Namely, Stalin was motivated by not only personal psychopathological needs but also by strategic and political concerns.[12] To illustrate, while scholar Robert C. Tucker is correct in arguing that the “crucial operative aim for Stalin was control,”[13] it is apparent that Stalin’s desire for influence was multifaceted. In other words, while Stalin’s drive to construct a centralized,[14] totalitarian, and industrially more-advanced Soviet state are all well documented,[15] it is evident that Stalin also sought to strengthen Soviet prestige, hegemony,[16] and influence, via empire-building abroad.[17] Molotov’s comments in 1976 reveal the extent of this Soviet imperialist arrogance (komchvanstvo)[18] by commenting that: Tito’s “republic [was] going under . . . we then shall be able to deal with him more firmly.”[19] Undoubtedly, instead of permitting East and Central European states to go their own way, Stalinization i.e. Soviet imperialism, in guise, pressured native intra-state policies to be brought closer to the Moscow line.           

Stalin undoubtedly believed that the true authority of the Communist satellite states was under the red-banner of Moscow and not within their own respective domains. Robert C. Tucker is wholly correct in stipulating that Stalin sought to transform once freethinking peoples into “well-oiled transmission belts”[20] within the hierarchy of the Kremlin. However, Tucker at times underplays the strategic drivers of Soviet imperialism in East and Central Europe. Considering that the USSR was invaded by way of Poland in WWII, and considering that Yugoslavia had easier access to vital Mediterranean shipping-lanes, it is unsurprising that Stalin’s main imperialist schema largely centered upon strategy rather than mere ideology. Although scholar Dusko Doder correctly reveals that, “the Kremlin would have liked to destroy the rival [Titoist] Marxist church [for fear of rising intra-nationalist Soviet sympathies],”[21] I also argue that Stalin’s earliest and primary objectives were to advance his own image cult over Tito’s clique, as well as to progress Soviet territoriality over Yugoslavia. Whatever the case, Stalin’s satellite system was not designed to benefit the disparate needs of East and Central Europe’s denizens, but rather was implemented to advance Stalin’s Imperial aims.[22]                                                                                           

What means did Stalin expend to undermine Yugoslavia, and why?

The greatest wide-scale instrument of coercion at Stalin’s disposal was the Cominform. While earlier scholarship painted the 1947 creation of the Cominform (Communist Information Bureau) as chiefly a reaction to the Truman Doctrine, Simon Sebag Montefiore’s as well as Robert C. Tucker’s research reveals the Cominform’s true aims. The Cominform was officially established by Zhdanov in Szklarska Poreba, Poland, as an organ where leading Communist representatives (of various entities) could share advice as well as to exchange information, but it is clear that the Cominform was essentially a marionette under the guiding red-hand of Stalin.                       

While scholars at times differ upon emphasis, a number of irrefutable facts are known. First, and according to scholar Lorraine M. Lees, the decision to seat the Cominform in Belgrade, “was taken by Stalin himself.”[23] What better way to monitor as well as to hinder Yugoslav mobility and independence than to grant her “first place at the first meeting?”[24] While Tito’s assertion that the “function of Comrade Yudin, the permanent Soviet representative, was to make trouble between Yugoslavia and her Cominform partners”[25] may be correct, there is no denying that Stalin did everything short of war to impede Yugoslav initiative.[26] Second, while Stalin was certainly “at the pinnacle,”[27] Stalin often sent minions to do his bidding so as to monitor purported subversives, as well as to stymie national modifications in Communism.[28] In fact, Zhdanov and Georgii Malenkov both went to Cominform meetings with Stalin’s pre-written instructions rather than exercising their own inherent ingenuity.[29] Lastly, while Edvard Kardelj and Tito both argue that the cause of the Tito-Stalin split was due chiefly to “the aggressive tendencies of the Soviet Union,”[30] history also reveals that Tito’s refusal to be “incorporated into the Soviet command-and-control structure”[31] was the main root of the conflict. What resulted was a mini-Cold War on Belgrade and Yugoslavia.         

Tools of the Imperialist Trade: Stalin’s Anti-Titoist Tactics and Strategy                                                               

           Although Stalin often converted many of his followers into “intellectual slaves or else liquidated them,”[32] his assorted tactics directed against supposed rebellious states were an additional element of his overarching power-hold paradigm. Fitzroy Maclean, British attaché and intimate of Tito, is correct in his analysis that the Soviet system was based on “the absolute and infallible authority of the Kremlin, [and that] Tito, on a number of issues, was challenging that authority.”[33] Whether Stalin’s turn against Tito stemmed from Yugoslavia’s strategic placement, Tito’s rising cult of personality, Yugoslavia’s supra-nationalism and stubborn independent streak,[34] or Stalin’s own personal mania, is up for debate. Nonetheless, Stalin’s anti-Titoist strategy can be subdivided into two general camps: overt and covert forms of coercion.                                                                                       

