The World in 2026 - A Flight of Fancy

Excerpt from “The Policy and Affairs Journal – 2025: The Year in Review” Published: 10 January 2026

Russia’s 2022 invasion of Ukraine and its subsequent failure ushered in a watershed period that restructured the geopolitical landscape. In fact, its consequences continue to reverberate around the globe. Far from a display of Russian military prowess, the dismal performance of Moscow’s armed forces exposed systemic weaknesses and internal stresses culminating in regime change and a fracturing within the country described by one observer as a “handful of mini civil wars.”

While the Russo-Ukraine War was still underway, NATO naval units were preparing to impose a “Quarantine Zone” in the Black Sea when elements of Russia’s Black Sea Fleet staged a revolt. Shorn of naval fire and air support, the hard-won land bridge from the Donbas to Crimea collapsed under Ukrainian pressure. This ensuing rout saw mass surrender of stranded forces and, where outlets still existed, the exit of Russian forces and their proxies from Ukrainian territory, including the previously disputed Donbas regions. One island of cohesion was Russian forces in Crimea. Their land and sea corridors now severed and with command-and-control links to higher headquarters cut by Ukrainian cyber operations, they announced that they would surrender - but only to NATO forces. Ukraine, busy with operations elsewhere, announced that it had no objection to a NATO occupation of Crimea and allowed the alliance to undertake an orderly demobilization and repatriation of Russian forces there.

The Lukashenko government in Belarus collapsed as the leadership sought refuge in Moscow. By the time they arrived in the Russian capital they met with a decidedly chilly welcome. In a diplomatic netherworld, they eventually appealed to NATO for refuge after Beijing refused their entreaties. 

The advent of the Russian Provisional Government in Moscow has been covered in detail in other treatises. One point of interest worth noting concerns the saga of Alexei Navalny. Whisked from a jail cell to the gilded halls of the Kremlin, as reported in the world press his journey evoked comparisons to that of Joseph of the Old Testament or the more contemporary example of Nelson Mandela.

In Russian Central Asia – despite protestations that any such operations were underway, by fall 2022, advanced Western weaponry started appearing in the hands of dozens of desperate insurgent groups whose common theme lay only in an adversarial relationship with the Russian government. Dormant conflicts threatened to reignite in places like Chechnya. The withdrawal of Russian forces from South Ossetia and Abkhazia, first to reinforce the war in Ukraine and later as a result of general disintegration, emboldened Georgia to reconquer its former territorial areas. Sporadic fighting in some of these areas continues as of this writing in late 2025. It remains a thorn in the side of the Western coalition. There are indications that China has coopted some of the current chaos towards its own ends.

NATO’s “Stability Operation” which peaked in early 2023 saw US and coalition forces take up positions in areas across Russia itself (at the behest of the Provisional government) to restore order and secure critical civilian and military infrastructure (primarily nuclear sites). In one notable instance, the Provisional Government in Moscow, in collaboration with NATO, negotiated with the Republic of Kazakhstan to ensure security and continuity of operations at the Baikonur Cosmodrome. For many, it was an eerie reprise of the early 1990’s.

The West was faced with the task of assisting Russia to recover from the impacts of its own economic sanctions. The short-term support flown into Ukraine and major Russian urban areas was likened to a latter-day version of the “Berlin Airlift.”

 In addition to distributing critical materials and necessities around Russia, NATO airlift capability was also employed to transport selected Russian military units (some of which had earlier disengaged from the Crimea) to the Far East to forestall fears that the Chinese People’s Liberation Army (PLA) might take advantage of the situation and move into Russian Siberia – staking territorial claims over a century old. Western media outlets cited reports from commercial satellite operators which indicated “suspicious” (some labeled “ominous”) actions by PLA units in regions adjacent to the Russia’s borders. 

US INDOPACOM units were airlifted from Japan to the Vladivostok area to secure airfields in support of NATO flights delivering Russian military units to the area. This put (momentarily) US forces on the short Russo-DPRK border directly facing North Korean Army units hastily moved from the DMZ into a region previously secured only by sparse border patrols. American media outlets displayed video coverage showing streams of C-17 transports landing in Vladivostok disgorging Russian troops flown in from west of the Urals.

The end of the Ukrainian war and the post-war situation in Russia itself initiated discussion in the US and Europe of the need for a ‘Marshall Plan’ aimed at both nations. The largest reconstruction effort since the latter half of the 1940’s took shape during the first half of 2023. Leaders in the West emphasized that engagement with Russia would take steps to avoid any repeat of a ‘Treaty of Versailles’ situation and would heavily leverage lessons learned from the mistakes of the early 1990’s. To date, both objectives seem to be bearing fruit. Ukrainian reconstruction is underway, and a significant portion of refugees have returned home. Russian GDP and economic activity have reached prewar levels and are anticipated to continue improving through 2026 and into 2027.

