You are here: / Family Law
, ,

IN THIS JUVENILE DELINQUENCY PROCEEDING, THE JUVENILE’S BEHAVIOR—LOOKING AT THE UNDERCOVER VEHICLE AND TURNING HIS BICYCLE AROUND—DID NOT PROVIDE THE POLICE WITH REASONABLE SUSPICION JUSTIFYING THE STREET STOP (FIRST DEPT). ​

The First Department, reversing Family Court’s finding there was reasonable suspicion justifying the street stop of the juvenile, determined the officers’ observation of the juvenile’s “look[ing] in the direction of one of the unmarked vehicles, back pedal[ing], duck[ing], turn[ing] the bicycle around and rid[ing] in the opposite direction” was not sufficient. The police had been alerted to a gunshot in the area. A handgun was retrieved from the juvenile:

… [T]he totality of the circumstances did not support Family Court’s finding that the officer had reasonable suspicion to justify the stop, and his detention was unlawful because appellant’s “equivocal or innocuous behavior” was “susceptible of an innocent as well as a culpable interpretation” … . Police, in two unmarked vehicles, while canvassing the area in response to a “Shotspotter” sensor report of shots fired, observed appellant riding a bicycle on the sidewalk. An officer observed appellant look in the direction of one of the unmarked vehicles, back pedal, duck, turn the bicycle around and ride in the opposite direction. The officer found appellant’s actions suspicious, exited the vehicle, approached appellant, ordered him to stop, grabbed him by both wrists and pushed him against the wall. While appellant was detained another officer observed a bulge in appellant’s pocket, squeezed the pocket area and retrieved a firearm.

Although an officer observed an L-shaped object in appellant’s pocket during the detention, there is no evidence or any reasonable inference that the officer “was in a position to view the contraband absent the unlawful detention” … . Matter of W.P., 2024 NY Slip Op 06426, First Dept 12-19-24

Practice Point: Here the police were canvassing the area after a report of a gunshot. They stopped the juvenile after observing him look at their undercover vehicle and turn his bicycle around. A handgun was retrieved during the stop. The First Department held the observations did not provide the police with “reasonable suspicion” and the street stop was therefore not justified.

 

, ,

THE ORDER OF FACT-FINDING IN THIS JUVENILE DELINQUENCY PROCEEDING WAS AGAINST THE WEIGHT OF THE EVIDENCE; THE STREET STOP WAS NOT SUPPORTED BY REASONABLE SUSPICION; AND THE SHOWUP IDENTIFICATION PROCEDURE WAS UNDULY SUGGESTIVE (SECOND DEPT). ​

The Second Department, reversing the order of disposition in this juvenile delinquency proceeding, determined the order of fact-finding was against the weight of the evidence, the appellant was stopped by the police in the absence of reasonable suspicion, and the victim’s identification of the appellant should have been suppressed. The victim was struck from behind and saw only the backs of the assailants’ heads. The identification was made from a police car at a distance of 240 feet, and the show-up identification procedure was unduly suggestive:

… [W]hile the complainant initially claimed that he had a momentary opportunity to see his alleged assailants’ faces after he stood up, he later acknowledged that he merely observed “the backs of their heads” as they fled. Moreover, the credibility of the complainant’s testimony was undermined by his claim to have been able to identify the appellant during a showup identification procedure from a significant distance in the backseat of a police car using only one eye. * * *

… [T]he testimony presented at the suppression hearing established that the police, using two police cars, stopped the appellant and two companions because they fit the general description given by the complainant of “black male[ ]” “youths” riding bicycles. The presentment agency did not present any evidence at the suppression hearing that the appellant and his companions were engaged in any suspicious behavior at the time of the police stop. Moreover, at the time of the police stop, the appellant was with only two companions, which conflicted with the complainant’s description of “five youths.” Under these circumstances, the evidence presented at the suppression hearing was insufficient to establish that the police had reasonable suspicion to stop the appellant … . * * *