Coercion via Propaganda: Inflammatory Letters from the CPSU to CPY—1947/8

           Negative propaganda and criticism can serve a number of different ends when directed against a specific actor and/or audience e.g. shaking confidence, pressure(s) to change course and/or humiliation. Stalin, and his minions, relied upon each of these tactics to undermine what they perceived to be an excessively independent Titoist cult. Considering that many ardent Communists, such as Tito prior to 1948, saw the USSR as the Mecca of world Communism,[35] any overt criticism from the Soviets came as a real shock to the Yugoslav Party elite.[36] While Kardelj reveals that Tito was thunderstruck by the Soviet leadership’s irritation with Yugoslav dealings,[37] letters from the CPSU to the CPY also show Moscow’s displeasure. While it is unclear, from the sources, whether Moscow criticized Tito out of pure annoyance or out of strategy, it is irrefutable that Tito was, “deeply hurt by not being informed of the true reason”[38] for Soviet unease. According to charges made by the CPSU, not only did the Yugoslav military “abuse Soviet military advisers and discredit the Soviet army,”[39] but the CPY also lacked “the spirit of the policy of class struggle”[40] within its Party ranks. To add insult to injury, Moscow charged that capitalist elements in “the villages and cities [were] in full swing.”[41] Undoubtedly, for a war ravaged and newly emerging Communist state to be so blatantly criticized by the USSR must have been a harrowing experience,[42] and it is possible that Moscow sought to undermine Tito’s confidence in hopes of convincing him to fall into rank.[43]                                                          

Overt Coercion via Propaganda: The Cominform and People’s Democracies 

           If critical private correspondence between the CPSU and the Yugoslav elite was one form of propagandist bullying, then Cominformist propaganda clearly stemmed from a similar albeit more complex strategy. “Durability was Tito’s trademark,”[44] but that did not prevent the Cominform leadership from expounding outlandish claims. While it is possible that anti-Tito incriminations stemmed from pure belief,[45] it is more likely that Cominformist propaganda was set in motion as a tool to undermine Yugoslav stability and prestige.[46] However, Dusko Doder’s discovery that prominent East European Communists were forced to admit to “being Gestapo agents and to testify that top Yugoslav leaders had been in the pay of the Nazis,”[47] is equally intriguing. While the recorded minutes from the 1948 Cominform make no mention of Stalinist or Soviet coercion from above, it is undeniable that those considered not-pro Soviet enough were swiftly hunted down. In fact, while Czech KSC members such as Rudolf Slansky were tried and executed for purported Titoist sympathies, show trials suspects in Albania, Hungary and Bulgaria, including Deputy Prime Minister Kostov also received zero mercy.[48]             

While it is possible that Cominform leaders truly believed that “the Tito clique [was] a de-generate[49] fascist gang of spies and murderers who dragged Yugoslavia into the camp of Imperialism,”[50] and that the Yugoslav police were actively cannibalizing unarmed Bulgarians,[51] scholars should not overlook the important role “fear” played in Stalin’s two pronged strategy—to intimidate both Tito’s followers and pro-Soviet Cominformists to do the Kremlin’s bidding. Undoubtedly, Yugoslavia was the main victim of a smear campaign chiefly designed to undermine Yugoslav confidence, prestige, as well as independence.                                                                                                                                                       

Overt Coercion via Economic Blockades

           The Second World War was a great burden upon not only the disparate peoples of Yugoslavia, but it was also a challenge for the newly established Titoist state. Thousands dead or dying, destroyed rail and road-networks, fallow fields, as well burned-out villages, were all challenges that needed to be addressed promptly. While some Soviet economic assistance via joint stock companies is acknowledged by Vladimir Dedijer,[52] it is obvious that more could have been done by the Soviets to aid Yugoslavia, and that fewer strings could have been attached. In fact, even before the war, Tito’s faith in Moscow’s financial dependability was far from complete. According to Kardelj, Tito grew increasingly suspicious of Moscow, and “during the whole period of [their Yugoslav] Communist Party’s work from 1919 to 1937 the receipt of money from Moscow had had only a harmful effect.”[53] Moreover, while Tito was visiting the USSR, during wartime, one Soviet official had the gumption to question Tito’s vision to transform Yugoslavia from an agrarian society into an industrially more advanced Soviet state.[54]             By arguing that we [the USSR] have “everything you need in the Urals,”[55] Tito began to realize Soviet imperial proclivities. However, the most telling assailment on Yugoslavia’s economic viability occurred in 1948 when Soviet minister Comrade Krutikov informed Yugoslav Trade representative Crnobrnjathat that the Soviets will, “not be able to sign a protocol for further exchanges of goods.”[56] Whereas in 1947 Yugoslavia exchanged one half of all imports and exports with the USSR, by 1949, Yugoslavia’s trade with Romania, Hungary, and Albania had all but disappeared. By restricting much of the economic lifeblood of Yugoslavia, Stalin hoped to indirectly asphyxiate Tito’s regime.[57]                                                                     

Covert Coercion via Spying—Soviet Agents, Home-Grown Spies and Saboteurs

           In addition to Stalin’s propagandist and economic forms of coercion, he also utilized Soviet state agents,[58] as well as Yugoslav sympathizers. While information gathering was one aspect of spy-ring related responsibilities, both groups were also engaged in saboteur activities. For example, while the CPY wrote to the CPSU leadership that Soviet official Colonel Stepanov did not hesitate in recruiting “one of our good comrades who was working in the central division of coding and decoding in [the] UDBa,”[59] it is also clear that the NKVD stopped at nothing to coax as many young Yugoslav Communists as possible “into working for [the USSR] with slogans about loyalty.”[60] This tactic at times proved lucrative, and while Sreten Zujovic-Crni, the General Secretary of the NFJ (Popular Front of Yugoslavia) transmitted sensitive material from numerous CPY meetings to Soviet ambassador, A.I. Lavrentiev,[61] Central Committee members such as Sreten Zujovic also chose to defy Tito openly at important Party gatherings. Worse still, when the UDBa tried saboteurs such as Andrija Hebrang,[62] Stalin demanded an independent Soviet investigation despite Tito’s repeated refusals. In short, Soviet tacticians sought to destabilize Yugoslavia via a divide and conquer strategy.                                        

