WINNING STRATEGIES
Winning strategies and the importance of Military history
by
James E. Sullivan
An essay submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of
Masters in Military History
Norwich University
2017
For: David Ulbrich, PhD
Date: 12.11.17
Every army of every country or republic needs a strategy that helps guide them through the confusion and uncertainty of wars and other human affairs. Studying past military history or strategies do not provide a roadmap on how to see clearly through the lenses of warfare. It does provide opportunities to explore the cerebral thought processes and the decision-making skills that makes a well-seasoned commander. Historian John Keegan wrote, “The written history of the world is largely a history of warfare.”[1] The study of military history should not even be considered a blueprint for developing winning strategies. When a combat leader, confronted with uncertainty, it is important that they have understood past military campaign strategies to defeat their enemy with ingenuity.The study of military history is important to the formulation of winning military strategies because theoretical reflections and historical battlefield analysis lead to an enhanced understanding of the human complexity about men at war.
While a series of well informed and well-read military commanders continue to find a solution to the war in Afghanistan, nothing much has changed in that hostile conflict. Many historians that have studied men in war rarely point out that lessons learned exactly represent current conflicts of modern-day battles. It is not the focused applications of lessons acquired that enables serious military history as both interesting and useful, but rather the advanced intellectual abilities that it provides to the student of military history.
The active study of military history develops critical and analytical thinking as well as provides innovative alternatives that offer new implications of old ruses to promote concepts, tactics, technological solutions for military strategists, theorists and philosophers. Multiple lenses of perceptions of past conflicts have been weaved together to form comprehensive visions that demonstrate complexity and impact upon the man in warfare in the human dimension. Historical lessons rarely reflect answers and solution to modern conflicts.
This essay will prove that the variety of written, documented analysis and reviews of military history offer considerations that contribute to the creation and formulation of winning strategies. Many military leaders such as Napoleon, Frederick the Great and U.S.Grant and others who have studied military history, have used it as a tool to formulate and develop military strategies. While other generals, even such current well-read and experienced front-line commanders in the Afghanistan and Iraqi quagmires seem to have ignored the great game of these countries previous military histories. Current and past wars promote creative as well as analytical visions that the comprehensive study of past military history can ensure the development of winning strategies with the use of technology, tactics, and concepts.
Throughout history, military thinkers have discussed, pondered and written many different military theories and strategies on how to best defeat their enemies. While some ideas remained purely theoretical, such ideas such as surprise, ruses, ambushes, night or foggy weather conditions have been used since wars began. Past wars provide the best database from which the military learns how to fight and strategize wars, but also to understand that they include both economic and political spheres as well.
Marine General James Mattis, a well-read and experienced military commander and now Secretary of Defense, suggested that ”Ultimately a real understanding of history means that we face nothing new under the sun. We have been fighting on this planet for over 5,000 years, and we should take advantage of their experience. For to be a committed student of war is first to be a student of military history.”[2] A well-versed commander facing the enemy understands the economic and political liabilities, creates his or her strategies, prepares and executes the tactics, overcomes weather, logistics, geography as well as friction, will be the one who creates winning strategies. Leaders must take full advantage of the many useful tools that the past has provided to create and execute winning strategies. In their book on the Battle of El Alamein, authors John Bierman and Colin Smith, point out that:”All of us feel that it was a terrible waste of human life and it should never happen again. However, if there was a war to be fought, the desert was a wonderful example of how it should be fought, because it was based on deep respect of men at the sharp end of each other.”[3] Both Montgomery and Rommel were well read and experienced commanders who absorbed the histories of past strategies and campaigns to fight their desert battles.
The creative use of strategy is one of the more complex components of human emotions, and that is war. Wars do not exist on their own but at the intersection of the human emotions with the advancement of technologies all under the guise of extreme duress. In developing future winning strategies, it is important to understand is that “war never has been, and is not today, a unitary or even a wholly military phenomenon, but a compound of many elements ranging from politics to technology to human emotions under extreme stress.”[4] Any analytical theories and ideas that stem from military history studies usurp early military assumptions and bring into question the validity and truths that arose out of previous historical decisions in wars, battles, and campaigns. These challenges to the concentrated study of military history broaden and expands the mental and physical challenges presented to the student of military history. Sometimes, even this has not broadened the ability of commanders such as General Henri Navarre at Dien Bien Phu, who stated, “ I will not make the same mistakes as my predecessors. His boast was soon destined to be fulfilled. Certainly, no other French commander erred on quite so grandiose a scale as he would at the defeat of French Union forces at Dien Bien Phu.”[5]
Dien Bien Phu, the Somme, and Afghanistan affairs offer many learnings to the serious student of military history. There is a tremendous value to be gleaned by absorbing the success as well as blatant failures of armies past, especially in the context of the prevailing economic, social and political mores that surrounded each historical action/reaction of their respective commanders.”Perhaps the most compelling explanation is that it falls mainly on generational transitions. The conviction of each new crop of leaders assuming power that they are different from their predecessors and immune from their errors.”[6] The conversations created through the critical review of the past merely broadens and expands the intellectual abilities of the strategist.
