What happened Turkey’s join BRICS member?

Turkey’s bid to join BRICS underscores Erdogan’s ambition for global influence, but the suspicion and distrust generated by Ankara’s past actions cast doubt on his great power aspirations.

During this year’s annual BRICS summit in Russia on 22–24 October, Turkey made a formal application to join the BRICS group of countries. However, the summit did not end with Turkey as a new member of the international bloc.

Reportedly, it was India that made the objection to Turkey’s bid. However, almost every BRICS member state has reason to distrust Ankara, which will now feel isolated having also distanced itself from its traditional allies in the West.

President Recep Tayyip Erdogan believes that Turkey is a global power and should be recognised as such. He has stated his intention of making Turkey a superpower. He has talked about the world being bigger than five, a reference to the five permanent members of the UN Security Council as well as a veiled reference to Turkey’s global role. Erdogan also declared that Turkey will be a logistical superpower by 2053, a convenient year as it would mark the 130th anniversary of the founding of the Republic of Turkey.

So back in January 2024, when Ankara saw that Iran, Egypt, Ethiopia and the UAE had become members of BRICS, there was no way that Ankara would not seek membership, which it reasoned would be a means to propel its international standing. Erdogan had long sought membership even before BRICS expanded.

Turkey is now viewed not only by Western countries but also by many BRICS members with distrust and suspicion.

But unlike other BRICS members, Turkey is in NATO and the Council of Europe, and remains a candidate for EU accession. In other words, Turkey is part of the West’s defence and diplomatic architecture, and it has been for generations.

Seeking BRICS membership is yet another example of Ankara’s distancing from its traditional allies in order to pursue greater international standing. In fact, Turkey’s policies have hampered the security of the West. Examples of this are plentiful, but a few will serve to illustrate the point.

Turkey’s lax attitude towards its border between 2012 and 2014 allowed thousands of jihadists to enter Syria when the so-called Islamic State was on the rise. Islamic State claimed responsibility for a number of terrorist atrocities on European soil, ranging from the November 2015 Paris attacks that killed 130 people to the 2017 Manchester Arena bombing that murdered 22 individuals. Instead of making NATO states more secure, Turkey did the opposite, as it allowed a militant jihadi force to gain strength right on its doorstep.

To make matters worse, Ankara’s subsequent interventions in Syria pitted Turkish forces against those of the Kurdish People’s Protection Units, which were on the frontline against Islamic State. Unconcerned, Erdogan even threatened to attack US forces in Syria who were helping the Kurdish forces battle Islamic State.

If Turkey continues on its current trajectory and charts a direction contrary to that of its traditional allies, the West should urgently reappraise Ankara’s role in its strategic frameworks

China also does not trust Turkey. Despite Erdogan holding his tongue about the persecution of the Turkic Uighur people, Beijing and Ankara have been at each other’s throats at the WTO, with tariffs and accusations being thrown at each other.

Relations with Egypt remain strained, despite attempts at a rapprochement marked by a meeting between Egyptian President Abdel Fattah el-Sisi and Erdogan in Ankara last September. Erdogan allowed Turkey to play host to Sisi’s avowed enemies, the Muslim Brotherhood, and publicly labelled Sisi a tyrant. Ankara was also on the opposite side to Cairo in the war in Libya. It will take more than smiles and handshakes to heal relations. The same is true of the UAE, which has also clashed with Turkey over regional and ideological disputes for well over a decade.

Finally, we come to India and its lack of enthusiasm for Turkish entry into BRICS. Prime Minister Narendra Modi would have noticed that Erdogan did not bring up Kashmir in his speech at the UN General Assembly last September; however, the leader of the world’s largest democracy certainly remembers that Erdogan has previously taken Pakistan’s side over Kashmir in every single UN address he has made since 2019, when India stripped the disputed territory of its special status. Modi is also very aware of Turkey’s strong military ties with Islamabad.

Turkey’s foreign policy under Erdogan has been a quest to gain acceptance as a global power; however, Ankara has only succeeded in generating greater mistrust and suspicion towards itself. If Turkey continues on this trajectory and charts a direction contrary to that of its traditional allies, Western countries should urgently reappraise Ankara’s role in their strategic frameworks.