Covert Coercion via Coup/Assassination Attempt(s)

           Tito’s resolute will to survive, coupled with Soviet failures to indirectly overthrow Tito’s regime,[63] are two prime reasons why Stalin ultimately reverted to more extreme tactics. Coup attempts as well as assassination missions now fit the bill. According to scholar Ivo Banac, Colonel General Arso Jovanovic, General Staff of the Yugoslav army, together with Major General Branko Petricevic-Kadja not only failed in organizing an anti-Titoist coup, but they also tried to flee to nearby Romania in hopes of securing Soviet protection and aid.[64] While not all of the Yugoslav military/security officers who were sent to the USSR (480 Cadets studies in Shuia between 1945-7) conspired against Tito, both Tito and Stalin understood the very real potential for Cadet inspired resistance.[65] A Titoist crackdown on potential subversives thus became an urgent matter of state. Moreover, and despite scholarly debate concerning the accuracy of the source, the head of the Hungarian General Staff Academy, Béla K. Király, claimed that the Soviets were actively planning to invade Yugoslavia between the years 1949 and 1951.[66] Since Soviet pressures greatly impacted Czechoslovakian political life in 1948, such fears were not wholly unfounded. Lastly, and perhaps equally disturbing, in a 1950 letter written by Tito to Stalin, found within Stalin’s desk, Tito reveals how Stalin actively sent headhunters to assassinate him. Tito chides: 

Stalin. Stop sending assassins to murder me. We have already caught five, one with a bomb, [and] another with a rifle . . . If this doesn’t stop, I will send one man to Moscow and there will be no need to send another.[67]                

Although scholars may never fully come to a consensus regarding exactly why Stalin sought to marginalize and then to liquidate Tito, it is clear that menacing letters from the CPSU, Cominformist propaganda, NKVD spies, loyalist saboteurs, Soviet Cadres, coup/assassination attempts, as well as economic boycott(s), were all tools utilized by Stalin so as to better control Yugoslavia. Unfortunately for Stalin, Tito’s personal nature, Yugoslavia’s Partisan philosophical culture, tangible political realities, as well as economic factors all rendered Stalin’s imperialist vision a tall order to place.                                              

Why was Tito able to defy Stalin? Personal Reasons; Tito’s Background and Personality

           Scholarship on the Tito-Stalin split is rich in causational political analysis, but scholars often overlook the considerable influence individual leadership has upon political outcomes. Milovan Djilas is correct in highlighting how personalities, “make an imprint on their time and their society in proportion to their spiritual power and creative skill.”[68] For Tito, his innate creative skill(s) largely involved charismatic leadership and supreme confidence,[69] coupled with a rising self-awareness and “a strong sense of danger”[70]—all of which served him well politically. On the most basic level, Tito was not a dull personality, and his leadership skills and capacity to inspire others proved legendary. Whether one analyzes Tito’s upbringing, journeyman years, promotion as a WWI Stabsfeldwebel officer in the Croat infantry, imprisonment in Tsarist Russia, inter-war Communist activities,[71] or his defiance of the Wehrmacht, it is evident that Tito was a resilient man of steely resolve and action. To be sure, there was something unique about Tito. While the 1928 Novosti newspaper remarked that Broz’s “shining eyes looked over his spectacles in a cool but energetic way,”[72] Molotov also commented nearly a half century later that, “there was something different about [Tito] . . . I was reminded of the provocateur Malinovsky.”[73] In brief, Tito was not an educated man, but he did have “an exceptionally sharp and quick intelligence,”[74] and this reality coupled with his multifarious experiences afforded him the knowledge and skills to resist Stalin’s bullying.          

Tito and the Bolshevik Revolution—Later Comintern Years—Joseph Stalin’s Purges

           The combination of Tito’s proletarian roots and imbedded leadership bravado enabled Tito to more readily see behind the veil of Stalin’s political personality. Tito’s proletarian background also lent him experience and political legitimacy that would later assist him (particularly within Yugoslavia) in his future ideological struggle against Stalin. To illustrate, while Stalin and Molotov both labeled Tito as a faux Communist “infected with the bourgeois spirit,”[75] Tito was never a member of the wealthy bourgeoisie but was rather “a soldier of the revolution.”[76] While Tito’s years in Kumrovec as a metal-worker,[77] warrant officer, and locksmith,[78] introduced him to a multitude of challenges facing the working class, it was Josip Broz’s participation in the Red Guard, and later the Comintern, that further solidified his singular political personality.[79] Even at this early stage, Broz was not a follower, but was instead an individual leader, and according to Comintern heavyweight Gorkic, “Walter [Tito] represented the best elements among our workers.”[80] However, while Tito’s involvement in the July demonstrations,[81] as well as his study of “Bolshevik papers and Lenin’s pamphlets”[82] certainly equipped him to later resist Stalin ideologically, it was Tito’s rising awareness of Stalin’s propensity for purges that best prepared him to avoid a similar fate.                                  