Wayne Bowman, a police officer who accompanied the complainant during the showup identification procedure, testified at the suppression hearing that he assured the complainant that “[w]e’re far enough back they’re not going to be able to see you” and acknowledged that he and the complainant were positioned about the distance of “[a] football field” away from the appellant and his companions during the showup identification procedure. Moreover, the complainant acknowledged at the suppression hearing that prior to the showup identification procedure, Bowman told him that the police “had stopped people that fit the description.” Under these circumstances, the Family Court improperly determined that the showup identification procedure was reasonable and not unduly suggestive … . Matter of Ahmand T., 2024 NY Slip Op 06051, Second Dept 12-4-24

Practice Point: The identification-evidence in this juvenile delinquency proceeding was too weak to support the order of disposition.

Practice Point: The street stop was not supported by reasonable suspicion.

Practice Point: The showup identification procedure was unduly suggestive.

 

,

ALTHOUGH THE PARTIES WERE DIVORCED IN COLORADO, THEY AND THEIR CHILDREN RESIDE IN NEW YORK; THE SUPPORT MAGISTRATE SHOULD NOT HAVE APPLIED COLORADO LAW IN DETERMINING FATHER’S SUPPORT OBLIGATION (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department, reversing Family Court, determined the support magistrate should not have applied Colorado law. Although the parties were divorced in Colorado, the parties and the children all reside in New York:

“The Uniform Interstate Family Support Act . . . , ‘adopted in New York as article 5-B of the Family Court Act, grants continuing, exclusive jurisdiction over a child support order to the state that issued the order'” … . “As relevant herein, the issuing state loses such jurisdiction where none of the parties or children continue to reside in that state” … . Here, it is undisputed that the parties and their children reside in New York and that the mother registered the Colorado support order in this state. Thus, the Family Court, Westchester County, had jurisdiction to adjudicate the proceeding … .

Further, Family Court Act § 580-613(b) provides that, in a modification proceeding brought pursuant to section 580-613(a), the court “shall apply . . . the procedural and substantive law of this state” … . Here, the Support Magistrate improperly applied Colorado law in calculating the father’s modified support obligation … . Accordingly, the Family Court should have granted the mother’s objections. Matter of O’Connor v Shaw, 2024 NY Slip Op 06046, Second Dept 12-4-24

Practice Point: Here the parties were divorced in Colorado but they and their children reside in New York. New York has jurisdiction over the support proceedings. The Support Magistrate should not have applied Colorado law to the support calculation.

 

,

THE COURT SHOULD NOT HAVE DELEGATED TO MOTHER ITS AUTHORITY TO SET A VISITATION SCHEDULE FOR FATHER; FORENSIC MENTAL HEALTH EVALUATIONS AND COUNSELING MAY BE APPROPRIATE WHERE, AS HERE, A CHILD REFUSES VISITATION WITH A PARENT (FIRST DEPT).

The First Department, reversing Family Court, determined the court improperly delegated to mother the authority to control father’s visitation with the child. The First Department noted that forensic mental health examinations may be appropriate where, as here,  a child refuses to visit with a parent:

Here, Family Court’s order that the father have visitation as agreed between the parties in consultation with the child is an impermissible delegation of its authority to the mother and child, and essentially causes the father to have no visitation at all. Furthermore, despite the father’s lack of sensitivity to the child … we cannot find on this record that there was a showing adequate to justify terminating the father’s contact with the child; that is, that any form of contact under all circumstances would be harmful to the child’s welfare.

We note that Family Court may order forensic mental health evaluations where a visitation petition is pending and where doing so will facilitate the court’s determination (Family Court Act § 251[A]; 22 NYCRR 202.18). “[T]he value of forensic evaluations of the parents and children has long been recognized,” including when a child refuses to visit with a parent … . We further note that a court may place restrictions on visitation that promote the child’s best interests and are not unduly restrictive, including ordering therapeutic or other kinds of supervised visitation … . The court may also make directives as to the amount and type of contact a parent has with the child between visits. Finally, a court may direct a parent to attend counseling as a component of a visitation plan, where doing so promotes the child’s best interests … . Matter of Michael B. v Patricia S., 2024 NY Slip Op 06005, First Dept 12-3-24

Practice Point: Family Court cannot not delegate to a parent its authority to set the other parent’s visitation schedule.