October 23, 2024

This week’s BRICS summit in Kazan, Russia, features a new participant: Turkey. A Kremlin official leaked last month that Ankara had applied to join the grouping, following repeated expressions of interest over the years. A spokesperson for Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan’s ruling Justice and Development Party (AKP) then conceded that “a process is underway.”

The BRICS grouping undertook a major expansion recently, adding Egypt, Ethiopia, Iran, and the United Arab Emirates in January, with Saudia Arabia still mulling whether to join. The acronym stands for the group’s original members: Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa.

Still, Turkey’s BRICS application is a watershed moment in geopolitics. If Turkey joins BRICS as a full member or partner state, it would become the first NATO member and longtime candidate for European Union membership to have an active role in an entity seen by some analysts as a challenger to Western predominance.

Turkey’s diplomatic demarche is yet another sign that the global south is rising in world affairs, and it underscores the growth of active nonalignment as an ideology. But it is not a major break in Turkish foreign policy: Ankara’s BRICS application is an extension of its international balancing act, which aims to diversify alliances while maintaining ties with the West.

During two decades in office, Erdogan has promoted a non-Western-centric vision of the world and sought greater global autonomy due to frustration with the EU and the United States. For its part, BRICS is on a roll in terms of both membership and growing global clout. In addition to Turkey, countries such as Malaysia and Thailand have also applied for entry and sent envoys to this year’s summit.

Joining BRICS would also put Turkey, a NATO member, in a privileged position: Having a foot in both camps increases Ankara’s foreign-policy leverage. “Being involved in these structures does not mean abandoning NATO,” Erdogan told journalists at the United Nations General Assembly in September. “We do not think that this alliance and cooperation are an alternative to one another.”

Despite Erdogan’s high profile in global affairs, Turkey’s domestic agenda has become increasingly challenging for the president. In March, the AKP lost ground in municipal elections, while economic growth has slowed and inflation runs rampant. But domestic constraints have not limited Turkey’s quest for influence across Eurasia; if anything, these international endeavors offer a welcome distraction.

Erdogan’s foreign policy is built on a complex blend of Turkey’s Ottoman legacy, nationalist aspirations, and a sense that the West’s best days are behind it. He seeks a more multipolar world, where Turkey can act independently of Western hegemony and search for strategic options beyond the West, even if this means partnering with historical enemies, such as Russia, or with countries that have pursued draconian policies against Muslim minorities, such as China.

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Erdogan has sought to expand Turkey’s strategic wiggle room through diplomacy. He has signed energy deals with Russia, allowing the Russian state-owned utility Rosatom to build, own, and operate Turkey’s first nuclear power plant; mediated in armed conflicts such as the Russia-Ukraine war; and rallied support against Israel’s military actions in Gaza.

Turkey’s BRICS application is no different. It is not about breaking ties with the West but rather recalibrating them in favor of broader and more diversified alliances that are important to Turkey’s long-term national interests—particularly as Ankara’s prospects for EU membership grow dim and strategic ties with the United States weaken.

Turkey’s decades-long bid for EU membership has been marked by frustration. As Ankara has pushed for accession, EU responses have been lukewarm at best, especially after French and German opposition in the late 2000s. With a population of 87 million people, Turkey would be the largest country in the EU and the only Muslim-majority member. Democratic backsliding after the 2013 Gezi Park protests and the 2016 coup attempt have not helped its case. Today, while Turkey remains a candidate officially, its EU accession talks have stalled.

EU ambivalence over Turkish membership stems from concerns over Turkey’s human rights record and growing authoritarianism under Erdogan’s leadership. There are also disputes over Cyprus and maritime rights in the Eastern Mediterranean. The 2023 European Commission report on Turkey further strained relations; the report condemned Ankara’s democratic erosion and suggested that it is nowhere close to reaching full membership.