Stalinist Purges –Tito’s Growing Caution—Wartime Meetings with Stalin

           Tito largely did not question Stalin ideologically prior to 1948, though it is apparent that Tito grew increasingly alarmed with events surrounding Stalin’s reign. Through Stalin’s political purges and USSR foreign policy, the genesis of Tito’s mistrust of Stalin began to form. For example, not only did the Comintern order the dissolution of the Communist Party of Poland in 1937,[83] but prominent Bolsheviks, Red Army generals, as well as a substantial number of foreign Comintern officials”[84] were purged. In fact, at least eight hundred of the nine hundred Communists of Yugoslav origin were arrested in 1936-7 by Stalin’s NKVD.”[85] Equally important, and despite Milovan Djilas’ initial support of the 1939 Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact, Tito questioned the “unholy” alliance of Fascists and Communists—a pact that benefited both Nazi Germany and the USSR at the expense of Polish sovereignty.[86] In truth, Tito’s “whole being rebelled against what [he] saw in Moscow,”[87] and thus he promptly left his nighttime post as lecturer at the Leninist School. Lastly, Yugoslav Partisan suspicions of Stalin’s true aims were reconfirmed when Tito, Djilas, Kardelj, and Ivan Subasic went to Moscow on several separate wartime occasions. For example, while Tito reveals that, “the first meeting was very cool [and that] Stalin could not bear being contradicted,”[88] Djilas commented that Stalin “made a point of impressing on us that we [the Partisans] were small and dependent.”[89] More disturbing still, in November of 1944, Stalin revealed his Churchill sphere of influence “percentages agreement” as regards post-War Yugoslavia to a shocked Edvard Kardelj—Vice President of the National Committee of Liberation of Yugoslavia.[90] What each episode reveals is mounting Yugoslav distrust over Stalin’s agenda. Indeed, while the ultimate split of Yugoslavia from the USSR’s orbit did not officially occur until 28th of June, 1948, it is evident that the Partisan leadership’s questioning of Soviet decision-making began earlier than 1948.[91] By not accepting Stalin’s word, Tito was better equipped to defy Stalin leading up to and following the Cominform split.                                                                   

Why was Tito able to defy Stalin? Philosophical Reasons; WWII and The Partisan Ethos

           If Tito’s wariness of Stalin’s officious nature was one reason why Tito was better prepared, than not, to defy Stalin’s future assaults, than the Partisan ethos was yet another reason behind Tito’s success. To begin, while it is true that Yugoslavia was confronted by both Fascist invasion as well as civil war between Partisans, Cetniks, as well as the Ustashe, the War also witnessed the rise of a supra-national Partisan ideology, which essentially served as an ideological bulwark against future Stalinist bullying. In a closed world of danger and comradeship, “national differences largely ceased to matter [particularly within the Partisan ranks],”[92] and it was during the war years that Tito began to cultivate his most famous slogan—brotherhood and unity. In stark contrast to Bulgarian Communists, etc. who were arguably were more ideologically bound to Moscow, and even though Tito still largely looked to Moscow for leadership up until 1948, Tito’s Yugoslavia nonetheless developed the inklings of an individualistic Communist culture that moved beyond Moscow’s boundaries. The Partisan’s five-pointed red star and clenched fist symbolized this blossoming transition.[93]                                                                                  

Although scholarly debate continues, it is evident that suspicion of foreigners as well as a self-reliance culture formed the ideological crux of the Partisan creed. First, and despite covert British and American assistance, the Partisans at times distrusted Westerners on the field in wartime Yugoslavia. While OSS operator Franklin Lindsay observed that interactions with the Partisans were at best “foreign and distant,”[94] British operative Fitzroy Maclean commented that, “there could be no question of the Partisans being placed under anyone’s command except its own.”[95] Such attitudes became essential ideological cornerstones of the post-War Yugoslav state. Second, and most importantly, the Partisans were not reliant upon Soviet aid. In fact, Tito’s repeat appeals to Moscow for much needed “automatic weapons and ammunition,”[96] largely fell on deaf ears. Since the Yugoslavs were not dependent upon the Red Army for their liberation,[97] they never fully developed a dependency culture in relation to the Soviet state.     

Moscow never quite understood the realities of the revolution in Yugoslavia,[98] and the Yugoslav leadership was poised to build a homegrown worker’s paradise by uniting Yugoslavia’s disparate nations into a federated state. Having defeated the ominous “Swastika flag [that] had been unfurled on the frontiers of Yugoslavia,”[99] Tito’s Partisan followers developed an inner-confidence and core that could not be wholly whitewashed by Stalin’s bullying. “Titoism was [akin to] the right of every nation to equality with others and to the right of independent development,”[100] an idea that directly contradicted Stalin’s desire for control.           

Why was Tito able to defy Stalin? Tangible Political Reasons-Partisan Strategy

           Although a binding Partisan ethos is one reason for Tito’s success both during and after the War, only through the consolidation of power was Tito able to better resist Stalin. While scholars are correct in highlighting that the Big Three Tehran Conference was a major milestone whereby Tito received much needed backing,[101] it is clear that the Partisans already had several assets at hand. A determined leadership, Partisans from all South Slav nations who shared common survival objectives,[102] and an infrastructure that was created during the war[103] were all key reasons behind Tito’s acquiring and maintenance of power. However, emphasis should also be placed upon leadership and strategy because without these two ingredients it is questionable whether Tito would have ruled Yugoslavia for thirty-five years.         

