Transformation Framework: Application - A Business & Its Nature

The Business of Intelligence

Application of our transformation framework will focus on the enterprise level. More specifically, our aim is to apply our transformation framework as a means of instituting a performance-based enterprise approach to the mission and business functions of intelligence such that the IC delivers the needed products and services to policymakers, customers, and consumers in a dramatic and continuously better way. In the parlance of the commercial space, we take the IC to represent a business-to-business product and service provider to policymakers, customer, and consumers. This customer base is constituted by a finite number of relatively specific, if not specified, U.S. government personnel, entities, organizations, or agencies. Furthermore, while the IC’s predominant customer base is internal to the U.S. government, the overwhelming majority of its activities can be characterized as business-to-business exchanges, internal to the IC itself, which enable eventual delivery of a final product or service to the aforementioned customer base. To that end, we can and should judge the IC based on its performance relative to the need of its customer base and of the performance of the internal components of the IC that support or produce the precursors necessary for ultimate satisfaction of customers needs.

Where a commercial corporation’s customer base may be quite difficult to identify, the IC’s customer base is, even if it has not yet been properly identified, relatively finite and straightforward. To that end, we consider the IC customer base as largely be defined by federal, state, and local government officials and policymakers and a few foreign allies and entities. Each customer has different needs and, therefore, will receive different products and services. Nevertheless, whatever the arrangement and quality criteria relevant to each customer-provider relationship, the IC’s performance can be defined based on a finite set of relatively specific if not specified customers and a series of business-to-business exchanges.

 The Nature of Intelligence

Because this is not necessarily a conventional characterization of the IC, particularly within the IC, it warrants a brief discussion. Two conditions are particularly important to understand if the reader is to buy in to our characterization of the IC. First, the IC actually has a limited role in foreign policy and foreign policy decision-making. Second, the authority of the IC is similarly quite limited.

The IC is an advisor regarding foreign threats. As such, it has a limited role. The IC can influence policymaker decisions. However, in the context of improving the performance of the IC, the primary role of the IC make information available – that is, provide products and services – that reduces uncertainty, increases clarity, and empowers the informed decision-making of its customers. This is necessarily a limited role.

There are, of course, some other issues we might address. For example, the nature of intelligence (reduces uncertainty, rarely provides clarity), the degree to which it drives policy (precision and accuracy may enable certain responses), the degree to which it is or is not politicized (administrations’ varying protection or disclosure of classified data), and the degree to which intelligence and operations are or are not inherently married (intelligence drives operations), are all interesting topics. However, they are also irrelevant for the application of a transformation framework focused on increasing the performance of the IC. The aforementioned issues all pertain to how intelligence is used. Our conversation focuses on, and our definition of performance, focuses on how well intelligence is provided. 

Does the IC, in the best of all worlds, take a quick, efficient, and scientific approach to determining ground truth and advising any number of customers about ‘what is’? Of course. When acting as a trusted advisor can an intelligence analyst create an important value-added relationship with a key senior policymaker? Certainly. However, regardless of whether the would-be advisor or analyst is at the national-, international-, strategic-, operational-, or tactical- level he or she is always in a product- or service-provider and, therefore, a limited role. It is the policymaker, customer, or consumer that makes a decision. Such is the challenge of leadership or the burden of command. Such is the limited role of intelligence. As an aside, the IC can become partially culpable for a decision if it can be shown that a decision was made based on poorly done or incorrect products (e.g and NIE) and services (e.g. assessment). This was the case with Iraq WMD intelligence and is the main justification for suggesting the IC failed in that case.

Like its limited role, the IC also has limited authority. There are many things we might assume the IC is ‘in charge of.’ However, that is, strictly speaking, not the case. Again, the IC only provides fused information, analyses, and supporting products and services to policymakers, their organizations, and supporting personnel. It neither decides on nor implements any number of governmental functions. It is not in charge of foreign policy. It does not make foreign policy. It does not make decisions regarding foreign policy. It does not decide to go to war. It does not wage war. It does not conduct attacks. The IC provides intelligence – information combined and fused in a timely, accurate, value-added manner – which enables these decisions and activities. Because intelligence is an enabler – again, a provider of products and services – it represents a predominately business-to-business enterprise serving other government bodies.

Therefore, we can measure the performance of the IC accordingly. We do not need to grade intelligence based on the outcome of a decision or upon the effectiveness of a foreign policy. That is not to say we may not want to, or that that doing so is not a worthwhile endeavor for measuring the overall effectiveness of the United States in the international security environment. Rather, measuring intelligence relative to the success of a customer’s decision is merely not compulsory for measuring the performance of the IC or for transforming it. The measurement of whether a quality decision was made pertains to the effectiveness of policy and statecraft, not intelligence per se. Intelligence is merely one input to each of those. As such, we should grade the performance of intelligence on whether sufficient clarity was provided regarding the issue or issues with which its customer base is concerned.