Practice Point: Where a child refuses to visit with a parent, the court may order forensic mental health evaluations and counseling.

 

, , ,

PETITIONER NOT ENTITLED TO COUNSEL IN A STATEWIDE CENTRAL REGISTER OF CHILD ABUSE AND MALTREATMENT (SCR) PROCEEDING; THE STATUTE REQURING EXPUNGEMENT OF AN SCR CHILD MALTREATMENT REPORT IF THE RELATED FAMILY COURT CASE IS DISMISSED DOES NOT APPLY RETROACTIVELY; THE MALTREATMENT REPORT WAS SUPPORTED BY THE EVIDENCE (CT APP).

The Court of Appeals, in a full-fledged opinion by Judge Troutman, over a three-judge dissent, determined (1) petitioner was not entitled to counsel at the Statewide Central Register of Child Abuse and Maltreatment (SCR) administrative hearing, (2) the amendment to the Social Services Law [Social Services Law § 422 [8] [a] [ii]] requiring expungement of a child maltreatment report after a related dismissal in Family Court did not apply retroactively, and (3) the report was supported by the evidence:

ACS [New York City Administration for Children’s Services] commenced a Family Court article 10 neglect proceeding against petitioner and her husband, who had custody of T. and her younger sisters. Family Court authorized an adjournment in contemplation of dismissal (ACD), which allows the court to adjourn the proceedings for a period not exceeding one year “with a view to ultimate dismissal of the petition in furtherance of justice” (Family Court Act § 1039 [b]). In February of 2020, Family Court dismissed the article 10 proceeding upon the expiration of the adjournment period based on petitioner’s satisfactory compliance with Family Court’s conditions, including completion of parenting and anger management classes.

Meanwhile, the police officer who interviewed T. made a report to the Statewide Central Register of Child Abuse and Maltreatment (SCR). One of the SCR’s primary purposes is to inform child care providers and agencies that a person has a substantiated report of child abuse or maltreatment “for the purpose of regulating their future employment or licensure” … . In July of 2019, ACS determined that the report against petitioner was indicated … and petitioner challenged that determination … . After an internal administrative review, the New York State Office of Children and Family Services (OCFS) concluded that a fair preponderance of the evidence supported a determination that petitioner had maltreated T. and that the maltreatment was relevant and reasonably related to employment, licensure, or certification in the child care field … . Matter of Jeter v Poole, 2024 NY Slip Op 05868, CtApp 11-25-24

Practice Point: Petitioner was not entitled to counsel in a SCR child maltreatment proceeding.

Practice Point: The Social Services Law statute which requires expungement of a maltreatment report if the related Family Court proceeding is dismissed does not apply retroactively.

 

,

THERE WAS NO EVIDENCE TO CORROBORATE THE OLDER CHILD’S OUT-OF-COURT ALLEGATIONS OF ABUSE BY FATHER; THE ABUSE AND DERIVATIVE ABUSE PETITION WAS DISMISSED (THIRD DEPT).

The Third Department, reversing Family Court, determined there was no evidence to corroborate the older child’s out-of-court statements. Therefore, the petition alleging abuse of the older child and derivative abuse of the younger siblings was dismissed:

At the hearing, petitioner offered the testimony of the children’s mother, two caseworkers, and the video recording of the oldest child’s interview with the Orange County Department of Social Services caseworker and a State Police investigator. The mother testified that when the oldest child was 17 years of age, she first disclosed the allegations of sexual contact to her. Thereafter, each caseworker testified that the oldest child told them that her father had sexual contact with her from approximately two years of age until she was eight. The caseworkers further testified that the oldest child explained that her memory of the abuse was triggered when she overheard her youngest sister make reference to a secret that she held with her father. The record also reveals that there was no additional evidence of any kind presented by petitioner that corroborated the oldest child’s out-of-court statements. For example, there was no medical evidence of any sort, nor did the mother or anyone else point to any change in the oldest child’s behavior, or indications of inappropriate sexual knowledge or behavior, nor was there any expert testimony to validate the oldest child’s account of sexual abuse, or to explain the nine-year gap between the cessation of the sexual contact and the allegations of same. While there was some testimony by the mother that the child has had nightmares since she was very young and has been diagnosed with anxiety, there was no testimony, expert or otherwise, linking the nightmares or diagnosis to the alleged sexual contact. While Family Court correctly noted that a child’s out-of-court allegations of sexual abuse — as testified to by the caseworkers — can be sufficiently corroborated by the child’s detailed in-court testimony … , petitioner did not present the oldest child as a sworn witness. Finally, there was no cross-corroboration of the oldest child’s statements by her siblings as the two younger children did not disclose any sexual abuse to their mother or during the initial interview. The younger two children did not give sworn testimony at the fact-finding hearing nor were the video recordings of their interviews with the caseworker admitted into evidence. Matter of Gabriella X. (Erick Y.), 2024 NY Slip Op 05856, Third Dept 11-21-24

Practice Point: Although out-of-court allegations of sexual abuse (made to caseworkers and police investigators) may support an abuse finding, the out-of-court statements must be corroborated.

 

,

FAMILY COURT SHOULD NOT HAVE DELEGATED TO MOTHER THE AUTHORITY TO DETERMINE FATHER’S PARENTING TIME (THIRD DEPT).

The Third Department, reversing (modifying) Family Court, determined mother should not have been given the authority over father’s parenting time:

… Family Court improperly delegated its authority to the mother over the father’s in-person parenting time and telephone and electronic contact with the daughter … . With respect to the father’s telephone and electronic contact with the daughter, inasmuch as the mother agrees that the father should have telephone and electronic contact three times per week, we modify that portion of the order accordingly. With respect to the father’s in-person parenting time, although we are empowered to independently review the record and decide parenting time issues, given the father’s instability, the fact that the mother has relocated to Mississippi and the passage of time, we cannot make that determination here. As such, we remit the matter to Family Court for a hearing for the purpose of fashioning a schedule of supervised in-person parenting time … . Matter of Leslie QQ. v Daniel RR., 2024 NY Slip Op 05857, Third Dept 11-21-24

Practice Point: A Family Court cannot delegate authority over parenting time schedules to mother or father.

 

, , , ,

ALTHOUGH THE JUVENILE DELINQUENCY PETITION WAS PROPERLY DISMISSED BECAUSE THERE WAS NO NONHEARSAY EVIDENCE OF THE IDENTITY OF THE ASSAILANT, IT WAS AN ABUSE OF DISCRETION TO DISMISS THE PETITION WITH PREJUDICE (THIRD DEPT). ​

The Third Department, reversing (modifying) Family Court, agreed the hearsay evidence identifying respondent as the assailant was not sufficient to support the juvenile delinquency petition, the petition should not have been dismissed with prejudice:

… Family Court abused its discretion in dismissing the petition with prejudice. “Where a petition is dismissed as jurisdictionally defective, dismissal is generally without prejudice, and the presentment agency’s proper recourse is to refile the petition” … . The court indicated that the error here was “egregious” because there were no nonhearsay allegations identifying respondent as the individual who committed the charged crime, and that this error could not be remedied by allowing for petitioner to refile. Although this error could not have been remedied by amendment of the petition (see Family Ct Act § 311.5 [2] [b]), it could have been remedied by refiling. Specifically, upon refiling there could be clarification from the deputy as to the specifics of the investigation including, as is relevant here, how the video of the incident was acquired and what that video depicted, based upon the deputy’s personal knowledge after review of the video. This is not a case where the presenting agency will necessarily be unable to establish respondent’s identity … and, therefore, the petition should have been dismissed without prejudice to allow for refiling … . Matter of Savannah F., 2024 NY Slip Op 05860, Third Dept 11-21-24

Practice Point: There was no nonhearsay proof the respondent was the assailant in this juvenile delinquency proceeding. But the petition should not have been dismissed with prejudice because the presenting agency may be able to provide sufficient proof of the identity of the assailant upon refiling.