           Not only did Tito rely upon bright and motivated commanders such as Edvard Kardelj, a Slovene; Milovan Djilas, a Montenegrin Serb; Alexander Rankovic, a Serb; and Mosa Pijade, a Jew,[104] but Tito’s Partisans also employed sound wartime tactics and recruitment strategy. When confronted with the awesome power of German Blitzkrieg Stukas, seven hundred thousand Wehrmacht troops, and twenty-two Italian Fascist divisions, Partisans brigades (Oldred) were forced to employ evasive hit and run guerilla tactics.[105] However, it was the Partisans inclusion of women, as well as the maintenance of Partisan discipline, that proved most decisive in the spread of the Partisan’s prestige. While Royalist Cetniks belittled female fighters within the Partisan ranks, there can be little doubt that the mobilization of women was a strategic wartime success. Between 15 and 20 percent of Partisan fighters were women.”[106] Equally important, by demanding a puritanical personal code of conduct, by equally distributing supplies among the countryside resistance, and by punishing Partisan hoarders, Tito garnered much respect from the war-weary population.[107] Whether Tito’s success was due to the recruitment of women, or the manner in which the Partisans conducted themselves is up for debate, but there is little doubt that Tito’s power hold was aided by Partisan prestige. Undoubtedly, Stalin’s schemes to undermine Tito’s authority largely ran counter to socially ingrained wartime Partisan popularity.                                                    

Why was Tito able to defy Stalin? Tangible Political Reasons-Consolidation of Power

           Partisan prestige among post-war Yugoslavs certainly could have benefitted Tito in his later struggle against Stalin, but of preeminent importance was the lack of Soviet presence coupled with Tito’s ability to consolidate territory. In stark contrast to other East and South European Red Army liberated states, Soviet attachments under Marshal F.I. Tolbukhin entered Yugoslavia only “on the clear understanding that they would [eventually] withdraw.”[108] Since the Red Army did not outright liberate Yugoslavia, the Soviets had much less post-war political leverage within that future federated state. In fact, because most of the anti-Fascist fighting involved the Partisans (People’s Liberation Army), Tito was in a better position to conduct a military campaign while simultaneously laying his political foundations.[109] Whenever the Partisans captured a town, “they destroyed all existing administrative records and set up their own local government.”[110] From his base at Bihac, Tito was not only able to disseminate Partisan propaganda through courier service, but he concomitantly consolidated his power via “great speed and disciplined energy.”[111] Regardless, it was not until the second session of the AVNOJ Partisan Assembly [Antifasisticko vijece narodnog oslobodjenja Jugoslavije], in November of 1943, in Jajce, when King Petar was banned from the country, and Yugoslavia became a federal state.[112] Stalin was not consulted in any way.                                                                                     

Why was Tito able to defy Stalin? Tangible Political Reasons-Liquidation of Enemies

           Tito’s power hold success is directly tied to his effective consolidation of power during wartime, but the stability of Tito’s regime also benefited from his liquidation of actual and/or perceived enemies [ibeovci]. While innocents were certainly victimized by the Yugoslav state e.g. Milovan Djilas, it is clear that Tito’s purges and crackdowns did more to stabilize than to undermine his rule. The marginalization of Ante Pavelic’s Ustashe, the execution of Royalist Chetnik leader Draza Mihailovic,[113] and the expulsion of King Petar, all served to bolster Tito’s hold on Yugoslav affairs of state. Considering that Hitler, as well as Stalin thereafter, attempted to divide Yugoslavia ethnically and politically, Tito’s decision to liquidate would-be rivals was a harsh, albeit shrewd, strategy. However, Tito’s purges did not rest solely upon Fascist and Royalist enemies, Tito and his Security Chief Alexander Rankovic also targeted purported and/or actual Stalin sympathizers within the CPY [Komunisticka partija Jugoslavije], especially between 1948 and 1953.[114] For example, according to the Dinko A. Tomasic Collection located within the Hoover Institution Archives, the Department for the Defense of the People (UDBa) in 1950-51 expelled two thousand CPY officials in Serbia for alleged Cominform ties.[115] By infiltrating the Party, transportation, and Interior Ministries, Stalin’s loyal supporters sought to undermine Tito’s hold on power.[116] Tito’s crackdowns may have saved him from this fate.                         

Why was Tito able to defy Stalin? Tangible Political Reasons-Tito’s Cult of Personality

           Although state oppression is one tactic that can buoy a regime, the propagation of a cult of personality is yet another method, especially if the leader in question has maintained some semblance of popularity. Even though not all Yugoslavs supported Tito’s clique, Molotov was largely correct in arguing that, “Tito was Tsar and God in Yugoslavia,”[117] a leader of Serb and Croat roots who derived much popularity from extending general equality among Yugoslavia’s disparate nations. In stark contrast to other Communist leaders who retreated into the bowels of the Kremlin, Tito often made appearances at rallies, visited construction sites, and enjoyed large audiences all to roars of applause and cheers.[118] OSS operative Franklin Lindsay remarks that, “parades, books, and quotations by the great man were fulsomely deployed.”[119] Tito was a bit of a dandy,[120] but he was also seen as a veteran of the Comintern, “a liberator of his own country, and a Marshall in his own right.”[121] Moreover, Tito’s authority rested on his success in keeping Yugoslavia independent from the Kremlin’s cronies. In fact, according to Dusko Doder, one textile worker was quoted as saying that, “as long as [Tito] is alive I know the Russians will not come.”[122] On the whole, employing state repression is not always enough to maintain power, often political skill, a widespread cult of personality, as well as general popularity are required. When analyzing how/why Tito was able to resist Stalin, therefore, scholars must also consider the extent and limits of Tito’s near mythical place within Yugoslavia’s collective psyche.                                                                           