Many in Russia protested the Western presence on their soil citing similarities with 1918-1920 era incursion of Allied troops into Russian during the Red-White Civil War. The debate spiked when the Provisional Government indicated its own desire to seek NATO membership or, at least, some formal affiliation. Foreign observers felt the motivation for this stemmed from a desire to safeguard the Far East from Chinese predation and Central Asia from a descent into Islamist radicalism driven chiefly by Iran and Afghanistan-Pakistan. In the long run, awareness of these threats acted to reduce domestic resistance to NATO affiliation.

From 2024, the Russian officer corps was greatly reconstituted to lay the groundwork for a professional service operating within constitutional guidelines. While command and control of nuclear forces remained under Russian authority, NATO command gained awareness (much like that of France). Russian contingents allocated for NATO did accede to subordination to the NATO Supreme Commander within the existing command structure. The NATO-Russia Council was dissolved as Russia was integrated into the existing NATO command structure. Ukraine followed suit.

Russia’s failure in Ukraine initiated a cascade of events as a veritable house of cards collapsed across the globe. In Syria the Assad regime left the stage in an anticlimax reminiscent of Batista’s departure from Havana. The Assad family simply departed Damascus (taking with them a significant portion of the national treasury) for Tehran in the dead of night with a rapidity that surprised even supposed insiders – who found themselves suddenly abandoned, some with grisly consequences. 

Tehran clearly sought exploit the vacuum left by the Russian exit but by the end of 2024 it was clear that the mullahs were fighting for survival both at home and abroad.  Given the recent European experience with Russian nuclear saber-rattling, the West was far less prone to accept the potential for an Iranian nuclear capability than it exhibited before.

US and coalition partners reasserted themselves in Syria and well as in Iraq. In Lebanon, Hezbollah found itself adrift as the Beirut government found its footing. In Venezuela, the Maduro government fell as its citizenry took to the streets of Caracas and installed Juan Guaidó formerly as president. Similar demonstrations erupted in Cuba and Nicaragua.

Islamic radical groups in the Sahel quickly surged into the gap left by the rapid withdrawal of Russian special operations forces and Wagner Group operatives. Over time, France and the US returned military units to the region in force and are still fighting to defeat the insurgents.

India, momentarily shorn of its Russian patron and faced with the prospect of a more westward leaning Moscow, moved closer to the US and sought even tighter military integration into the Quad. India initiated a flight from the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) as Kazakhstan, Cambodia, and Russia followed suit and cut ties with the organization.

As one Nobel laureate noted “mercantilism returned, after a fashion, to the domain of respectable economic dialog” as western governments and firms sought to minimize risk and secure their supply chains. 

The Peoples Republic of China found itself in a much less propitious geopolitical position. The “Stability Operation” reinforced Russian units and brought a new NATO presence along parts of its western borders – one aimed at ensuring the integrity of existing Russian boarders. This new reality left Beijing with a fear that NATO might directly encourage or at least turn a blind eye towards efforts to provide some form of material support to Uygur separatist movements in Xinjiang – a tactic honed and employed with success over the previous two years all along Russia’s periphery. 

On China’s eastern flank, her prospects fared no better. As discussions ramped up between Washington and Tokyo regarding basing of tactical nuclear weapons in Japan, the US reinvigorated its support for Taiwan and began moves to restore its diplomatic status as a sovereign entity. Following this US lead, dozens of other nations - who had themselves earlier severed relations with Taiwan in favor of Beijing - did likewise. This diplomatic turn-about coupled with the effects of the Russian debacle and coming in the wake of China’s Zero COVID Policy and its resultant “disengagement” began to be discussed in policy circles as a 21st century virtual equivalent of the isolation China experienced after 1433.

In the wake of the Ukraine war, Taiwan took center stage in considerations of Pacific security. ‘What-if’s’ abounded. Had Russian operations gone as planned with an occupation of an essentially compliant Ukraine, an emboldened China might have considered a similar operation aimed at the occupation and subjugation of Taiwan, perhaps a early as late 2022. In view of the actual outcome in Ukraine, many experts feel that such a Chinese operation would likely have failed. Such an outcome could have led to the fall of President Xi and the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) itself. Such an outcome would have had significant implications not only for China and the region but for global stability as a whole.

So, in one ironic sense, although China’s geopolitical options saw significant realignment (the 2022 Beijing Winter Olympics are now viewed as the high-water mark for the PRC) as a result of the costs of Russia’s actions, the CCP may have dodged the proverbial bullet.

--End of Excerpt