 

, , ,

MOTHER SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN DEEMED COLLATERALLY ESTOPPED FROM PRESENTING EVIDENCE OF HER MENTAL HEALTH IN THIS TERMINATION-OF-PARENTAL-RIGHTS ACTION; THE PRIOR MENTAL-HEALTH-BASED RULING WAS BASED ON THREE-TO-EIGHT-YEAR-OLD EVIDENCE (FOURTH DEPT).

The Fourth Department, reversing Family Court, determined mother should not have been prevented from presenting evidence of her mental health in this termination-of-parental-rights proceeding under the collateral estoppel doctrine. Although mother had previously been adjudicated unable to provide proper and adequate care of the children in 2018, there was no evidence of mother’s current mental health:

Neither the relied-upon 2018 order of disposition nor its supporting decision … contains a finding of fact or conclusion of law that the mother’s mental illness or intellectual disability permanently impaired the mother’s ability to provide adequate care for a child … . Instead, the prior judicial determination that the mother was “presently and for the foreseeable future” unable to provide adequate care was premised upon evaluations of the mother conducted in 2012 and 2017. Further, that determination was issued a year prior to the birth of the subject child in the present proceeding and, although the subject child was ordered into petitioner’s care almost immediately following her birth, the instant petition was nonetheless not filed for yet another two years. Thus, the 2018 judicial determination, premised on three- to eight-year-old evidence, is insufficient to establish by clear and convincing evidence, as a matter of law, that the mother was, at the time of this proceeding, “presently and for the foreseeable future unable, by reason of mental illness or intellectual disability, to provide proper and adequate care for [the subject] child” (Social Services Law § 384-b [4] [c] …). Matter of Juliet W. (Amy W.), 2024 NY Slip Op 05690, Fourth Dept 11-15-24

Practice Point: Here there was a prior ruling based on three-to-eight-year-old evidence that mother’s mental health prevented her from adequately caring for her children. The collateral estoppel doctrine should not have been applied to prevent her from presenting evidence of her current mental health.

 

, ,

HERE THE CUSTODY CASE WAS TRANSFERRED TO A NEW JUDGE; THE PREVIOUS JUDGE’S ORDERS CONSTITUTED THE LAW OF THE CASE WHICH CANNOT BE VIOLATED BY SUBSEQUENT ORDERS BY THE NEW JUDGE (THIRD DEPT).

The Third Department, reversing Family Court, determined the judge to whom the case was transferred should not have issued orders which conflicted with those issued by the previous judge, which constituted the law of the case:

The March 21, 2023 order, which directed a hearing on the father’s motion to vacate the 2017 custody order, constituted the law of the case and was thus binding on all judges of coordinate jurisdiction … . Thus, the order denying the motion to vacate the custody order, without holding a hearing, constitutes a violation of the law of the case doctrine, and the order should be reversed on that basis alone … . …

… [W]e further find that the [previous judge’s] decision to so-order the subpoena … likewise constituted law of the case. Family Court therefore erred when it denied the motion to compel solely on the basis that the judicial subpoena was overbroad. Matter of Jahir I. v Sharon E.W., 2024 NY Slip Op 05635, Third Dept 11-14-24

Practice Point: When a case is transferred to a new judge, the orders issued by the previous judge are the law of the case and must be adhered to by the new judge.

 

Categories

Sign Up for the Mailing List to Be Notified When the Site Is Updated.

  • This field is for validation purposes and should be left unchanged.

Copyright © 2024 New York Appellate Digest, Inc.
Site by CurlyHost | Privacy Policy

  翻译：