Why was Tito able to defy Stalin—Economic Factors—Western Assistance and Aid

           Tito’s cult of personality and public works projects afforded the Yugoslav leader a certain level of popularity and legitimacy, however, turbulent market pressures engendered by Stalin’s 1948 blockade began to take its toll on the Yugoslav state. Tito played the international game well, and his ability to secure Western financial assistance and military guarantees is yet another reason for his success. To illustrate, although Edvard Kardelj and Milovan Djilas’ self-management system—whereby immediate producers, through free association, would largely make their own decisions—was seen as promoting better decision-making and thus economic prosperity,[123] Yugoslavia’s increasing economic isolation began to pose challenges. Not only was Yugoslav economic health growing increasingly dire, but in 1950 a famine struck and peasant uprisings spread throughout the countryside. Consequently, Tito looked for alternative trade partners and markets following the Cominform embargo so as to buffer his regime. By securing US$ 1.187 billion in economic aid from the United States by 1955, as well as US$ 420 million from the UNRRA, Tito’s economy received a much-needed financial boost.[124] Nonetheless, one of the most important Yugoslav-Western agreements involved President Truman’s 1951 NSC 18/6 measure, whereby the U.S. would support action [broadly defined] in the U.N. if Yugoslavia were ever attacked by the Soviets.[125] Undoubtedly, Tito’s defiance of and independence from Stalin surely rested upon his securing of Western aid.                              

Conclusion and Significance

           From humble beginnings in the small peasant village of Kumrovec, Tito later skyrocketed to the top of the Yugoslav Communist hierarchy. The 1953 death of Soviet dictator Joseph Stalin, in time, engendered a thaw in Soviet-Yugoslav relations, but the shakeup in the world of Communism had already begun. While historians debate Tito’s significance, and while some scholars such as Bosko S. Vukcevich argue that Tito was the sine qua non architect of Yugoslavia’s disintegration,[126] it is irrefutable that Tito will go down in history as the dogged Communist David who resisted the Soviet Goliath. A classic South Slav, if ever there was such a thing, “[Tito’s] fame will be celebrated by future generations of South Slavs, the fame of his virtues and of his vices alike.”[127] This paper has revealed a number of facets concerning the Tito-Stalin rift. Whether Stalin’s pressuring of Tito stemmed from Yugoslavia’s strategic placement near vital Mediterranean shipping lanes, Tito’s rising cult of personality when juxtaposed with Stalin’s, Yugoslavia’s stubborn self-reliance, or Stalin’s own personal masochist tendencies, is hotly debated by scholars. What is clear is that Stalin utilized the Communist Information Bureau, as well as employed overt and covert coercion, in an instable effort to control Yugoslav political life. Unfortunately for Stalin, the Soviet dictator utterly failed to dismantle the obstinate Partisan fighter turned Marshall. Indeed, Tito’s political dexterity, keen self-awareness, his all-encompassing Partisan creed, as well as his speedy consolidation of power and liquidation of enemies are all elements behind Tito’s success story. However, Tito’s personality cult coupled with Western aid are also highly relevant. Undoubtedly, when analyzing how/why Tito was able to defy Stalin, one must examine not only personal and philosophical developments, but also tangible economic and political realities. Perhaps scholars will never agree regarding Tito’s legacy nor concur why he was able to defy Stalin, but it is clear that Tito saw himself as a leader who changed the course of Communism and world history. Fitzroy Maclean’s eternal words speak true: “Experts do not usually take sufficient account of the strength of the human will. If human beings are really determined to do something, they will do it, even if all calculation shows it to be impossible.”[128]                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                              

                                                                                                                                             Bibliography:

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[1] Milovan Djilas, Conversations with Stalin (Harcourt, Brace & World Inc., 1962), 117.

[2] Dusko Doder, The Yugoslavs (New York: Vintage Books, 1979), xi.

[3] Ibid. xiii.

[4] G.R. Urban, Stalinism: Its Impact on Russia and the World (Cambridge: Harvard, 1986), 39.

[5] Ibid. 5.

[6] Roy Medvedev, The Unknown Stalin (New York: Overlook, 2004), 261.

[7] Felix Chuev, Molotov Remembers: Inside Kremlin Politics (Chicago: Ivan R. Dee, 1993), 159.

[8] G.R. Urban, Stalinism: Its Impact on Russia and the World (Cambridge: Harvard, 1986), 9.

[9] Robert C. Tucker, The Soviet Political Mind (New York: Norton & Co, 1972), 106.

[10] Milovan Djilas, The New Class (New York: HBJ Publishers, 1957), 51.

[11] Robert C. Tucker, “The Cold War in Stalin’s Time,” Diplomatic History, 21 no. 2 (2002): 278.

[12] Geoffrey Swain, Tito: A Biography: Communist Lives (London: I.B. Tauris, 2011), 91.

[13] Robert C. Tucker, The Soviet Political Mind (New York: Norton & Co, 1972), 229.

[14] Ivo Banac, With Stalin Against Tito (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1988), 3.

[15] Simon Montefiore, Stalin: Court of the Red Tsar (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 2004), 44.