Turkey’s links with the United States have not fared any better. A major point of contention was Turkey’s purchase of the Russian S-400 missile defense system, which led to its removal from the F-35 fighter jet program. In response, Turkey opted for F-16s, taking advantage of the Russian invasion of Ukraine to upgrade its defense industry. The conflict also increased Turkey’s leverage over NATO, particularly as it stonewalled Sweden’s bid for membership.

Amid the war in Gaza, Erdogan’s alignment with the Palestinian cause and vocal criticism of Western support for Israel have deepened rifts between Ankara and Washington. In the past, the Turkish president also blamed the Obama administration for its support for the Kurdish-led Syrian Democratic Forces during the Syrian civil war, an issue that has lingered.

All the same, Turkey has proved that it is still indispensable to the West: It has acted as a key mediator in the Russia-Ukraine war, underscoring its delicate balancing act between NATO commitments and partnership with Moscow. In this role, Turkey has achieved impressive results—such as facilitating the largest prisoner swap since the Cold War.

For Erdogan, these developments have confirmed Turkey’s need to pursue a form of nonalignment and to shift its focus toward the global south and non-Western entities. Turkey’s pivot has led it to engagements across the Middle East, Africa, and Latin America, where Ankara has expanded its networks and business. In this context, BRICS offers Turkey a unique opportunity to join a rising bloc that represents a significant portion of the global south as well as Russia and China—key actors in Eurasia.

In a world marked by great-power rivalry and competing grand narratives, Turkey stands to regain its role as a bridge between the West, global south, and Eurasian powers. The country’s unique position draws on its geographical location and imperial history. By applying to join the BRICS—an informal yet high-profile group—Turkey is signaling to the West that it should not be taken for granted.

As a bloc, BRICS represents a shift in global south attitudes from accepting a Western-led liberal hegemony to establishing an as-yet-undiscovered new order. Turkey’s desire for BRICS membership – whether intended to spook the West or for Turkey to establish greater economic opportunities – is a symptom of changing global currents. It legitimises the global south’s search for a new order and perpetuates the notion that the West is in terminal decline. It should be a warning signal that Turkey, a long-time NATO ally and one-time poster child of Europe’s transformative power through enlargement, is open to alternative ideas.

As it stands, Turkey’s BRICS membership application will be considered at the upcoming meeting in Kazan on 22 October, where both Erdogan and Putin will be in attendance. If it goes ahead, this will be a major coup for Russia and China – but it is not necessarily a loss for the West, assuming it can reconfigure its relationship with Turkey. This is the gamble on which Erdogan is counting.

This is a big deal. Should Turkey’s bid succeed, it would benefit the country’s ongoing quest to develop an independent foreign policy which often diverges from its transatlantic allies. But Turkey’s drift from the West is nothing new. President Recep Tayyip Erdogan’s Turkey is entrenched in a post-Western narrative which has shaped his political identity for at least a decade. The idea of the West as in decline is now firmly rooted across the Turkish political spectrum and Turkey’s current political leaders believe that strategic autonomy is the ticket to a greater role on world stage.

Although BRICS produces 36-37 per cent of global GDP, the European Union remains Turkey’s main partner for trade and investment, and its main export market – in this arena, BRICS’ relationship with Turkey lags behind. But the Turkish reasoning for joining BRICS seems to be that, in addition to building trade opportunities, membership could make Ankara’s Western allies pay more attention to its domestic needs. At the very least, Ankara hopes they will soften their policy of cold-shouldering the Turkish capital.

It is evident that Turkey wants to retain its Western anchor; but also the flexibility to have a foot in each camp. Much like his illiberal counterparts in Serbia, Hungary, and the Gulf Arab monarchies, Erdogan views geopolitics as a constant hedging among great powers. He is skilfully playing off Russia against the West, using both the advantages of NATO membership and his personal rapport with Vladimir Putin to expand Turkey’s economic gains. And Russia’s invasion of Ukraine has allowed Ankara to take this to a new level: Turkey is doubling down on its trade and energy relationship with Moscow while also supporting Ukraine through arms sales, defence industry partnerships – and restricting the Russian navy’s access to the Black Sea.

References

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