When to eject, a cautionary tale

When to eject; a cautionary reflection for all aviators.

Marine Corps Air Station Yuma, AZ early 1980’s: the Search and Rescue (SAR) crew were standing by in the SAR shack on a quiet spring day afternoon. The weather was clear and visibility unlimited (CAVU) with temperatures in a very comfortable high 80’s. The crash claxon sounds. The pilot and crew chief (we flew single pilot for day missions) raced to Rescue One (a HH-1N Huey) which was in the “cocked” condition. As the rescue corpsman answered the crash phone and copied all the pertinent information down. The aircraft was started. The corpsman arrives and straps in providing the information to the other crew members. “Yuma tower, Yuma Rescue One to takeoff SAR pad depart to the north. Request Yuma Approach freq.” “Rescue One, Yuma tower, cleared for takeoff from the SAR pad, depart to the north, contact Yuma Approach on (assigned frequency) when safely airborne”. We were headed for what was then known as the Cibola MOA, today known as the Dome MOA. A downed aircraft had been reported on the UHF Guard frequency (343.00). Yuma Approach provided vectors to us based upon radar position of the reporting aircraft. The flight to the mishap site took approximately 30 minutes. The on-scene aircraft had departed due to a low fuel state. Arriving overhead, the mishap site was readily apparent. The crew chief and corpsman confirmed the site on the JOG Air map and the Yuma TACAN radial and DME. We observed fires ongoing. A unique aspect of the site was that the fires and debris field was in a V shape instead of the normal wide circular area. We landed, shut down our aircraft and proceeded to any remaining fires and extinguished the fires with our onboard handheld fire extinguishers. We confirmed human remains and no survivors. All three Yuma SAR aircraft and crews were pressed into operation ferrying security, EOD, medical, and squadron mishap personnel to the site. Remains were recovered and transported to MACS Yuma for further transport to Naval Hospital Balboa in San Diego, CA. Over the course of the next several weeks we conducted several flights in support of the mishap investigation.

My last flight to the mishap site was with the JAG Manual investigating officer and a team from a national level organization. This was eye-opening. Important to note that all this information is based upon my memories of events and conversations at the time and not a review or reading of either the JAG investigation or mishap reports. Both of which are available. The former can be requested via a Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) request. The latter can be accessed by authorized personnel from the Naval Safety Center’s database. The area was mountainous, but the mishap site was in valley that was around 5 km wide north to south and 10 km long oriented east to west. The terrain was flat with desert scrub vegetation. The valley floor was approximately 1300 feet MSL. The surrounding terrain was mountains varying from 2000 to 5000 feet MSL. There was one unusual terrain feature in the valley. A mound of dirt that was 2 to 3 feet high ran the entire north to south width of the valley. I have no idea why that was there. This mound played a crucial role in the mishap.

The background of what happened. The flight was with two aircraft doing Air Combat Maneuvers (ACM). One was an F4S Phantom II from VMFAT-101, the Sharpshooters and the other an AV8C from VMA-513, the Flying Nightmares. Both squadrons and crews were based at MCAS Yuma, AZ. The mission was dissimilar ACM, visual. The F4 was on a qualification training mission for the NFO under instruction. The pilot was the designated instructor. Several intercepts and engagements had been already accomplished. From what was related, the engagement prior to the mishap was a high energy horizontal and vertical engagement. The F4 was on the six of the Harrier attempting to gain a Sidewinder tone. The engagement box had a hard floor of 10,000 feet MSL. The aircraft were both in a right-hand turn. The Harrier pilot called “Knock it off” as he was reaching the floor and was in a low energy state. The F4 was outside of the Harrier’s turn (left wing), turning right, also in a low energy state. The Harrier leveled wings, looked over his left shoulder and noticed that the Phantom was still in a right turn. The aircraft suddenly departed controlled flight. In other words, the pilot had stalled the aircraft. The Harrier accelerated, climbed, and turned to continue to observe the Phantom. The Phantom NATOPS Manuel (operators manual for the uninitiated) called for an ejection at 5000 feet MSL if the aircraft was not in controlled flight. The Harrier called for the Phantom crew to eject. He heard no response. The Phantom was over the valley, leveled wings, heading west (270 degrees magnetic) when the impact with terrain occurred. The Harrier pilot observed no chutes. He climbed and initiated contact with Yuma Approach via the UHF Guard Channel.

On the last flight to the site, we landed well clear of the mishap area to avoid disturbing any remaining evidence. We shut down, disembarked, and began walking the area. What I noticed immediately was the area to the east of the mound that I previously addressed. There was a lengthy area that was burrowed and burned leading up to the mound in two parallel rows. It was clear that this was the exhaust from the Phantom and given the burning, the Phantom was in afterburner. This was lighter from the east and progressively got deeper and more burned progressing west to the mound. Arriving at the mound. The crest of the mound had two burrows that were several inches deep. The investigating officer confirmed that if measured center to center these two burrows would be the same distance as the afterburner turkey feathers of the Phantom. The SAR crew was asked to show where we had found remains and to describe what we found and did. We complied. It was in this conversation that we learned that the Phantom crew had begun the ejection sequence. The back seater had initiated the sequence and was about halfway up the seat rail. The front seater’s seat sequence had begun. The IO stated that the analysis of the aircraft instruments confirmed that the aircraft was in level flight, full afterburner, had achieved flying speed, was under control, and accelerating. If not for the mound of dirt in the valley, the crew would have flown out of it. Heart breaking to learn this.

What was reinforced in my mind professionally and personally. First and foremost, brief what you fly, fly what you brief. Follow the rules. Aggressive flying in the right place and time is important to what we Naval Aviators and military aviators do. As the Assassin is fond of saying: “fly to the limits but never beyond”. Finally, never count on luck. Sooner or later everyone’s luck runs out. That’s why Vegas is booming.