[16] Robert C. Tucker, “The Cold War in Stalin’s Time,” Diplomatic History, 21 no. 2 (2002): 281.

[17] Robert C. Tucker, The Soviet Political Mind (New York: Norton & Co, 1972), 227.

[18] Ivo Banac, With Stalin Against Tito (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1988), 3.

[19] Felix Chuev, Molotov Remembers: Inside Kremlin Politics (Chicago: Ivan R. Dee, 1993), 82.

[20] Robert C. Tucker, The Soviet Political Mind (New York: Norton & Co, 1972), 186.

[21] Dusko Doder, The Yugoslavs (New York: Vintage Books, 1979), xii.

[22] Robert C. Tucker, The Soviet Political Mind (New York: Norton & Co, 1972), 32. 

[23] Lorraine Lees, Keeping Tito Afloat (University Park: Pennsylvania State Press, 1997), 39.

[24] Vladimir Dedijer, Tito Speaks (London: Weidenfeld & Nicholson, 1954), 304.

[25] Fitzroy Maclean, Tito: A Pictorial Biography (New York: McGraw-Hill Books, 1980), 90.

[26] Simon Montefiore, Stalin: Court of the Red Tsar (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 2004), 569.

[27] Felix Chuev, Molotov Remembers: Inside Kremlin Politics (Chicago: Ivan R. Dee, 1993), 181.

[28] Milovan Djilas, The New Class (New York: HBJ Publishers, 1957), 183.

[29] Robert C. Tucker, “The Cold War in Stalin’s Time,” Diplomatic History, 21 no. 2 (2002): 276.

[30] Vladimir Dedijer, Tito Speaks (London: Weidenfeld & Nicholson, 1954), 262.

[31] Robert C. Tucker, The Soviet Political Mind (New York: Norton & Co, 1972), 229.

[32] Milovan Djilas, The Unperfect Society (Harcourt, Brace & World Inc., 1969), 71.

[33] Fitzroy Maclean, Tito: A Pictorial Biography (New York: McGraw-Hill Books, 1980), 91.

[34] Milovan Djilas, The Unperfect Society (Harcourt, Brace & World Inc., 1969), 17.

[35] Vladimir Dedijer, Tito Speaks (London: Weidenfeld & Nicholson, 1954), 259.

[36] Vladimir Dedijer, Tito Speaks (London: Weidenfeld & Nicholson, 1954), 333.

[37] Ibid. 334.

[38] RIIA, Soviet-Yugoslav Dispute (London: Royal Institute of International Affairs, 1948), 9.

[39] Ibid. 13.

[40] Ibid. 15.

[41] Ibid. 16.

[42] Geoffrey Swain, Tito: A Biography: Communist Lives (London: I.B. Tauris, 2011), 69.

[43] Hamilton Armstrong, Tito and Goliath (New York: The Macmillian Company, 1951), 47.

[44] Richard Rustin, “Tito and his Partisan Army,” Strategy and Tactics, no. 81 (1980), 8.

[45] Felix Chuev, Molotov Remembers: Inside Kremlin Politics (Chicago: Ivan R. Dee, 1993), 83.

[46] RIIA, Soviet-Yugoslav Dispute (London: Royal Institute of International Affairs, 1948), 70.

[47] Dusko Doder, The Yugoslavs (New York: Vintage Books, 1979), 97.

[48] Leslie Benson, Yugoslavia: A Concise History (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2001), 95.

[49] Fondazione Feltrinelli, Cominform Minutes (Milan: RCCSR of Modern History, 1994), 861.

[50] Ibid. 862.

[51] Ibid. 937.

[52] Vladimir Dedijer, Tito Speaks (London: Weidenfeld & Nicholson, 1954), 278.

[53] Vladimir Dedijer, Tito Speaks (London: Weidenfeld & Nicholson, 1954), 112. 

[54] Dusko Doder, The Yugoslavs (New York: Vintage Books, 1979), 65.

[55] Fitzroy Maclean, Tito: A Pictorial Biography (New York: McGraw-Hill Books, 1980), 90.

[56] RIIA, Soviet-Yugoslav Dispute (London: Royal Institute of International Affairs, 1948), 21.

[57] Lorraine Lees, Keeping Tito Afloat (University Park: Pennsylvania State Press, 1997), 62.

[58] RIIA, Soviet-Yugoslav Dispute (London: Royal Institute of International Affairs, 1948), 29.

[59] Ibid. 29.

[60] Vladimir Dedijer, Tito Speaks (London: Weidenfeld & Nicholson, 1954), 270.

[61] Ivo Banac, With Stalin Against Tito (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1988), 45.

[62] Vladimir Dedijer, Tito Speaks (London: Weidenfeld & Nicholson, 1954), 269.

[63] Milovan Djilas, Tito: Story from the Inside (London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1981), 15.

[64] Ivo Banac, With Stalin Against Tito (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1988), 129.

[65] Ibid. 22.

[66] Ibid. 131.

[67] Roy Medvedev, The Unknown Stalin (New York: Overlook, 2004), 70.

[68] Milovan Djilas, Tito: Story from the Inside (London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1981), 23.

[69] Fitzroy Maclean, Tito: A Pictorial Biography (New York: McGraw-Hill Books, 1980), 94.

[70] Milovan Djilas, The Unperfect Society (Harcourt, Brace & World Inc., 1969), 29.

[71] Geoffrey Swain, Tito: A Biography: Communist Lives (London: I.B. Tauris, 2011), 20.