There is much value in absorbing the successful campaigns as well as the blatant failures of past leaders that includes the historical contexts and constraints that lead to their good or disastrous consequences. In General Stanley McChrystal's book, “My Share of the Task,” he states “that history of the past and the leadership qualities of T.E. Lawrence, Sam Grant, Roland at the Pass and Horatius at the Bridge” helped forge his talents. These past leaders, as well as readings from many other military commanders, gave him the passion for obtaining some success in command of Afghanistan forces from June 2009 until June 2010.[7]
The wars in Afghanistan is surely a fertile ground on learning how to win or at least not lose example of military leadership to better understand the history of the region, its previous interlopers as well as the history of its peoples and their old millennial hatred of its occupiers. The student of military history would learn much from Afghanistan’s wars, its multi-languages, and ethnic makeups as well as its many provinces, terrain as well as its hostility to foreign intruders.The conflict in Afghanistan is just one of many historical examples where the intense study of military history has deferred to the failures of military incursions by many countries. While many positive results have occurred in such conflicts, the military development strategies to cope as well succeed with formulating winning strategies corresponds back to the study and analysis of military history. The concentrated study of military history covers vast areas of military strategy along with political, economic, racial and women’s issues and technological advancements. The study of military history has both shaped and re-shaped military, social, economic as well as political and cultural landscapes.
Past wars provide the modern landscape with the only database from which the military learns how to conduct their profession: How to do it and even more important, how not to do it.[8] Military historians need to study it in a variety of ways, which includes width, depth and most importantly, in context. According to Professor Michael Howard, “the study of military history should not only enable the civilian to understand the nature of war and its part in shaping society but also gain a better understanding the nature of war and its part in shaping society but also directly improves the officer’s competence in his profession. Reading with a purpose to gain a better understanding of the nature of war and the practice of warfare sharpens the intellect and develops the perspective to face current problems in an informed manner as well as plan for the future.”[9]
The serious student of military history should not just limit their readings to those of the West. Eastern military thinkers are also of value when formulating winning strategies as well. Byzantine military thinkers like Maurikios (Maurice) and Leo VI, the Indian Arthashastra and of course, Sun Tzu and Musahi Myamoto should also be seriously studied.The military history student would be wise to understand the indirect approach and the immersion of an enemy’s culture to understand better and “Know your enemy.”[10]
The art of warfare must constantly be studied and analyzed by the serious proponent of military history. That was as true in the times of Sun Tzu and Clausewitz as it is today with our global commanders. “War is thus an act of force to compel our enemy to do our will.”[11] Clausewitz and Sun Tzu fully understood this fundamental maxim of war, and this is as true today as it was in their times. One can learn the principles of strategy from Carl von Clausewitz or Baron Henri Jomini, but the opportunity to replicate Napoleon’s victories is unlikely beyond the sandtable or the wargame. While reading and exploring each decade of military history, they still provide no blueprint for success or detour the many pitfalls on the battlefields of tomorrow. These will, however, provide valuable insight into the forces at work that includes social mores, religious beliefs or leaders, governmental hierarchy, or the tenets of far-off popes on the military decision makers. The need to situate events in their context is, after all, at the heart of exploring, absorbing and studying military history and the reasons behind the decisions made by the commanders at the scene. Why was Napoleon so distracted at Waterloo? Author Phil Mason, suggested,”Napoleon was suffering from the debilitating effects of severe hemorrhoids.”[12] Studying the methods and habits of commanders from ancient times through Napoleon and post 19th-century leaders, the serious reader finds out a variety of reasons for success or failure in the fields of battle.
Caesar, Frederick the Great and Napoleon have surely extended the boundaries of glory in battle. The volumes about military history include the social and political realms which make the intensive study of military history so essential and relevant to the formulation of winning strategies. Strategies do not come from thin air; it is up to the ground commander to be aware of the enemy’s strengths as well as weakness, then review his resources, logistics, political restraints as well as the mettle of his forces under his command. This strategic analysis should incorporate economic, political and social variables to be unleashed upon his opponent. Alternatively, reflections upon Sun Tzu, “subduing the other’s military without battle is the most skillful.”[13]
Miltary strategists, theorists as well as philosophers must be understood within the realm that they act. Thus, although a certain military philosopher may be a soldier, it does not make him automatically a strategist. Likewise, it does not make them a theorist. Professor Charles Oliviero’s Precis on the Military Theory Primer provides for an introduction upon the nature of war, the value of theory and upon the mandates that govern warfare on land, sea, air.[14]
Post 9/11, military history has been grappling with the stratagem of guerilla warfare and asymmetrical warfare. The large set-piece battles of the past are reserved to the history books for both entertainment and knowledge. The new commander must incorporate the fear of collateral damage to both buildings and indigenous peoples located within the conflicts at large. The military history studied today encompasses political, socio-economic as well as racial and women’s issues along with logistics, communications net, weapons and delivery methods and forces under their command. At some point, winning strategies might even involve space and inter-galactic strategies. Any future strategies might need to include the dominions of cyber as well as galactic wars. The intense study of military history lay the foundations for developing new ideas and winning strategies based upon ancient methods, “old Indian tricks,” as well as tried and true methods of ambush, surprise, nighttime or foggy conditions to defeat one’s enemies. The evolution of military theories and ideas is the direct result of the heightened cerebral focus on man and warfare. The intense study of military history provides serious insight into future conflicts and how past historical hindsight will aid in developing future winning strategies.