[72] Vladimir Dedijer, Tito Speaks (London: Weidenfeld & Nicholson, 1954), 63.

[73] Felix Chuev, Molotov Remembers: Inside Kremlin Politics (Chicago: Ivan R. Dee, 1993), 84.

[74] Milovan Djilas, Tito: Story from the Inside (London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1981), 7.

[75] Felix Chuev, Molotov Remembers: Inside Kremlin Politics (Chicago: Ivan R. Dee, 1993), 83.

[76] Fitzroy Maclean, Tito: A Pictorial Biography (New York: McGraw-Hill Books, 1980), 18.

[77] Vladimir Dedijer, Tito Speaks (London: Weidenfeld & Nicholson, 1954), 23.

[78] Geoffrey Swain, Tito: A Biography: Communist Lives (London: I.B. Tauris, 2011), 5.

[79] Vladimir Dedijer, Tito Speaks (London: Weidenfeld & Nicholson, 1954), 6.

[80] Fitzroy Maclean, Tito: A Pictorial Biography (New York: McGraw-Hill Books, 1980), 35. 

[81] Vladimir Dedijer, Tito Speaks (London: Weidenfeld & Nicholson, 1954), 33.

[82] Ibid. 35.

[83] Alexander Dallin, Letters from the Soviet Archives (New Haven: Yale Univ. Press, 2000), 26.

[84] Ibid. 26.

[85] Ivo Banac, With Stalin Against Tito (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1988), 67.

[86] G.R. Urban, Stalinism: Its Impact on Russia and the World (Cambridge: Harvard, 1986), 197.

[87] Vladimir Dedijer, Tito Speaks (London: Weidenfeld & Nicholson, 1954), 101.

[88] Ibid. 234.  

[89] G.R. Urban, Stalinism: Its Impact on Russia and the World (Cambridge: Harvard, 1986), 193.

[90] Vladimir Dedijer, Tito Speaks (London: Weidenfeld & Nicholson, 1954), 265.

[91] Ibid. 268.

[92] Leslie Benson, Yugoslavia: A Concise History (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2001), 76.

[93] Ivo Banac, With Stalin Against Tito (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1988), 7.  

[94] Franklin Lindsay, Beacons in the Night (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1993), 248.

[95] Fitzroy Maclean, Tito: A Pictorial Biography (New York: McGraw-Hill Books, 1980), 84.

[96] Alexander Dallin, Letters from the Soviet Archives (New Haven: Yale Univ. Press, 2000), 212.

[97] Simon Montefiore, Stalin: Court of the Red Tsar (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 2004), 575.

[98] Milovan Djilas, Conversations with Stalin (Harcourt, Brace & World Inc., 1962), 8.

[99] Vladimir Dedijer, Tito Speaks (London: Weidenfeld & Nicholson, 1954), 117.

[100] Ibid. 450.

[101] Alex N. Dragnich, Serbs and Croats (New York: Harcourt Brace & Co, 1992), 114.            

[102] Franklin Lindsay, Beacons in the Night (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1993), 43.      

[103] Dusko Doder, The Yugoslavs (New York: Vintage Books, 1979), 26.

[104] Vladimir Dedijer, Tito Speaks (London: Weidenfeld & Nicholson, 1954), 88.

[105] Richard Rustin, “Tito and his Partisan Army,” Strategy and Tactics, no. 81 (1980), 6.

[106] Leslie Benson, Yugoslavia: A Concise History (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2001), 77.

[107] Ibid. 76. 

[108] Fitzroy Maclean, Tito: A Pictorial Biography (New York: McGraw-Hill Books, 1980), 84.

[109] Misha Glenny, The Balkans (New York: Penguin Books, 1999), 529.

[110] Richard Rustin, “Tito and his Partisan Army,” Strategy and Tactics, no. 81 (1980), 6.

[111] Leslie Benson, Yugoslavia: A Concise History (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2001), 85.

[112] Milovan Djilas, Tito: Story from the Inside (London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1981), 30.

[113] Franklin Lindsay, Beacons in the Night (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1993), 12. 

[114] Ivo Banac, With Stalin Against Tito (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1988), 11.

[115] Ibid. 147.

[116] Milovan Djilas, Tito: Story from the Inside (London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1981), 71.

[117] Felix Chuev, Molotov Remembers: Inside Kremlin Politics (Chicago: Ivan Dee, 1993), 233.

[118] Milovan Djilas, Tito: Story from the Inside (London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1981), 57.

[119] Franklin Lindsay, Beacons in the Night (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1993), 251.

[120] Dusko Doder, The Yugoslavs (New York: Vintage Books, 1979), 59.

[121] Ibid. 117.

[122] Ibid. 118.

[123] Milovan Djilas, The Unperfect Society (Harcourt, Brace & World Inc., 1969), 221.

[124] Leslie Benson, Yugoslavia: A Concise History (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2001), 96.

[125] Lorraine Lees, Keeping Tito Afloat (University Park: Pennsylvania State Press, 1997), 103.

[126] Bosko Vukcevich, Tito: Architect of Yugoslav Disintegration (New York: River Cross Publishing, 1994), 33.

[127] Fitzroy Maclean, Tito: A Pictorial Biography (New York: McGraw-Hill Books, 1980), 123.

[128] Fitzroy Maclean, Tito: A Pictorial Biography (New York: McGraw-Hill Books, 1980), 5. 

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