BIBLIOGRAPHY
Books
Bierman, John, Smith, Colin. The Battle of El Alamein: Turning Point of
World War II. New York: Penguin Group, 2005.
Chaliand, Gerard, ed. The Art of War from Antiquity to the Nuclear Age.
Berkeley: University of Californa Press,1968.
Clausewitz, von, Carl, On War, eds. Michael Howard and Peter Paret,
Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1984.
Horne, Alistar. Hubris: The Tragedy of War in the Twentieth Century.
Great Britain: Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 2015.
Howard, Michael. Military History and the History of the World, in The
Past as Prologue: The Importance of History to the Military Profession.
Edited by Williamson Murray and Richard Hart Sinnreich. New York:
Cambridge: University Press, 2006.
Jessup, E. John, Jr. & Robert W. Oakley. Ed. A Guide to the Study and Use
of Military History. Honolulu: University Press of the Pacific, 1978.
Keegan, John. A History of Warfare. New York: Alfred A Knoph, 1994.
Mason, Phil. Napoleon’s Hemorrhoids: And Other Small Events that
Changed History. New York: Skyhorse Publishing, 2009.
McCrystal, Stanley. My Share of the Task. New York: Portfolio/Penguin,
2013.
Murray, Williamson. & Richard Hart Sinnreich. The Past as Prologue: The
Importance of History to the Military Profession. New York: Cambridge
University Press, 2006.
Paret, Peter. Makers of Modern Strategy: From Machiavelli to the Nuclear
Age. Princeton: NJ: Princeton University Press, 1968.
Tzu, Sun. The Art of War. Trans. Demma Translation Group. Boston:
Shambala Group, Inc. 2001.
Precis
Oliviero, Charles.Precis of the Military Theory Primer. Northfield: Vt:
2016.
[1] John Keegan, “A History of Warfare” (New York: Alfred A. Knoph, 1994), 386.
[2] Williamson Murray, Richard Hart Sinnreich eds.,“The Past as Prologue: The Importance of History to the Military Profession (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2006), 7.
[3] John Bierman and Colin Smith,“The Battle of El Alamein: Turning Point of World War I.” (New York: Penguin Group, 2002), 5.
[4] Peter Paret, ed. “Makers of Modern Strategy: From Machiavelli to the Nuclear Age,”(Princeton: New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1968), 8.
[5] Alistair Horne,“Hubris:”The Tragedy of War in the Twentieth Century.”(Great Britain: Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 2015), 322.
[6] Williamson Murray, Richard Hart Sinnreich, eds. “The Past as Prologue: The Importance of History to the Military Profession.” (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2006), 3.
[7] Stanley McChrystal, “My Share of the Task,”(New York: Portfolio/Penguin, 2103), 21.
[8] Michael Howard, “Military History and the History of War,” in “The Past as Prologue: The Importance of History to the Military Profession,”2006, Williamson Murray and Richard Hart Sinnreich, eds. (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2006), 13.
[9] John E. Jessup, Jr. & Robert W. Oakley, eds.“A Guide to the Study and Use of Military History” (Honolulu: Hawaii, University Press of the Pacific, 1978), 42.
[10] Gerard Chailiand, ed. “The Art of War in Wolrd History: From Antiquity to the Nuclear Age” (Berkeley: California, University of California Press, 1994), XXV.
[11] Carl von Clausewitz,“On War,” Michael Howard and Peter Paret, eds., trans. (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1976), 75.
[12] Phil Mason, “Napoleon’s Hemorroids: And Other Small Events that Changed History” (New York: Skyhorse Publishing, 2009), 74-75.
[13] Sun Tzu, “The Art of War,”Translation, Essays and Commentaries by the Demma Translation Group (Boston: Ma: Shambala Publications, Inc. 2001), 9.
[14] Charles Oliviero,”Precis of the Military Theory Primer,”(Northfield, VT: Norwich University Handout, 2016), 8.